Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 634South Africa
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Tariomix (Pty) Limited and Others (2021/14331) [2022] ZAGPPHC 634 (22 August 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
22 August 2022
Headnotes
in the respondents' bank accounts were frozen. The papers and the order were subsequently served on the respondents on 24 March 2021. [6] The respondents are the aggrieved parties who apply for the reconsideration of the application. I will refer to the NDPP as the applicant has been referred to in the application for the preservation order. I also note that at the time of the granting of the order, the funds had been frozen on the accounts in question at the instance of the Finance Intelligence Centre ("the FIC"). [7] The applicant contended in the application, that the preservation
Judgment
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## National Director of Public Prosecutions v Tariomix (Pty) Limited and Others (2021/14331) [2022] ZAGPPHC 634 (22 August 2022)
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Tariomix (Pty) Limited and Others (2021/14331) [2022] ZAGPPHC 634 (22 August 2022)
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sino date 22 August 2022
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO:
2021/14331
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
REVISED:
NO
22
AUGUST 2022
THE
NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS Applicant
and
TARIOMIX
(PTY)
LIMITED
1
st
Respondent
LOUIS
PETRUS LIEBENBERG
2nd Respondent
MAGDALENA
PETRONELLA KLEYNHANS
3
rd
Respondent
JUDGMENT
MOKOSE
J
Introduction
[1]
Before me is
a
reconsideration
application
by
the respondents against the
granting
of
a
preservation
order granted by this Court in terms of Section 38 of the Prevention
of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (
"
POCA").
The
applicant
opposes the relief sought.
[2]
Counsel for the respondents indicated to the court that there are
several
issues which are not in dispute. The right, in terms of
Section 38 of POCA, to approach a matter
ex
parte
and in camera are not in dispute. However, counsel indicated that the
dispute concerns whether the applicant should have approached
the
court and if so, how it should have conducted itself before and after
obtaining the order.
[3]
Secondly, the respondents do not challenge the applicant's
identification
of the asset forfeiture scheme, the meaning of
instrumentality of an offence or the meaning of proceeds of unlawful
activities.
The dispute is whether, on the facts of the case, these
features have been established.
[4]
Thirdly, the respondents do not challenge the applicant's remarks
about
the Banks Act 94 of 1990, the
Consumer Protection Act 68 of
2008
, the Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 and the definitions of fraud and
money-laundering. The dispute is whether, on the facts of this
matter,
these Acts and offences have been committed.
## Background
Background
[5]
On 18 March 2021 the applicant obtained a preservation order, granted
ex parte,
on an urgent basis and in chambers against the
property of the respondents in terms of Section 38 of POCA. The
effect of this order
is that all funds held in the respondents' bank
accounts were frozen. The papers and the order were subsequently
served on the
respondents on 24 March 2021.
[6]
The respondents are the aggrieved parties who apply for the
reconsideration
of the application. I will refer to the NDPP as the
applicant has been referred to in the application for the
preservation order.
I also note that at the time of the granting of
the order, the funds had been frozen on the accounts in question at
the instance
of the Finance Intelligence Centre ("the FIC").
[7]
The applicant contended in the application, that the preservation
order was necessitated
by the following facts:
(i)
on 5 March 2021 the FIC issued intervention notices in terms of
Section 34
of the
Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of
2001
("FICA"), directing ASSA Bank and Nedbank to place
holds on the respondents' accounts;
(ii)
the applicant investigated the available facts and interviews given
by the first respondent
and proceeded with a preservation
application;
(iii)
the basis for the granting of the order which was granted on 18 March
2021 was that the second
respondent, through the use of social media
was inviting investors to invest in diamonds for unrealistic profits.
Furthermore,
the second respondent granted an interview to Carte
Blanche where he stated that
'his
dealings were illegal but that he made
them legal'. He confirmed further that he did not possess a licence
to deal in diamonds.
He furthermore posted pictures of diamonds and
in particular, unpolished diamonds.
[8]
The applicant contended further that there was a contravention of
several laws including
unlawful activities being conducted by the
respondents in terms of POCA. It was also noted by the applicant that
the bank accounts
which had been opened by the respondents to run the
business were being run as personal accounts. No normal
business-related expenses
and transactions were observed nor were
payments to SARS observed in respect of VAT. It was also noted by the
applicant that the
respondents had been involved in other civil
matters, one of which was with Capitec Bank where the respondents'
bank accounts had
been frozen on allegations of being involved in a
multiplication scheme.
