Case Law[2023] ZAGPPHC 529South Africa
Mnisi and Others v Master of the High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Division, Pretoria and Others [2023] ZAGPPHC 529; 2023 - 013876 (27 June 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
27 June 2023
Headnotes
the Court has no jurisdiction in so far as Part A of the application is concerned as both the applicants and the respondents are resident within the territorial area of High Court of Mpumalanga, including the Trust.
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Mnisi and Others v Master of the High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Division, Pretoria and Others [2023] ZAGPPHC 529; 2023 - 013876 (27 June 2023)
Mnisi and Others v Master of the High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Division, Pretoria and Others [2023] ZAGPPHC 529; 2023 - 013876 (27 June 2023)
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sino date 27 June 2023
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I
N
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
Case
no: 2023 - 013876
In the matter between:
JACOB
CHARLES MNISI
ID
NO: […]
FIRST
APPLICANT
MENZI
JOHN NYAMBI
ID
NO: […]
SECOND
APPLICANT
MAHLEKlSANE
MOSA CHIRWA
ID
NO: […]
THIRD
APPLICANT
PANYANA
ENOCH BHEMBE
ID
NO: […]
FOURTH
APPLICANT
And
THE
MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
FIRST
RESPONDENT
SMILE
ZANDlLE NKOSI
N.O.
ID
NO: […]
SECOND
RESPONDENT
HLUPHEKA
SALMINAH MOHALE
N.O
.
ID
NO: […]
THIRD
RESPONDENT
RODAH
LINDIWE MGWENYA
N.O
.
ID
NO: […]
FOURTH
RESPONDENT
JOSlAH
NDABAMBI MOKOENA
N.O.
ID
NO: […]
FIFTH
RESPONDENT
BONGANI
KENNETH SHAKOANE
N.O.
ID
NO: […]
SIXTH
RESPONDENT
MAQUANDASHIELIAS
MATHAIA
N.O.
ID
NO: […]
SEVENTH
RESPONDENT
ISAAC
SITHOLE
N.O.
ID
NO: […]
EIGHTH
RESPONDENT
HENDRY
SIPHO LAMOLA
N.O.
ID
NO: […]
NINTH
RESPONDENT
MOKWAZl
THEM8EKA MDZINGASE NKAMBULE
N.O.
ID
NO: […]
TENTH
RESPONDENT
MAGOLIDI
JIM MANDLAZI
N.O.
ID
NO: […]
ELEVENTH
RESPONDENT
ZULU
SAMUEL CHIRWA
N.O.
ID
NO: […]
TWELFTH
RESPONDENT
HENDRY
NTININI MZIMBA
N.O.
ID
NO: […]
THIRTEENTH
RESPONDENT
AGNES
NTOMBIKAYISE MAVUSO
N.O.
ID
NO: […]
FOURTEENTH
RESPONDENT
(In
their capacity as Trustees of the Libuyile Community Trust, IT No:
4939/06{T)
JUDGMENT
This
matter has been heard in open court and is otherwise disposed of in
terms of the Directives of the Judge President of this
Division.
This Judgment is made an Order of the Court by the Judge whose name
is reflected herein and duly stamped by the
Registrar of the Court.
The judgment and order are accordingly published and distributed
electronically. The date for hand-down
is deemed to be
27
June 2023
.
BADENHORST AJ
Introduction
[1] The applicants
launched an urgent application for interim relief in Part A of the
application, prohibiting the second
to fourteenth respondents from
conducting business activities on behalf of the Trust, pending the
outcome of Part B of the application.
[2] Part B of the
application seeks the removal of the second to fourteenth respondents
as trustees of the Libuyile Community
Trust for the reasons as set
out in the founding papers.
[3] The First
Respondent, being the Master of the High Court, elected not to oppose
the relief sought.
[4] The urgent
court was not seized with whether the said trustees are disqualified
from holding positions of trustees in
the Trust.
