Case Law[2023] ZAGPPHC 277South Africa
Phakula v Minister of Safety and Security [2023] ZAGPPHC 277; 64450/2011 (6 April 2023)
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Phakula v Minister of Safety and Security [2023] ZAGPPHC 277; 64450/2011 (6 April 2023)
Phakula v Minister of Safety and Security [2023] ZAGPPHC 277; 64450/2011 (6 April 2023)
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sino date 6 April 2023
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
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FLYNOTES:
CRIMINAL – Arrest – Use of force – Reasonably
necessary and proportional to circumstances –
Suspected
robber fleeing house toward open veld – Police officer
firing at his legs – To prevent escape and risk
that
suspect, regarded as dangerous, would put people in danger –
Officer had reasonable grounds, even if no firearm
was found on
suspect –
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
,
s 49.
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO: 64450/2011
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: NO
DATE:
6 APRIL 2023
WJ
du Plessis
In
the matter between:
THABANG
PHAKULA
PLAINTIFF
and
MINISTER
OF SAFETY AND SECURITY DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT
DU
PLESSIS AJ
[1]
This is a retrial of a claim for damages for the unlawful shooting,
arrest and detention
of the plaintiff. This court only needs to
determine the merits.
[2]
The plaintiff, Mr Thabang Phakula, alleges that on 26 October 2010,
he was unlawfully
shot by Warrant Officer De Klerk ("De Klerk")
acting in the scope of his employment (with the defendant). As a
result
of this shooting, the plaintiff sustained multiple gunshot
wounds. The plaintiff also alleges that after the shot, he was
assaulted
by De Klerk, and that because of this assault, he sustained
two broken teeth.
[1]
After being
shot, the plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully arrested by
members of South African Police Service ("SAPS"),
and after
that he was detained at the instance of members of SAPS until 11
November 2011 as a consequence of bail having been refused.
[3]
The defendant admits that the plaintiff was shot by De Klerk, acting
in the course
and scope of his employment with the defendant, as a
consequence of which he sustained gunshot injuries and that the
plaintiff
was arrested by members of SAPS and thereafter detained
until 30 September 2011 as a consequence of having been refused bail.
[4]
The defendant, however, denies that the plaintiff was unlawfully shot
by any member
of the SAPS and pleads that the plaintiff was lawfully
shot by De Klerk acting in terms of s 49(2) of the Criminal Procedure
Act
51 of 1977 (“the CPA”). Alternatively, in the event
of the court finding that the plaintiff was shot in the process
of
other SAPS members having fired shots, that the other members of the
SAPS fired shots in self- defence, alternatively in a situation
of
necessity; or that the firing of the shots by the other members of
the SAPS was under the circumstances lawful, reasonable and
necessary.
[5]
The defendant further denies that the arrest of the plaintiff was
unlawful and pleads
that firstly, the SAPS members were peace
officers as defined by section 1 of the CPA, and secondly, the SAPS
members reasonably
suspected the plaintiff of having committed an
offence referred to in Schedule 1 of the
Criminal Procedure Act,
namely
housebreaking with the intent to rob and attempted robbery
with aggravating circumstances, alternatively housebreaking with
aggravating
circumstances, alternatively housebreaking with the
intent to steal and attempted theft, alternatively attempted murder.
This places
the arrest within the parameters of
s 40(1)(b)
of the
CPA.
[6]
As for the detention of the plaintiff, the defendant pleads that it
was pursuant to
the refusal of bail on 9 December 2010, in terms of
an order of a court that the plaintiff remained in custody. This is a
consequence
of a judicial act.
[7]
The defendant denies that De Klerk assaulted the plaintiff.
The
evidence
[8]
The defendant called the following witnesses to testify on its
behalf:
i.
Then Warrant Officer Gert Pieter de Klerk (“De Klerk”);
[2]
ii.
Then Constable Danie de Bruin ("De Bruin");
[3]
iii.
Then Sergeant Paul Hendrik Keyser (“Keyser”);
[4]
and
iv.
Then Warrant Officer Botes ("Botes");
[5]
[9]
They were all members of SAPS at the time of the incident. Only De
Klerk is a member
at the time of testifying.
[10]
The plaintiff did not call any witnesses but testified on his own
behalf.
(i)
De Klerk
[11]
At the time of the incident, De Klerk had 17 years of experience
working in the SAPS. He was
then, and is still now, a member of the
Tactical Operations Management Section of the Directorate for
Priority Crimes and Investigation
("the Hawks").
[12]
He testified that they received information that an armed robbery
would occur at 9[...] W[...]
Street in Witbank on 26 October 2010.
This prompted De Klerk and six other Hawks members to be deployed to
the evacuated house.