[9]
It is alleged by the respondents that in making its case, the
applicant failed to
display
uberrimae fidei
in that it
approached the court in a specific and calculated manner which tended
to exclude the ability to hear the respondents'
version and arguments
against the application from the Court's purview. As a result, the
respondents aver that the court was not
apprised of the
inadmissibility of some of the evidence on which the applicant
relied. The respondents also allege that the applicant
relied upon
interviews and television shows in which the respondents had been
involved and relied on,
inter alia,
a series of packets of
diamonds to show that the funds in the bank were indeed the proceeds
as described in
Section 38(2)
of POCA.
The
law in respect of applications in terms of
Rule 6(12)(c)
[10]
Rule 6(12)(c)
of the Uniform rules of Court
provide for the remedy of reconsideration to a person against whom an
order has been granted in his
absence in an urgent application. It is
intended that the rule is to afford an aggrieved person a mechanism
designed to redress
imbalances in and injustices flowing from a court
order granted on an urgent basis and in his absence.
[11]
In terms of
Rule 6(12)(c)
the court has a wide discretion to
reconsider an order obtained
ex
parte.
It also has a discretion to
take other factors into account including whether an imbalance,
oppression or injustice has resulted.
If such an imbalance,
oppression or injustice has resulted, the nature and extent thereof
and whether there are alternative remedies
can be taken into account.
The dominant reason for this subrule is to afford the aggrieved party
a mechanism designed to
redress
such
imbalances, oppression or injustices
flowing from an order
granted
as
a matter of urgency in his absence.
[12]
Although this application is
a
reconsideration in terms of
Rule
6(12)(c)
and
is
so
termed,
it
is
not
an
application
by
the
respondents.
It
is
a
reconsideration,
in
light of the
respondents'
version
,
of
whether
the
applicant
was
entitled to
the
ex
parte
order
granted
by
the
court
.
[13]
Counsel for the respondents argued that
an issue
pertaining
to the onus of proof needs to be determined by this court. The
respondents
contend
that the hearing is a reconsideration of the applicant's application
by
a
Judge
who now has
the
case
of both
sides
before
her. As
such,
the
applicant bears the onus of proving that it is
entitled
to the order originally
sought.
The applicant,
on the other hand,
contends
that
because
the respondents
are
applying for
reconsideration
of
the order that
it
had
obtained
ex parte,
the
respondents bear the onus.
[14]
A
court
which
reconsiders an
order in
terms
of Rule
6(12)(c)
does
so
with the
benefit not only of the facts
contained
in the
original
application
but
also
on
the
basis of a
set
of different circumstances presented
in
affidavits filed
by all interested
parties. The
consequence
of
this
is
twofold in that the issues
are
to
be considered in light of
the
fact
that both sides of the
story
are
before the
court
and
that the execution
of the
original
order may have had the
effect that
those
issues
are
not exactly the
same
as
those which were before
the court when
granting the
orig
i
nal
order
and
are
then dealt with accordingly.
[15]
I agree with the view of Mr Suttner
,
counsel for
the
respondents. The matter is to be
considered
by
this
court
afresh
with both
sides
of
the
story
before
this court.
The
respondents
file
their
answering affidavit and the applicant then has an opportunity to
reply thereto. Accordingly, the applicant bears the onus
of proving
that it is entitled to the order which had originally been
sought
and was subsequently granted.
## Issue
Issue
[16]
The issue in this matter is whether there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the property
concerned, being funds in the frozen bank
accounts, is:
# "(i)an instrumentality of an offence
referred to in Schedule 1; o
"(i)
an instrumentality of an offence
referred to in Schedule 1; o
(ii)
the proceeds of unlawful activities."
[17]
The respondents submit that the applicant has failed to meet the
evidentiary requirements for the relief which it seeks
against them
and that upon a proper consideration of the allegations presented by
the applicant, the relief sought is unsustainable
and not justified.
## Purpose
and nature of Preservation Orders
Purpose
and nature of Preservation Orders
[18]
POCA creates two distinct mechanisms in respect of asset forfeiture
procedure. Chapter 5 provides for the forfeiture
of the benefits
derived from crime and Chapter 6 provides for forfeiture of the
proceeds of and instrumentalities used in crime
but is not conviction
based. Accordingly, it may be invoked even where there is no criminal
prosecution.
[19]
Section
38
of POCA provides that a court shall make a preservation order if
there are reasonable
grounds
to
believe
that
the
party
is
either
an
instrumentality
of
an
offence
or
the
proceeds of unlawful activity or property associated with terrorism.
The
application is directed against the property that had been used to
commit
an offence or which constitutes the proceeds of crime.
The
guilt or wrongdoing of the owners of the goods is therefore not
primarily relevant to
the
proceedings
.
[1]
[20]
The notice which is subsequently given after the granting of the
order is to interested parties. It is intended
to give those
interested parties an opportunity to come forward and either dispute
that the property is the proceeds of criminal
activity or an
instrumentality of an offence. Any interested party may also raise an
innocent owner's defence.
