Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 22South Africa
Becker and Others v Financial Services Conduct Authority and Others (23807/2020) [2022] ZAGPPHC 22 (1 February 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
1 February 2022
Headnotes
and the registrar was ordered to reconsider the debarment order.
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Becker and Others v Financial Services Conduct Authority and Others (23807/2020) [2022] ZAGPPHC 22 (1 February 2022)
Becker and Others v Financial Services Conduct Authority and Others (23807/2020) [2022] ZAGPPHC 22 (1 February 2022)
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sino date 1 February 2022
REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES /
NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES /
NO
(3)
REVISED: YES /
NO
(4)
SIGNATURE
CASE
NO: 23807/2020
In the matter
between:
ILSE BECKER
First Applicant
EUGENE BECKER
Second Applicant
FUSION GUARANTEES (PTY)
LTD
Third Respondent
and
THE FINANCIAL SERVICES CONDUCT
AUTHORITY
First Respondent
THE HONORABLE MINISTER TITO
TITUS
MBOWENI, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
THE
MINISTER OF FINANCE OF THE
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH
AFRICA
Second Respondent
THE NATIONAL CREDIT
REGULATOR
Third Respondent
JUDGMENT
NCONGWANE
AJ:
[1]
In this matter, the applicants seek an order declaring sections 154,
167 and 231 (“the
impugned sections”) of the Financial Sector
Regulation Act No 9 of 2017 (“the FSR Act”) unconstitutional as
well as orders
declaring that those impugned sections are invalid and
should be set aside.
[2]
In addition to the orders of unconstitutionality and invalidity, the
applicants’ seek
an order suspending the declaration of invalidity
for a period of 12 (twelve) months and that the court should direct
the second
respondent (“the Minister”) to correct the alleged
constitutional defects in the FSR Act within 12 (twelve) months of
this court
order.
[1]
[3]
It is the applicants’ contention that the impugned sections of the
FSR Act violate the following
of the applicants’ entrenched
constitutional rights as contained in the Bill of Rights:
[3.1]
Section 22 - the right to freedom of trade, occupation and
profession,
[3.2]
Section 33 – the right to fair and just administrative action;
[3.3]
Section 34 – the right of access to the courts.
[2]
[4]
The application is opposed by the Financial Services Conduct
Authority (“the Conduct Authority”) and by
the Minister of
Finance of the Republic of South Africa (“the Minister”). The
third respondent is the National Credit Regulator
played no part in
the proceedings and did the Prudential Authority who due to the
direct interest it may have in the outcome of the
application was
subsequently joined but filed a notice to abide the decision of the
court.
[5]
Before me, Mr Mundell SC, with Mr D. Van Niekerk, appeared for the
applicants and Mr Cockrell SC appeared for
the first respondent. Ms
Gcabashe SC with Ms P. Jara appeared for the second respondent.
Adumbrated
version of the applicants’ case
[6]
The thrust of the applicants’ contention is that the impugned
section 154 of the FSR Act, regardless that
it provides that, prior
to imposing of a debarment order (which is provided for in section
153 of the FSR Act) in respect of a natural
person, the Conduct
Authority must, inter alia, invite the applicants to make submissions
on the matter, the impugned section however,
does not, afford a right
of access to an impartial and independent tribunal or forum which
will objectively assess the merits of
the proprietary of each order.
The process, as contented by the applicants, is inherently unfair for
the reasons that section 154
does not require that prior to making of
the debarment order or the imposition of a fine those results be
adjudicated upon in a fair,
open public hearing.
[7]
The constitutionality of section 167 of the FSR Act which makes
provision for the imposing by the Conduct Authority
of an
administrative penalty, in the event that, an entity such as Fusion
has contravened the financial sector law, is challenged
on the
grounds that, it does not afford the applicants the rights to have
the dispute regarding the imposing of the administrative
penalty
and/or the quantum thereof resolved by the application of law in a
fair public hearing before an independent and impartial
tribunal or
forum.
[8]
In the applicants’ notice of motion and the founding affidavit, a
claim for an order of unconstitutionality
in respect of both sections
230 and 231 of the FSR Act was pursued. Applicants have elected not
to persist in seeking relief in relation
to section 230 of the FSR
Act.
[3]
In this regard, the
submissions were only in relation to the relief on the declaration of
invalidity in respect of section 231 of
the FSR Act. A submission
made on behalf of the applicants is that although section 230 of the
FSR Act allows for a reconsideration
by the Tribunal of a decision by
the Conduct Authority at the instance of an aggrieved person, section
231 of the FSR Act substantially
limits the benefit of that right by
stipulating that an application for such a reconsideration does not
suspend the decision unless
the Tribunal so orders
[4]
.
[9]
The constitutionality of the impugned sections are weighed against
the provisions of sections 22, 33 and 34
of the Constitution which
ensure that everyone has the right to freedom of trade, occupation
and profession, to administrative action
that is lawful, reasonable
and procedurally fair and to have any dispute that can be resolved by
the application of law decided in
a fair public hearing before a
court or, where appropriate, by an independent and impartial tribunal
or forum.
BACKGROUND
[10]
The primary component of the third applicant’s
(“Fusion”)
business is the issue of building guarantees and deeds of surety,
primarily in the import, export and construction industries
[5]
.
[11]
The first and second
applicants
(“the
Beckers”)
are
Fusion’s directors and its controlling minds.
[12]
Fusion
is a credit provider in terms of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005
(“the
NCA”)
[6]
.
Fusion is not registered as a short-term insurer in terms of the
Short-Term Insurance Act, 53 of 1998
(“the
STIA”),
and makes historical contention, as submitted on its behalf, in that,
registration as an insurer is unnecessary as the guarantees/deeds
of
surety in issue do not constitute “
any
kind of short term insurance business”
as
contemplated in section 7 of the STIA.
[13]
The Conduct Authority was established in terms of section 56 of the
FSR Act and is primarily responsible for
the application and
enforcement of the FSR Act in its entirety.
[14]
The Act introduced what is called “
twin
peaks”
model of financial regulation
[7]
which resulted in a creation of a market conduct regulator (“
the
Conduct Authority”)
and the new prudential regulator called the
(“Prudential
Authority”)
.