They took up their position at around 19:00 in
the house in anticipation of the robbery. He testified that Botes and
Pretorius
were in the Kitchen, Viljoen, the controller, in the dining
room, Van der Mescht and de Klerk in the hallway, and De Bruin and
Smith in the lounge upstairs. Members of the SAPS Middelburg were
outside the premise in the streets to guard escape routes.
[13]
Around 19:30, they took their positions and dimmed the lights so that
people from outside could
not see them. Outside the house there were
bright lights in the swimming pool area and the garage. The
streetlights were also on.
[14]
At around 21:00, five men jumped over the wall into the yard, of
which three were armed. They
moved to the back door, and he heard
tampering with the gate at the kitchen and lounge doors. Botes and
Pretorius then moved closer
to the lounge, as did he, De Klerk.
[15]
He stationed himself in the hallway, where he could see the dining
room and the lounge. He heard
people whispering in the dining room,
and he heard them moving towards the hallway where he was standing.
He saw a pistol coming
around the corner, held by a man leopard
crawling into the hallway. He then saw a head but did not know whose
head it was. Botes,
however, crouching on his knees next to the hall,
was right next to the person. Botes then fired many shots, killing
the person,
after which Botes moved into the dining room area where
there were other suspects and more shooting. De Klerk could not
recall
how many shots, but he remembers it was more than one or two.
[16]
At this stage, De Klerk turned around to exit the house to arrest
those who attempted to flee
the scene. As he came outside, he heard
De Bruin from the balcony shouting, "Stop! Stop! Police!".
He heard a warning
shot being fired. De Bruin used a torch to point
out the subject to De Klerk, which he testified wore a white jacket
and a black
backpack. He saw the suspect running from the swimming
pool area to the palisade, which he jumped over, ignoring the
warnings of
the police. De Klerk then shot a warning shot in the
grass, but the person continued to flee. In the process, he dropped
his bag
inside the premises.
[17]
De Klerk, about 15 meters from the palisade, saw the person running
from left to right in his
line of sight towards an open veld,
presumably to escape. He could not get out of the premise as the gate
was locked. The police
still shouted, but the person did not heed the
warning. He then took his R1 rifle and fired three shots at the
suspect's legs to
get him arrested. He did this, he testifies, to
prevent the person from kidnapping others, taking someone hostage, or
doing some
future harm as he deemed the person dangerous based on the
shootings in the house. He did not know at the time whether the
person
was armed.
[18]
However, he believed that he had to affect the arrest in the way that
he did, as he did not have
the person's particulars to affect the
arrest in any other way. He decided in the moment, full of adrenalin
and the excitement
of the shootout inside the house.
[19]
At this stage his colleagues Van Zyl and Keyser arrived. He pointed
out the suspect to them,
who was lying in the road with jeans and a
white jacket. He testified that he did not lose sight of the suspect
fleeing. When the
gate opened, he walked to the person. Keyser was
busy questioning the person. De Klerk explained how he shot the
suspect, whom
we now know is the plaintiff.
[20]
When Keyser asked the plaintiff his name, he stated that his name is
Mpho Kekana. He also acknowledged
that the person shot inside was his
relative, and he admitted that he knew about a green Audi around the
corner.
[21]
The plaintiff then received medical attention, at which stage Keyser
arrested him.
[22]
De Klerk then went back and found the bag that had been dropped. They
found cable ties (customarily
used to tie people's hands and feet)
and ammunition in the bag when he opened it. He left the bag for the
investigation team.
[23]
De Klerk does not deny shooting the plaintiff but denies the
plaintiff's version that he shot
him from the balcony or that he shot
him while he was walking on the street while phoning his girlfriend.
He denies assaulting
the plaintiff and states that neighbours came
from their homes angry and aggressive, wanting to hurt the plaintiff
with stones.
He also says that no charges of assault were laid
against him, and he was also not charged with the shooting. He denies
knowing
anything about the plaintiff's confiscated phone or
wristwatch.
[24]
De Klerk testified that his R1 rifle is equipped with an aim point
system that guarantees accuracy,
which means he is unlikely to shoot
a bystander once he aims at a subject. It is also possible to shoot
through a palisade.
[25]
During cross-examination he was asked whether he knew if the Audi was
booked in or not. He said
he is not an investigating officer, so he
does not know what happened to the Audi afterwards. He did not need
to follow up on whether
there was a SAP13 form and, if there was, why
it was not in the docket. Counsel for the plaintiff stated that he
tried to obtain
this form through discovery but did not receive a
warm reception from the defendant. De Klerk, however, remained
adament that there
was an Audi.
[26]
He was also asked how many shots he fired (three) and how many hit
the plaintiff (unsure). He
did disagreed with the contention that the
plaintiff was outnumbered as far as police officers and weapons were
concerned, as,
at that stage, he did not know whether the plaintiff
was armed.
