begin wrapper
begin container
begin header
begin slogan-floater
end slogan-floater
- About SAFLII
About SAFLII
- Databases
Databases
- Search
Search
- Terms of Use
Terms of Use
- RSS Feeds
RSS Feeds
end header
begin main
begin center
# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
You are here:
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
>>
2022
>>
[2022] ZAGPPHC 758
|
Noteup
|
LawCite
sino index
## KeyHealth Medical Scheme v Ngoepe N.O and Others (A203/2021)
[2022] ZAGPPHC 758 (10 October 2022)
KeyHealth Medical Scheme v Ngoepe N.O and Others (A203/2021)
[2022] ZAGPPHC 758 (10 October 2022)
Download original files
PDF format
RTF format
make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPPHC/Data/2022_758.html
sino date 10 October 2022
FLYNOTES:
MEDICAL SCHEME BENEFITS
Health
– Medical schemes – Prescribed minimum benefits –
Scheme paying from day-to-day benefits funded by
member's saving
account – Act and schemes rule obliging scheme to pay from
prescribed minimum benefits pool –
Medical Schemes Act 131
of 1998
.
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO: A203
/
2021
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
REVISED
10/10/2022
In
the matter between:
KEYHEALTH
MEDICAL SCHEME
APPELANT
and
THE
HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE SM NGOEPE N.O.
First Respondent
(First
Respondent a quo)
REGISTRAR
OF MEDICAL SCHEMES
Second
(Second
Respondent a quo)
Respondent
WILLIAM
REED
Third
(Third
Respondent
a
quo)
Respondent
JUDGMENT
BARIT
AJ
Introduction
[1]
This is an appeal by KeyHealth Medical
Scheme with respect to a judgment in the Court a quo. In her
judgment, Constantinides AJ
dismissed an application to review and
set aside a decision of the Appeal Board constituted in terms of
Section 50
of the
Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998
, which application
was brought by KeyHealth. The appellant (KeyHealth) is now appealing
against this judgment.
[2]
KeyHealth Medical Scheme (the appellant)
is a not-for-profit medical scheme, duly registered under
Section 24
(1) of the
Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998
as amended.
[3]
Dr William David Reed (the third
respondent in this appeal), a non-practicing attorney, who is
representing himself in this matter,
describes himself as an "elderly
gentleman". He is a member of KeyHealth Medical Scheme.
Substance
of the Appeal by KeyHealth
[4]
The crisp factor to be decided in this
matter is whether KeyHealth Medical Scheme can apply prescribed
minimum benefits (PMB) to
the day-to-day benefits (DTD) that a member
of the scheme is subscribed to. Simply stated, KeyHealth in terms of
what they call
their "rule", would first deduct any
prescribed minimum benefit (PMB) from the day-to-day benefits (DTD)
which in turn
is funded by the member's saving account (MSA), and
only after the MSA was depleted would KeyHealth then take the funds
from what
they refer to as their PMB "risk pool" which
exists for PMB items.
[5]
Reed maintains this practice is wrong
being contrary to the
Medical Schemes Act and
PMB items must be
funded from the scheme's risk pool, which exists for PMB items.
[6]
The importance of this can be seen from
two stark facts. Firstly, chronic expenses (e.g. chronic medication)
is included under the
heading of PMB's. Secondly, once the MSA is
depleted by PMB's, the member will not have funding for his or her
day-to-day medical
expenses -
like
dentists, chemists, physiotherapists and house doctor.
Background
[7]
The history of this appeal by KeyHealth
goes back a number of years.
[8]
During 2016, Reed objected to KeyHealth
paying for his cardiologist consultations with his DTD benefits. Reed
contended that this
was not permissible as he claimed that Prescribed
Minimum Benefits had to be funded from PMB (referred to by KeyHealth
as their
risk pool) and cannot be funded by his DTD benefits, which
are funded from his (i.e. Reed's) MSA.
[9]
Basically, the contention of Reed was
his chronic condition was meant to be funded from the PMB risk pool
only. KeyHealth stated
that this is not so and that it first takes
the funds from the DTD benefits and only when that fund (effectively
the MSA of the
member) is depleted does it take the funding from the
PMB risk pool.