As stated above, it is common cause between the parties that the
Prudential Authority has an interest in the outcome of the
application
and was subsequently joined as the respondent but abides
by the decision of the court.
[15]
The object of the FSR Act is, inter alia, to “
achieve
a stable financial system that works in the interests of financial
customers”
and “
support
balanced and sustainable economic growth in the Republic”
.
The impugned section 154, 167 and 231 of the FSR Act are integral
part of the mechanism that are intended to achieve these objects.
Section 153 (1) of the Act authorises the Conduct Authority to make a
debarment order in respect of natural persons in the event
that the
Conduct Authority is satisfied that the jurisdictional requirements
of section 153 (1) have been met, and justifies a debarment
order
[8]
.
[16]
A brief overview of the dispute as contained in the historical record
of the proceedings that have preceded this application
and to which I
was referred by counsel for the parties, only serves to give context
and the factual matrix of the subsisting dispute
between the parties.
[17]
The factual background to this application can be traced as far back
as 2010 when the Financial Services Board (“the
FSB”) the Conduct
Authority’s predecessor, initiated an investigation into Fusion’s
business.
[9]
The investigation
report found that the applicants conducted an unregistered insurance
business by issuing guarantee policies “
in
contravention of section 7 (1) of the STIA”
[18]
Based on the report by inspectorate team of the FSB the FSB concluded
that the first applicant no longer satisfied the
requirements of
“
honesty and integrity"
established by section 8 of
FAIS. As a consequence, Ms Becker was barred for a period of five (5)
years.
[19]
Most significantly, when that matter served before the appeal board,
that forum found in favour of Ms Becker on the same grounds
of appeal
and the appeal was upheld and the registrar was ordered to reconsider
the debarment order.
[20]
Despite that finding the appeal board concluded that, by issuing
guarantees, Fusion has been conducting business of a short
term
insurer in conflict with section 7 of the STIA.
[21]
Fusion sought the review of that finding in the High Court (Gauteng
Provincial Division) but that review application was
dismissed with
costs as was an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court
of Appeal.
[10]
[22]
Subsequent thereto, the registrar of short term insurance issued a
directive that the first applicant and Fusion were to
cease any
contravention of section 7 (1) of the STIA and should not issue
guarantee policies without being registered as a short
term insurer.
The directive is contained in the notice dated the 12
th
of February 2020 (“the 12
th
February notice”).
[11]
The
applicant submitted that it has presented a response to the Conduct
Authority setting out the opposition to the notice and submit
that
they have arguable grounds of opposition to the 12
th
February notice and this application is not merely dilatory. The
respondents did not seriously seek a finding from court that the
applicants’ application, as argued on the papers, is aimed at
delaying the inevitable outcome of the Conduct Authority’s
processes,
Accordingly, I am not required to make such a
determination.
THE
CONCISE ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
[23]
The crisp issues before me can be summarised as firstly, involving
the determination on whether the impugned provisions
are
constitutionally compliant. This aspect must per force interrogate
whether sections 154 and 167 as currently formulated, seek
to promote
and fulfil, rather than undermine section 22, 33 and 34 of the
Constitution.
[24]
The Conduct Authority has not yet taken any final decision to make a
debarment order or impose an administrative penalty.
This application
has nothing to do with the merits of any debarment order that may be
issued or any administrative penalty that may
be imposed in due
course, if so required. The question is whether the applicants would
have remedies at their disposal to challenge
any debarment order or
any administrative penalty if and when those decisions are made and
if so, whether the applicable remedies
meet constitutional muster.
[25]
The application is concerned with the constitutionality of the
impugned provisions. It is not based on any subjective circumstances
of the applicants, but it involves an objective enquiry. If the
impugned provisions are unconstitutional, then they will be
unconstitutional
against the world at large and not merely against
the applicants. This judgment therefore is not aimed at resolving the
enduring
dispute between the applicants and the Conduct Authority by
analysing the submissions made by the parties regarding that pending
dispute. My determination is only in respect of the relief sought in
Part B of the Notice of Motion, and in particular, to consider
each
of the impugned provisions and the constitutional rights relied on by
the applicants in challenging those provisions.
THE
APPLICANTS’ ATTACK ON SECTION 154 OF THE FSR ACT
[26]
Section 154 of the FSR Act creates a regime that must be adhered to
by the Conduct Authority if it is minded to make a
debarment
order.
[12]
[27]
The regime contemplated in section 154 is that prior to the issue by
the Conduct Authority of the debarment order, and
having established
that the natural person (such as the Beckers) has contravened the
Financial Sector Law in a material way, or has
traded, adverted,
adduced or procured another person (such as Fusion) to contravene
such a Financial Sector Law, the Conduct Authority
is, inter alia,
required
[13]
to invite the
affected person to make submissions on the matter within a reasonable
period
[14]
. In deciding on
whether or not to make a debarment order the Conduct Authority is
required to take into account at least any submissions
made by the
affected person. Self-evidently, section 154 deals with matters of
process and not matters of substance.
Violation
of Section 22 of the Constitution
[28]
In their founding affidavit, the applicants contend that section 154
of the FSR Act violates section 22 of the Constitution.
[29]
Section 22 of the Constitution provides as follows:
“
Every
citizen has the right to choose their trade, occupation or profession
freely. The practice of a trade, occupation or profession
may be
regulated by law.”
[30]
The meaning of section 22 was considered in the leading case of
Affordable Medicines
Trust v Minister of Health
2006 SA 247
(CC).
The Constitutional Court held as follows:
1.
“Section 22 protects every citizen’s
right “
to
choose their trade, occupation or profession freely.”
The
right to choose one’s trade includes the right to practice it. Any
law which prohibits a trade altogether or bars any citizen
from
practising it, limits this right. Such a limitation is
unconstitutional and invalid unless it can be justified in terms of
section
36 of the Constitution.
[30.1]
Section 22 only protects a citizen’s freedom of choice. It does not
protect the manner
in which a trade is practised. The state may
freely regulate the practice of a trade as long as it does not
prohibit the trade altogether
or exclude citizens from it.