[27]
While he did not see the plaintiff in the dining room, there was an
exchange of fire in the dining
room, apart from Botes' shot in the
hallway. He also answered that he did not know who fired the shots in
the dining room or how
many shots Botes fired. He was referred to
photos showing where the ammunition shells were found, but he said he
did not know about
that as he did not compile the report and thus
could not testify to it. He was also asked whether these bullets came
from Botes'
firearm and again answered that he could not attest to
that as it is not within his knowledge.
[28]
Counsel then put to him that he was on the balcony with De Bruin,
which he denied. He stated
again that he shot the plaintiff running
from the house and across the road and denied the plaintiff's version
that he was walking
in the street trying to reach his girlfriend. He
denies that he fired three shots in the upper left arm from the
balcony, two in
the legs, and a shot in the hip as the plaintiff was
lying on the ground. He does not know where the plaintiff sustained
the injuries
on his arms but suspects it was during the crossfire in
the dining room.
[29]
The hospital record, not properly introduced as evidence, was shown
to him where it indicated
six wounds. He did not know where the other
wounds came from. He testified that he did not know about the other
injuries when he
shot the plaintiff.
[30]
He did not know where the R1 cartridges were; it is not unique that
they could not be found.
He cannot testify as to the incomplete
record.
[31]
He did not see the other suspects; he only heard them speaking in the
room and was informed by
Viljoen that there were five. He does not
know why no other arrests were made – possibly because the
other three suspects
fled in a different direction after the
shooting. He was questioned about the other suspects at length, with
a statement that he
shot the plaintiff mistakenly, thinking he was
part of a gang, which he denied. He could also not summons the police
in the street
to affect the arrest, as people fled in different
directions, and the plaintiff was heading for a veld where he could
escape easily.
[32]
He did not see the plaintiff in the house – De Bruin and Smith
pointed out the suspect
with the torch on the gun. They warned the
suspect by shouting and firing warning shots. He then decided to
shoot three times,
as he was unsure if the other shots hit the
plaintiff. Since the plaintiff ran from left to right, he shot him in
the right hip.
[33]
As to the phone: De Klerk denies that the plaintiff asked him to look
through the phone to call
his girlfriend.
[34]
There was also a line of questioning as to what was in his statement
and why he did not inform
the court at the bail hearing that he did
not see the plaintiff in the house and that it was not the plaintiff
that shot at Botes.
He got visibly agitated at this line of
questioning, stating that he could not testify on something that he
did not know and that
a statement contained things that he knew, not
that he did not know. He denies that he deliberately withheld
information that would
enable the plaintiff to get bail.
De
Bruin
[35]
De Bruin testified that he was part of the team stationed in the
house on the evening. As De
Klerk also testified, he was stationed in
the lounge exiting onto a balcony. He took the position after dark
and had a view of
the yard and the palisade. Around 21:00, he saw
five figures climbing over the wall from outside, moving towards the
house. He
also heard the backdoor gate being tampered with and glass
breaking. The next moment, he testified, there was chaos. Based on
the
instructions, this prompted him to go outside on the balcony to
secure arrests.
[36]
He saw people running from the door to the wall, upon which he
shouted, "Stop! Police!"
firing one warning shot. He saw a
person in the corner and called to De Klerk "daar is een in die
hoek!"
[6]
, pointing at the
person with the torch mounted on his R5. Visibility was good, and he
saw the person wearing a white jacket.
[37]
He heard De Klerk shout to the person, "Stop! Polisie!".
The person did not stop but
instead proceeded to climb over the wall.
De Klerk then shot in his direction. He was unsure if it was a
warning shot; he did not
see what happened, and he only heard shots
afterwards but did not know from whom they came.
[38]
In cross-examination he confirmed that it was only him and Smith on
the balcony. He was asked
if the incident happened at 19:00, to which
he answered no, at 21:00. He testified that there were six other
police officers. He
stated that Keyser was in the house (instead of
Pretorius), and when asked about it again, he confirmed it was
Keyser. He also
said that he does not know Keyser well since they are
not in the same unit.
[39]
During re-examination, this issue was clarified: he does not know
Pretorius well, and he does
not know Keyser at all; he conceded the
possibility of a mistake.
Keyser
[40]
Keyser testified via Teams. He stated that he was in the house on the
day, acting on the tipoff
received. He was with Van Zyl outside the
premises on the other side of the veld, about a 300 – 500m
drive from the house.
They waited in the car and, around 21:00, heard
gunshots from the house. They then drove there for backup.
[41]
De Klerk informed them of the suspect on the other side of the road
on the pavement when they
arrived at the house. De Klerk was inside
the premise as the gate was locked. The suspect was injured on his
leg and arm, and he
wore jeans and a white jacket.
[42]
Once the gate was opened, De Klerk told him what had happened inside
the house and that he had
shot the plaintiff. He was also informed of
the bag with the cable ties and ammunition found next to the
palisade.
