Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 4South Africa
Danga v S (A77/2021) [2022] ZAGPPHC 4 (11 January 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
11 January 2022
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Danga v S (A77/2021) [2022] ZAGPPHC 4 (11 January 2022)
Danga v S (A77/2021) [2022] ZAGPPHC 4 (11 January 2022)
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sino date 11 January 2022
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case
number A77/2021
REPORTABLE:
YES/NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHERS JUDGES: YES/NO
REVISED
DATE:
11 JANUARY 2022
In
the matter between
TINASHE
DANGA
APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE
STATE
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
MAKWEYA
AJ
INTRODUCTION:
1.
The appellant appeared before the Regional
Magistrate, Springs, charged with rape in terms of section 3 of the
Sexual Offences and
Related Matters, Act 32 of 2007. He was found
guilty and he was sentenced to Life Imprisonment in terms of
section
51(1)
of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
. Although he
appealed his conviction and sentence, in terms of 309(1)(a) of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
the appellant has an automatic
right to appeal his conviction and sentence.
THE FACTS
2.
C[....] T[....] was the mother of the
complainant. She testified that on 19 November 2018 at around 18h00,
the complainant arrived
home from school. She and her husband
confronted the complainant and were adamant to know why she had come
home late. The complainant
explained that she and a friend came from
U-Safe (typed “Usays”) where they had gone to buy a cake.
When her husband
threatened her with a hiding, she reported that she
was raped on two occasions by the Appellant, also known to her as
Sutsu. These
incidents took place at Appellant’s shack. They
proceeded to lay a charge against the Appellant after the complainant
was
medically examined and the doctor confirmed that she was sexually
violated. The doctor testified that the complainant had a medical
condition and that she could not hold wind due to her being anally
penetrated.
3.
The incidents happened on the two
occasions, the 18 August 2018 and the second one on the 19 October
2018.On both incidents the
complainant did not inform her parents
about the rape. The Complainant only informed her parents about both
incidents on the 19
November 2018 for the first time. She stated that
she was afraid the Appellant will kill her as he had threatened her
after both
incidents.
4.
The complainant, N[....] M[....], testified
that her friend Eliza, asked her to accompany her to the Appellant’s
house to
fetch a phone. When Eliza asked for the phone, the Appellant
called her and said, they must come and do “stupid things”.
She thought they were playing as she did not understand what he was
talking about, however, Eliza responded saying the ‘Appellant
must start with N[....]’. Thereafter she was pushed on the bed,
her one hand and feet were tied to the bed while she was
laying on
it. She was lay on her stomach and she was also blindfolded and
undressed. A person then penetrated her anally and had
sexual
intercourse with her. She was thereafter threatened with death by the
Appellant should she inform anyone about the incident.
The appellant
and Eliza were enjoying each other’s company and she could be
heard saying’ it’s nice ‘while
the complainant was
still blindfolded and sexually assaulted by the Appellant.
5.
The second incident happened when she
was from school, and she was thirsty, she went to ask for water from
the wife of Appellant’s
brother. Appellant was however alone at
the house at that time when she requested water. The Appellant asked
her to come inside
the house, he then locked the gate and pushed her
onto a bed. She was tied and her head was covered like the first
time. She was
also sexually assaulted anally. The Appellant again
threatened to kill her should she say anything. She did not tell her
parents
immediately about the incidents and only did so on the day
she arrived late at home on the 19 November 2018, when she was
confronted
for being late.
6.
During cross examination of the
complainant’s mother she testified that the complainant was
beaten twice by her father before
she could tell them about the rape
incident by the Appellant.
7.
However, during cross-examination of the
Complainant, she testified that she was not beaten by her father as
she told them what
had happened immediately when he was about to beat
her. She told them about the incident with the Appellant because her
parents
did not believe her as they kept on saying she was dating
someone. She further testified that she did not see what happened to
Eliza because she was blindfolded, but she heard her saying it was
nice. She heard that after the Appellant was done raping her
and
thereafter the blindfold was removed from her face. She did not see
who removed it, however, the Appellant and Eliza were in
the room
with her.
8.
It was also put to her that the Appellant
was informed by the community that complainant was raped on the 19th
of November 2018,
the same day when he was arrested. The complainant
denied that she reported that she was raped on the day of the arrest
of the
Appellant. The appellant did not cross examination the
witnesses any further with the crucial evidence before court and he
did
not even cross examine the doctor with regard to the injuries he
testified about.
9.
Appellant testified that on the 19th of
November 2018 he went to work and only learned that he was accused of
rape of the Complainant
after he knocked off duty. It was said that
the complainant came from his place and her bum was bleeding. He went
to complainant’s
house where the mother of the complainant
accused him of rape. According to her, the rape took place that day.