[30.2]
A law which regulates the manner in which a trade is practised
without prohibiting the
trade altogether or excludes anybody from it,
does not need to be justified in terms of section 36 of the
Constitution. It merely
have to conform to the requirements
applicable to all law, which means that it must be rational and must
not infringe any of the
other provisions of the Bill of Rights.
[31]
It is apparent that “
only
a citizen”
may claim the benefit of the first sentence of section 22. Since
Fusion is not a citizen, it cannot claim that benefit. The first
and
second applicants contend that it is the Conduct Authority’s
intention to make a debarment order against them that “
constitutes
an infringement”
of their constitutionally guaranteed right to freely choose their
trade, occupation or profession.
[15]
This contention in my view, appears to be oblivious of the precise
provision of section 154 of the FSR Act, which does not make any
provision for debarment. It is section 153 of the FSR Act that
empowers the Authority to debar persons, but the constitutionality
of
section 153 is not challenged by the applicants. Section 154 merely
specifies the process that must be followed before the making
of a
debarment order. In their heads of argument, the applicants make no
any further argument than merely alluding that the impugned
section
154 violates section 22 of the Constitution.
[16]
[32]
On the grounds stated above, the debate regarding the challenge to
section 154 based on section 22 has no merit, and insufficient
to
influence a different view.
Violation
of Section 33 of the Constitution
[33]
The applicants argue that the rights “
in
terms of section 33 of the Constitution are violated and inasmuch as
[the Conduct Authority’s] conduct in making the debarment
order
and/or imposing the administrative penalty does not amount to just
administrative action.“
[17]
The
principle of subsidiarity
[34]
The applicants’ contention is that section 154 of the FSR Act
violates section 33 of the Constitution.
[35]
It is common cause that the requirements of section 33 of the
Constitution have found expression in the Promotion of Administrative
Justice Act, 3 of 2000
(“PAJA”)
.
[18]
In this matter, the applicants rely directly on an alleged violation
of section 33 of the Constitution and seek to contend that section
154 of the FSR Act violates section 33 of the Constitution directly.
Before me, during argument, Mr Mundell persisted with the assertion
that the fact that PAJA has been enacted to give effect to section 33
is irrelevant for purposes of the applicants’ case. He disavowed
PAJA and confined the applicants’ case strictly on the provisions
of section 33 of the Constitution, as violated by the impugned
section 154 of the FSR Act.
[36]
In my view, this contention is not sustainable because of the
principle of constitutional subsidiary. The principle entails
that
“
where
legislation is enacted to give effect to a constitutional right, a
litigant may not bypass that legislation and rely directly
on the
constitution without challenging that legislation as falling short of
the constitutional standard.”
[19]
The
principle has been developed by the Constitutional Court in a long
line of cases.
[20]
The
respondents, relying on the principle of subsidiarity, contend that
the applicants’ reliance on section 33 of the Constitution
to the
exclusion of PAJA is misconceived. I find merit in the respondents’
contention that principle of subsidiarity applies in
this matter and
should be enforced.
[37]
O’Regan J explained the matter clearly in
Mazibuko
[21]
“
where
legislation has been enacted to give effect to the right, a litigant
should rely on that legislation in order to give effect
to the right
or alternative challenge the legislation has being inconsistent with
the Constitution.”
Particularly,
the principle of subsidiarity means that if legislation gives effect
to the Constitution and the legislation is alleged
to fall short of
the Constitutional standards, it is the legislation that must be
challenged as being unconstitutional and recourse
cannot be had
directly to the Constitutional right. The majority of the
Constitutional court made the point in
My
Vote Counts
:
[22]
“
Axiomatically,
it cannot be that the principle of subsidiarity applies only where
the legislation does exactly that which is constitutionally
required.
If that were the case, they could hardly ever be any meritorious
challenges based on constitutional deficiencies or other
basis of
constitutional invalidity.”
[38]
Jafta J, made the same point with reference to PAJA in his dissenting
judgment in
PG
Group
:
[23]
“
[112] … Where legislation
has been passed to give effect to constitutional rights, the party
that seeks to vindicate those rights
must rely on that legislation
and not directly on the Constitution. Therefore, it would not
have been competent for the review
applicants to rely on the
principle of legality sourced directly from the Constitution.
[113]
…Litigants should not be allowed to sidestep PAJA where it applies,
by relying on the principle of
legality. To permit this would
seriously undermine PAJA and the constitutional principle of
subsidiarity…”
[39]
The applicants further contend that the FSR Act does not contain
provisions that entitle the Conduct Authority to exercise the
discretion contemplated in section 3 (3) of PAJA.
[24]
[40]
Amongst others, section 3 (3) of PAJA provides that, in order to give
effect to the right to a procedurally fair administrative
action, an
administrator (such as the Conduct Authority) may, in its discretion,
give an affected person an opportunity to:
[40.1]
obtain assistance and, in serious or complex cases, legal
representation,
[40.2]
present and dispute information in argument,
[40.3]
appear in person.
[41]
The contention is that these rights (guaranteed by the constitution)
have been removed from the applicants. An analysis
of the hearing
provided for in section 3 (3) of PAJA including the provisions of
section 154 of the FSR Act, has to occur in conjunction
with section
91 of the FSR Act which makes it clear when it provides as follows:
“
The
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act applies
to any administrative
action taken by the financial sector regulator in terms of this Act
or a specific financial sector law.”
[42]
Accordingly, the contention that the FSR Act does not contain the
provision which entitle the Conduct Authority to exercise
that
discretion and in the circumstances the applicants are precluded from
addressing the Conduct Authority in requesting that prior
to any
decision being made which is adverse to the applicants, be afforded
fair and proper hearing and to be entitled to test the
evidence on
which the first respondent intends to rely, is not entirely correct.
The discretion provided for in section 3 (3) of
PAJA has not been
removed by the FSR Act. But to the contrary, section 91 of the FSR
Act makes it clear that section 3 (3) of PAJA
applies to any
administrative action contemplated by the Conduct Authority.
An
impartial and an independent Tribunal
[43]
The applicants contend that, if a debarment order is to be made, an
affected person should be afforded a fair and public
hearing before
an impartial independent Tribunal or Forum to assess the relevant
evidence.
