Case Law[2023] ZAGPPHC 1994South Africa
Mogoai and Others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (120856/2023) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1994 (4 December 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
4 December 2023
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Mogoai and Others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (120856/2023) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1994 (4 December 2023)
Mogoai and Others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (120856/2023) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1994 (4 December 2023)
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sino date 4 December 2023
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
CASE
NO: 120856/2023
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHERS JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED
04
December 2023
In
the matter between:
THAPELO
JOSIAH MOGOAI
First Applicant
THE
BURGERS PARK COMMUNITY
2
ND
to 25
th
Applicants
and
CITY
OF TSHWANE METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY
Respondent
JUDGMENT
NGALWANA
AJ
[1]
South Africa has become a veritable cesspool of lawlessness.
[2]
Evidence of this is legion. People generally seem to do as they
please without any
fear of consequence, including arrest and
successful prosecution. Media reports have in recent times carried
stories about people
stealing electrical cables right on the doorstep
of a police station. The police, who are supposed to enforce the law,
have themselves
been at the receiving end of criminality. Others have
themselves been implicated in the very criminality the tide of which
they
are supposed to stem. An entire National Police Commissioner was
convicted of corruption.
[1]
Legislators, who are supposed to pass laws by which we are all
governed, have been accused of living high on the hog on salaries
that hardly justify their lifestyle. An independent panel of jurists,
led by a former Chief Justice, has found that the President,
no less,
“
may
have committed”
a
serious violation of section 96(2)(a) of the Constitution,
[2]
a serious violation of section 34(1) of PRECCA,
[3]
serious misconduct in that the President violated section 96(2)(b) of
the Constitution by acting in a way that is inconsistent
with his
office, and serious misconduct in that the President violated section
96(2)(b) by exposing himself to a situation involving
a conflict
between his official responsibilities and his private business. There
is even a suggestion that the President may be
implicated in money
laundering.
[4]
The Legislature,
which is supposed to hold the President accountable, decided that
these
prima
facie
findings do not deserve further investigation. The President, under
oath at a judicial commission of enquiry, characterised the
ruling
party as “
accused
number one when it comes to corruption”
.
[5]
Yet South African voters, like fanatical club football supporters,
continue to return the ruling party to power. Voters seem to
have
become numb to criminality. This is not a political statement. It is
an observation on the cosy relationship that South Africans
seem to
have with criminality. The state of the nation seems to be one of
endemic lawlessness.
[3]
There is another dimension to the national state of lawlessness: the
soft words South
Africans tend to use to describe certain crimes,
depending on the identity and station in life of the people who
commit them. In
his 1946 essay on
Politics
and the English Language
, George Orwell
succeeded in surgically peeling off the veneer of prosaic
respectability from what passes for “
modern”
English to expose the ugly lies ignominiously hidden beneath.
Mourning the perversion of the English language –
ostensibly
in the name of modernism but, in truth, with a view to
obfuscating and deceiving – he observed that the decline of a
language
must ultimately have political and economic causes. That
observation finds an austere ring of truth about it in the South
African language of choice in describing certain crimes. Indeed,
the great enemy of clear language is insincerity. For example,
when
senior company executives “
cook
the books”
, the media has
described it as “
accounting
irregularities”
instead of
calling it what it is: crime, and those who perpetrate it, criminals.
When senior company executives violate the Public
Finance Management
Act, with considerably deleterious consequences for near-absent
service delivery to ordinary South Africans,
even lawyers have tended
to characterise this criminality as “
irregularity”
instead of the crime that it is, and those who perpetrate it as
criminals.
[4]
It is little wonder, then, that people should feel justified in
pitching a tent or
similar structure on a sidewalk next to a public
park, call it a “
home”
, and rush to court on an
urgent basis to complain when the municipality removes their “
homes”
.
They even demand that they be compensated for violating municipal
by-laws, even after they have, on their own version, unlawfully
reconstructed their makeshift homes. Can they be faulted for
believing that if common criminals, legislators, the Executive, and
law enforcement officers are seen getting away with far more serious
criminality, that they too will get away with their lawlessness?