[5] Part A of the
application was heard in the urgent court on 28 March 2023 and 31
March 2023 by the Honourable Justice Kumalo
and judgment was handed
down on 4 April 2023.
[6] In paragraph 19
of the judgment the Court held that the Court has no jurisdiction in
so far as Part A of the application
is concerned as both the
applicants and the respondents are resident within the territorial
area of High Court of Mpumalanga, including
the Trust.
[7] The
obiter
dictum
in paragraph 26 of the judgment was that it may be that
this court has jurisdiction in so far as Part B is concerned, it does
not
have the necessary jurisdiction to adjudicate on the
interlocutory relief sought by the applicants.
[8] The honourable
Justice Kumalo dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction and
it was ordered that the applicants
should pay the costs of the
application.
[9] On 17 April
2023 the second to fourteenth respondents served a notice of
intention to oppose the relief sought in Part
B of the applicants’
application.
[10] The second to
fourteenth respondents filed their answering affidavit to Part B of
the application dated 5 May 2023.
The present
application
[11] The
application before me only relates to Part B of the notice of motion
and is opposed by the second to fourteenth respondents.
[12] In Part B the
applicants seek a declaratory order that the second to fourteenth
respondents were not duly elected as
trustees for the trust and an
order directing the first respondent to cancel the letter of
authority issued on 3 Nov 2022 in respect
of the appointment of said
trustees. The applicants also pray for an order directing the first
respondent to appoint an interim
board of trustees, pending the
outcome of an elections of trustees.
[13] The second to
fourteenth respondents raised several defences to Part B of the
applicants’ claim.
[14] The Master of
the High Court, being the first respondent, did not oppose Part B of
the application.
[15] Mr. Klopper,
counsel for the applicants, informed the court that the applicants
filed a Notice of Intention to Amend
paragraph 3 of the notice of
motion pertaining to Part B of their application. This
amendment was by agreement between the
parties and Mr. van Vuren,
counsel for the second to fourteenth respondents, confirmed same. The
amendment was granted.
[16] The applicants
then informed the court,
in limine
, that they object to the
respondents’ answering affidavit to Part B of the application.
[17] The applicants
requested that this affidavit should be ignored by the court and
declared as
pro non scripto
as the respondents did not obtain
leave from the court to file a supplementary affidavit.
[18] This objection
came as a surprise to the respondents as no objection was raised when
the Notice of Intention to Oppose
or answering affidavit to Part B
were filed.
[19] The
applicants’ practice note, filed in terms of the court’s
practice directive, is silent on the objection
raised
in limine
.
[20] The applicants
contend that Uniform Rule 6 makes provision for three affidavits and
it is trite that a party who wish
to file further affidavits, should
obtain leave from the court.
[21] The applicants
also argued that the respondents dealt with all the issues in its
answering affidavit to Part A of the
application and the answering
affidavit to Part B, is unnecessary.
[22] It was further
argued that should the court however allow the answering affidavit to
Part B of the application, the court
should grant the applicants
leave to reply to said affidavit.
[23]
The court was referred to
Hano
Trading CC v JR 209 Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another
[1]
where
the court set out the test to be applied in filing further
affidavits. In p
aragraph
11 it was held that Rule 6(5)(e)
“
establishes
clearly that the filing of further affidavits is only permitted with
the indulgence of the court. A court, as arbiter,
has the sole
discretion whether to allow the affidavits or not. A court will only
exercise its discretion in this regard where
there is good reason for
doing so.”
[24]
Reference was also made to
James
Brown & Hamer (Pty) Ltd (previously named Gilbert Hamer
& Co Ltd) v
Simmons
NO
[2]
:
“
It
is in the interests of the administration of justice that the
well-known and well-established general rules regarding the number
of
sets and the proper sequence of affidavits in motion proceedings
should ordinarily be observed. That is not to say that those
general
rules must always be rigidly applied: some flexibility, controlled by
the presiding Judge exercising his discretion in
relation to the
facts of the case before him, must necessarily also be permitted.