[25]
In the absence
of such a hearing, the applicants’ complain that the Conduct
Authority would be “
judge,
jury and executioner”.
[26]
[44]
The applicants’ argument is therefore that section 33 of the
Constitution requires that an affected person be afforded
“
a
full hearing before an impartial Tribunal or Forum before a decision
is taken.”
[27]
[45]
For this reason, the applicants ask for an order declaring that
section 154 is unconstitutional “
to
the extent that it does not provide for a hearing before an impartial
Forum prior to the decision maker imposing the intended decisions
and
sanctions”.
[28]
[46]
On the other hand, the Conduct Authority contends that applicants
have confused the right to fair administrative action
(section 33 of
the Constitution) with the entitlement to have a dispute resolved
before a court or independent Tribunal (section
34 of the
Constitution). The applicants, so the argument goes, seemingly want
to super impose the right enshrined in section 34 of
the Constitution
onto administrators. In effect, what the applicants are saying is
that administrative action may only be performed
by an independent
Tribunal or Court. In my view, the applicants’ startling
proposition cannot be correct because it elides the
distinction in
section 33 and section 34 of the Constitution. There is nothing in
the language of section 33 of the Constitution
that refers to a
hearing before an “
independent and impartial Forum”
. That
is indeed language of section 34 of the Constitution, but section 34
is not concerned with administrative action. The Constitutional
Court
rejected a similar argument in
Islamic Unity Convention v Minister
of Telecommunications
2008 (3) SA 333
(CC),
which Authority was
relied upon by both counsel for applicant and for first respondent in
their submissions.
[47]
The Constitutional Court, as per Jafta J, remarked as follows:
“
[53]
In
this case we are not concerned with a court of law or with the fair
resolution of social conflict, but with a regulatory body that
performed an administrative function. The question is whether a
constitutional challenge against legislation conferring investigative
and adjudicative powers on an administrative tribunal like the BMCC,
based on institutional bias, can be sustained under the right
of
access to court provisions of section 34 of the Constitution.”
[54] It
was submitted on behalf of the first respondent that section 34 was
not implicated in this case and that section 33
was. Counsel
for the applicant argued, however, that the “dispute” was whether
the applicant had breached the Code of Conduct
which was determined
by the BMCC by the application of that Code of Conduct (a law) to the
facts in relation to the complaint.
The guarantees of
independence impartiality and fairness in section 34 are not limited
to a hearing before a court, but extend to
a hearing before other
tribunals or fora resolving disputes by the application of law.
This is buttressed, so the argument
continued, by section 8(1) of the
Constitution
which provides, inter
alia
,
that
the Bill of Rights applies to all law and all organs of state,
including the BMCC.
[55] ..In
view of the basis of the applicant’s constitutional challenge, it
is unnecessary to express a firm opinion on this
issue. It
suffices to say that it is doubtful whether section 34 is implicated
in the present matter. Even if the complaint
could be
characterised as a “dispute” the BMCC did not resolve it.
The BMCC’s function of investigating and adjudicating
the complaint
was but the first of a two-stage process. It was a higher
authority, namely ICASA, which took the final decision.
The
writers Currie and De Waal submit on this issue that before an
administrative agency has taken a final decision, there is no
“dispute” that can be resolved by an application of law. This
view is indeed persuasive.
[48]
It is accepted that section 230 and section 235 of the FSR Act
guarantee the applicants a hearing before an independent
Tribunal and
a Court respectively. This right however can only be exercised after
the Conduct Authority has made its decision (which
issue is not
before me). The Tribunal is an independent impartial body that
operates independently of the Authority.
[49]
Confronted by the availability of this remedy, the applicants are
driven to contend that the right of access to a court
or tribunal in
terms of the FSR Act is “
not
real” but is a “chimera”.
[29]
[50]
In advancing their argument in support of this contention, the
applicants submit that before the Authority makes a decision
to
impose a debarment order, they have no right to “
an
impartial and independent Tribunal or Forum”
.
[30]
This argument boils down to the fact that, almost all administrative
actions may be unlawful since they are routinely performed by
decision makers that do not function as independent Tribunals, I am
unable to be persuaded by this assertion. In any event, there
is
nothing in section 33 of the Constitution that guarantees the
applicants a hearing before an independent and impartial Tribunal
before a decision is taken to impose a debarment order. The first
respondent’s contention in this regard is that the applicants
have
actually been afforded such a hearing. The applicants were given from
the 12
th
of February 2020 until 1
st
June 2020 (a period of three and a half months) to state their case
in response to the intention notice. The extension requested
by the
applicant was granted. The indulgence afforded to the applicants was
reasonable, both from the perspective of section 154
(2) of the FSRA
(which requires a notice period of 1 month) and section 2 (b)(ii) of
PAJA (which requires reasonable opportunity).
As matters stand
currently, the Conduct Authority has not yet decided whether to allow
the applicants to appear in person (as contemplated
in section 3 (3)
of PAJA) before a final decision is made. I therefore, conclude that
the applicants’ rights in terms of section
33 of the Constitution
are in no way violated by section 154 of the FSR Act.
Violation
of Section 34 of the Constitution
[51]
Section 34 of the Constitution guarantees three distinct rights.
Those are:
[51.1]
Right of access to a court or other Tribunal or Forum,
[51.2]
The Tribunals or Forums, other than courts, be independent and
impartial when they engage
in the resolution of legal disputes, and
[51.3]
The creation of a due process guarantee which requires that the legal
disputes to which
it applies are decided in a fair and public
hearing.
[31]
[52]
The applicants contend that, because the Authority is vested with the
power to debar, their rights under section 34 of
the Constitution
have been violated. In terms of the FSR Act, it is only once the
Conduct Authority has made a final decision that
a dispute may be
said to arise that “
can
be resolved by the application of law”
,
within the meaning of section 34 of the Constitution. It is on this
ground that the first respondent contends that applicants have
conflated the administrative process that may result in a dispute
between them and the Conduct Authority with the right to have such
a
dispute determined in a court of law.
