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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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[2023] ZAGPPHC 1831
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## Incasa Body Corporate v Rise Property Solution and Others (B5673/2023)
[2023] ZAGPPHC 1831 (23 October 2023)
Incasa Body Corporate v Rise Property Solution and Others (B5673/2023)
[2023] ZAGPPHC 1831 (23 October 2023)
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sino date 23 October 2023
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case
number: B5673/2023
Date
of hearing: 17 October 2023
Date
delivered: 23 October 2023
(1) REPORTABLE:
YES
/NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO
OTHERS JUDGES:
YES
/NO
(3) REVISED
DATE:
20/10/2023
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
INCASA
BODY CORPORATE
Applicant
and
RISE
PROPERTY SOLUTION
First Respondent
RUDOLPH
KROG
Second Respondent
OYENIYI
AKADI
Third Respondent
BEAUTY
BANKOLE
Fourth Respondent
JUDGMENT
SWANEPOEL
J:
[1]
This application came before me in the urgent court. The deponent to
the founding
affidavit, who appeared in person, says that he is the
president of the 'respondent' (which should read applicant), which is
the
lcasa Body Corporate. He attached a constitution of the so-called
body corporate which was signed by a number of the owners of the
lcasa sectional title scheme at a meeting held on 22 July 2023. The
constitution has as its theme "Reclaiming ownership of
lncasa
Body Corporate common property." The deponent says that he is
authorized to act for the body corporate by virtue of
the
constitution.
[2]
The first respondent is the managing agent for the scheme, who was
appointed by the
actual trustees of the body corporate. Second to
fourth respondents are three of the six trustees of the body
corporate.
[3]
Applicant seeks, firstly, an interdict restraining respondents from
either personally,
or through another person, acting on behalf of the
body corporate. Secondly, applicant seeks an interdict restraining
respondents
from bringing the body corporate into disrepute. Thirdly,
applicant seeks to interdict respondents from controlling,
administering
or managing the common property of the body corporate.
[4]
The founding affidavit is devoid of any factual context, save for a
bald allegation
that respondents intend to hold a meeting on 11
October 2023, which is apparently a threat to applicant, and which
would bring
the applicant into disrepute. There is no factual basis
laid for this averment.
[5]
Applicant relies on a finding by an adjudicator who was appointed in
terms of
section 54
of the
Community Schemes Ombud Service Act, Act
9
of 2011. The complaint was brought by one Maligana Edward Musehane,
evidently one of a group of breakaway owners of the scheme.
The
relief sought in the adjudication was the following:
[5.1]
That first respondent must relinquish its management role of the
scheme;
[5.2]
That the board of trustees be dissolved and new trustees be
appointed;
[5.3]
That foreign nationals be ordered to make available their residents'
permits;
[5.4]
That the identity of service providers be made known to owners, and
their accounts audited.
[5.5]
That all the files of the body corporate to be 'availed'.
[6]
The adjudicator held against the applicant in respect of all the
relief sought, either
on the basis that no case was made out, or that
the relief sought was moot. However, somehow, the applicant
interpreted the adjudicator's
findings to mean that it granted them
leave to hold their own general meeting, and to choose their own
trustees. To that end they
drafted their own "constitution",
and they held a meeting of aggrieved owners on 24 July 2023. At this
meeting new "trustees"
were chosen, and it is those
trustees who now drive this application.
[7]
The application is riddled with difficulties. From a procedural point
of view, applicant
has not complied with the directive that requires
an applicant to specifically deal with the grounds for urgency.
Applicant vaguely
refers to a meeting which was to be held by
respondents on 11 October 2023, but not only does applicant not say
why the meeting
is a matter of concern, applicant also set the matter
down for a date after the meeting had already been held, and the
proverbial
horse had bolted.
[8]
From a substantive point of view, applicant suffers from a number of
difficulties.
Respondents say that second to fourth respondents are
three of the lawfully elected trustees of the board of trustees, who
are
solely allowed to act for the body corporate. Not only must I
accept the respondent's version where it is in conflict with the
applicant's version
[1]
, the
facts also strongly support the respondent's averment. Applicant's
members do not seem to understand that they cannot simply
hold their
own meeting and install a rival board of trustees. They also do not
understand that nothing in the adjudicator's finding
gives them that
authority. I believe that it is clear that the applicant does not
have locus standi. The deponent to the founding
affidavit could,
therefore, also not be authorized by the non-existent applicant to
act on its behalf.
[9]
A further problem is that respondents say that there are three
trustees who have not
been joined, which is fatal in itself to the
application. The other three trustees have a direct and substantial
interest in the
outcome of this matter, and they should have been
joined as parties to the proceedings.
[10]
Finally, applicants have not made out any case for the relief sought.
They have not shown a clear
right, or at least a prima facie right to
the relief sought. They have alleged that they will be irreparably
harmed should the
order not be granted, but they have not supported
that averment with any evidence. Applicants have also not shown that
they have
no alternative remedy. It is not sufficient for an
applicant merely to make the bald allegation that the requirements
for an interdict
have been met. It must provide a factual basis for
the averment.
[11]
From the above it will be clear that the application must be
dismissed. Respondents argued that
the costs must be paid by the
deponent
de bonis propriis
. Respondent's argument is that
applicant does not exist. It has no legal personality, and any costs
order granted against it will
not be satisfied. Respondents say that
the only manner by which they may recover costs is if the deponent is
made to pay the costs.
[12]
Reluctant as I am to award costs against a person who is clearly not
legally qualified, and who
has taken a mistaken, but probably bona
fide position on the adjudicator's findings, I must agree with
respondents. The only way
in which respondents can recover their
costs is if the deponent is ordered to pay the costs.
[13]
I therefore make the following order.
[13.1]
The application is dismissed.
[13.2]
Mr. Emmanuel Sibadela is ordered to pay the costs of the application
de bonis propriis
.
SWANEPOEL
J
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION PRETORIA
COUNSEL FOR
APPLICANT:
None. Mr
Sibadela in person
ATTORNEY FOR
APPLICANT:
None.
COUNSEL FOR
RESPONDENT:
Adv. Z Schoeman
ATTORNEY FOR
RESPONDENT:
Kleynhans &
Swanepoel
Inc.
HEARD ON:
17 October 2023
JUDGMENT HANDED
DOWN ON:
23 October 2023
[1]
Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984 (3) SA
623
(AD)
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