[10]
This would mean a disadvantage for Reed.
With the day-to-day funds drawn from the MSA, Reed would not have
funds for other medical
expenses, or less funds.
Reed maintains that this amounts to him
being prejudiced.
The
historical facts
[11]
In 2016 Reed filed a complaint with the
Council for Medical Schemes (CMS). This was based on Reed believing
that the appellant (KeyHealth)
did not comply with legislative
instructions relating to "prescribed minimum benefits" as
promulgated in the Medical
Schemes Act of 1998 (The Act) and other
relevant legislation.
[12]
The CMS found against Reed. Their ruling
was in favour of KeyHealth, and they based their finding on the
contentions of KeyHealth.
[13]
Reed then appealed the ruling of CMS to
the Appeals Committee of the Council for Medical Schemes. Again the
ruling was against Reed
and in favour of KeyHealth. The Appeals
Committee's finding was that KeyHealth was correct in utilising the
DTD benefits to pay
Reed's PMB claims. This confirmed the finding of
the CMS. Their view was that the Regulations of the
Medical Schemes
Act do
not prohibit the scheme from doing so. They believed the only
express prohibition concerning the PMB's is found in
Regulation 10
(6), of the
Medical Schemes Act, which
provides that the funds in the
member's MSA should not be used to pay for the costs of a PMB. Hence,
given the express prohibition
in
regulation 1O
(6) it was the appeals
committee's view that if the legislature had intended to prohibit the
funding of PMB claims from a member's
day-to-day benefits then it
would have said so in the Act. Similarly, if the Minister of Health
had intended to prohibit the funding
of PMB claims from a member's
day-to-day benefits then she too would have done so when she made the
Regulations. In the absence
of such a prohibition, in both the Act
and the Regulations, it follows that the scheme was entitled to fund
the claims from DTD
benefits.
[14]
Reed then appealed to the Appeal Board of the Medical Council,
comprising of three members with
Judge Ngoepe as the chairperson and
the other two members being Dr NB Jada and Dr D Ramagole. The
finding, of the Chairman, was
in favour of Reed, hence setting aside
the decision by the appeal committee of the CMS.
[15]
The Appeal Board rejected KeyHealth's contention that the KeyHealth's
rules authorised KeyHealth to fund PMB's from a member's
DTD benefits
and held that
Regulation 8
of the
Medical Schemes Act obliges
a
Medical Scheme to fund PMB's from its PMB risk pool. The Appeal Board
concluded that KeyHealth's conduct "amounted to an
attempt to
contrive and escape from its liability to the full payment of PMB
benefits out of its pool". Further, it constituted
a stratagem
to avoid dipping into the risk pool from which the PMB contributions
are meant to be paid for, by deflecting such debits
to what KeyHealth
referred to as a "member's day-to-day benefits".
[16]
Quite simply, the KeyHealth Medical Scheme therefore could not apply
the funds available as part
of the day-to-day benefits of Reed for
purposes of funding Reed's PMB's.
[17]
KeyHealth was ordered to refund all the
fundings it had made for prescribed minimum
benefits
from
Reed's
day-to-day
benefits
as
from
15
March
2015
which was the date that Reed discovered what he described as the
"irregularities".
[18]
Subsequently, KeyHealth applied to the
High Court, for an order as follows:
(a)
The decision of the Appeal Board dated 3
April 2019 be reviewed and set aside;
(b)
Reed's Appeal to the "Appeal Board"
of the Medical Council be dismissed;
(c)
In the alternative to paragraph (b)
above, the matter be referred back to the Appeal Board for
reconsideration having regard to
the fact that firstly nothing in the
Act and Regulations prohibits a scheme to fund PMB's from a member's
DTD benefit. Secondly
Rule 17.7 read with rule 17.8 of the applicant
(KeyHealth) rules authorises the applicant to fund PMB's from a
member's DTD benefits.
[19]
The matter was heard by Constantinides
AJ, in the High Court, who ruled in favour of Reed, confirming the
ruling of Judge B M Ngoepe,
the Chairman of the Appeal Board of the
Medical Council.