[32]
[53]
As pointed out elsewhere in this judgment, the Conduct Authority has
not made any decision in respect of the dispute between
the
applicants and the Conduct Authority. In my view, until such time the
Conduct Authority has taken a final decision, there is
no dispute on
which a court may adjudicate. The applicants’ contention that a
finding as regards to the contravention of law can
only be determined
by impartial and independent adjudicators or courts cannot be
correct. If this were to be correct it would mean
that almost all
administrative actions would be unconstitutional since countless of
such decisions are taken by decision makers that
do not operate as
independent Tribunals.
[54]
Accordingly, if a final decision were to be made by the Conduct
Authority, the applicants will at that stage be able to
exercise the
guaranteed right to a hearing before an independent Tribunal, since
applicants, if aggrieved by that decision, will
be entitled to
approach the Tribunal in terms of section 230 of the FSR Act to
reconsider the decision. In addition thereto, section
235 of the FSR
Act entitles a party to proceedings or an application for
reconsideration of a decision who is dissatisfied with an
order of
the Tribunal to institute proceedings for judicial review of the
order in terms of PAJA or any applicable law.
[55]
I accordingly agree with the respondents’ contention that there is
nothing in section 154 of the FSR Act that violates
the applicants’
rights under section 34 of the Constitution. Before approaching a
court in order to have any dispute with the Conduct
Authority
determined, PAJA requires that applicants must first exhaust any
internal remedy as may be available. In this instance,
the applicants
will be entitled to make application to the Tribunal for
reconsideration if aggrieved as a result of any decision
taken by the
Authority. Undoubtedly, the process followed by the Conduct Authority
in arriving at the decision is administrative
in nature. Applicants
cannot claim a violation of their rights under section 34 in
circumstances where a dispute has not arisen.
I therefore conclude
that there is no merits in the challenge to the constitutionality of
section 154 of the FSR Act. Unless and
until a final decision is made
by the Conduct Authority, section 34 of the Constitution is not
implicated at all.
The applicants’ attack on
Section 167 of the FSR Act
[56]
Section 167 of the FSR Act provides for an imposition by the Conduct
Authority of administrative penalties in the event
that an entity,
such as Fusion, has contravened a financial sector law. In
determining the appropriate administrative penalty the
Conduct
Authority is required to consider those issues detailed in
sub-paragraph 167 (2) of the Act.
[33]
[57]
Applicant’s contentions is that section 167 similar with the
debarment order contemplated in section 154 of the FSR Act,
does not
afford the applicants’ “
the
right to have a dispute regarding the imposition of the
administrative penalty and/or quantum thereof resolved by application
of law in a fair public hearing before an independent and impartial
Tribunal or Forum.”
[34]
[58]
As pointed out above, I have not been able to find, and nothing has
been pointed out to me, any provision in the Constitution
that
requires administrative decisions to be made in the sequence
advocated by the applicants. Upon consideration of the relevant
provisions of the Constitution, no provision that requires the
Conduct Authority, if it intends to impose an administrative penalty,
that it must do that “
after having afforded the aggrieved party
a fair public hearing before an independent and impartial Tribunal or
Forum.”
This argument is not borne out of the proper reading of
section 33 of the Constitution. There is nothing in section 33 of the
Constitution
that guarantees the applicants a hearing before an
independent and impartial Tribunal before a decision is taken to
impose a debarment
order.
The
applicants attack on Section 231 of the FSR Act
Section
231
[59]
In view of the applicants not persisting with the relief in relation
to section 230 of the FSR Act, this judgment will
only confine itself
to a challenge for a declaration of invalidity in relation to section
231 of the FSR Act.
[60]
Section 231 of the FSR Act is in the following terms:
“
Neither
an application for a reconsideration or a decision, nor the
proceedings on application, suspends a decision of the decision
maker
unless the Tribunal so orders.”
[61]
The process established for an application for the suspension of a
“decision” pending a reconsideration by the Tribunal
is provided
for in the Tribunal Rules 15 to 21.
[35]
[62]
Rule 15 provides:
“
An
application in terms of section 231 of the Act for suspension of a
decision pending the hearing of an application for reconsideration
may be made only once there is a pending application for
reconsideration of a decision.”
[63]
Applicants’ contention is that, because section 231 does not
automatically undo or suspend the operation of a debarment
order,
their right to choose a profession or practice a profession or
occupation is limited and therefore contend that this “
default
position”
established by section 231 of the FSR Act is, for
those reasons, unconstitutional, invalid and falls to be set aside.
It is also
contended by the applicants that a decision by the Conduct
Authority, for instance on making a debarment order and imposing of
the
administrative penalty on Fusion, will lead to the publication of
the decision to the general public and such decision will remain
until the process established by section 230 (the lodging of an
application for reconsideration) has been complied with by the
applicants.
[64]
The Conduct Authority’s contention is that the applicants are
plainly wrong to say that section 231 means that the applicants
are
“
precluded from practising their chosen trade”
. The
applicants have confused the effect of a debarment order with the
procedural remedies provided for by section 231 of the FSR
Act.
Section 231 of the FSR Act as submitted by the Conduct Authority
provides for an internal remedy as contemplated in section
7 of PAJA.
It does not limit the applicants’ rights in terms of section 33 or
34 of the Constitution.
[65]
The applicants’ dispute is on the basis that a different rule
applies in terms of the common law where there is an appeal
against a
decision of a court. But that common law rule does not apply in the
case of an appeal against an administrative decision.
[66]
In this regard, I was referred by the applicants to various
authorities, to corroborate a submission that such authorities
should
equally be equated to the launching of an application for
reconsideration provided for under section 230 of the FSR Act. The
authorities that I was referred to mainly deal with the suspension of
the execution of court judgments upon the noting of an appeal
or
filing of an application for leave to appeal by the aggrieved party.
The argument is to the effect that the foundation of the
common law
rule, which later became codified into legislation, or a standard
court rule maintain a just legal principle that the
noting of an
appeal permits the suspension of the execution of the judgment in
order to prevent irreparable damage that may be occasioned
by the
execution of the judgment pending the outcome of the appeal on an
application for leave to appeal.
