Case Law[2023] ZAGPPHC 272South Africa
S v Montsie [2023] ZAGPPHC 272; CC93/19 (28 April 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
28 April 2023
Headnotes
in S v Brown 2015 (1) SACR 211 (SCA) the evidence already led by the state in this matter up to this stage is relevant to these proceedings. As such it has also been considered. Having done so, I am satisfied that the accused is admitting all the elements of the offences preferred against him on counts 2, 3, 9 and 10. Accordingly the accused is therefore and in accordance with his plea, found guilty as charged on counts 2, 3, 9 and 10 as charged.
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## S v Montsie [2023] ZAGPPHC 272; CC93/19 (28 April 2023)
S v Montsie [2023] ZAGPPHC 272; CC93/19 (28 April 2023)
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sino date 28 April 2023
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO:
CC93/19
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES
/ NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/NO
(3)
REVISED.
Date:
28 April 2023
THE STATE
versus
HERBERT
KGOPE MONTSIE
Accused
JUDGMENT
MSIBI
AJ
Introduction
[1]
The accused, Herbert Kgope Montsie is
indicted before this court on 10 charges. He is legally represented
by Advocate F Joubert,
while Advocate R Molokwane appears for the
State. The charges were read out to him as follows:
[2]
Count 1
Housebreaking with intent to commit robbery with aggravating
circumstances, as intended
in section 1 of Act 51 of 1977
Count 2
Robbery with aggravating circumstances as intended in Section 1 of
Act 51 of
1977, read with the provisions of Section 51(2) and Part II
of Schedule 2 of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
Count 3
Murder read with the provisions of
Section 51(1)
of the
Criminal Law
Amendment Act 105 of 1997
, in that the death of the deceased was
caused by the accused after having committed robbery with aggravating
circumstances as intended
in
section 1
of Act 51 of 1977 as well as
the accused acting in the execution or furtherance of a common
purpose.
Count 4
Attempted murder
Count 5
Attempted murder
Count 6
Attempted murder
Count 7
Attempted murder, was withdrawn by the State.
Count 8
Attempted murder
Count 9
Contravening Section 4(1)(iv), read with Sections 1, 103, 117, 120
and 121 and Schedule
4 of Act 60 of 2000 and further read with
Sections 250 and 270 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
(unlawful possession of
a prohibited firearm)
Count 10
Contravening Section 90(1), read with Sections 1, 103, 117, 120 and
121 and Schedule 4 of
Act 60 of 2000 and further read with Section
250 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (unlawful possession of
ammunition)
LITIGATION HISTORY
[3] On
25 May 2021 before he could plead, the accused’s attention was
drawn to the provisions of
Sections 51(1)
and (2) of the
Criminal Law
Amendment Act 105 of 1997
applicable to counts 2 and 3. regarding the
prescribed minimum sentences and the fact that Count 7 was withdrawn
by the state.
[4]
Upon such arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty to all 9 charges
proferred against him. Advocate Joubert
confirmed that the not guilty
pleas were in accordance with his instructions.
[5] The
defence handed in written admissions which were received as formal
admissions in terms of
Section 220
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51
of 1977
. The accused admitted the contents and correctness of these
admissions, which were admitted by the court and marked Exhibit A,
The admissions read as follows: -
“
Count
1
That upon or about 19
October 2019 at 33 Reading Street , in the district of Evander ,
there was a housebreaking into the business
premises of Telkom, and
several items as per annexure A of the Indictment were taken at gun
point.
Count
2
Upon or about the 19
th
of October 2019 at Reading Street in the district of Evander, one
Thembela Tshotana was unlawfully and intentionally assaulted
by a
group of armed men and several items in his lawful possession and of
Telkom were taken from him. The aggravating circumstance
being that a
firearm was used during the robbery.
That the deceased is
Chester Mmakgoropedi Ramaila, who died on 19
th
of October
2019 as a result of injuries that he sustained at or near Solomon
Mahlangu Drive in the district of Pretoria.
The deceased sustained
no further injuries after sustaining the initial injuries until an
autopsy was performed on 22 October 2019.
Dr Ryan Blumenthal, a
senior specialist performed a post mortem examination on the body of
the deceased on the 22
nd
of October 2019, his findings as
recorded in the form GW7/15 were admitted by consent as Exhibit B.
The facts and findings of the
post-mortem report including the cause
of death in Exhibit B are true and correct.