Where, as in the present case, an affidavit is
tendered in motion
proceedings both late and out of its ordinary sequence, the party
tendering it is seeking, not a right, but
an indulgence from the
Court: he must both advance his explanation of why the affidavit is
out of time and satisfy the Court that,
although the affidavit is
late, it should, having regard to all the circumstances of the case,
nevertheless be received.
”
[25]
The court was also referred to
Standard
Bank of SA Ltd v Sewpersadh & another
[3]
:
“
The
applicant is simply not allowed in law to take it upon himself and
(to) file an additional affidavit and put same on record
without even
serving the other party with the said affidavit.”
[26] The applicants
submit that the answering affidavit to Part B falls to be regarded as
pro non scripto
.
[27] It is further
submitted that should the court allow the said answering affidavit,
then the application should be postponed
allowing the applicants the
opportunity to reply thereto.
[28] The
respondents submit that after the judgment was handed down by the
honourable Justice Kumalo, the respondents filed
their Notice of
Intention to Oppose and answering affidavit to Part B of the claim,
as per the directive in the applicants’
Notice of Motion.
[29] The
respondents further argue that this answering affidavit to Part B
is
not a supplementary affidavit
and the respondents did not need to
ask the court for leave to file same. It is argued that it was
specifically requested
by the applicants in their notice of motion
Part B ‘that if the respondents wish to oppose Part B of the
application, they
should deliver their answering affidavit.’
[30] The
respondents contend that the applicants did not exercise their
remedies in terms of Rule 30 to say it is an irregular
step to file a
further Notice of Intention to Oppose or a further answering
affidavit. It is submitted that the applicants
also did not
launch an application to strike out the answering affidavit to Part B
of the application.
[31] The
respondents pointed out that on perusal of the applicants’
practice note no mention is made of the objection
that will be raised
to the answering affidavit to Part B of the claim. This
objection was in fact never raised prior to the
date of enrolment.
[32] According to
the respondents the answering affidavit to Part B contains other
averments and defences which were not raised
in the answering
affidavit to Part A. The respondents referred the court to
their defence of
res judicata
and that this court does not
have the necessary jurisdiction to hear the matter. The
respondents based the latter defence
on the judgment by the
honourable Justice Kumalo granting an Order that the entire
application is dismissed due to a lack of jurisdiction.
[33] The
respondents further stipulated that they have complied with every
directive in the applicants’ notice of motion.
[34] The applicants
challenge these averments and argue that this is one application with
one set of facts. The timelines
in Part B of the notice of
motion are to be read as part of the timelines set out in Part A of
the notice of motion. The
timelines stipulated in Part B are
not additional timelines as interpreted by the respondents, as it is
only one application.
[35] The applicants
referred to the court to sub paragraph (a) in Part B of the notice of
motion reading “within fifteen
[15] days” and allege that
this was only a typographical error as it should read “five [5]
days”.
[36] The applicants
argue that the respondents are taking ‘a second bite at the
cherry’ so to speak and the respondents
are trying to fill the
gaps by placing new information before court which is
ex post
facto
.
Consideration
the Applicants’ objection/point
in
limine
:
[37] In essence,
what the parties are asking the court is to interpret the notice of
motion and consider the case law referred
to from the bar during
argument of the point
in limine
.
[38] A notice of
motion sets out the relief that the applicant seeks and it gives a
directive to a respondent as to when and
where the application is to
be heard and what it should do to oppose, if it wishes to do so.
[39] The
respondents’ case is that the answering affidavit to Part B of
the application is not a supplementary affidavit
and leave to file
same is not sought by the respondents. The reason being, the
wording and directives in the applicants’
notice of motion
directed the respondents to file a second Notice of Intention to
Oppose and a second answering affidavit to Part
B of the application.
[40] The notice of
motion reads as follows:
PART A:
1.
Dispensing, insofar as Is necessary, with the
forms and service provided for in the Rules of Court and directing
that the matter
be heard as a matter of urgency;
2.