[43]
Keyser then spoke to the plaintiff while De Klerk was with him. He
read him his
s 35
rights and asked him for his identity and why he
was there. The plaintiff told him that he was there with his cousin
and six other
suspects to rob the owner of Pick n Pay. The plaintiff
told him about the Audi around the corner and gave his name as Mpho
Kekana.
Keyser then arrested the plaintiff for armed robbery and
attempted murder based on the information obtained from De Klerk and
the
suspect himself.
[44]
Keyser also testified that since De Klerk left the premise, he was
never alone. De Klerk did
not assault the plaintiff; he would have
reported it if that was the case. No cell phone was on the scene, nor
was anyone asked
to phone his girlfriend.
[45]
A few days later, upon following up at the hospital, the hospital
informed him there was no one
by that name. When he explained that he
was looking for the suspect that was shot, he was told the person had
changed his name
on their records and moved to another ward. His name
is Thabang Phakula.
[46]
He testified that the accused applied for bail on 23 November 2010,
which they opposed. Bail
was refused on 9 December 2010, and the
plaintiff remained in custody until he was discharged.
[47]
During cross-examination he was asked about De Bruin's testimony that
he was inside the house,
and he stated that he was never stationed
inside the house. He was also questioned about the Audi – which
he said was booked
in. He testified that he was the person who
compiled the docket, but he is not sure where the SAP13 form for the
Audi was. It was
put to him that there was no Audi, which he denied.
He was questioned about this again later and gave the same answers.
[48]
He was also cross-examined about the fact that he had interrogated a
wounded person. He answered
that the plaintiff was still conscious
and answered the questions clearly. It was put to him that the
plaintiff will deny being
interrogated about the Audi and the bag, to
which he responded that that would be a lie. Keyser stated that he
also did not find
a cell phone on the scene.
[49]
He admitted to opposing bail and that the count of attempted murder
was justified as there had
been a shooting in the house, and he, at
that stage, did not know who did the shooting. This was despite not
finding a firearm
on the plaintiff. He stated that on the strength of
information received from De Klerk and the answers the plaintiff
gave, he decided
to arrest the plaintiff.
[50]
As to the bag: he testified that the bag was taken by forensics. He
does not know if it was presented
at the court – his
responsibility is to collect evidence and take it to court at the
prosecutor's request. He also did not
testify at the criminal trial,
as the prosecutor did not call him to do so.
[51]
It was put to Keyser that nobody placed the plaintiff inside the
house, to which Keyser replied
that De Klerk told him he saw him in
the yard and that, based on that, they regarded him as one of the
suspects.
Botes
[52]
Botes has been part of the police service for 30 years by the time of
the incident. He, too,
testified about the tipoff and added that the
tipoff included that anyone who will be found in the house will be
held hostage.
[53]
He confirmed that De Bruin and Smith were part of the team inside and
were stationed in the lounge
where the balcony overlooks the street.
They were in the house around 19:00. Around 20:45, De Bruin and Smith
saw five suspect
persons climbing over the wall. From where he stood
in the bedroom, he could see five people moving past, some with
backpacks.
He then lost sight of them and heard a rattling at the
kitchen gate. He looked through the curtain where he could see that
the
person closest to him wore denim jeans and a white jacket, with a
backpack and a weapon in his hand.
[54]
As he could not talk to the others in the house, he moved to the
dining room area to provide
backup to Viljoen. He squatted against
the wall to avoid being seen and heard whispering and movement in the
dining room. Next,
he saw a pistol in the hands of a person leopard
crawling next to him. He had to decide whether to grab the gun (too
dangerous)
or wait and shoot. When the person's head came around the
corner, he saw Botes and fired a shot at him but missed. This
prompted
Botes to fire four shots back at the suspect. He knows that
three of them hit the person. He moved into the door and saw people
fleeing. He shot two more shots in the dining room at the fleeing
suspects. He fired six shots in total and heard more shots which
possibly came from Viljoen, he is not sure.
[55]
Botes then shouted to the other police officers in the front that the
suspects were trying to
flee, although he could not see where they
were running to. He heard gunshots in the front of the house but did
not know where
they came from. He later went outside and saw De Klerk
and Keyser speaking to a person on the ground wearing jeans and a
white
jacket. He told De Klerk that it was the person he saw at the
window and told them he had a bag and a firearm.
[56]
He testified that De Klerk asked the suspect what he was doing there,
and he said he came with
his uncle to rob the house. They came with a
green Audi.
[57]
Botes appeared nervous under cross-examination. He was questioned
about the absence of mentioning
the green Audi in his statement, to
which he answered that he did not write about what happened outside
in his statement.