He denied that the
complainant came to his place during August and
October 2018. He nevertheless stated that the complainant and Eliza
came to his
house in March 2018 to collect a phone that was charged
there, but denied that he raped the complainant. He further stated
that
his brother and his wife were also present when the phone was
collected. The Appellant did not take his evidence further.
10.
During cross-examination the Appellant
testified that the mother of the complainant said the complainant was
coming from his house,
but when she testified, she said the
complainant was coming from U-Safe shop. He stated that he had a
close relationship with the
complainant and her parents. However, the
complainant’s mother falsely implicated him, because she wanted
him to drink alcohol
and wanted him to have girlfriends. Further, the
Appellant went on to say that the complainant’s mother
conspired against
him and the complainant did not have any problem
with him.
11.
THE ISSUES
12.
The issue is whether the conviction and
sentence was inappropriate and, further, whether the trial court
misdirected itself in finding
that there were no substantial and
compelling circumstances entitling it in terms of section 51(3) of
the Act to deviate from imposing
the prescribed minimum sentence.
13.
THE LAW
14.
A court of appeal is not at liberty
to depart from the trial court’s findings of fact and
credibility, unless they are vitiated
by irregularity, or unless an
examination of the record reveals that those findings are patently
wrong. The trial court’s
findings of fact and credibility are
presumed to be correct, because the trial court, and not the court of
appeal, has had the
advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses,
and is in the best position to determine where the truth lies.
15.
The trial court treated the evidence of the
complainant with caution, because she was a young single witness on
the aspect of rape.
Even where there were some minor discrepancies
between her evidence and the evidence of her mother. The
discrepancies in the evidence
of the complainant and her mother were
properly considered by the learned regional magistrate.
16.
The doctor’s findings and the
evidence of complainant provided corroboration in material respects
for the credibility of her
evidence. Doctor Thobejane stated that her
observations showed that the Complainant was anally penetrated and
her sphincter was
damaged to an extent that she could not hold air,
as a result it made her uncomfortable. The evidence of Dr. Thobejane
was consistent
with the evidence of the Complainant that she
penetrated in the anus.
17.
The question of whether the allegation was
made voluntarily is a factual one and depends on the circumstances of
each case. The
Complainant was not pushed to implicate the Appellant
in anyway. She was merely asked why she came home late and she was
threatened
with beating by her father, there was no mention of the
appellant or any question about the rape from her parents. Everything
she
told them was voluntarily. Even though her mother testified that
they suspected that she was dating and that she was allegedly beaten
twice by her father. There was no mention of the appellant’s
name from them except from the complainant herself. Therefore,
it
cannot be said by the Appellant’s counsel that the complaint
was not voluntary. The trial court dealt with this issue
well, by
finding that the complainant was not influenced in implicating the
Appellant.
18.
Despite the Appellant’s denial that
the Complainant and her friend came to his place on the days stated
above, he admitted
that they once came to his place in march 2018 to
collect a phone which was left by Eliza to be charged by the
Appellant. The facts
which are similar to what the complainant told
her parents when confronted by her father.
19.
The Appellant’s Counsel submitted in
paragraphs 19-23 in heads of argument that the Honorable Court should
draw a negative
inference against the state for its failure to call
Eliza as witness. The Respondent submitted that such an inference can
only
be made if the witness was available (at court) and not called
by the state. In this instance such inference cannot be made, because
the witness was not available and could not be traced.
20.
Counsel further submitted that the
State did not prove that penetration of the complainant took place
without her consent. It is
submitted that the circumstances under
which the complainant was raped does not leave room for any other
inference than that it
was without consent. The Appellant’s
Counsel also argued that should we find that the Appellant had sexual
intercourse with
the complainant such should be taken as consensual
sexual intercourse with her.
21.
The Respondent submitted the Court must
further take into consideration that anal penetration took place and
that it is unlikely
that the complainant would have consented to
this. Furthermore, if it happened with consent it would not have been
necessary for
the Appellant to threaten the complainant that he would
kill her if she mentioned it to anyone.
22.
The Respondent’s Counsel submitted
that the circumstances under which the complainant was raped does not
leave room for any
other inference than that it was without consent.
The Court must further take into consideration that anal penetration
took place
and that it is unlikely that the complainant would have
consented this. Furthermore, if it happened with consent it would not
have
been necessary for the Appellant to threaten the complainant
that he would kill her if she mentioned it to anyone.
23.
I agree with the argument of the
respondent’s counsel, that there could not have been consent,
looking at the evidence given
at trial court and the circumstances at
which this incident happened, the blindfolding, anal penetration,
death threats made and
the age of the complainant and that of the
Appellant. I am in agreement that the complainant was raped and the
defence of consent
an afterthought as there was overwhelming evidence
against him in court.