[36]
[67]
I do not intend to deal, in quite great extent with the authorities
relied on by the applicants in them emphasising the
well-established
premise of the common law that the granting of a relief by the court
to a successful party to proceed with the execution
of a judgment
where an appeal or a leave to appeal is still pending before court.
What is of considerable significance as was re-stated
in the common
law principle
South
Cape Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Engineering Management Services
[37]
is that in exercising of the discretion on the special application
whether or not to grant leave to execute pending the appeal the
court
is to determine on what is just and equitable in all the
circumstances and will have regard to the following four factors:
[67.1]
the potentiality of irreparable harm if leave to execute were to be
granted;
[67.2]
the potentiality of irreparable harm if leave to execute were
refused;
[67.3]
the prospects of success on appeal;
[67.4]
where there is the potentiality of irreparable harm or prejudice to
both appellant and
respondent, the balance of hardship or convenience
as the case may be.
[68]
Having expressed the views that the onus in this applications for
leave to execute was then a vexed one
[38]
,Corbett
JA concluded
[39]
:
“
Applying
this concepts to an application for leave to execute the judgment
pending an appeal, the onus proper (or overall onus) rests
as I have
already indicated, upon the applicant. This is so, in my view,
irrespective of whether the judgment in question is one
sounding in
money only or is one granting other form of relief. Where the
judgment is for money only, then, in an appropriate case,
the
inference to be drawn, prima facie, that the furnishing of security
de restutiendo would protect the appellant against irreparable
harm
or prejudice.
[69]
As stated above, and relied on by the applicants, is that the same
principle of common law has been re-stated in the amended
Uniform
Rule 49 (11)
[40]
:
“
Where
an appeal has been noted or an application for leave to appeal …
has been made, the operation and execution of the order in
question
shall be suspended pending the decision of such appeal or
application, unless the court which gave such order, on the
application
of a party, otherwise directs.”
[70]
Section 18
(1) of the
Superior Courts Act, 10 of 2013
is in the
following terms:
“
Subject
to sub-section 2 and 3, and unless the court under exceptional
circumstances orders otherwise the operation and execution
of a
decision which is the subject of an application for leave to appeal
or of an appeal, is suspended pending the decision of the
application
or appeal.”
[70.1]
Section 18
(2) of the
Superior Courts Act allows
the court to direct
that a decision which is a final judgment is not suspended pending
the decision of an application for leave to
appeal or an appeal under
exceptional circumstances.
[71]
In a consideration of the concept of “
exceptional
circumstances”
as employed in
section 18
of the
Superior Courts Act, the
Supreme
Court of Appeal in
University
of the Free State v Afri Forum
[41]
concluded
[42]
that, in
enacting
section 18
(1) and (3) of the
Superior Courts Act the
legislature had proceeded from a well-established premise of the
common law that the granting of the relief which entitles a
successful
party to immediate execution of a judgment subject to an
application for leave to appeal on appeal, constitutes an
extraordinary
deviation from the norm. That exceptionality has found
expression in
section 18
(4) of the
Superior Courts Act which
provides for the following distinctive consequences to such an order:
[71.1]
the court granting an order must immediately record its reasons;
[71.2]
the aggrieved party have an automatic right of an appeal;
[71.3]
the appeal must be dealt with as a matter of extreme urgency;
[71.4]
pending the outcome of the appeal the execution order is
automatically suspended.
[72]
It is also noteworthy that the Supreme Court of Appeal in the
University
of Free State v Afri Forum
said
[43]
that the requirements
introduced in
section 18
(1) and (3) of the
Superior Courts Act are
in fact more humorous than those of the common law. Reference was
made, for example, to the requirement that the applicant “
in
addition”
is required to prove on the balance of probabilities that he or she
will suffer irreparable harm if the order is not made, and that
the
other party will not suffer irreparable harm if the order is made.
[73]
Fourie AJA, emphasised that
[44]
:
“…
in
evaluating the circumstances relied upon by an applicant, a court
should bear in mind that what is sought is an extraordinary deviation
from the norm, which, in turn, requires the existence of truly
exceptional circumstances to justify the deviation.”
[74]
In
Metcash
Trading Ltd v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service, and
Another
[45]
the Constitutional Court gave consideration to the similar
constitutional challenge in regard to the provisions of the Value
Added
Tax Act
[46]
. In the
context of the so called “
pay
now, argue later”
the
court was confronted with the argument that sections 36 (1), 40 (2),
40(5) , and 42 of the Vat Act were unconstitutional as they
illegitimately infringed on Metcash’s right of access to court, a
right protected by section 34 of the Constitution.
[75]
Section 36 (1) of the Vat Act provides, under the heading “
Payment
of Tax pending appeal”
:
“
(1)
The obligation to pay and the right to receive and recover any
additional Tax penalty interest chargeable under this Act
shall not,
unless the Commissioner so directs, be suspended by any appeal
pending for the court of law, but if any assessment is
altered on
appeal or in conformity with any such decision… a due adjustment
shall be made, amounts paid in excess being refunded
with interest…
and amounts short paid being recoverable with penalty interests
calculated as provided in s. 39 (1)”.
[76]
Section 40 (2)(a) of the Vat Act permits the Commissioner, on failure
of any person to pay any tax, to file with the clerk
or registrar of
the court a certified statement setting forth the amounts due after
that statement will have the effect of a civil
judgment lawfully
given in that court in the amount specified in the statement.
[77]
The processes contemplated in that portion of the Act concludes with
section 40 (5) which provides that it is not competent
for any person
in proceedings in connection with any statement filed in terms of
sub-section 2 (a) to question the correctness of
any assessment
notwithstanding that the objection and appeal may have been launched
against that assessment.
[78]
The High Court found
[47]
that
the impugned sections of the Vat Act infringed the fundamental rights
of access to the courts afforded by section 34 of the
Constitution
whereafter the court declared that the three challenged provisions of
the Act to be invalid and referred the order of
the constitutional
invalidity to the Constitutional Court in terms of sub-section 167(5)
and 172 of the Constitution.
[79]
In declining to confirm the High Court’s order
[48]
Kriegler J emphasised the following features of the impugned
provisions:
[79.1]
The
Commissioner is not a judicial officer. Decisions by the Commissioner
not “
judgments
of a court”
but
are proceedings in terms of a specially created statutory mechanism
which makes provision for the appropriate corrective action
by a
specialist Tribunal.
