Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 530South Africa
Unitrade 1047 (Pty) Ltd Isidingo Security Service v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (24270/2022) [2022] ZAGPPHC 530 (18 July 2022)
Headnotes
what one has is an application for the furnishing of information which is not required for the exercise of a legality review and one has an application based on a premise of urgency which is not supported by the facts. Ordinarily if an application is found not to be urgent, the customary order is that it is struck off the urgent court’s roll. Notionally the consequence thereof might be that such an application may be re-enrolled. Although there was some argument from the bar regarding alternate relief, none of that was forthcoming in the replying affidavit nor was there a formal amendment.
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Unitrade 1047 (Pty) Ltd Isidingo Security Service v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (24270/2022) [2022] ZAGPPHC 530 (18 July 2022)
Unitrade 1047 (Pty) Ltd Isidingo Security Service v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (24270/2022) [2022] ZAGPPHC 530 (18 July 2022)
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sino date 18 July 2022
# IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO
: 24270/2022
DATE
:
2022-05-17
REPORTABLE:
NO.
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO.
REVISED.
YES
18
JULY 2022
In
the matter between
UNITRADE
1047 (PTY) LTD ISIDINGO
SECURITY
SERVICE
Applicant
and
MINISTER
OF HOME AFFAIRS &
OTHER Respondent
JUDGMENT
DAVIS
J
:
This is an urgent application in which
an order is sought that the first respondent deliver a selection of
documents to the applicant.
The applicant is Unitrade 1047
(Pty) Limited trading as Isidingo Security Services. The
applicant had in mind to bid and
be appointed as a security services
provider in respect of a bid labelled DHA19-2021, for the provision
of physical guarding services
in Mpumalanga Province for a period of
36 months. The respondents in the application are the Minister
of Home Affairs (the
Minister), the Department of Home Affairs, the
information officer for the Department of Home Affairs and the
Director General
of Home Affairs.
The relief sought is directed against
the Minister. The relief claimed has been formulated in the
notice of motion as follows:
"
That the Minister be directed
to within five days of the granting of this order deliver to the
applicant:
1. Copies
of all internal memoranda and recommendations relating to the
decision to award tender DHA19-2021.
2. The
report of the Bid Evaluation Committee, that is the BEC and the
minutes of the meeting of the meeting
of the Bid Adjudication
Committee BAC in respect of that tender.
3. Reasons
why the tender was not awarded to the applicant.
4. ‘Any
additional information taking into account in the decision to award
the tender’.
5. The
scoring sheet for all tenders received.
6.
The details of the winning tender
.”
The background facts are briefly the
following: In the applicant’s own founding affidavit it
is already stated that
the tender calling for the bids was cancelled
on 3 February 2022. Confirmation hereof is found in the
applicant’s deponent’s
founding affidavit whereto he
annexes a letter of cancellation marked FA4. This confirms the
cancellation in writing.
The applicant alleges that since the
cancellation it attempted to obtain information regarding the
decision to cancel the tender
which was unsuccessful. The
applicant then lodged a formal application in terms of the
Promotion
of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000
requesting certain documents.
The applicant says when the
documentation was not forthcoming it launched an internal appeal in
terms of that Act. However
the response from the Department of
Home Affairs, apparently referring to the initial request but not
mentioning the subsequent
appeal, is dated 16 March 2022. The
relevant portion thereof reads as follows:
"
The department has considered
your request in this regard. In accordance with the provisions
of the
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000
and they have
considered the said request but regret to inform you we are unable to
provide you with the requested information
due to the following
grounds as provided for in the act.
(a) Mandatory
protection of commercial information of third parties in terms of
section 36(i).
(b) Mandatory
protection of certain confidential information and protection of
certain other confidential information
of third parties
section
37(i).
(c)
The information involves internal operations of a public body,
section 44.
The only information that can be disclosed in this
regard is the list of all the companies who submitted a bid for this
tender.
A list of the companies is herewith attached and marked
B for easy reference
.”
The list then includes 64 different
companies who submitted bids for the tender. Regarding the
present application, in the
founding affidavit the deponent thereto
states:
"
I am advised that the current
situation is very similar to the one which was the subject matter of
the decision of the supreme court
of appeal in Tetra Mobile Radio
(Pty) Limited v MEC Department of Works and Others
2008 (1) SA 438
(SCA) where the SCA ordered information to be provided for purposes
of internal appeal
.”
