Case Law[2023] ZAGPPHC 1813South Africa
Majories Trading Enterprises CC v Monareng (A34/2022) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1813 (16 October 2023)
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Majories Trading Enterprises CC v Monareng (A34/2022) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1813 (16 October 2023)
Majories Trading Enterprises CC v Monareng (A34/2022) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1813 (16 October 2023)
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE NO: A34/2022
DOH:
24 August 2023
1.
REPORTABLE:
NO
/YES
2.
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
NO
/YES
3.
REVISED
SIGNATURE:
DATE: 16 October 2023
In the matter of:
MAJORIES
TRADING ENTERPRISES CC
APPLICANT
(Respondent
in the appeal and
Defendant
in the Court
a quo
)
And
KLEINBOOI
MONARENG
RESPONDENT
(Appellant
in the appeal and
Plaintiff
in the Court
a quo
)
In
re
:
KLEINBOOI
MONARENG
APPELLANT
And
MAJORIES
TRADING ENTERPRISE CC
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
THIS JUDGMENT HAS BEEN
HANDED DOWN REMOTELY AND SHALL BE CIRCULATED TO THE PARTIES BY WAY OF
EMAIL / UPLOADED ON CASELINES, ITS
DATE OF HAND DOWN SHALL BE DEEMED
TO BE 16 OCTOBER 2023
Bam
J (Collis J concurring)
A.
Introduction
1.
This is an application for additional
security by the respondent on appeal, Majorie Trading Enterprises CC.
Prior to dealing with the citation of the
parties I indicate that we deemed it prudent to adjudicate the
application to file additional
security prior to the hearing of the
appeal itself. I refer to the parties as they are in the
underlying appeal. That means,
for the appellant, even though he is
the respondent in this application, I refer to him as the appellant.
The application for additional
security is premised on the provisions
of the Magistrate’s Court Rules, rule 54 (4), which deals with
appeals in civil cases.
The rule provides:
‘
An
appeal shall be noted by the delivery of notice, and, unless the
court of appeal shall otherwise order, by giving security for
the
respondent's costs of appeal to the amount of R1000: Provided that no
security shall be required from the State or, unless
the court of
appeal otherwise orders, from a person to whom legal aid is rendered
by a statutorily established legal aid board.’
2.
The appellant, is an adult male and a taxi
driver. He is based in Pretoria, Gauteng. The respondent is a close
corporation duly
incorporated in terms of South African laws, with
its principal place of business situated on 1st Floor, Relimed
Building, 2[...]
B[...] Street, Pretoria, Gauteng
.
3.
Briefly by way of background, the appeal
arises from the decision of the Magistrates Court in which the
appellant’s claim
for delictual damages against the respondent
was dismissed with costs. The appellant was shot in the leg by an
employee of the
respondent. Arising from that shooting, the appellant
unsuccessfully claimed damages against the respondent. He is now
before this
court appealing the decision of the Magistrate.
4.
The respondent contends that the appellant
is a man of straw. He will not be able to satisfy an award of costs
in the event the
respondent succeeds in its defence. It further says
that appellant’s case is speculative and the amount of R1000 he
provided
as security is wholly insufficient to cover its costs of
appeal. It asks the court for additional security in the amount
of R 131 167.66.
B. Legal principles
5.
The application will be considered against
the legal principles as set out in the cases discussed here-below:
6.
In
Zietsman
v
Electronic Media Network Ltd. and
Others
, the court, entertaining an
appeal against the order of the Commissioner of Patents, that the
appellant provide security in the
amount of R 250 000.00 in respect
of each of the two respondents had the following to say:
‘
In
terms of section 17 (2) [of the
Patents Act 57 of 1978
] the court a
quo had a discretion to order the appellant to furnish security. Such
an order places a limitation on the right conferred
on litigants in
terms of s 34 of the Constitution… In terms of s 36
of the Constitution the right may be limited
in terms of a law of
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable
and justifiable in an open and democratic
society. … As the
validity of the section itself depends on the reasonableness and
justifiability thereof it must follow
that an order that a plaintiff
should furnish security, thereby limiting his right to have his
dispute resolved in a court, may
only be made if it is reasonable and
justifiable to do so.
[13]
In exercising his discretion in terms of s 17(2) a commissioner
must consider all relevant factors and balance them against
one
another. It is clear that the court a quo never did so…’
[1]
7.
The question whether to grant security
requires that the court balance competing interests. In
Giddey
NO
v
JC
Barnard and Partners
the Constitutional
Court had to consider a claim for security against a huge claim
brought by the liquidator of an insolvent company
against a firm of
accountants. Aggrieved by the order that he provide security for
costs in favour of the firm, the liquidator
appealed to the
Constitutional Court. In reasoning the issue, the Court remarked:
‘
[4]…Accordingly,
in determining whether an order for security should be made, a court
needs to take into consideration the
provisions of the Constitution
and in particular, section 34. In deciding whether it is appropriate
to require security for costs
to be paid, therefore, a court makes a
decision on a constitutional matter. The respondent’s argument
to the contrary must
therefore be rejected….