[58]
Botes was further questioned about De Bruin's testimony that Keyser
was inside the house, to
which Botes answered that De Bruin must be
mistaken. He was repeatedly asked about this and stated that Keyser
was not inside the
house. He was also questioned about who opened the
gate and what happened in front of the house, to which he replied
numerous times
that he could not testify on it as he was not there
and did not see what happened at the front during the shootings.
[59]
It was put to him that the plaintiff will deny that it was him that
he saw through the window
and that the police interrogated him. He
replied that that would be a lie.
[60]
He further stated that it is possible that the plaintiff was shot in
the arms during the crossfire.
He does not know if the plaintiff was
shot before climbing over the wall, but he thinks it is possible to
climb over a wall with
a wounded arm because of adrenalin.
Plaintiff
[61]
The plaintiff’s testimony in essence, was the following. On the
day, he got a lift (hiking)
from Mamelodi to Witbank, where he was
dropped off at around 19:00. He was alone, on his way to visit his
girlfriend. While he
was walking down the road, there was a house on
the right-hand side. It was the first time he was in this area.
[62]
As he passed the house, people shouted over a loudhailer in
Afrikaans, things he did not understand.
Then there were tiny red
lights facing him, about 9 meters away, that concerned him. He was
trying to call from his cell phone
and heard a shot. He was shot
three times in the arm from the balcony. This was followed by many
other shots, hitting him in the
middle of the right leg and two
bullets in the hip. There were a total of seven wounds.
[63]
The plaintiff was adamant that he did not try and jump over the wall
and that he did not know
the deceased. He does not know about the
Audi – he testified that he got a lift to Witbank. He further
denied introducing
himself as Mpho Kekana and insists he introduced
himself as Thabang Phakula. As to a bag, he admits that he had a bag
but that
it had toiletries and a clean shirt in it. The police took
his cell phone and wallet as evidence, he said.
[64]
Under cross-examination, he confirmed that he was shot at 19:00. He
was reminded that four witnesses
testified that it was 21:00 and that
it was never put to the other witnesses that the plaintiff's version
is that it happened at
19:00. He remained adamant that the incident
occurred at 19:00.
[65]
As to the injuries, he stated that three shots came from the balcony.
He does not know where
the other shots came from – but they
were two. He also stated that the big wound in the hip came from De
Klerk, who shot
him while lying in the road. When asked how many
times he was shot, he stated six times: three from the balcony and
three from
De Klerk. Counsel for the defendant pointed out that
during his criminal trial, he did not indicate that he was fleeing,
and in
his initial pleadings, there was no mention of being shot from
the balcony. Counsel also referred him to various expert reports
submitted to quantify the claim. He did not mention being shot from
the balcony to any of the experts – but rather that he
was shot
from the street. He further gave two different versions to the
psychiatrist and the clinical psychologist. To the psychiatrists,
he
stated that the police officers approached him, questioned him, and
then started shooting 8 or 9 shots at him. To the clinical
psychologist he said that he answered a call from his girlfriend when
the police approached him and confused him with a robber
and shot
him, while more police officers came running towards him, shooting
him. As to De Klerk and Keyser's versions of what happened
in the
street, he stated that they were lying.
[66]
For clarity it was asked if his version is that he was an innocent
bystander that was shot at
or if his version was that he was lined up
and shot at from the balcony after lights were shone on him. He
confirmed the latter
– he was innocently shot. It is not that
he was mistaken for someone else (like a fleeing suspect); it was a
cold-blooded
deliberate shooting. It was put to him that his version
was inherently absurd and improbable. The police officers all
testified
that they followed a suspect fleeing. On his version, it
would mean that all of a sudden, the suspect disappeared, with the
plaintiff
then walking down the street and being gunned down by the
police. He answered he did not hear the warning shots, and the
shouting
"stop stop polisie" was in Afrikaans, which he did
not understand. He also did not hear the shots in the house, even
though Keisier, 300m from the house, heard it. It was put to him that
he was not truthful.
[67]
The plaintiff admitted that he did not lay a charge against the
police, stating he employed an
advocate to help him. He did not
follow up on it in 13 years and only instituted a claim for damages.
He did not report the theft
of his cell phone or wallet. Since he
lost his phone, he could not call his girlfriend to testify. He did
not think of contacting
the service provider to get the number from
his records.
Evaluation
of evidence
[68]
It is now for this court to evaluate the evidence the witnesses gave.
Overall, the witnesses
for the defendant did not contradict one
another, and also not under cross- examination. There was one
contradiction: De Bruin
testifying that Keyser was inside the house.
He explained that the police officers do not know each other very
well. I accept this
explanation and do not find the contradiction so
material as to make an adverse finding regarding De Bruin's
credibility or to
reject his testimony.
[69]
De Bruin’s version was not challenged in cross-examination that
he and Smith took up positions
in the lounge and went to the balcony
when shots were fired. De Klerk and Botes confirmed De Bruin's
evidence. The only shots fired
from the balcony were warning shots. I
accordingly find that the plaintiff was not shot from the balcony.