Interdicting and restraining the Second to
Fourteenth Respondents from taking any decisions on behalf of the
Trust relating to any
of the following pending the outcome of the
relief sought in Part B of the application, including any appeal to
any court against
the grant and/or refusal of such relief;
2.1.
The appointment of any further Trustees;
2.2.
The approval of any financial transactions on
behalf of the Trust;
2.3.
The conclusion of any business transaction,
including but not limited to:
2.3.1.
Entering into any joint venture, partnership or
similar relationship on behalf of the Trust;
2.3.2.
The cancellation of any existing business
relationships and/or contracts on behalf of the Trust;
2.3.3.
Entering into any agreement and/or obligation on
behalf of the Trust, which may have an influence on the financial
status of the
Trust;
3.
Directing that the Second to Fourteenth
Respondents pay the costs of Part A jointly and severally;
4.
Granting further and/or alternative relief.
TAKE
NOTICE FURTHER
that should any of the
Respondents intend opposing the relief sought in
Part
A
of this application, they are
required to:
(a)
Notify the Applicants attorneys in writing within
five (5) days of the service of this notice, of their intention to
oppose this
application;
(b)
To appoint, in such notification, and address
referred to in Rule 6(5)(d) at which they will accept notice and
service of all documents
in these proceedings; and
(c)
To deliver their answering affidavit, if any,
within fifteen (15) days of notification of their intention to
oppose.
TAKE
NOTICE FURTHER
to the extent that any
answering affidavit is delivered timeously, the Applicants will file
their replying affidavit within five
(5) days of receipt of the
answering affidavit.
PART B
1.
A declaratory order, that:
1.1.
The Second to Fourteenth Respondents were not duly
elected as Trustees of the Trust at a proper constituted annual
general meeting
of Trustees;
1.2.
The annual general meeting held on 13 July 2022,
was not duly constituted as same did not comply with the provisions
of clauses
16 to 21 of the Trust Deed;
1.3.
The Second to Fourteenth Respondents are not
eligible to be elected and appointed as Trustees or the Trust as they
are no longer
permanently resident on the Trust property as defined
in clauses 37 and 3.8 of the Trust Deed and in accordance with the
provisions
of clause 15 of the Trust Deed.
2.
An Order directing the First Respondent to cancel,
alternatively withdraw the letter of authority issued on 3 November
2022 in respect
of the appointment of Trustees of the Libuyile
Community Trust, it Number 4939/06(T).
3.
An order directing the First Respondent to appoint
the Applicants as Trustees of the Trust together with an Independent
Trustee
to be nominated by the First Respondent to act in such
capacity, pending the election of Trustees for the Trust at a duly
constituted
general meeting to be held within thirty (30) days from
date of this order.
4.
Directing that the Second to Fourteenth
Respondent’s to pay the costs of Part B jointly and severally.
5.
Granting further and/or alternative relief.
TAKE
NOTICE
the affidavit of JACOB CHARLES
MNISI together with annexures thereto, will be used in support of
this application.
TAKE
NOTICE FUTHER
that any Respondent who
wish to oppose the relief sought in relation to
Part
B
is required:
(a)
Within fifteen [15] days of receipt of this notice
of motion, to deliver a notice to the Applicants attorneys that such
Respondents
intend to oppose the application;
(b)
To appoint an address within fifteen km of the
office of the Registrar at which the Respondents will accept notice
and service of
all processes in such proceedings; and
(c)
To deliver their answering affidavit, if any,
within fifteen [15] days of notification of their intention to
oppose.”
[41] By plain
reading of Part A of the notice of motion the applicants:
[40.1] stated when
Part A will be heard;
[40.2] the relief
sought in Part A;
[40.3] give a
directive as to what the respondents should do when opposing Part A
and the timelines are stipulated;
[42] By plain
reading of Part B of the notice of motion the applicants:
[42.1] stated the
relief sought in Part B;
[42.2] give a
directive as to what the respondents should do when opposing Part B
and the timelines within which the respondents
should act.