24.
It is true that the court must evaluate the
evidence before it in its totality and judge the probabilities in the
light of all the
evidence as the trial court arrived at in its
judgement. When the trial court looked at the evidence in totality it
did not find
any material contradictions between the evidence of the
complainant and her mother. The court admitted that there were
contradictions
but it had to understand the circumstances it was
coming from and whether it affected their credibility in a negative
way. It found
that the fact that the complainant said she went to
U-save or pick and Pay cannot affect her credibility in a negative
way.
25.
The fact whether she was first hit by her
father before she could talk or whether she was not hit, she just
talked about the threat
or being assaulted. The court looked at that
and it accepted that the evidence of the complainant is true, that
she at some stage
went to the Appellant’s place with Eliza. The
court found that there was no motive to implicate the appellant by
the complainant
except that he was in the same room with her and
Eliza when she was raped in her anal. Further to that there was no
evidence before
it that suggested that the complainant’s family
tried to influence her to implicate him.
26.
In the circumstances, the court
a
quo
found correctly that the only
reasonable inference to be drawn from the established facts was that
it was the Appellant who
had raped the complainant. I can therefore
find no fault with the court
a
quo
’s reasoning or with its
conclusion, that the state proved beyond reasonable doubt that
the appellant had raped the complainant.
I recommend that the appeal
against the conviction be dismissed.
27.
SENTENCING
28.
The prescribed minimum sentence of life
imprisonment is applicable due to the fact that the complainant was
12 years old at the
time of the incident. It is conceded that the
rape of a child is a serious offence and there is an obligation on
our legal system
to deal with such offences appropriately. It is
submitted that a substantial period of direct imprisonment is called
for in most
of these cases.
29.
The appeal court has to determine whether
the trial court misdirected itself in finding that there were no
substantial and compelling
circumstances entitling it in terms of
section 51(3) of the Act to deviate from imposing the prescribed
minimum sentence. In determining
whether or not substantial and
compelling circumstances were present, the trial court relied on the
personal circumstances of the
appellant as stated in the
pre-sentencing report and victim assessment report compiled by a
Social Worker.
30.
The Appellant’s Counsel submitted
that although the appellant was 24 years of age he cannot be regarded
as immature, he still
has the prospect of a long productive life
ahead of him. Life imprisonment is the most severe sentence that a
court can impose.
It is intended to endure the length of the natural
life of the offender and leaves no room for rehabilitation. The
appellant can
still rehabilitate and integrate into society as a
useful member of the community.
31.
The Respondent’s Counsel submitted
that the sentence is supported by the evidence of the doctor and
complainant, it is respectfully
submitted that the court a quo did
not misdirect itself or commit a serious irregularity in evaluating
all the relevant factors
with regard to sentence, and that the
sentence is also not disproportionate or shocking. He submitted that
the appeal against sentence
should be dismissed.
32.
The Supreme Court of Appeal in
S
v Malgas 2001(1) SACR 469 (SCA)
at
paragraph 25(1), laid down the determinative test in order to
establish whether or not there are substantial and compelling
circumstances to deviate from minimum sentences:
“
If
the sentencing court on consideration of the circumstances of the
particular case is satisfied that they render the prescribed
sentence
unjust in that it would be disproportionate to the crime, the
criminal and the needs of society, so that an injustice
would be done
by imposing that sentence, it is entitled to impose a lesser
sentence.”
33.
Further to that, in Malgas it was
stated that in determining whether the prescribed sentence is
proportionate to the particular
offence, a trial court looks to the
offence in the context of whether the circumstances render it unjust
and disproportionate to
impose the sentence. In this context the
“offence” as stated S v Dodo 2001(3) 382 (CC) at para 3
“
consists
of all factors relevant to the nature and seriousness of the criminal
act itself, as well as all relevant personal and
other circumstances
relating to the offender which could have a bearing on the
seriousness of the offence and the culpability of
the offender.”
If on consideration of the sentence it would be unjust and
disproportionate, then the court is obliged to
impose the lesser
sentence.
34.
The Appellant’s Counsel, stated
in his heads of argument that, it is conceded that comparative case
law is not binding on
the Court, it is however submitted that widely
divergent sentences for similar cases are not ideal in any criminal
justice system.
[See: S v McMillan
2003 (1) SACR 27
(SCA) at
paragraph 10.]
35.
In S v MM; S v JS; S v JV
2011
(1) SACR 510
(GNP), The Court reduced the sentences as stated in the
following paragraphs:
36.
In S v MM, the appellant was convicted
on rape of his 12-year-old stepdaughter in their family home. On
appeal the sentence of life
imprisonment was set aside and a sentence
of 12 years’ imprisonment was imposed.
