Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 630South Africa
Makole Resources (Pty) Ltd v Wessels (26690/2016) [2022] ZAGPPHC 630 (18 August 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
18 August 2022
Headnotes
a court seized with an application for rescission of judgment should not, in determining whether good or sufficient cause has been proven, look at the adequacy or otherwise of the explanation of the default or failure in isolation.
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Makole Resources (Pty) Ltd v Wessels (26690/2016) [2022] ZAGPPHC 630 (18 August 2022)
Makole Resources (Pty) Ltd v Wessels (26690/2016) [2022] ZAGPPHC 630 (18 August 2022)
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sino date 18 August 2022
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(PRETORIA
DIVISION)
CASE
NO: 26690/2016
DOH:18
FEBRUARY 2022
In
the matter between:
MAKOLE
RESOURCES (PTY) LTD
APPLICANT
And
HERMAIN
JURIE WESSELS
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
THIS
JUDGMENT HAS BEEN HANDED DOWN REMOTELY AND SHALL BE CIRCULATED TO THE
PARTIES BY WAY OF EMAIL. ITS DATE ANDTIME OF HAND DOWN
SHALL BE
DEEMED TO BE
18 AUGUST
2022
# MALI
J
MALI
J
1.
The applicant seeks an order for
rescission of default judgment
granted
by this honourable court on 3 October 2016. The order is for payment
of the sum of R 491 650 with costs, in respect of claim
for damages
against the applicant. The claim arose as a result of the veld fire
which took place on 15 May 2015, allegedly due
to the negligence of
the applicant.
The
fire commenced on the prospecting area in the immovable property of
the applicant. The fire destroyed the possessions of the
respondent.
The summons was served on the address of applicant's auditors. The
applicant did not to enter appearance to defend
hence the default
judgment.
2.
The issue for determination is whether
the applicant is entitled to rescission of default judgement. The
application is in terms
of Rule 31 (2) (b) of the Rules of the court,
alternatively in terms of common law.
3.
Judgment obtained by default under
common law can be rescinded by court if the applicant has shown,
sufficient cause for rescission.
Rule 31 2(b) provides;
"A
defendant
may
within
20 days after acquiring knowledge of such judgment apply to court
upon notice to the plaintiff to set aside such judgment
and the court
may, upon good cause shown, set aside the default judgment on such
terms as it deems fit."
4.
In the matter of
Harris
v ABSA Bank Ltd Volkskas
2006 (4) SA
527
(T)
("Harris")
in
a Full Court decision Moseneke J (as he
then was) said the following:
"8.
Before an applicant in
a
rescission
of judgment application can be said to be in "wilful default"
he or she must bear knowledge of the action brought
against him or
her and of the steps required to avoid the default. Such an applicant
must deliberately, being free to do so, fail
or omit to take the step
which would avoid the default and must appreciate the legal
consequences
of
his or her actions. A decision freely taken to reform from filing
a
notice to defend or
a
plea or from appearing would
ordinarily weigh heavily against an Applicant required to establish
sufficient cause.
"
5.
The second stage of the inquiry is
whether the applicant has raised a
bona
fide
defence to the action against
him. In
paragraph 9 and 10 of the Harris
decision, Moseneke J stated thus:
"9.
A decision freely taken to refrain from filing
a
notice to defend or
a
plea or from appearing, ordinarily
will weigh heavily against an applicant required to establish
sufficient cause. However, I do
not agree that once wilful default is
shown the applicant is barred; that he or she is then never entitled
to relief by wat of
rescission as he or she as acquiesced.
The Court's discretion in
deciding whether sufficient cause has been established must not be
unduly restricted. In my view, the
mental element of the default,
whatever description in bears, should be one of the several elements
which the Court must weigh
in determining whether sufficient or good
cause has been shown to exist. In the words of Jones J in De Witts
Auto Body Repairs
(Pty) Limited v Fedgen Insurance
Co.
Limited
1994 (4) SA &05 (E) at 708
G,
'......
the wilful or negligent or
blameless
nature
of the defendant's default now becomes one of the various
considerations which the courts will take into account in the
exercise of their discretion to determine whether or not good cause
is shown'.
10.
A steady body of judicial authorities has held that
a
court seized with an application for
rescission of judgment should not, in determining whether good or
sufficient cause has been
proven, look at the adequacy or otherwise
of the explanation of the default or failure in isolation.
'Instead,
the explanation, be it good, bad or indifferent, must be considered
in the light of the nature of the defence, which is
an important
consideration, and in the light of all the facts and circumstances of
the case as
a
whole'."
6.
The applicant 's version is that the it
did not receive the summons as they were served on Ms Du Preez, the
company secretary of
the applicant's auditors. This is supported by
the email attached in the founding affidavit marked annexure
"NLM3"
sent by the respondent's attorneys
on 6 October 2020 to the applicant. The attorney wrote as follows:
"
Subsequently
a
warrant
for execution was issued as is evident from the copy attached hereto.
The warrant was delivered at the registered address
of the company,
but it turned out that it is the address of the company's auditors. I
have now obtained the address of the place
of business of the
company
"
7.
The applicant does not deny that the
address of its auditors is its registered address. From the conduct
of respondent's attorneys
by their own admission, although the
admission pertains to the warrant for execution; it is reasonably
possibly true that the auditors
did not bring the summons to the
applicant's attention.
In
this regard I find that the applicant was not in wilful default.
8.
It is trite that an applicant for
rescission must demonstrate an existence of a substantial defence and
not necessarily a probability
of success. It is sufficient that in
his evidence he shows a
prima facie
case which raises triable issues.
9.
In the present it has been submitted on
behalf of the applicant that on the day of the fire, it was very
windy and the grass was
tall. The drill rig was barricaded and
drilling operations were underway. The applicant's drilling
operations were fenced off and
two fire extinguishers were placed
strategically inside the working area. A fire started on the
respondent's
property
and the cause of same was unknown to the applicant and its
subcontractors. The applicant's employees and subcontractors
attended
to the fire using the watercraft and fire extinguishers to try and
doze the fire, nevertheless the fire moved quickly
beyond their
control. Neighbouring farmers also assisted. Furthermore, it is the
applicant's case that the respondent failed to
prepare firebreaks on
the applicant's side of the boundary and he neither failed to discuss
fire breaks with neighbours.
10.
There is an explanation in this matter.
It is not for this court to determine whether the explanation is good
or bad.
In
applying the principles laid down above, I have considered the
explanation in the light of the applicant's defence. I am persuaded
that the applicant has demonstrated a substantial defence and that
the defence is
bona tide.
I
therefore conclude that that the rescission application must succeed.
In
the result
# ORDER:
ORDER:
1.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment
granted by this court on 3 October 2016 be and is hereby rescinded
and set aside.
2.
The costs are hereby reserved for the
main action.
N.P
MALI
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
APPEARANCES
On
behalf of the Applicant:
Adv. TM Madise
Instructed
by Moorosi
Inc Attorneys
On
behalf of the Respondent:
Adv. DC Du Plessis
Instructed
by Johan
Du Preez Attorneys
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