[20]
KeyHealth then applied for leave to
appeal. Constantinides AJ, passing judgment in the application gave
judgment against KeyHealth.
[21]
As a result of an application made by
KeyHealth, the Supreme Court of Appeal on 1 March 2021 granted
KeyHealth leave to appeal to
the "Full Court of the Gauteng
Division of the High Court of South Africa, Pretoria".
Legislative
provisions
[22]
The Regulations of the
Medical Schemes
Act 131 of 1998
contains the following provisions.
In
the Definitions section:
'"prescribed
minimum benefits' means the benefits contemplated in section 29.1 (o)
of the Act and consist of the provisions
of the diagnosis, treatment
and care costs of
-
(a)
The diagnosis and treatment
pairs listed in Annexure A,
subject to any limitation specified in Annexure A;
(b)
Emergency Medical condition;
(c)
Prescribe minimum benefit
condition means the condition contemplated in the diagnosis and
treatment parts listed in annexure A or
any emergency medical
condition."
Regulation
8
of the
Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998
describes PMBs further as:
"Subject
to the provisions of this regulation, any benefit option that is
offered by a medical scheme must pay in full without
co-payment or
the use of deductibles, diagnoses, treatment and care costs of the
prescribed minimum benefit conditions".
Regulation
10
(6) reads as follows:
"The funds in the member's Medical
Savings account shall not be used to pay for the costs of prescribed
minimum benefit."
Section
32 of the Act states:
"The
rules of
a
medical scheme
and any amendments thereof shall be binding on the medical scheme
concerned, its members, officers and on any person
who claims any
benefit under the rules and whose claim is derived from
a
person so
calling".
Day-to-day
benefits
[23]
What are "day-to-day"
benefits?
1.
From factors currently available, it is
evident that day-to-day benefits are not a separate fund, but it is
the terminology used
to describe the day-to day services
utilised by members on a day-to-day basis (e.g. medical expenses such
as house doctor
visits, optometry, dentistry, physiotherapy), which
are funded from the MSA of the member.
2.
In simple terminology, the payment of
services rendered by a service provider is either paid for from the
member's MSA (e.g. physiotherapist)
or from the medical scheme's
"risk pool" which includes the PMB's (e.g. chronic
medication). DTD benefits can be seen
not to be a separate pool and
therefore it can lend itself to ambiguity in an inter-play of words.
It simply, by all accounts,
are the words used for what transpires on
a day to-day basis, and then funded from the member's savings
account.
3.
Hence there is one source of funding for
day-to-day benefits and this is the MSA. The use of two terms -
day-to-day and member's savings account
-
creates
ambiguity. In terms of funding, it is one and the same.
No
prohibition
[24]
KeyHealth maintained that there was no
prohibition on the using of the day-to day benefits. Hence, it
was not a question of
whether there was permission to use it, but
whether there was a prohibition on the use of it.
[25]
This formed the basis for the finding in
favour of KeyHealth by the Medical Schemes Appeals Committee which
stated that:
"In
the absence of such prohibition in both the Act, and the Regulations,
it follows that the scheme is entitled to fund the
claims from the
DTD benefits."
[26]
Simply stated, this ruling would mean
that the members of KeyHealth, which include Reed, would find
themselves having the day-to-day
benefits depleted, which funds are
drawn from their savings account.
[27]
Constantinides AJ in her judgment (para
35) stated that the "Appeal Board Chairman" took into
account KeyHealth's initial
argument that it was entitled to do as it
did because there was nothing in the Act, Regulations or the Rules
prohibiting it from
doing so and found that it was a flawed argument
in two respects:
"Firstly,
its approach to the issue was wrong: the question was not whether
there was any prohibition not to utilise the DTD
account, but whether
there was any authorisation (in the Act, Regulations or the
KeyHealth's Rules), to do that."
"Secondly,
in any event, what it did amounted to an attempt to contrive and
escape from its liability for the full payment
of PMB benefits out of
the risk pool and... Regulation 8 dealing with PMB's stated: 'Subject
to the provisions of this regulation,
any benefit option that is
offered by
a
medical scheme
must pay in full, without co-payment or the use of deductibles, the
diagnosis,
treatment
and
care
cost
of
the
prescribed
minimum
benefit
conditions."'