[70]
The evidence of De Bruin that he was standing on the balcony, saw the
suspect running from the
pool to the palisade, that De Klerk saw the
suspect climb over the palisade, and then fired shots at his leg,
stands as uncontested.
In
S
v Fortuin
[7]
it was held that
"If
a party wishes to lead evidence to contradict an opposing witness, he
or she should first cross-examine the witness upon
the fact he or she
intend to prove in contradiction, so as to give the witness an
opportunity for explanation. Similarly if the
court is to be asked to
disbelieve a witness, he or she should be cross-examined upon the
matters which it will be alleged make
his or her evidence unworthy of
credit. […] Failure to cross-examine may therefore prevent a
party from later disputing
the truth of the witness' evidence".
[71]
The plaintiff was a poor witness and contradicted himself during his
testimony. He insisted that
the incident occurred at 19:00. The
evidence given by the police officers that the shooting took place
around 21:00 was largely
left unchallenged in cross- examination.
[72]
It is improbable that the police would make up the name Mpho Kekana,
or the existence of the
Audi. No reasons were proffered as to why the
police would fabricate the name or the presence of the Audi. The
missing dockets
and perhaps incomplete investigation do not adversely
affect this case, as the burden of proof is one of a balance of
probabilities.
[73]
The plaintiff's version that he was deliberately shot while
innocently walking down the street
is rejected as improbable. Various
inconsistent statements were made on different occasions, as alluded
to above. This has an adverse
effect on the credibility of the
witness, specifically as to where shots were fired from.
[74]
It is also unclear why the plaintiff did not call his girlfriend to
testify, as she could corroborate
his version. It is improbable that
a person would continue to leisurely walk down the street on the
phone with his girlfriend while
there is a shootout in the house
right next to him. At least two warning shots were fired, and people
shouted, "stop, polisie!".
Even if in a different language,
the commotion of the shootout and the presence of police officers in
uniforms shouting makes it
improbable that a person would leisurely
continue walking down the street.
[75]
Having dealt with the evidence, my findings are the following : the
plaintiff was part of a group
of robbers that broke into the house in
the evening, around 21:00. Once Botes shot and killed the one
suspect, a shootout ensued
in the dining room. It is probable that
the plaintiff got shot in the crossfire. The suspects then fled in
various directions,
with the plaintiff jumping over the palisade to
escape through the open veld across the street. As he fled, De Bruin
and Smithh
pointed him out with a torch mounted on their riffles,
shooting a warning shot and shouting that he must stop. De Klerk, who
was
outside by this time, also shot a warning shot. Then, De Klerk,
suspecting that the plaintiff committed an offence in terms of
Schedule 1 of the CPA, shot the plaintiff in the right leg and hip to
arrest the plaintiff. Some time after, Keyser
arrived
at the scene, and on the strength of what De Klerk told him and what
the suspect told him, he arrested the plaintiff.
[76]
On a conspectus of the evidence, the question is first whether the
arrest was lawful, and secondly
whether the use of force in this
instance was within the bounds of
s 49
of the CPA. Once these
questions are answered, the question of whether the defendant can be
held liable for the plaintiff's detention
after bail was refused will
be dealt with.
The
law
(i)
The arrest:
section 40(1)(b)
[77]
Section 40(1)(b)
of the CPA provides that a peace officer may arrest
a person without a warrant if he reasonably suspects the suspect of
committing
an offence referred to in Schedule 1, other than escaping
from custody.
i.
The arrestor must be a peace officer;
ii.
The arrestor must entertain a suspicion;
iii.
The suspicion must be that the suspect committed an offence referred
to in Schedule
1; and
iv.
The suspicion must rest on reasonable ground.
[78]
The defendant that wishes to provide a justification for conduct that
might otherwise be unlawful
bears the onus to prove such a ground of
justification.
[8]
This is an
objective test.
[9]
Suspicion
does not require absolute certainty or the requirement that there be
sufficient evidence at that point for a prima facie
case against the
arrestee.
[10]
Based on the
accepted version of the events as set out above and viewed
objectively, I am satisfied that at the time of the arrest,
all the
requirements were present that justified an arrest without a warrant.
(ii)
Section 49(2)
[79]
Section 49
of the CPA
[11]
has
been amended twice, fistly, in 1998 by s 7 of the Judicial Matters
Second Amendment Act
[12]
that
came into operation on 18 July 2003, and secondly, in 2012 by s 1 of
the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act.
[13]
The cause of action in this matter arose in 2010, which means that s
49(2), as amended in 2003, was the applicable law at the time.
[80]
At that time, s 49 read as follows:
49.