[21]
Section 38(2)
provides that a preservation order of property must be
made if there are reasonable grounds to believe exist that the
property
concerned is an instrumentality of an offence referred to in
Schedule 1 or is the proceeds of unlawful activities.
## Evaluation
of Evidence
Evaluation
of Evidence
[22]
it is important to deal with certain aspects of POCA before I
evaluate the evidence. The legislature intended to
introduce strict
measures to combat organised crime, money laundering and criminal
gang activities and in the process to
inter a/ia,
provide for
the recovery of the proceeds of unlawful activity.
[23]
"Proceeds of unlawful activities" is described in
Section 1
of POCA and means "any property or part thereof or any service,
advantage, benefit or reward which was derived, received or
retained,
directly or indirectly, in connection with or as a result of any
unlawful activity carried on by any person, whether
in the Republic
or elsewhere
"
[24]
An
applicant in a matter such as the matter is
casu
is
obliged to set out the facts upon which
it
relies
for an order in terms of
Section 38
of POCA to
be
granted.
It
must set out the facts upon which
it
relies
to base a belief that is reasonable and that which would cause
a
reasonable
person to hold the belief in question. The issue is whether the
applicant has set out such facts as would cause a reasonable
person
to
hold
the belief in question.
In
the
case
of
Minister
of Law and Order
&
Others
v Hurley
&
Another
[2]
the
court held that the belief must be based on reasonable grounds and
that the information in question must be such as would lead
a
reasonable man to believe what is required.
A
belief based on hearsay evidence does not suffice.
The
test must be an objective one that looks at whether there were
reasonable grounds for
the
belief.
[25]
The parties in the matter
in casu
do
not differ starkly in respect of the requirements as set out above.
The respondents are however of the view that the applicant
has fallen
short of the onus placed upon it to prove a basis for the
preservation order by setting out the facts upon which it
relied upon
to come to a belief based upon reasonable grounds, that the funds in
the frozen bank account are proceeds of unlawful
activities. The
respondents furthermore refute that the applicant's case has been
made out in the founding affidavit and further
contend that the
applicant has
sought
to
introduce new evidence in reply.
[26]
Asa
general
rule, an applicant must make out its case in the founding
affidavit.
[3]
Introducing
evidence in reply is impermissible.
In
the
locus
classicus
case
of
Titty's
Bar and Bottle Store (Pty) Limited v ABC
Garage
(Pty) Limited and Others
[4]
it
was
accepted by the court that an applicant will not be permitted to
introduce new matters in reply except within a very narrow
ambit.
The
Court may ignore or strike out matter in a replying affidavit that
should have been contained in the founding affidavit.
The
court must therefore consider whether the facts only in the founding
affidavit are sufficient to warrant a finding in favour
of the
applicant.
[27]
In ascertaining whether the case made out by the applicant in its
founding
affidavit contained facts upon which the court may find in
its favour, I will consider the following allegations of the
applicant
concerning the property of the respondents which include
bank accounts with Absa Bank held in the names of the respondents.
The
applicant refers the court to documents and affidavits used in
support of the application, which affidavits include one by Ms Brown
and Mr Smit, both senior special investigators employed by the Asset
Forfeiture Unit. The deponent of the affidavit founding this
application refers to the allegations contained in the affidavits of
unlawful activities to which the respondents are linked. They
include,
inter alia,
the following:
(i)
that the second respondent through the use of social media invited
investors to invest
in diamonds for unrealistic profits;
(ii)
that the second respondent gave an interview on Carte Blanche in
which he stated that his
dealings were illegal but that he made them
legal and that he did not possess a licence to deal in diamonds;
(iii)
upon scrutinising of the third respondent's bank account it was
evident that it was being used
to run a business although it was a
personal account;
(iv)
the respondents were involved in civil litigation including a matter
wherein Capitec Bank froze
the respondents' account due to a
suspicion that the respondents were involved ina multiplication
scheme. Capitec Bank was however
ordered to release the hold on the
accounts;
(v)
the applicant, in support of his application, obtained affidavits
from the south African
diamond and Precious Metal Regulator and the
FSB confirming that the respondents did not have a licence to deal in
unpolished diamonds
and also that they did not have the necessary
authority to take deposits.
[28]
The applicant avers that the abovementioned activities fall within
the realms of POCA and that
the proceeds in the bank accounts are
accordingly proceeds of unlawful activities.
[29]
The applicant introduces the affidavits of Mr Bruwer and Mr Neethling
both of whom make some
of the allegations as stated above in his
affidavit in reply. Furthermore, there is no explanation nor
justification for this evidence
to be accepted by this court in
reply
.
Accordingly,
I come to the view that this evidence should be struck out for the
reason that it was not contained in the founding
affidavit as it
should have been.
