Case Law[2023] ZAGPPHC 1907South Africa
Brinant Security Services (Pty) Ltd v Private Security Sector Provident Fund and Others (9102/2022) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1907 (13 November 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
13 November 2023
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Brinant Security Services (Pty) Ltd v Private Security Sector Provident Fund and Others (9102/2022) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1907 (13 November 2023)
Brinant Security Services (Pty) Ltd v Private Security Sector Provident Fund and Others (9102/2022) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1907 (13 November 2023)
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sino date 13 November 2023
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
CASE
NO: 9102/2022
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES
/ NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/ NO
(3)
REVISED:
DATE:
13/11/2023
SIGNATURE:
In
the matter between:
BRINANT
SECURITY SERVICES (PTY) LTD
Applicant
and
THE
PRIVATE SECURITY SECTOR PROVIDENT FUND
First Respondent
JZ
FANKOMO
Second Respondent
L
J
PHIRI
Third Respondent
THE
PENSION FUND ADJUDICATOR
Fourth
Respondent
JUDGMENT
(The
matter was heard in open court but judgment is handed down
electroni-cally by circulation to the parties/their legal
representatives
and by uploading it to the electronic file of this
matter on CaseLines. The date of the judgment is deemed to be the day
of uploading
thereof).
BEFORE:
HOLLAND-MUTER J:
[1]
The applicant launched this application in terms of section 30 P of
the Pension Fund Act, Act 24 of 1956 (“the Act”)
as
amended for an order to set aside the determination by the fourth
respondent of a complaint lodged by the second respondent.
[2]
The second respondent was out of time filing his notice of intention
to oppose and later his answering affidavit but the applicant
had no
objection that the court grants the necessary condonation to the
second respondent. The necessary condonation was granted.
[3]
The applicant seeks the that determination by the fourth respondent
dated 30 June 2022 relating to the second respondent’s
complaint be set aside in terms of section 30 P of the Act and that
the second respondent pay the costs of the application. The
second
opposed the application and requested the dismissal of the
application with costs.
[4]
There are two issues to decide: namely (1) whether the determination
by the fourth respondent has prescribed or is time barred
and (2)
whether the complaint procedurally complied with section 30A (3) of
the act.
FACTUAL
POSITION:
[5]
It is common cause that the applicant is a registered security
provider.
[6]
The applicant prior to 2016 faced serious opposition from some of its
employees against the deduction of pension fund contributions
from
their salaries resulting that some employees were not registered with
the first respondent and that no pension deductions
were made and
paid over to the first respondent.
[7]
After obtaining legal advice, the applicant registered all its
employees with the first respondent since February 2016. The
applicant thereafter proceeded to deduct the pension fund
contributions from the salaries of all employees and paid over to the
first respondent. The applicant contends that it made all payments
required to the fourth respondent and that there were no out-standing
contributions due.
[8]
The third respondent, one L J Phiri, did not file any notice to
oppose or opposing papers. Although not partaking in this
application,
the determination made by the fourth respondent with
regard to the third respondent remains a bone of contention for the
applicant.
The applicant however did not request the court to deal
with this aspect in similar way to the second respondent’s
matter
and only moved for prayers 1 & 4 of the Notice of Motion.
[9]
The second respondent was employed by the applicant for the period of
1 September 2004 to November 2021 before he was dismissed.
[10]
The fourth respondent indicated in its determination that the second
respondent received three (3) withdrawals from the pension
fund in
the amount s of R 5 367-79; R 33 811-76 and R 9 325-15.
It is however not clear from the determination by
the fourth
respondent when these withdrawals were done towards the second
respondent. These withdrawals can only take place at
the request if
the employee.
SECOND
RESPONDENT’S CASE:
[11]
The second respondent’s version is to a great extend in line
with that of the applicant save for the following:
11.1
The second respondent denies that he ever requested to be excluded
from being a contributor to the pension fund before 2016.
His version
is that he was under the belief that he was a contributing member of
the pension fund since becoming an employee of
the applicant. He
denies that he withdrew from the fund at any stage.
11.2
He tried to create the impression that the applicant’s
administration was poor in that at some stage employees no longer
received printed salary slips and that it was not possible for him to
access the electronic supplied salary slips.
11.3
He admits receiving three withdrawals from the pension fund.
Although no specific dates were given, it remains that he
received
these withdrawals. The annexed determination by the fourth respondent
is clear in this regard.
[12]
The applicant alleged that the second respondent, like other
employees, prior to 2016, opted to exit from the pension fund
for
reason of not wanting deductions made from their salaries. The second
respondent denies this. If the greater picture is taken
into account,
the version of the applicant ought to be accepted. This is a clear
example where the
Plascon-Evans rule
finds application where
two conflicting versions are before court and the court, in applying
the Rule, accept one and reject the
second. The version of the
applicant is accepted as indicated below.
[13]The
applicant annexed examples of other employees’ exit requests
and although it could not produce one for the second
respondent, the circum-stances favours the version of the applicant.