Criminality?
[5]
South Africa is supposed to be a constitutional democracy where
everyone is supposed
to enjoy equal protection and benefit of the
law, and no one is supposed to suffer arbitrary deprivation of
property. But in recent
times it has become clear to all who care to
observe, through an objective lens untainted by factional tint, that
South Africa’s
fabled Constitution delivers much
constitutionalism only in text and not in the lived experiences of
millions of those who live
here. This case exposes that soft
underbelly spectacularly. It is not the first such case to do so and,
dispiritingly, it is not
the last. Elected public representatives at
all three levels of government, who are supposed to bring the lofty
promise of the
text of the Constitution to life for the benefit of
everyone, have become numb to ephemeral public outrage and Judicial
rebuke
– even Judicial orders that are binding on them –
safe in the knowledge that this too, as many before it, shall pass,
and then it is on to the next vacuous election promise.
[6]
Regrettably, urgent court is not a platform that is suited to
developing the law or
diving deeper into the root problem that lies
hidden beneath the facts that serve before it. This case is
significant less for
what is pleaded and more for what is not.
Considered contextually, it implicates not just the Respondent
municipality and its endeavours
to enforce municipal by-laws, as it
must. It also implicates provincial and national departments
responsible for human settlements,
provincial and national treasury
for budget allocation in respect of housing development, the home
affairs department for its handling
of immigration affairs, the
national legislature for the kind of laws it produces to regulate the
influx of immigrants, law enforcement
officials for how they police
and enforce municipal by-laws, and numerous other role players
including the courts for the kind
of orders they make in cases like
these, setting precedent that may or may not result in sustainable
solutions to immigration challenges.
[7]
In this application the Applicants, a group of 26, want to be
restored immediately
to peaceful and undisturbed access to their
makeshift homes, immediate return of their building materials and
other movable assets,
or reconstruction of their “
homes”
.
In the alternative they demand that the South African state provide
them with emergency temporary accommodation within 48 hours.
They
also want damages in the amount of R1,500 each “
in respect
of the removal of their personal possessions”
. These
“
homes”
– made largely of cardboard and
plastic if the photographs attached to the pleadings are any
indication – are constructed
on sidewalks near a park in the
country’s capital, Pretoria.
[8]
As I indicated to Counsel for the Applicants in open court, who
conceded that the
Applicants’ occupation of the sidewalk is a
violation of municipal by-laws, a court cannot grant an order that
facilitates
continued violation of municipal by-laws. On their own
version, the Applicants have rebuilt their structures where they were
removed.
The deponent to the founding affidavit says: “
Having
no alternative accommodation and having been rendered homeless, we
were left with no choice but to rebuild our homes as we
had nowhere
to go”
. This renders urgency moot. The Applicants have
taken the very relief they seek from this court into their own hands.
No reasonable
court should endorse lawlessness.
[9]
But what is the alternative? That in my view is a question not for
urgent court but
for the court hearing the Part B application, in
which the Applicants seek, among other things, an order directing the
Respondent
municipality “
to implement the Street
Homelessness Policy for the City of Tshwane 2015 ... which includes …
creating, developing and sustaining
access to diverse housing options
that are affordable, accessible and well-located”
.
[10]
But what happens in the meantime? This court cannot turn a blind eye
to lawlessness (criminality)
and self-help that the Applicants have
themselves brought to its attention. By occupying the sidewalk, in
cardboard and plastic
structures, they are acting in violation of
municipal by-laws as their Counsel has rightly conceded. They cannot
remain there.
Where they go is a problem that the Respondent must
resolve, working together with the various other governmental
role-players
some of which I have mentioned above. Housing is a
national multi-departmental problem. The Constitution places an
obligation
on the state to “
take
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of [the right
of
access to adequate housing”
. For
this the Respondent points to a shelter at 2 Struben Street. But the
Applicants say this shelter is “
not
conducive to individuals to reside in”
.
But then how is a sidewalk, with no ablution facilities, more
conducive to human habitation?