[28]
Constantinides AJ pointed out that
KeyHealth was not able to point out any authority for its
proposition. The Chairman of the Appeal
Board stated in that respect
that KeyHealth could not do as it pleased, to the detriment of a
member simply because there was nothing
which prohibited it from
doing that.
[29]
Further, Constantinides AJ pointed out
that the Chairman of the Appeal Board emphasised that the scheme
cannot avoid full liability
to pay for the PMB condition out of the
risk pool. He found that what KeyHealth did was to "employ a
stratagem, indirectly
if not directly, (to) achieve just that."
Further the Chairman of the Appeal Board stated that:
"Through
this stratagem, it avoided dipping into the risk pool from which PMB
conditions are paid for by deflecting such debits
to day-to-day
account".
Rule
17
[30]
In her judgment, Constantinides AJ, came
in strongly with respect to the switch that KeyHealth made with
respect to their argument
to support their contention to the
prejudice of Reed. KeyHealth's initial argument was that there was no
prohibition on the utilisation
of DTD funds for PMB accounts.
However, KeyHealth then switched their argument to bring in "Rule
17" as being in support
of their contention.
[31]
KeyHealth maintained that in terms of
their Rules, they were entitled to do so. Particular reference was
made by KeyHealth to what
they called their "Rule 17". This
was mentioned extensively by KeyHealth. A study of Rule 17 shows that
it is a very
long section,
with
some 16 clauses, many of these clauses having their own subsections.
Though reference is made in Rule 17, to prescribed medical
benefits,
Rule 17.5 is quite clear in what it states:
"No
limitations or exclusions will be applied to the Prescribed Minimum
Benefits."
[32]
The reading of this Rule is completely
against any contention that KeyHealth has made with respect to Rule
17 supporting their use
of the so-called DTD benefit account.
KeyHealth particularly referred to their Rule 17.7 (which however
refers to benefit year)
and Rule 17.8 (which refers to the "date
on which services were rendered"). Hence Rule 17.7 and Rule 17.8
has no relevance
to the prescribed minimum benefits. The applicable
paragraph is rule 17.5. of the KeyHealth set of rules.
The
Appeal Board Chairman found that upon reading "Rule 17",
the interpretation contended to by KeyHealth was unsustainable.
[33]
I agree with the Constantinides AJ
support for what the Appeal Board Chairman contended. Nowhere in Rule
17 is there any form, of
support for what KeyHealth has stated. On
the contrary the simple English reading of "Rule 17.5", as
quoted above, nullifies
any attempt to successfully use "Rule
17" as was attempted by KeyHealth.
Simply
stated, Rule 17 is completely against any contention that KeyHealth
had attempted to make in support of their argument.
[34]
The Appeal Board Chairman stated further
that it was a disingenuous way of KeyHealth avoiding to "pay in
full" for PMB
conditions out of the PMB risk pool which resulted
in the depletion of the appellant's (Reed's) day-to-day account to
his detriment
and the detriment of his dependent. According to the
Appeal Board Chairman such conduct was wrong and the arguments
provided by
KeyHealth, that nothing prohibited KeyHealth from doing
so, held no water.
[35]
An argument by KeyHealth was simply that
all the claims were paid, so why is the member complaining. That is
equivalent to a bank
saying that you have got money in your account,
and as you are not using it we have now transferred it elsewhere.
[36]
On
a
correct
interpretation
of
the
words
"prescribed
minimum
benefits", this applies by way of
example to where a patient goes into hospital and/or is suffering
from a chronic condition.
Hence it would only be common sense for
such to be taken from the pool specially designated for this purpose.
This definitely should
not to be part of day-to-day benefits to be
funded from the Member's Savings Account.
Legal
aspects
[37]
In terms of legislation and KeyHealth's
rules, the following is relevant:
In
Regulation 10 it is stated that "the funds" in the member's
Medical Savings Account shall not be used to pay for the
costs of a
Prescribed Minimum Benefit.