On 19 October 2019,
Captain Thierry Werner Beheydt, a photographer, draughtsman, forensic
field worker and finger print expert attached
to the Criminal Record
and Crime Scene Management in the local Criminal Record Centre
Pretoria, attended the scene of crime.
Captain Beheydt
condoned the scene, made scene observations, and took pictures,
prepared sketch plan and collected forensic exhibits
which he
forwarded to the Forensic Laboratory for analysis.
Captain Beheydt
compiled a photo album, computer sketch plan and key to forensic
exhibits.
The correctness of the
contents of the affidavits, photo album, computer sketch plan and key
to forensic exhibits compiled by Captain
Beheydt is not disputed”.
[6] The
document was admitted into the record by consent as
Exhibit
C.
BACKROUND OF THE
STATE’S CASE:
[7] In
proving its case, the State called 6 witnesses who testified under
oath in relation to count 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 7 and 8 and were
subsequently cross-examined by the defence. After the evidence of the
sixth witness the matter was postponed
for further trial.
[8] On
26 May 2021 the matter could not proceed since the accused was in
default. A warrant was authorised for
his arrest. He was rearrested
in October 2022. On 4 April 2023, the matter was again on the roll
for further trial. The accused
through his legal representative
changed his plea of not guilty in respect of counts number 2, 3, 9
and 10 to one of guilty. The
change of plea was confirmed by the
accused. Counsel handed up a statement in terms of
section 112(2)
of
the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
, which set out the plea
explanation amplifying the guilty plea of the accused. He read into
the record the statement, which was
duly translated to the accused in
the Sepedi language, being the language in which the accused elected
to conduct the proceedings.
[9] The
accused confirmed the correctness of the contents of the statement
and that it was indeed his statement.
He also confirmed that the
signature appearing on the statement was his own. The statement was
admitted as Exhibit E.
[10] Counsel for
the State, confirmed that the statement of the accused was indeed in
accordance with the State’s case
as far as counts number 2, 3,
9 and 10 were concerned and on that basis the State accepted the
accused’s plea explanation.
[11] I have
considered the statement myself in relation to the plea that the
accused has entered, the elements of the crimes
and the alleged facts
in the indictment. As it was held in
S v Brown
2015
(1) SACR 211
(SCA)
the evidence already led by the state in this
matter up to this stage is relevant to these proceedings. As such it
has also been
considered. Having done so, I am satisfied that the
accused is admitting all the elements of the offences preferred
against him
on counts 2, 3, 9 and 10.
Accordingly the accused is
therefore and in accordance with his plea, found guilty as charged on
counts 2, 3, 9 and 10 as charged.
[12] The state
closed its case in respect of the rest of the counts. Counsel for the
defence called the accused to the witness
stand to testify in his
defence regarding the rest of the counts.
[13]
Mr
Herbert
Montsie
testified under oath that on 19 October
20219 he was in the company of the deceased. After they had robbed
the Telkom office they
drove from the scene in the Telkom company
car. He was the driver, while the deceased was a passenger. Members
of the SAPS pursued
them and fired shots at them. The motor vehicle
capsized, they got out and fled. He was arrested and he learnt
thereafter that
his accomplice had passed as a result of a gunshot
wound.
[14] Under
cross-examination by the State the accused maintained the fact that
neither himself nor the deceased fired shots
while being chased by
the police. The defence closed its case.
[15] As it was held
S
v
Brown
(
supra
)
the court has to consider the evidence of the accused in the light of
the evidence of State witnesses who testified in regard
to the
alleged shootout between the accused and the police.
[16]
Donovan
Renier
Blignaut,
who is a sergeant in the SAPS,
testified he was in the company of Sergeant Pretorius and Engelbrecht
when they responded to the
report concerning a stolen Telkom vehicle.
He was the driver, while his colleagues were his passengers. While
pursuing the motor
vehicle, he used blue lights to alert the
occupants of the motor vehicle to stop. The occupants of the motor
vehicle fired shots
at them. They also fired back. The driver of the
motor vehicle lost control and the vehicle capsized. Two male persons
ran out
of the motor vehicle. They gave chase, and he managed to
apprehend the accused, Mr Montsie. His accomplice passed on due to a
gunshot
wound.
[17] The other
witnesses
Sergeant
Pretorius
and
Sergeant
Engelbrecht
corroborated h his evidence in all respects.