[11]
According to a media article attached to the Applicants’
replying affidavit (the content
of which has not been disputed by the
Respondent in a further affidavit) the Respondent’s
spokesperson is quoted as saying
the Respondent’s plan is to
shut down 2 Struben Street and relocate residents to alternative
accommodation. He said, as recently
as 28 November 2023, 2 Struben
Street “
has been declared unsafe for the people to stay in
and several homeless shelters have been identified to accommodate the
homeless”
. In the result, the Respondent should be able,
within a reasonably short space of time, to accommodate the
Applicants in the shelters
that its spokesperson is reported as
saying it has already identified to accommodate the homeless. That is
the order I intend to
make.
[12]
I have already found that this application is not urgent by reason of
the Applicants, on their
own version, having already taken the law
into their hands by rebuilding their makeshift structures where they
were removed. That
really is the end the application. But striking
the application off the roll solves nothing. The Applicants’
desperate situation
may beget desperate measures, as they have
already demonstrated by rebuilding their unlawful structures in
continued violation
of municipal by-laws. The never-ending cycle of
lawlessness may continue while elected representatives get a free
pass to continue
making more election promises of building “
a
million houses”
they have no
intention of keeping. For that reason, I am not inclined to strike
the application off the roll, as that would contribute
to the
continuing cycle of lawlessness and the problem will serve again
before another court without the needle having moved an
inch. As
section 34 of the Constitution makes clear, courts exist to
resolve
disputes between litigants by application of law,
not to avoid disputes by doctrinal refuge.
[13]
The Applicants say the Respondent requires a court order in order to
enforce municipal by-laws.
This needs addressing.
[14]
I agree with Counsel for the Respondent that the right to housing is
not absolute. It is subject
to limitation by law of general
application. Municipal by-laws are part of such law. The Respondent’s
by-laws relating to
public amenities prohibit the erection of any
shelter, house, shack or structure on public amenities with the
intention to live
in it. Any person who contravenes this by-law (or
any of the many others in relation to health, indecent behaviour,
liquor, food
and fires) is guilty of a criminal offence and may, on
conviction, be liable to a fine of up to R10 000 or a term of
imprisonment
of up to 12 months. Sidewalks are a public amenity as
refined. The Respondent has the power to enforce these by-laws
without the
need first to approach a court for a court order. If the
Respondent or its officials needed to obtain a court order with a
view
to enforcing a by-law every time a by-law is violated, then the
by-laws would be redundant.
[15]
In the final analysis, the Applicants, who say they have rebuilt
their “
homes”
in a public amenity, cannot remain
there in violation of the law. This must be called what it is –
criminality. Breaking
the law is a criminal act regardless of who
breaks it. It does not become less so just because the person
breaking it is a billionaire
or a homeless immigrant.
[16]
But the Respondent must be held to its promise of providing
alternative accommodation that it
says it has already identified. To
that end, I propose issuing an interim order directing the Respondent
to provide alternative
accommodation for the Applicants that is
conducive to human habitation within 48 hours of the date of this
order. The Constitution
affords that right to the Applicants within
the Respondent’s available resources. I have already cited a
media article (not
disputed by the Respondent) that the Respondent
has already identified homeless shelters in which to accommodate the
homeless.
It does have available resources to accommodate the
Applicants.
[17]
Such are the bizarre circumstances of this case that the Applicants
have, despite breaking the
law, and continuing brazenly to do so,
nonetheless been successful in securing something resembling their
alternative relief in
paragraph 4 of the notice of motion. This is
more a function of pragmatism and, ironically, the vindication of the
rule of law
in what is supposed to be a constitutional democracy than
the merits of their case.
[18]
In my view, it would not be in the interests of justice to strike
this application for lack of
urgency. A preferable outcome is one
that holds elected representative to their promise, and one which the
text of the Constitution
itself makes. Correspondingly with South
African voters maturing to the level of holding their elected
representatives to the promises
they make, it behoves the courts to
step in, in accordance with the oath of office of all judicial
officers, and “
uphold and protect
the Constitution and the human rights entrenched in it, and …
administer justice to all persons alike
without fear, favour or
prejudice, in accordance with the Constitution and the law”
.