Use of force in effecting arrest. –
(1)
For the purposes of this section –
(a)
'arrestor' means any person authorised under this Act to arrest or to
assist in arresting
a suspect; and
(b)
'suspect' means any person in respect of whom an arrestor has or had
a reasonable suspicion
that such person is committing or has
committed an offence.
(2)
If any arrestor attempts to arrest a suspect and the suspect resists
the attempt, or flees,
or resists the attempt and flees, when it is
clear that an attempt to arrest him or her is being made, and the
suspect cannot be
arrested without the use of force, the arrestor
may, in order to effect the arrest, use such force as may be
reasonably necessary
and proportional in the circumstances to
overcome the resistance or to prevent the suspect from fleeing:
Provided that the arrestor
is justified in terms of this section in
using deadly force that is intended or is likely to cause death or
grievous bodily harm
to a suspect, only if he or she believes on
reasonable grounds-
(a)
that the force is immediately necessary for the purposes of
protecting the arrestor, any
person lawfully assisting the arrestor
or any other person from imminent or future death or grievous bodily
harm;
(b)
that there is a substantial risk that the suspect will cause imminent
or future death or
grievous bodily harm if the arrest is delayed; or
(c)
that the offence for which the arrest is sought is in progress and is
of a forcible
and serious nature and involves the use of
life-threatening violence or a strong likelihood that it will cause
grievous bodily
harm."
[81]
The use of deadly force to affect an arrest comes at the cost of
various constitutional rights,
namely (possibly) the right to
life,
[14]
freedom and security
of the person,
[15]
and the
right to dignity.
[16]
This was
all considered by the Constitutional Court in
Ex
Parte Minister of Safety and Security
:
In re
S
v Walters
,
[17]
dealing with the original version of s 49. The principles laid out in
the case remain helpful in understanding how this section
should be
understood in line with the Constitution. The court made it clear
that
[18]
“
If
the fugitive is not suspected of having committed a crime involving
the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily
harm or if
the fugitive constitutes no threat to the arrester or to someone else
or to the public at large and can be picked up
later, there is no
justification for the use of any significant force, let alone deadly
force.”
[82]
The court then laid down some principles regarding arrest and the use
of force. These are:
“
[54]
In order to make perfectly clear what the law regarding this topic
now is, I tabulate the main points:
(a)
The purpose of arrest is to bring before court for trial persons
suspected of having committed
offences.
(b)
Arrest is not the only means of achieving this purpose, nor always
the best.
(c)
Arrest may never be used to punish a suspect.
(d)
Where arrest is called for, force may be used only where it is
necessary in order to carry
out the arrest.
(e)
Where force is necessary, only the least degree of force reasonably
necessary to carry out
the arrest may be used.
(f)
In deciding what degree of force is both reasonable and necessary,
all the circumstances
must be taken into account, including the
threat of violence the suspect poses to the arrester or others, and
the nature and circumstances
of the offence the suspect is suspected
of having committed; the force being proportional in all these
circumstances.
(g)
Shooting a suspect solely in order to carry out an arrest is
permitted in very limited circumstances
only.
(h)
Ordinarily such shooting is not permitted unless the suspect poses a
threat of violence
to the arrester or others or is suspected on
reasonable grounds of having committed a crime involving the
infliction or threatened
infliction of serious bodily harm and there
are no other reasonable means of carrying out the arrest, whether at
that time or later.
(i)
These limitations in no way detract from the rights of an arrester
attempting
to carry out an arrest to kill a suspect in self-defence
or in defence of any other person.”
[83]
In
April
v Minister of Safety and Security
[19]
the court had to apply this version of the CPA since the cause of
action arose in 2006. The court stated:
[20]
“
In
order to discharge the onus resting upon him, the defendant must not
only prove that the police suspected on reasonable grounds
that the
plaintiff was part of a conspiracy to rob the cash-in-transit
vehicle. This would justify the arrest. He must also satisfy
the
requirements laid down in section 49(2). In terms of that section the
use of deadly force likely to cause either the suspect's
death or
grievous bodily harm to him is justified only in limited
circumstances. There must be acceptable evidence that the police
believed on reasonable grounds that the use of the R5 rifle and the
9mm pistol to prevent the plaintiff from fleeing and resisting
…
was immediately necessary for their protection or to the protection
of any other persons; that there was a substantial
risk that the
plaintiff would cause imminent or future death or grievous bodily
harm if the arrest was delayed; or that the offence
in question was
in progress and was of a forcible nature involving the use of
life-threatening violence or a strong likelihood
that it would cause
grievous bodily harm”
[84]
Likewise,
Mondlane
v Minister of Safety and Security
[21]
dealt with the second version of the section. The court stated that
the
"belief
that the arrestor must hold or must have held is the belief that
force is immediately necessary for the purposes of
protecting
[themselves], and person lawfully assisting the arrestor and any
other person from imminent or future death or grievous
harm”.