[18] During
arguments on the merits of the matter, the state conceded to the fact
that the spent cartridges that were found
at the scene were only
those that were discharged from the police service pistols. A firearm
was found at the scene close to the
deceased, but no cartridges were
found which were discharged from this firearm. There was also no gun
powder residue on the accused
but only on the deceased. As a result
the state had no further address.
[19] Counsel for
the accused also addressed the court stating that the same way that
spent cartridges that were fired by police,
were found at the scene;
cartridges that were fired by the accused or the deceased should have
been found. The police vehicles
would have been damaged to prove that
there was exchange of fire.
[20] In analysing
the evidence of the state and the defence with regard to counts
number 4, 5, 6 and 8, the court is mindful
of the decision in
S
v Trickett
1973 (3) SA 526
(T)
where it was held that
the onus to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt
rests on the State; if the accused’s
version is reasonably
possibly true, the accused must be acquitted.
[21] As correctly
conceded to by the Prosecution and further argued by the defence,
except for the oral evidence on record,
there is no other evidence
supporting the fact that the accused or the deceased fired shots at
the police. Spent cartridges fired
from the stolen motor vehicle
during the chase, or damage to the police vehicles would have
corroborated the version of the state
witnesses. The accused’s
version is reasonably possibly true.
[22] With regard to
count 1 it was further conceded by the state that count 1 is actually
a duplication of count 2. Count
2 which carries a minimum sentence of
15 years’ imprisonment in respect of a first offender, in terms
of
section 51(2)
of Act 105 of 1997.
[23] It was further
conceded by the state that the provisions of section 51(1) of Act 105
of 1997 are not applicable to count
3, since the accused has been
convicted on the basis of
dolus
eventualis.
The state
argued that while acting in common purpose with the deceased, to
commit the robbery, armed with a firearm the accused
should have
foreseen the consequences of his decision; which resulted in the
death of his accomplice. Although the robbery was
planned, the death
of his accomplice was not planned by the accused.
[24] Counsel for
the accused was also in agreement with the submissions made by the
state on counts 2 and 3. Counsel further
argued that compelling and
substantial and compelling circumstances exist with regard to count 2
which warrants a deviation from
the prescribed minimum sentence,
namely the fact that the accused is now remorseful, no-one was shot
during the robbery, and no
violence was perpetrated against any
victim during the robbery.
[25] As such the
provisions of section 51(1) of Act 105 of 1997 are not applicable on
count 3.
[26] The court
finds that the state has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt in regard to counts 1, 4, 5, 6 and
8.
The accused is
therefore acquitted on counts 1, 4, 5, 6, and 8.
SENTENCE
PROCEEDINGS
[27] Having been
convicted on his plea of guilty, the state proved no previous
convictions against the accused. Counsel for
the accused addressed
the court in mitigation of sentence from the bar. The State also
addressed the court in aggravation of sentence.
[28] In determining
the appropriate sentence the court has to consider the personal
circumstances of the accused, the nature
of the crimes and the
interests of society. The court has to impose a sentence
incorporating the objectives of punishment, namely
deterrence,
prevention rehabilitation and retribution. As stated in
S v
Holder
1979 (2) SA 70
(A),
an appropriate sentence
entails that the demands of our times be taken into account, together
with the mitigating and aggravating
factors.
In
S v
Rabie
1975 (4) SA 855
(A)
at 862G it was stated that
punishment should fit the criminal as well as the crime, be fair to
society, and be blended with a measure
of mercy according to the
circumstances.
[29] No sentence is
appropriate in a particular case merely because it is customarily
imposed in similar cases. Courts are
expected to individualise
sentences that are imposed so as to reflect the desired balance of
the above mentioned factors.
[30] The
considerations mentioned above are affected by the provisions of
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
, which provides for the
imposition of minimum sentences of imprisonment in respect count 2.
The provisions of
section 51
of this Act are peremptory. In
S v
Malgas
2001 (1) SACR 469
(SCA)
at 481 the court
remarked as follows:
“
Courts
are required to approach the imposition of sentence conscious that
the Legislature has ordained life imprisonment (or the
particular
prescribed period of imprisonment) as the sentence that should
ordinarily and in the absence of weighty justification
be imposed for
the listed crimes in specified circumstances.”