It is in the fulfilment of that oath of office that I make the order
that I propose to make.
[19]
This court cannot interdict the Respondent municipality from
enforcing municipal by-laws. If
the Applicants’ prized
belongings should go missing in the process of the enforcement of the
law by authorities, there are
remedies in law for that, about which
their lawyers will no doubt advise them.
[20]
No proper case has been made out for “
emergency
constitutional damages”
.
[21]
The Applicants have asked for leave to approach this court for their
Part B application on the
same papers, duly supplemented. I have no
difficulty with that. But there has to be a time period within which
the Part B application
must be launched, otherwise the interim relief
I propose may turn out to have final effect. In the circumstances, I
think it fair
to both parties that the interim order I propose should
pend the launching of the Part B application, failing which it will
lapse.
Order
In the result, I make the
following order:
1.
Pending the outcome of Part B application
contemplated by the Applicants, the Respondent is directed to provide
to the Applicants,
within 48 hours of this order, alternative
accommodation that it says it has already identified, and that
alternative accommodation
must be fit for human habitation.
2.
The Applicants are granted leave to
approach this court on the same papers, duly supplemented, for the
determination of Part B of
the notice of motion within two months of
this order and no later than Tuesday 6 February 2024.
3.
The costs in this application shall be
stand over for determination at the hearing of Part B of the notice
of motion.
4.
Should the Applicants fail to launch its
contemplated Part B proceedings within the time period stipulated in
paragraph 2 of this
order, the relief granted in paragraph 1 of this
order shall lapse.
V NGALWANA
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION OF
THE HIGH COURT, PRETORIA
Delivered: This
judgement was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically
by circulation to the
Parties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to
the electronic file of this matter on
CaseLines. The date for
hand-down is deemed to be 04 December 2023.
Date
of hearing: 30 November 2023
Date
of judgment: 04 December 2023
Appearances:
Attorneys
for the Applicants:
Lawyers
for Human Rights, Pretoria
Counsel
for the Applicants:
Z
Mahamba (060 941 2925)
Attorneys
for Respondent:
Ncube
Inc
Counsel
for Respondent:
SG
Zwane
[1]
S
v Selebi 2012 (1) SACR 209 (SCA); 2012 (1) SA 487 (SCA)
[2]
Which
says members of cabinet, of which the President is one, may not
undertake any paid work other than one for which they have
been
elected or appointed in public office.
[3]
The
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Practices Act, 2004, which
enjoins all persons in positions of authority (such as a President)
who know or ought reasonably to have known or suspected that another
person has committed crimes including theft involving R100,000
or
more to report such knowledge or suspicion to the Directorate for
Priority Crime Investigation.
[4]
The
Ngcobo Panel observed as follows in its
Report
of the Section 89 Independent Panel Appointed to Conduct a
Preliminary Enquiry on the Motion proposing a Section 89 Enquiry
,
and concluded that the President has a case to answer for not
reporting the theft of “
probably
more than US$580,000”
in foreign currency that had been concealed in pieces of furniture
at his Phalaphala farm to the DPCI as required by section
34(1) of
PRECCA:
“
243.
…
One reason for forcing people to
report theft of R100,000 or more is to stamp out money laundering or
organized crime by forcing
individuals to report theft of large sums
of money that the owners of the money may be reluctant to report for
fear of being
called upon to account for the stolen money.
244. A person who keeps
huge sums of illicit money concealed at his or her house is unlikely
to report the theft of such money
for fear of being discovered that
he or she is involved in money laundering. This would be too much to
expect of human nature.
For this reason, the legislature
considered it prudent to require any person who has knowledge of the
commission of the offence
of theft to report it. If you happen to
know or ought reasonably to have known or suspected that this money
has been stolen from
the owner, the law requires you report this
theft so that the owner of the money can be called upon to explain
the source of
the money as well as why he or she did not report the
theft.
245. The owner of the
money stolen is also required to report theft of his or her money.
That you happen to be a victim
of crime yourself, matters not. You
must report the theft.”
[5]
At
the State Capture Commission on Wednesday 28 April 2021
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