[49]
[80]
The Vat Act does not exclude judicial review in the normal cause, but
leaves intact all other avenues of relief to the
dissatisfied
vendor.
[50]
The common law
rule of judicial practice relating to automatic suspension of
execution by the noting of an appeal does not apply
to the appellate
procedure established in the Vat Act.
[51]
The obligation to pay notwithstanding appeal is not inexorable.
Section 36 (1) of the Vat Act furnished the Commissioner with the
discretion and encompassed in the phrase “
unless
the Commissioner so directs”
.
The exercise by the Commissioner of that discretion constitutes
administrative action which is reviewable in terms of the principles
of administrative law
[52]
.
[81]
The determination made by the Constitutional Court in Metcash, in my
view, equally applies to the issues raised by the
applicants in this
matter. It is indeed so that the Conduct Authority is not a judicial
officer and its decisions are not judgments
of the court but are a
result of proceedings stemming from a specially created statutory
corrective process or mechanism that is
constitutionally legitimate
for the maintenance of financial discipline in the financial sector
as well as protection of financial
sector customs.
[82]
The applicants endeavour to distinguish the relief sought in this
application from the outcome in Metcash case by contending
that
section 231 contains no remedial provision that is similar to section
36 (1) of the Vat Act which, effectively amounts to the
grant to the
affected vendor of security
de restituendo
. In the
circumstances governed by the FSR Act, the applicants’ argument is
that there is no warrant for the limitation imposed
on section 22 of
the Constitution as is contemplated in section 36 (1) of the Vat Act.
This is centred around what appears in the
final phrase of section 36
(1) which requires the Commissioner,
if the assessment altered on
appeal in favour of the vendor, to refund the vendor any excess
amounts paid together with interest.
[83]
The applicants concede that the debarment order under section 153 of
the FSR Act is a necessary tool as a corrective action.
And Conduct
Authority’s power of imposing a penal administrative order in terms
of section 167 is not challenged. In the context
of section 231 of
FSR Act, it is the non-existence of a provision for an automatic
suspension of the debarment order in section 231
of the FSR Act that
applicants contend is a violation of the Constitutional provision of
section 22 of the Constitution.
[84]
It appears to me that the applicants’ case in respect of the
challenge on section 231 of the FSR Act is limited to the
alleged
existence of the limitation imposed by that section on section 22 of
the Constitution and not necessarily on section 33 and
34 of the
Constitution.
[85]
In my view, the enforcement of the remedy availed to the aggrieved
party in section 231 of the FSR Act, will call upon
the Chairperson
of the Tribunal to consider the interest of justice after weighing
all the prevailing circumstances of each case,
in the exercise of his
discretion to grant a suspension of the operation of the decision or
not.
[86]
In terms of section 231 of the FSR Act read with the Financial Sector
Tribunal Rule 15, the Chairperson of the Tribunal
has the discretion
to suspend the decision of the Conduct Authority, on application by
the aggrieved party. I see no reason why,
in appropriate case, the
chairperson of the Tribunal should not invoke the same test developed
and followed by the Supreme Court
of Appeal. In my view, the
aggrieved party is not left without a remedy since the decision by
Chairperson of the Tribunal can be
challenged by launching a court
application to suspend the decision where the factual circumstances
are exceptional and upon consideration
of the test similar to the
test developed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the
University of
Free State v Afri Forum
, when analysing the relevant
considerations in making an order in terms of section 18 (4) of the
Superior Court Act.
[87]
The mere fact that the legislation deviates from the common law does
not in itself give rise to any constitutional complaint.
The
complaint raised by the applicants that the application to suspend
the Conduct Authority’s decision would amount to a reversal
of the
standard principle of onus as applicants would be required to
persuade the Tribunal that the suspension of the fine/debarment
would
be appropriate in the circumstances, has no substance as the
applicants have failed to set out succinctly the grounds they
rely on
as to why such an application has to be approached on the basis of an
onus. In my view, the Chairperson of the Tribunal will
have a general
discretion in terms of which such an application is to be dealt with.
Implicit in that is that the chairperson of
the Tribunal should not
fetter his/her own discretion and in particular, can direct any party
to produce any document or evidence
that may assist in arriving at a
rational and fair decision. In my view, the issue of onus is not an
inflexible matter in the consideration
of the application by the
Chairperson as onus shifts from one party to the other based on the
circumstances of the prevailing issues
for determination.
[88]
Having regard to all the relevant factors, I am of the view that the
applicants’ challenge to the constitutionality of
the impugned
sections 154, 167 and 231 of the FSR Act is not well founded and is
speculative in the extreme. And in these circumstances,
I am not in a
position to issue an order of invalidity sought in the notice of
motion. The applicants have failed to make out a case
that the
impugned provisions are unconstitutional and therefore cannot succeed
in this application for an order declaring the impugned
provisions
invalid.
[89]
I am accordingly of the view that the application stands to be
dismissed.
[90]
In so far as the issue of costs is concerned, no submissions were
made that the general principle that costs should follow
the event
should not be applied. The applicants and the second respondent
employed more than one counsel. Only one counsel appeared
on behalf
of the first respondent. In my view however, there is no reason not
to award the costs of two counsel employed by the third
respondent.
[91]
In the result, the following order is made:
[91.1]
The applicants’ application is dismissed with costs, such costs to
include the costs occasioned by the costs of two counsel
where so
employed.
NCONGWANE AJ
Acting Judge of the High Court
Date
of hearing:
03 September 2021
Date
of Judgment:
01 February 2022
Appearances:
For
the Applicants:
Adv ARG Mundell SC
With Adv D.
Van Niekerk
Attorneys for the Applicants:
Korsten and Beukes Attorneys, Alberton.
For
the First Respondent:
Adv A. Cockrell SC
Attorneys for the First
Respondent:
Mothle Jooma Sabdia
Inc, Pretoria.
For
the Second Respondent:
Adv L. Gcabashe SC
With
P. Jara
Attorneys for the Second
Respondent:
The State Attorney, Pretoria.