Interpretation of
the Notice of Motion
[43] In terms of
rule 6(5) an applicant must give directive to a respondent –
[43.1] of the
timelines to files a Notice of Intention to oppose;
[43.2] of the
timelines to file an answering affidavit, should it choose to do so;
[43.3] the date on
which the matter will be heard should no answering affidavit be
filed;
[43.4] give an
address where applicant will accept service of above pleadings.
[44] Rule
6(5)(b)(iii) reads: “set forth a day,
not less than 5
days after service thereof
on the respondent, on or before
which such respondent is required to notify the applicant, in
writing, whether respondent intends
to oppose such application.”
[45] It seems that
the Rule permits an applicant to allow a longer period for the
respondent to file its notice of intention
to oppose. This seems to
be the case in the matter at hand. The notice of motion before
me gave the respondents fifteen days
in Part B, to file its notice of
intention to oppose Part B. This timeline differs from the timeline
set out in Part A to the notice
of motion.
[46] The
respondents are clearly informed to deliver their Notice of Intention
to Oppose within fifteen days and to deliver
their answering
affidavit within fifteen days thereafter.
[47] By the plain
reading of the notice of motion, the applicants chose the normal set
of affidavits in Part A and then give
the respondents the opportunity
to file another answering affidavit in Part B. The applicants,
however, chose to file only one
founding affidavit pertaining to Part
A and Part B of the application.
[48] The relief
sought and the processes in Part A and Part B seem to be separate
from each other, although partially operating
at the same time.
[49] The applicants
did not amend their notice of motion, nor did they file an
application in terms of Rule 30 to object to
the further Notice of
Intention to Oppose and further answering affidavit.
[50] I do not see
any justification for the applicants to argue that the filing of a
further affidavit is not allowed and
should be regarded as
pro non
scripto
.
[51] Although the
notice of motion is not a contract, the issue before this court is
the interpretation of the language and
words used. In doing so,
the court revisits the trite principles applicable to the
interpretation of contracts, with reference
to the following
judgments:
[52]
In
Privest
Employee Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Vital Distribution Solutions (Pty) Ltd
[4]
the
Supreme Court of Appeal held that one is firstly to consider the
language used, which must be given its ordinary grammatic and
grammatical meaning unless this results in absurdity, repugnancy, or
inconsistency with the rest of the agreement.
[53]
Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality Natal Joint
Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
[5]
pronounced that interpretation is the process of attributing meaning
to the words used, having regard to the context provided by
reading
the particular provision or provisions in the light of the document
as a whole and the circumstances attendant upon its
coming into
existence… The process is objective, not subjective….
The ‘inevitable point of departure is the
language of the
provision itself’, read in context and having regard to the
purpose of the provision and the background to
the preparation and
production of the document.
[54]
Macingwane
v Masekwameng and Others
[6]
said
the following as to how approach the interpretation of the words used
in a document:
“
[21]
The proper approach to statutory interpretation is well-known,
following the judgment of this Court in
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality Natal Joint
Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
[2012]
ZASCA 13
;
[2012] 2 All SA 262
(SCA)
offer
guidance as to how to approach
the
interpretation of the words used in a document
.
It is the language used, understood in the context in which it is
used, and having regard to the purpose of the provision that
constitutes the unitary exercise of interpretation.
[22] What this
means in the context of this case, is that one considers the language
used, which must be given its ordinary
grammatical meaning unless
this results in absurdity, repugnancy, or inconsistency with the rest
of the document. The language
used must be understood in the context
in which it is used and having regard to the purpose of the provision
of the document.”
[55] The
applicants’ proposed interpretation that the timelines
stipulated in Part B of their notice of motion and the
timelines
stipulated under Part A of said notice of motion should be read
together, cannot be correct if one considers the language
used, which
must be given its ordinary grammatical meaning in the context in
which it is used.
[56] The notice of
motion in Part A gives directives to the respondents and then gives
separate directives in Part B thereof.