[8]
The courts have accordingly recognised that in applying section 13
[of the Companies Act 61 of 1973] , they need to balance
the
potential injustice to a plaintiff if it is prevented from pursuing a
legitimate claim as a result of an order requiring it
to pay security
for costs, on the one hand, against the potential injustice to a
defendant who successfully defends the claim,
and yet may well have
to pay all its own costs in the litigation. To do this balancing
exercise correctly, a court needs to be
apprised of all the relevant
information. An applicant for security will therefore need to show
that there is a probability that
the plaintiff company will be unable
to pay costs. The respondent company, on the other hand, must
establish that the order for
costs might well result in its being
unable to pursue the litigation and should indicate the nature and
importance of the litigation
to rebut a suggestion that it may be
vexatious or without prospects of success, Equipped with this
information, a court will need
to balance the interests of the
plaintiff in pursuing the litigation against the risks to the
defendant of an unrealisable costs
order.’
[2]
C. Analysis and
conclusion
8.
Although Giddey had to do with a claim by a
liquidator of a company in liquidation instituting proceedings
against a firm of accountants,
the remarks of the court are not
confined to instances involving section 13. As has already been seen
in
Zietsman
,
which involved individuals, in making the decision whether or not to
order security, the court exercises a discretion which requires
it to
consider all the relevant information.
9.
In
the present case the respondent says that the appellant has already
testified before the magistrate’s court and his case
was
rejected with costs in favour of the respondent. Following the case
the respondent wrote through its attorneys to the appellant’s,
requesting some undertaking that the appellant was capable of paying
not only the costs arising from the magistrate’s court
case but
including the costs envisaged in the respondent’s opposition of
the appeal
[3]
.
The appellant’s attorneys wrote back advising that the
appellant is the owner of taxi, allegedly being an asset of value
[4]
.
They added that following the injury, the appellant no longer
regularly drives. In response to this letter, the respondents sought
proof that the appellant was indeed the owner of the taxi. In their
reply, the appellant’s attorney’s advised that
the
earlier statement was made in error and that the appellant is not the
owner of the taxi.
[5]
10.
The appellant on the other hand submits
that the entire pursuit of additional security is aimed at stifling
his claim. He says he
has no duty to prove against speculative
statements that he is a man of straw and he is capable of paying the
respondent’s
costs. In argument counsel for the appellant, with
references to the authority in
Zietsman
and
Giddey
decried the amount of R131 167.00 sought by the respondent stating
that even if the court were to consider granting the respondent
security, the amount should not be exorbitant as it will effectively
close the doors of the court to the appellant in his quest
for
justice. Counsel emphasised the need for the court to carefully
consider the individual parties’ positions and their
respective
interests in the matter.
11.
We have considered the parties’
written and oral submissions. It is clear from authorities that the
court is called upon to
exercise a discretion in the strict sense. In
coming to the decision, this court takes into account,
inter
alia
, the appellant’s prospects
of success based on what is in the record, the respondent’s
prospects and the parties’
individual interests in the matter.
There is little by way of information supporting the appellant’s
means other than that
he drives a taxi and draws income from that
activity. I am confident that the court can take judicial notice of
the fact that a
taxi driver who does not drive for his own cause is a
person of relatively limited means. The court must thus take that
information
into account along with the implications in the event an
order were to be made for an amount of security beyond his means but
this
must be balanced against the risk that the respondent may
ultimately fund the litigation even in the event he were to succeed
in
his defence. Ultimately, the decision made must uphold the
interests of the parties and the interests of justice.
12.
The amount sought by the respondent of R
131 167 00 is based on a pro forma bill of costs drawn by a costs
consultant. The estimation
however, is not binding to the court. Nor
is it one of the considerations that the court must take into account
in order to serve
the interests of justice. The Constitutional
Court’s
ratio
in
Giddey is clear; a court must be minded that it is making a
decision on a Constitutional matter when deciding the question
of
security for costs.
13.
Accordingly, it is in the interests of
justice that the appellant provide security in the amount of R10
000.
D. Order
14.
The application for additional security
succeeds.
14.1
The appellant is ordered to provide security in the amount of R10 000
within six weeks from date of this order. Until such time that the
security in the aforementioned amount has been provided, the
appellant may not set down his appeal.
14.2
The costs of this application shall be held over for final
determination
of
the appeal.
N.N BAM
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT, PRETORIA
I agree:
C COLLIS
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT, PRETORIA
For
the applicant:
Adv
T.J Jooste
Instructed
by:
Albert
Hibbert Attorneys
Nieuw
Muckleneuk
Pretoria
For
the Respondents:
Adv
C Zietsman
Instructed
by:
Loubser
van Wyk Inc
Persequor
Park, Lynnwood,
Pretoria
Date
of Hearing:
24
August 2023
Date
of Judgement:
16
October 2023
[1]
Zietsman
v Electronic Media Network Ltd. and Others (11/07)
[2008] ZASCA 4
;
[2008] 2 All SA 523
(SCA);
2008 (4) SA 1
(SCA); 2008 BIP 1 (SCA) (7
March 2008)
[2]
(CCT65/05)
[2006] ZACC 13
;
2007 (5) SA 525
(CC);
2007 (2) BCLR 125
(CC) (1
September 2006), paragraph 4, 8
[3]
Caselines
10-17 paragraph 20.6
[4]
Caselines
10-17 paragraph 20.7
[5]
Caselines
10-17 paragraph 20.9
sino noindex
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