At para 476 the court
further remarked as follows:
“…
the
Legislature aimed at ensuring a severe, standardised, and consistent
response from the courts to the commission of such crimes,
unless
there were, and could be seen to be, truly convincing reasons for a
different response.”
[31] Section 51(3)
allows the court to enquire into the existence or otherwise of
substantial and compelling circumstances
which would justify the
imposition of a lesser sentence than the prescribed minimum sentence.
[32] The accused
did not testify in mitigation of sentence, Advocate Joubert addressed
the court on his behalf on sentence
from the bar. He stated among
others that the accused is 40 years of age, married with four minor
children. His wife is currently
suffering from a mental condition
that renders her unfit to single-handedly care for the children. His
parents are involved in
taking care of his children. At the time of
his arrest he was running a small business, selling roasted chicken
generating about
R9 000 per month. As a sole breadwinner, he used
this income to cater for the needs of his parents, wife and children.
[33] In addition to
these personal circumstances counsel submitted that the following
constitute substantial and compelling
circumstances justifying a
departure from the prescribed minimum sentence. Namely: that the
accused has decided to change his plea
of guilty to one of guilty out
of remorse. He has decided to take the court into his confidence and
accept responsibility for his
wrongful conduct. On count 2 there is
no victim that was traumatised, injured or shot at.
[34] In aggravation
of sentence counsel for the State submitted that the accused has been
convicted on serious offences that
attract minimum prescribed
sentences. Not only are the offences serious in nature but also
prevalent in this Division and country-wide.
Violent crime is
currently a cancer to our society. Housebreaking with intent to rob
and robbery is a violent crime; same applies
to the charges of
attempted murder. Any offence that gives the impression that human
life is cheap calls for harsh punishment.
After committing the
offence on count 2, the accused and his accomplice were chased by the
police. Instead of surrendering to the
law, they continued to flee
until their motor vehicle capsized. The accused’s accomplice Mr
Makgoropedi Ramaila, died during
the alleged exchange of fire between
them and the police.
[35] Count 2 is an
offence that requires a certain measure of planning as it is not an
offence that can be committed at a
spur of a moment. The fact that a
firearm was used confirms this fact.
[36] The recovery
of the vehicle was as a direct result of the diligence of the members
of the SAPS in responding to the crime
committed. The other
properties were never recovered, since some of the accused’s
accomplices, were never arrested. After
the commission of the offence
on count 2, when the accused and his accomplices were chased by
police they did not stop or surrender
to the police, they opted to
lead a police chase that ended in fatal consequences. It was further
argued by Counsel for the state
the circumstances presented to the
court on behalf of the accused do not amount to substantial and
compelling circumstances but
are ordinary circumstances.
[37] The court
found that the circumstances presented on behalf of the accused do
not amount to compelling and substantial
circumstances that would
justify a departure from the prescribed minimum sentence.
[38] As stated in
S
v
Matthee
1971
(3) SA
769
(A)
, the purpose of the sentence is to deter offenders and
other potential offenders from committing similar offences or crime
in general.
The sentence is also aimed at rehabilitating or reforming
the accused. It was submitted on his behalf that he is already on the
road to rehabilitation, which is evidenced by the fact that accused
decided to take the court into his confidence and enter a plea
of
guilty in respect of the four counts. It was further submitted by
Counsel for the accused that this comes from a repentant heart,
which
is a sign of remorse.
[39] The sentence
is also aimed at expressing the moral outrage of society against
these particular types of offenses.
[40] Accordingly.
the accused is sentenced as follows:
1. On Count (2) - 15
(fifteen) years imprisonment
2. On Count (3) - 10
(ten) years imprisonment.
3. On count (9) - 10
(ten) years imprisonment.
4. On count (10) - 2
(two) years imprisonment.
In terms of
section
280
(2) of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
, the sentences on
counts 3, 9 and 10 are ordered to run concurrently with the sentence
on count 2.
The effective sentence
is therefore 15 (fifteen) years imprisonment. The accused is declared
unfit to possess a firearm. In terms
of
section 301(1)
of Act 60 of
2000 no order is made to the contrary.
S. MSIBI
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA.
Dates of hearing: 25
October 2021, 3, 4, and 6 April 2023
Delivery of judgment in
court: 6 April 2023
Date of distribution of
signed judgment: 28 April 2023
Appearances:
Counsel for the State:
Adv. R. Molokoane
Counsel for the accused:
Adv F. Joubert
sino noindex
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