For example, Part A and
Part B separately direct the respondents to “appoint and
address within fifteen km of the office
of the Registrar at which the
respondents will accept notice and service of all processes in such
proceedings.” The
relief sought in Part B also differs
from the relief sought in Part A. By plain reading of the notice of
motion, these examples
confirm the respondents’ argument that
they understood the directives in Part B of the notice of motion as
separate to Part
A and that a further answering affidavit should be
filed to Part B.
[57] It is my view
that the applicants, being the authors of the notice of motion,
should stand or fall by their notice and
the directives contained
therein.
[58]
The court was referred to
Olgar
v Minister of Safety and Security and Another
[7]
where it was held that a Notice filed out of time was an irregular
step and, although the applicant in that matter, did not seek
condonation in respect to such late filing, the first respondent
could simply not have ignored the notice, but should have brought
an
application to set it aside.
[59]
In
Gibson
& Jones (Pty) Ltd v Smith
[8]
the court held that the late delivery of a Notice of Intention to
Oppose was an irregular proceeding which the plaintiff was not
entitled to treat as a nullity. The correct procedure was first
to set aside the irregular proceedings.
[60] By applying
the same principle to the matter before me, the applicants should not
have ignored the second Notice of Intention
to Oppose and second
answering affidavit filed by the respondents and then only object
thereto on the day of the proceedings. The
Notice of Intention to
Oppose to Part B was served on 17 April 2023 and the applicants
elected to except same.
[61] Mr. Klopper
submitted that should the court accept the answering affidavit to
Part B then the application will have to
be postponed enabling the
applicants the opportunity to reply thereto.
[62] For proper
adjudication of the matter and in the interest of the parties, I am
inclined to allow the further answering
affidavit filed, subject to
the applicants’ replicating thereto.
[63] The court
requested short heads of argument and case law on the objection in
in
limine
raised by the applicants. The respondents added to
its heads of argument firstly, that this court does not have the
jurisdiction
to hear the application considering the judgment granted
by the honourable Justice Kumalo dismissing the entire application.
Secondly,
given the judgment referred to, this application has
been finalised and is
res judicata
.
[64] I do not
intend to deal with the merits of Part B of this application as the
court was not addressed on the merits. The
applicants and respondents
addressed the court only on the objection raised by the applicants,
which I have dealt with
supra
.
[65] All that
remains is the issue of costs.
[66] The
postponement of the relief sought in Part B of this application is
the result of an objection raised
in limine
by the
applicants.
[67] In my view,
the applicants were the primary cause of the matter having to be
postponed and therefore have to pay the
costs occasioned as a result
of the postponement.
ORDER:
[68] In the result
the following order is made:
1.
The relief sought in
Part
B
of the application is postponed
sine
die
;
2.
The respondents’ answering affidavit dated 5
May 2023, opposing the relief sought in Part B of the application, is
hereby
allowed;
3.
The applicants are granted leave to file their
replying affidavit to the respondents’ answering affidavit
referred to in paragraph
2 above, within 15 days of date of this
order;
4.
The applicants are ordered to pay the respondents’
costs occasioned by the postponement.
L BADENHORST
Acting Judge of the High
Court
Gauteng Division,
Pretoria
Counsel for
applicants: Adv JA Klopper
Instructed by:
Cavanagh & Richards Inc
Counsel for 2
nd
to 14
th
respondents: Adv SM van Vuren
Instructed by:
Neethling & Vosloo Inc
Date
of Hearing: 23 May 2023
Judgment delivered:
27 June 2023
[1]
2013
(1) SA 161
SCA
[2]
1963
(4) SA 656
(A)
at 660D-H
[3]
2005
(4) SA 148
(C)
at
paras 12-13
[4]
2005
(5) SA 276
(SCA) 281 par [21]
[5]
2012
(4) SA 593
(SCA)
par
[18]
[6]
(Case
no 626/2021)
[2022] ZASCA 174
(7 December 2022)
[7]
2012
(4) SA 127
ECG
[8]
1952
(4) SA 37
(T)//1952 (4) TPD 87
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