Firstly it proves that employees had the option; secondly
although
the dates are not clear, the second respon-dent made
[14]
In view of receiving the withdrawals from the pension fund on at
least three occasions, it is more in line with the version
of the
applicant that the second respondent opted out from the fund at some
stage but that since 2016 all employees became participants
in the
pension scheme. Receiving with-drawals can only mean two things
namely that the second respondent voluntary withdrew pension
monies
or that this happened when the employee decided to opt out of the
scheme. In view of any contrary evidence I am satisfied
that the
latter is the position in view of the circumstantial evidence by the
applicant. The second respondent failed to give any
version of his
own in this regard.
[15]
The allegation by the legal representative of the second respondent
in the heads of arguments that employees should be guarded
against
maladminis-tration of kind by the applicant and suggesting the
applicant is not bona fide before court is without any substance
and
is rejected. In my view the opposite is more on par that the
second respondent is not fully candid with the court. He
failed to
set out when and for what purpose the withdrawals were received.
LEGAL
POSITION:
[16]
Chapter VA of the Act deals with considerations and adjudications of
complaints with regard to administration of a fund, the
investment of
its funds or the interpretation of its Rules.
[17]
It is clear from section 30A(1) that the Adjudicator is not divested
from dealing with a complainant in the absence of it first
being
dealt with by the Fund, The Supreme Court of Appeal in
Municipal
Gratuity Fund vs Pension Fund Adjudicator {364/2022 at para 14-17
reasoned that the provisions of section 30A (1) gave rise to an
election for a complainant when submitting a complaint in terms of
section 30 to either lodge the complaint with the Fund or the
Adjudicator. This means that the Adjudicator is not divested from
dealing first with a complaint in the absence of it being dealt with
by the Fund. I am satisfied that the second respondent’s
lodging of the complaint direct to the fourth respondent does not
invalidate the process. This was confirmed in
Brinant Security
Services (Pty) Ltd v The Private Security Sector Provident Fund and
Four Others Case No A 113/2022 GDP
on 6 September 2023.
[18]
The High Court can set aside a determination in terms of section 30P
of the act. Section 30 provides that a party aggrieved
by a
determination may, within six weeks after date of the determination,
apply to the High Court for relief. The application was
lodged
timeously and the only remaining issue is whether the fourth
respondent erred when making its determination taking into
account
the whole period of employment and not limiting the determination to
three years before lodging of the complaint.
[19]
It is common cause that in this matter the applicant is aggrieved by
the determination and applies to the court to set aside
the
determination and refer it back to the fourth respondent to
reconsider its determination.
[20]
Section 30P empowers an aggrieved person to apply to the High Court
to consider the merits of the complaint regarding the determination
made by the fourth respondent and to make any order it deems fit.
This is the relief sought by the applicant to set aside the
determination under consideration.
[21]
Section 30I (2)of the Act makes the provisions of the
Prescription
Act 68 of 1969
applicable in respect of the calculation of the time
barred three year period referred to in
section 30I
(1). Of
significance is that the fourth respondent does not possess the
discretion to condone nor extend the time bar provided
for.
Section
30I
is simply a time bar and that the
Prescription Act’s
three
year period when calculating a determination has to be accounted for.
Section 30I
is clear that the Adjudicator (fourth respondent) shall
not investigate a complaint of the act or omission to which it
relates
occurred more than three years before the date on which the
complaint was received. This was confirmed in
Investic Employee
Benefit Ltd v Marais and Others
[2012] 3 All SA 622
(SCA).
There
is no room for any argument that the three year period was
interrupted as in normal prescription matters. It is a time bar
and
not a prescription period. The fourth respondent erred in this
regard.
[22]
The complaint by the applicant is that the fourth respondent failed
to calculate the determination taking into account that
it was
restricted to the years prior the complaint received. It is clear
that the fourth respondent could not include any period
from
March
2005 to December 2008
and from
August 2010 to February 2016
in its determination.
[23]
It is on this basis that the applicant seeks an order in terms of
prayers 1& 4 of the Notice of Motion. It has to be remembered
that the third respondent did not oppose the application and that
similar reasoning is applicable to this determination. In terms
of
section 30P of the Act the court may make any order it deems fit.
Under the circumstances it would be just and fair that the
determination regarding the third respondent be dealt with similar to
that of the second respondent.
[24]
I make the following order:
ORDER:
1.
The determinations in respect of the second and third respondents are
set aside in terms of section n 30P of the Pension
Fund Act, 24 of
1956.
2.
The second respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the
application on a party and party scale.
HOLLAND-MUTER
J
Judge
of the Pretoria High Court
Appearances:
For the Applicant:
Adv T Ellerbeck
tanyae@lawcircle.co.za
Attorney:
Arthur Channon Inc
michelle@channonattorneys.co.za
For Second
Respondent:
Me I L Snyman
Attorneys:
Legal Aid Pretoria
MphoMot@legal-aid.co.za
Heard on:
3 August 2023
Delivered on:
13 November 2023
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