Further,
Regulation 8, states that "any benefit option that is offered by
a medical scheme must pay in full, without co-payment
or the use of
deductibles, the diagnosis, treatment and care costs of the
prescribed minimum benefit conditions".
Rule
17.5 of the KeyHealth rules states that "no limitations or
exclusions will be applied to the Prescribed Minimum Benefits".
With
reference to Section 32 of the Act, the binding force of a medical
scheme's rules is discussed. More specifically it provides
that:
"The
rules of a medical scheme and any amendments thereof shall be binding
on the medical scheme concerned, its members, officers
and on any
person who claims any benefit under the rules or whose claim is
derived from a person
so
claiming."
From
the above, in terms of both the Act and KeyHealth rule 17.5,
prescribed minimum benefits must be paid from PMB.
[38]
Should, rule 17 of KeyHealth rules have
any provision otherwise -
which
it has not -
the
following
dicta,
from
the
English
case
of
Johnson
and
Another
vs Mareton
1918
AC 37
(HL), cited in the matter of
The
Counsel of Medical Schemes v Genesis Medical Scheme
2015
ZASCA 161
para 42, would in any event apply.
"(It)
can no longer be treated axiomatic that, in the absence of explicit
language, the Courts will permit contracting out
of the provisions of
an Act of Parliament where the Act, though silent as to the
possibility of contracting out, nevertheless
is
manifestly passed
for the protection of a
class
of persons who do
not negotiate from a position of equal strength, but in whose
well-being there is
a
public
as
well as a private
interest. Such acts are not necessarily to be treated as simply }us
pro
se
introduction, a
"private remedy and
a
private right"
which an individual member of the class may simply bargain away by
reason of his freedom of contract. It is
precisely this weakness as a
negotiating party from which Parliament wishes to protect him."
[39]
Based on both the Act and the rules of
KeyHealth, the conclusion that must be drawn is that KeyHealth is
obliged to pay prescribed
minimum benefits from what they refer to as
the PMB pool.
Tacit
Acceptance
[40]
Any allegation by KeyHealth of an
alleged acceptance by Reed of the use of the DTD benefits, (which
means funding from the MSA)
of PMBs must be rejected. There can be no
tacit acceptance by Reed of KeyHealth's prior actions in funding his
PMBs (chronic treatment
and/or medication) from Reed's MSA, by virtue
of Reed having no knowledge of KeyHealth's actions and being totally
unaware that
KeyHealth was utilising his MSA to fund his PMBs. At no
time did KeyHealth make its intentions clear to Reed, that it
intended
to utilise his MSA to fund his PMBs. In light of the fact,
that it is prescribed that PMBs may not be paid from the
member's
MSA, KeyHealth
acted
contrary
to
what
is
prescribed
by
the
Act.
Hence,
it
cannot
be
said
that
Reed
had
acquiesced
to the utilisation of his
MSA for the funding of PMBs.
[41]
Therefore, KeyHealth's indication that
Reed had accepted the deduction of PMBs as
being part of his DTD benefits, (and
hence funded from his MSA) must be rejected.
Promotion
of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA)
[42]
Section 33 (1) of the Constitution gives
anyone a right to administrative action that is procedurally fair.
Section 6 (2) (c) of
PAJA allows review of an administrative action
on the ground that the action was procedurally unfair.
[43]
Section 6(2)(h) of PAJA has reference to
the "exercise of power" of a tribunal. This is particularly
important in relation
to KeyHealth's contentions with respect to the
Appeals Board ruling.
Section
6(1) read with section 6(2)(h) states as follows:
'
Any
person
may institute
proceedings
in
a
court or
a
tribunal
for review
of an
administrative action
...
if the exercise
of the power
or the
performance of the function authorised by the empowering provisions,
in pursuance of which the administrator's action was
purportedly
taken, is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so
exercised the power or performed the function."
[44]
The test is clear as explained in the
Duma's
case
-
RAF v Duma
2013(6)
SA 9 (SCA) paragraph 22 - whether the Appeal Tribunal's decision is
so unreasonable that no reasonable person would have
reached it. The
question that must be answered in the present matter is whether this
Court is satisfied that a reasonable person
in the position of the
Appeal Board, on the evidence before it, could have reached the
conclusion that it had reached. The decision
maker' in this instance,
the Appeal Board, had to take into consideration all matters which a
reasonable person would have done,
having the same information at its
disposal at the time the decision was taken.