37.
In S v JS, the appellant pleaded
not guilty and was subsequently convicted to life imprisonment. On
appeal the court found that
it was not dealing with the category of
the worst rape. The sentence of life imprisonment was set aside and a
sentence of 12 years'
imprisonment was imposed on appeal.
38.
In
S
v JV
2011 (1) SACR 510
(GNP), the
appellant was convicted of two counts of rape of his two daughters.
The two sentences of life imprisonment were set
aside and replaced
with two sentences of 15 years' imprisonment, which were ordered to
be served concurrently.
39.
In this case, the appellant presented
the following personal circumstances at the time of the incident, he
was 24 years’ old,
he had no previous convictions, he has no
formal education but was gainfully employed as a builder and he spent
21 days short of
2 years in prison pending the outcome of the trial.
As per the pre-sentence report stated that he was a good boy who had
a good
relationship with his siblings and he was taking care of his
mother and unfortunately she died on the 24 August 2020.
40.
I am of the view that the injuries
sustained during the sexual assault were serious, and that it was
aggravating that the appellant
penetrated the complainant anally on
two occasions. This calls for a lengthy term of imprisonment.
However, while life imprisonment
is the prescribed sentence, having
regard to the trite principles in S vs Zinn discussed above and the
cumulative effect of those
principles and the personal circumstances
of the appellant, I find that the learned Magistrate misdirected
himself by imposing
life imprisonment.
41.
Dr. Thobejane testified that the
complainant’s anus did not have injuries but there was poor
hygiene. Further to that, there
was funneling and cupping, she could
see rectal pink mucosa. There was no hard faeces in the rectum, but
there was laxity and the
tone of the anus was decreased, though her
conclusion was that the anal findings were consistent with chronic
anal penetration.
She further testified that funneling is when the
shape of the anal cavity looks like a funnel. It is a bit dilated in
the exterior
and it is a bit narrowed towards in the inside. She also
testified that the way the anus was injured, when you touch it and it
automatically dilated while it’s supposed to be closed under
normal circumstances. As a result of the anus which was dilated
and
not closed as it is supposed and the Complainant could not hold the
air due to chronic anal penetration.
42.
Respondent’s Counsel, further stated
in his heads of argument that the complainant suffered physical
injuries that did not
receive medical attention, because her parents
did not have the financial means to help her, which the Doctor also
confirmed during
her evidence that the complainant was not attended
by a surgeon to assist her, as her parents did not have money. It
appears that,
for the same reason, she also did not receive
counselling for her psychological problems.
43.
The learned magistrate and the victim
impact report did not deal further with the consequences of the
injury after Dr. Thobejane
had recommended a review of the
complainant's injuries having regard to his observations. The assault
took place August to October
2018 and the appellant was sentenced on
29 October 2020 being two years later. No evidence was tendered as to
whether after such
lengthy period, the complainant still required a
review to establish whether reconstructive surgery was still
required, whether
the complainant still had problems passing wind, or
problems regarding containment of faeces in the anus. No evidence was
tendered
as to whether or how the injuries impacted the complainant
physically growing into adulthood. The only information available is
that Dr. Thobejane who testified that the mother had informed him
that the complainant had not been to review due to lack of funds.
44.
Although the crime committed by the
Appellant was serious, in considering sentence the court quo should
have regard to the triad
principles in by S vs Zinn
1969 (2) SA 537
(A)
.
Those
principles and personal circumstances of the appellant taken together
and also what was raised in the pre-sentence report
gave rise to
substantial and compelling circumstances being present.
45.
In conclusion the sentence of life
imprisonment imposed by the trial court is inappropriate in the
circumstances and warrants interference
on appeal.
It
is my view that had the trial court taken all the circumstances
cumulatively into account, it should have found that substantial
and
compelling circumstance were present which called for a sentence
other than life imprisonment for rape.
46.
In the result the following order is
made:
1, The appeal on
conviction is dismissed,
2. The appeal on sentence
is upheld. The sentence of life imprisonment is set aside and
substituted with a sentence of 25 years’
imprisonment which is
antedated to 29 October 2020.
___________
MAKWEYA
T
(ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT)
I
agree,
___________
TLHAPI
V. V
(JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT)
Counsel
for the Appellant:
ADV. F. VAN AS
Legal
Aid South Africa
Tel:
0795240929
Email:francoisv@legal-aid.co.za
Counsel
for Respondent: ADV.
GJC MARITZ
Office
of the Director of Public Prosecutions:
Tel:015
351-6832/0842579436
Email:gjcmaritz@npa.gov.za
Date
of hearing –– 05 AUGUST 2021
Date
of Judgment: 11 JANUARY 2022
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