[30]
I now consider whether the allegations as set out by the applicant in
his founding affidavit
would cause a reasonable person to hold the
belief that reasonable grounds to believe exist that the property
concerned is an instrumentality
of an offence referred to in Schedule
1 of POCA or is the proceeds of unlawful activities. The applicant
alleges and relies upon
a Carte Blanche interview as proof of
unlawful activities. The court was not given an edited version of the
television report or
a transcript of same. A mere allegation has been
made by the applicant and no evidence of such an
interview
is before the court. We are informed by the respondents that this
interview dates back to more than a year ago
.
[31]
I am of the view that this evidence is inadmissible evidence and as
such would not suffice for
a reasonable person to come to a
reasonable belief that the proceeds in the respective bank accounts
are proceeds of unlawful activities
or are an instrumentality of an
offence as referred to in Section 1 of POCA.
[32]
The applicant further attaches voluminous documents for the Court to
consider in making the
ex
parte
application
without express reference to
the
relevant portions.
It
is important to bear in mind the principles set out in the matter of
Swissborough
Diamond Mines {Pty) Limited and Others v
Government
of the
Republic
of South Africa and Others
[5]
where
it was held as follows:
"Regard
being had to the function of affidavits, it is not open to an
applicant or a respondent to merely annexe to its affidavit
documentation and to request the Court to have regard to it. What is
required is the identification of the portions thereof on
which
reliance is placed and an indication of the case which is sought to
be made out on the strength thereof."
[33]
In
view of the principles set out
as
stated above, I am of the view that the applicant's approach to
placing documentation before the Court without referring to them
in
the founding affidavit renders the applicant's case having
"not
been fully canvassed in the application.
No
regard can be had to them in determining the application.
"
[6]
[34]
Another issue which
is
noted
in the founding affidavit is
the
applicant's presentation of its case and
in
particular, the applicant's reliance on
similar
fact
evidence.
Similar
fact
evidence is conditionally admissible in
civil
proceedings -
the
condition
being
that the probative value of
the
evidence is
"strong
enough
to
warrant its reception
in
the
interests of
justice
and its
admission
will
not
operate
unfairly
against
the
other
party
or
parties".
[7]
[35]
The respondents
contend
that the
applicant
adduces similar fact evidence to
further
the
conclusion
that
the respondents are
guilty and
therefore
more likely to have committed the
offences
which
it
seeks
to
prove against them
.
The respondents further
contend
that
this
evidence should be excluded.
No
underlying facts have been
submitted to
court
to enable
it
consider
the
reception
of similar
fact
evidence
to determine that it is relevant
and
it has probative value.
I
agree with
Counsel
for
the
respondents
and
am
of the
view
that
such
evidence is
inadmissible
and is accord
i
ngly
excluded.
[36]
The respondents further contend
that
the
applicant is
not
certain
what
case
it wishes to
present
to this Court
and
expects
the
respondents
to meet. On
the
one
hand the
applicant avers
that
the
respondents'
business
does not
trade in actual, physical
diamonds
and
on
the
other hand,
relies
on an
allegation
that
the
respondents'
business
trades
illegally
in
uncut diamonds. These are
two
mutually destructive and
contradictory
allegations
by
the applicant
which
cannot
be
relied upon to
obtain
the
order
sought.
[37]
For the reasons set out above, I accordingly come to the
view
that
the applicant has failed to prove that the evidence it relied upon
for the purpose of obtaining the order does not fall within
the
purview of the Act and accordingly, the following order is granted:
(i)
the application is dismissed;
(ii)
the preservation order is overturned; and
(iii)
the applicant is ordered to pay the respondents' costs including the
cost of two counsel.
MOKOSE
J
Judge
of the High Court of
South
Africa
Gauteng
Division, Pretoria
For
the Applicant:
Adv
J Wilson
On
instructions of
Office of the State Attorney
For
the First, Second and Third Respondents:
Adv J
Suttner and
Adv
A Jansen van Vuuren
On
instructions
of W
N Attorneys Inc
Date
of Judgement:
22
August 2022
[1]
NDPP v RO Cook Properties (Pty) Ltd; NDPP v 37 Gillespie Street
Durban (Pty) Ltd and another; NDPP v Seevnarayan (2004]
2 All SA 491
(SCA) at para 10
[2]
1986 (3) SA 569 (A)
[3]
Eagles Landing Body Corporate v Molewa
2003 (1) SA 412
(T)
[4]
1974 (4) SA 362 (T)
[5]
1999 (2) SA 279
(T) at 324 F - G
[6]
Swissborough case supra at 327A - 8/C
[7]
Mood Music Publishing Co Limited v De Wolfe Limited
1976 1 All ER
763
{CA) at 766
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