[1]
Applicants’
HoA, p53, para 147.2.
[2]
FA,
para 21, p12.
[3]
See:
Applicants’ HoA, p38 - para 119, p53 - para 147.1.
[4]
The
Financial Services Tribunal established in terms of section 219 of
Chapter 15 of the FSR Act.
[5]
Founding
Affidavit (“FA”) para 36 at p16.
[6]
Fusion
was so registered in March 2010 and was allocated registration
number NCR CP4426
[7]
A
concept pioneered in Australia.
[8]
Section
153 (2) prohibits the debarred natural person (for the period
specified in the debarment order) from providing or being
involved
in the provision of specified financial products or financial
services. In addition the debarred person’s is precluded
from
engaging in any conduct that, directly or indirectly, contravenes
the debarment order.
Section
153 (4).
[9]
Both
the First and the Second Respondents have detailed this “
prior
litigation”
in
their affidavits, at some length in an attempt to sustain an
argument that the applicant’s have, for an extended period, been
in persistent breach of the provisions of the STIA and the Financial
and Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, 37 of 2002 (“the
FAIS
Act”).
[10]
FA,
para 49 at p18 read with Annexure “FA 5”, at pp 204 to 219.
[11]
A
copy of the directive appears as Annexure “FA 6” at pp220 to
222.
[12]
Section
154 of the FSR Act provides that: “
1.
Before a debarment order in respect of a natural person, the
responsible authority must –
(a) give a draft of the
debarment order to the person and to the other financial sector
regulator, along with reasons for and/or
other relevant information
about the proposed debarment, and
(b)
invite the person to make submissions on the matter, and give the
person reasonable period to do so.
2.
The period contemplated in terms of sub-section 1d must be at least
one (1) month.
3.
In deciding whether or not to make a debarment order in respect of a
natural person, responsible authority must take into account
at
least – (a) any submission made by, or on behalf of, the person,
and (b) any advice from the other financial sector regulator.”
[13]
The
word used is
must.
[14]
Which
must be at least a month – section 154 (2).
[15]
Founding
Affidavit, para 45, page 32, and para 106.4, page 39
[16]
Applicants
Heads o Argument, para 18.1.
[17]
Founding
affidavit para 108.6, page 54.
[18]
Applicants’
Heads of Argument, para 51,
See:
First Respondent’s Answering Affidavit, para 74, page 171, Second
Respondent’s Answering Affidavit, para 106-110, page
37.
[19]
South
African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence
2007 (5) SA 400
(CC) (para 51
).
[20]
For
instance:
Chirwa
v Transnet
[2007] ZACC 23
;
2008 (4) SA 367
(CC) para 123, Sibumo v Rustenburg
Platinum Mines
2008 (2) SA 24
(CC) para 248, MEC for Education, Kwa
Zulu Natal v Pillay
[2007] ZACC 21
;
2008 (1) SA 474
(CC) para 40, Mazibuko v City of
Johannesburg
2010 (4) SA 1
(CC) para 73, Gcaba v Minister for Safety
and Security
2010 (1) SA 238
(CC) paras 37 and 38, PFE International
v Industrial Development Corporation of SA
2013 (1) SA 1
(CC) para
4, Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau
2014 (5) SA 69
(CC) para 27, De Lange v Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of
Southern Africa for the time being and Another
2016 (1) BSLR 1
(CC)
para 53, My Vote Counts MPC v Speaker of the National Assembly
2016
(1) SA 132
(CC) para 161
[21]
Mazibuko
v City of Johannesburg
2010 (4) SA 1
(CC) para 73.
[22]
My
Vote
Counts NPC v Speaker of the National Assembly
2016 (1) SA 132
(CC)
para 166.
[23]
NERSA
v PG Group (Pty) Limited 2020 (1) SA 450 (CC)
[24]
Founding
Affidavit, para 100 and 102, page 37.
In Applicants’ heads of
argument para 96
[25]
Founding
Affidavit, paras 99, 106.6.1, 106.17 and 107.7, page 36.
[26]
Founding
Affidavit, para 106.28, page 47.
[27]
Founding
Affidavit, para 106.17, page 45.
[28]
Founding
Affidavit, para 118, page 57.
[29]
Applicants
Heads of Argument, para 61.
[30]
Applicants’
Heads of Argument, para 74 and para 75, also in para 85.
[31]
Para
104 at 37 and 38.
[32]
First
respondent’s heads of argument, para 39 and 40, pp 17.
[33]
Section
167 (2) of the FSR Act provides that “In determining an
appropriate administrative penalty for a particular conduct –
(a)
The
matters that the responsible authority must have regard to include
the following:
(1) The need to
deter such conduct,
(2) The
degree to which the person has cooperated with the Financial Sector
Regulator in relation to the contravention, and
(3)
Any submissions by, or on behalf of, the person
that is relevant to the matter, including litigating factors
referred to in those
submissions.”
[34]
Applicants’
Heads of Argument, para 112.
[35]
The
Financial Services Tribunal Rules issued by the Chairperson of the
Tribunal.
[36]
Ried
and Another v Godart and Another
1938 AD 511
, and also South Cape
Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Engineering Management Services (Pty) Ltd
1977 (3) SA 534 (A)
[37]
South
Cape Corporation, supra at p545 D-E
[38]
South
Cape Corporation, supra at p546 B.
[39]
At
p548 C to D.
[40]
Which
was repealed with effect from 22
nd
May 2015 (GNR 317 at 7 April 2015 GG 38694 of 17 April 2015)
[41]
2018
(3) SA 428 (SCA).
[42]
In
para 9.
[43]
In
para 10.
[44]
In
para 13.
[45]
2001
(1) 1109 (CC)
[46]
Act
39 of 1991.
[47]
Per
Snyders
J in Metcash Trading Ltd v Commissioner of South African Revenue
Services and Another
2000 (2) SA 232
W.
[48]
Metcash
Trading, supra para [74] at p1145
.
[49]
At
para 32 on pp1129 to 1130.
[50]
At
para 33 on pp1130.
[51]
At
para 36 on pp1132.
[52]
At
para 38 and 40 on pp 1132 and 1133.
sino noindex
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