[45]
The various elements applicable to this
matter are:
i.
The administrative decision has to be
taken on an accurate factual basis.
ii.
There must be true facts which are
material to the decision. By way of example the considering of
relative material and/or all the
material provided and/or personal
circumstances
(Minister of Home
Affairs and Others v Somali Association of South Africa and another
2015 (3) SA 545
SCA).
iii.
That there was no material error of law
that influenced the outcome of the decision.
[46]
The court
a
quo went into detail with respect to the above. It concluded that the
Appeal Board in its finding had taken all the factors into
account,
and acted in a manner that any reasonable person would have -
when having the same information at its
disposal at the time the decision was made.
Medical
Schemes Act
[47
]
The opening section of the
Medical
Schemes Act states
that one of its intentions is "to protect the
interests of members of medical schemes". KeyHealth's attempts
to evade
paying, by all means, especially after rulings by both the
Chairman of the Appeals Board and subsequently by the High Court in
no way promotes the interests of a member, namely Mr Reed.
Summing
up
[48]
Reed's savings account in this matter,
is being utilised by KeyHealth for PMB's
-
as what transpires is that such day-to-day expenses (e.g. dentists,
physiotherapists, etc) are taken by KeyHealth from the member's
savings account resulting in the savings being effectively used for
PMB's. Based on this alone, stating that there is no prohibition
on
the medical aid using DTDs for PMB's is false logic, as, the
prohibition of not utilising DTDs for PMB's takes effect. It is
purely an accounting administrative procedure flowing directly from
the paying of the supplier - which results in a vagueness of
words
and an attempt to differentiate day-to-day benefits from the fact
that such funds come from the member's (Reed's) saving
account.
[49]
With respect to all the above:
(a)
In terms of Regulation 10(6) of the Act,
the use of "the funds in the member's medical savings account
shall not be used to
pay the costs of prescribed medical benefits."
(b)
KeyHealth is attempting to apply Reed's
member's savings account for prescribed medical benefit despite the
Regulations prohibiting
it.
(c)
KeyHealth is trying to evade a
legislative provision using a disguise of "day-to-day benefits",
which if the disguise
is removed, it is nothing other than utilising
the member's savings account.
(d)
KeyHealth's own Rule does not allow for
the funding of prescribed medical benefits from the member's savings
account.
(e)
If KeyHealth's own Rule 17 would allow
such, which it does not, same would be trumped by the clear
legislation in Regulation 8.
(f)
The attempted use of PAJA, in the light
of the detailed findings of the Chairman of the Appeals Board has no
merit in this matter.
Conclusion
[50]
No fault can be found in the original
judgment with the Court a quo, on 8 May 2020, where Constantinides AJ
gave a detailed and
well-reasoned judgment, which confirmed the
decision of the Appeal Board of the Council for Medical Schemes dated
3 April 2019.
[51]
In view of the fact that Reed appeared
in person, I don't think that he would be entitled to a cost order in
his favour. I am of
the view that no cost order should be made.
[52]
I can only confirm the final decision of
Constantinides AJ where she stated: "The Appeal Board of the
Council for Medical Schemes
who was the decision maker in this
instance and took into consideration all matter which a reasonable
person would have done, having
the same information at its disposal
at the time the decision was taken".
[53]
Therefore the following order is
made:
1.
The appeal is dismissed.
2.
There shall be no
order as to costs.
L
BARIT
Acting
.Judge of the High Court, Pretoria.
I
AGREE
DS
FOURIE
Judge
of the High Court
Pretoria,
I
AGREE
C
SARDIWALLA
Judge
of the High Court, Pretoria.
DATE
OF JUDGMENT:
Appearances
Counsel
for the Applicant:
Adv. Stoop SC
Instructed
by:
Kotze & Roux Attorneys Inc.
Appearance
for the Third Respondent:
Mr
William Reed
sino noindex
make_database footer start