[85]
In the end, there is a combination of factors to consider: whether
the degree of the force used
is proportional to the seriousness of
the crime which the victim is suspected of fleeing from, coupled with
the possibility of
the suspect posing a threat of serious physical
harm if they should escape arrest. It should be kept in mind that the
arrestor
at the time often does not have the luxury of time to make a
decision, and unlike a court considering the matter, does not have
the benefit of hindsight. Still, the use of force is invasive and
drastic, requiring the court to remain sensitive to the issues
raised
by s 49 and to decide the case based on the delicate balancing of the
rights and duties involved in a particular factual
circumstance.
[86]
Was the use of force to prevent the plaintiff from escaping, in this
case, reasonably necessary
and proportional to the circumstances, as
the 2003 amendment requires? In my opinion, yes. The police were
stationed in the house
based on a tip-off that there would be a
serious house robbery, which then happened. The suspects were armed,
there was a shootout
in the house that resulted in the death of a
suspect, warning shots were fired and ignored, and De Klerk, acting
on information
from his colleagues and the knowledge that some
suspects were armed, regarded the plaintiff as dangerous. Seeing the
plaintiff
flee towards an open veld in a build-up area, De Klerk did
not aim to kill him but to prevent him from escaping and putting the
lives of others in danger. These would be reasonable grounds, even if
no firearm was found on the plaintiff.
[87]
The arrest was, therefore, lawful, and the use of force was
reasonable.
(iii)
Detention
[88]
I have found that the plaintiff was lawfully arrested, with the
result that subsequent detention
was lawful. The plaintiff then
applied for bail, which the magistrate refused on 9 December 2010.
For the detention between 9 December
2010, when bail was denied,
untill 30 September 2011, when the plaintiff was found not guilty and
discharged, the defendant cannot
be held liable.
[22]
[89]
The underlying rights applicable in such a case is s 12(1)(a) of the
Constitution (not to be
deprived of freedom or liberty without just
cause), which is likewise protected by s 35(1)(d)-(f) of the
Constitution. Thus, even
if the arrest was unlawful, the question is
whether the defendant can be held liable for the detention between 9
December 2010
and 20 September 2011. I think not. The duty of the
police is restricted to ensuring that the plaintiff is brought before
a court
as soon as possible. The decision to charge the suspect falls
under the authority of the National Prosecuting Authority, and the
decision to detain the plaintiff falls within the judicial authority.
[90]
During the cross-examination of Keyser, counsel for the plaintiff did
ask him about the evidence
that was led at the bail application.
Keyser indicated that he brings the evidence to the court that the
prosecutor requires and
that he is not the person that presents the
case in court. This is correct. Unless the plaintiff can show that
false evidence
[23]
or
unlawfully obtained evidence
[24]
was given by Keyser during the bail application, leading to the
refusal of bail, Keyser cannot be held liable for the detention
if
the arrest was lawful.
Order:
[91]
In the result, the following order is made:
i.
The plantiff’s action is dismissed, with costs.
WJ
du Plessis AJ
Judge
of the High Court
Delivered:
This judgement is handed down electronically by uploading it to the
electronic file of this matter on CaseLines. It will
be sent to the
parties/their legal representatives by email.
Counsel
for the plaintiff: Adv
MJ Letsoalo
Instructed
by:
AJ
Masingi attorneys
Counsel
for the defendant: Adv
TWG Bester SC
Instructed
by:
State
Attorney
Date
of the hearing: 23
– 26 & 30 January 2023.
Date
of judgment: 6
April 2023
[1]
Paragraph 4 of the Particulars of Claim dated 9 November 2011.
[2]
He now holds the rank of captain.
[3]
He resigned from the SAPS.
[4]
He resigned from the SAPS.
[5]
He retired from the SAPS with the rank of Captain.
[6]
There is one in the corner.
[7]
2008 (1) SACR 511 (C).
[8]
Mabaso
v Felix 1981 (3) SA 865 (A).
[9]
Ntsomi v Minister of Law and Order
1990 (1) SA 512
(C) at 528F.
[10]
Liebenberg v minister of Safety and Security [2009] ZAGPPHC 88 para
19.22.
[11]
51 of 1977.
[12]
122 of 1998.
[13]
9 of 2012.
[14]
S 11 of the Constitution.
[15]
S 12 of the Constitution.
[16]
S 10 of the Constitution.
[17]
2002 (2) SACR 105 (CC).
[18]
Para 46.
[19]
[2008]
3 All SA 270 (SE).
[20]
Par
5.
[21]
2011
(2) SACR 425 (GNP).
[22]
Minister
of Police and Another v Muller
2020
(1) SACR 432 (SCA).
[23]
Woji v
Minister of Police [2014]
ZASCA
108.
[24]
Minister
of Safety and security v Tyokwana [2014]
ZASCA
130.
sino noindex
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