The facts in the
Tetra Mobile
case
are completely distinguishable from the facts in the present matter.
In
Tetra Mobile
the applicant seeking information was an
unsuccessful tenderer in a completed tender process and needed
documents to proceed with
its review of the award of the tender.
In the present matter there was no
such tender process. In fact the answering affidavit indicates
that neither a Bid Evaluation
Committee nor a Bid Adjudication
Committee had even been appointed. There were also no score
sheets because the tenders were
not considered. None of the
documents requested in the notice of motion are relevant to the
sequence of events. In
fact the decision to withdraw the tender
or the bid is analogouos to that in
Tshwane City and Others v
Nambiti Technologies (Pty) Limited
2016 (2) SA 494
(SCA).
That decision determined that the withdrawal of a tender is not an
administrative act and such withdrawal can only
be attacked under a
legality review.
The issues regarding the nature of
decisions have subsequently with reference to the
Nambiti
case
received further attention of the Supreme Court of Appeal in
University of Free State v Afriforum and Another
2017 (4) SA
283
(SCA). The relevance of these cases regarding the nature of
the act whereby a tender is withdrawn is twofold.
Firstly, the documents applicable to
such a decision are not the same as those in a tender. They may
relate to financial viability
or other considerations in terms of
which a tender may be withdrawn. Secondly a legality review is
not in terms of the Promotion
of Administrative Justice Act on which
the applicant relies for purposes of urgency in this application.
The relevance hereof
appears from the following statement in the
founding affidavit:
"
The present application is
obviously urgent as the application must launch a review application
within 180 days from the date it
was notified on the cancellation of
the tender i.e. on 3 February 2022. Applicant cannot adequately
consider that there are
any grounds for a review application should
the release sought be granted in the ordinary course
.”
Clearly the time period is not
applicable but even if one were to have found in favour of the
applicant, that a reasonable time
period for the launching of a
legality review would equate to 180 days, one is surprised to find
that the applicant has not even
requested reasons why the tender had
been withdrawn. Had reasons been granted, the calculation of time
would have commenced upon
the furnishing thereof and had the reasons
been insufficient, of course then alternative remedies could be
followed.
In the present case therefore, in
summary what one has is an application for the furnishing of
information which is not required
for the exercise of a legality
review and one has an application based on a premise of urgency which
is not supported by the facts.
Ordinarily if an application is
found not to be urgent, the customary order is that it is struck off
the urgent court’s roll.
Notionally the consequence
thereof might be that such an application may be re-enrolled.
Although there was some argument
from the bar regarding alternate
relief, none of that was forthcoming in the replying affidavit nor
was there a formal amendment.
There is consequently no sense in
merely striking this application from the roll so that it might at
some stage in the future possibly
– and I mention the word
possibly because there was no indication that it would in fact serve
before an opposed motion court
– be re-enrolled for the same
relief to which the applicant would still not be entitled. To
do so would be wasteful
of time, costs and judicial resources.
The application for the relief sought
is without merit and should be refused. As to the issue of
costs, counsel for the applicant
valiantly argued that costs should
be reserved for determination in a future hearing of this
application. As already indicated,
there would not be any
future hearing after the demise of the application at today’s
hearing. There is therefore no
reason to reserve the costs or
to make it conditional upon any other steps taken in this
application. The life has gone out
of this application and the
relief which the applicant might seek, should it wish to question the
withdrawal of the tender by way
of a legality review or otherwise,
would have to form the subject matter of a fresh application.
Having mentioned these factors I find
no reason why the customary principle should not be applied namely
that costs should follow
the event. Accordingly the order of
the court is as follows: The application is dismissed with
costs.
MR
HLONGWANE
: As
the court pleases.
MS
UNKNOWN
: As
it pleases the court, M'Lord. M'Lord if I may clarify
is it
cost on a party-and-party scale or is that for…
COURT
:
That is customary what
follows if no special costs
order is made.
MS
UNKNOWN
:
As it pleases the court. Thank you, M'Lord.
COURT
:
Thank you. The
court will adjourn.
COURT ADJOURNS
DAVIS
J
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
DATE
SIGNED
: 18 JULY 2022
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