Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 793South Africa
De Wet and Others v Scheepers (21021/2020) [2022] ZAGPPHC 793 (27 October 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
27 October 2022
Headnotes
the property in terms of the principles relating to deceased estates. The first plaintiff agreed to grant the appointed estate agent a period within which to promote and advertise the sale of the property, or alternatively to arrange for the sale thereof on auction.
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## De Wet and Others v Scheepers (21021/2020) [2022] ZAGPPHC 793 (27 October 2022)
De Wet and Others v Scheepers (21021/2020) [2022] ZAGPPHC 793 (27 October 2022)
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sino date 27 October 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE NO.: 21021/2020
REPORTABLE: NO
OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES: NO
REVISED.
In the matter between:
FRANCO JACQUES DE WET
First plaintiff
JOHAN WILHELM CHRISTIAAN
NEL
Second plaintiff
NEL & DE WET
ATTORNEYS
Third plaintiff
And
OCKER
SCHEEPERS
Defendant
JUDGMENT
van
der Westhuizen, J
[1]
It is trite that one must endure the everyday hustle and bustle to
one’s character,
but not to the extent that one’s
reputation is tarnished as a result. In particular where one’s
professional reputation
is at stake.
[2]
The first and second plaintiffs practise as attorneys in a
partnership under the name
and style of the third plaintiff. They are
longstanding members of the South African Legal Practice Council.
They specialise in
deceased estates.
[3]
The defendant is a lay person, who holds that which is his, dearly
and close to his
heart. He was the primary heir to his late mother’s
estate on her passing. That estate has one particular valuable
property,
namely immovable property situated in Pretoria North, of
which the defendant was the sole beneficiary. It was this property,
or
rather the manner in which it was allegedly dealt with by the
executor of the estate that gave rise to the unfortunate events
leading
up to this action.
[4]
The plaintiffs instituted this action for damages suffered as a
result of accusations
levelled against them, which the plaintiffs
alleged were defamatory in nature and which were publicised widely by
the defendant.
[5]
The first and second plaintiffs testified and the defendant, who
acted in person,
also testified. The defendant was clearly at sea in
putting his defence forward and managing his defence. He could not
afford legal
representation and was apparently unsuccessful in
obtaining either Legal Aid, or
pro bono
representation.
[6]
In terms of the last will and testament of the defendant’s late
mother, Sanlam
Trust Limited was appointed the testamentary executor.
The latter appointed the plaintiffs to administer the deceased estate
on
behalf of Sanlam Trust. Due process was followed in that regard.
That is common cause. Sanlam Trust is a client of the third
respondent
and has it on its panel for appointment as administrator
of estates where Sanlam Trust is appointed as testamentary executor.
[7]
As recorded, the defendant is a lay person, not knowledgeable of the
law and the intricacies
of legal principles, in particular those
relating to deceased estates. He lived with his late mother in the
aforesaid property
prior to her passing. His late mother took care of
him. He remained in the property after her passing. However, being
unemployed,
with no real expectation of being gainfully employed, he
could not afford the property rates and the relevant costs applicable
to the property. He decided to place the property on the market for
sale. He had the misconception that, having inherited it from
his
late mother on her passing, he owned the property. It was common
cause that the estate had not yet been finalised and thus
the
property was not registered in his name. The defendant had no
appreciation that the property was to have been registered in
his
name before he could offer it for sale in his personal capacity.
[8]
The first plaintiff, who dealt with the administering of the deceased
estate on behalf
of Sanlam Trust, caught wind of the defendant’s
attempt to sell the property on the open market. At that stage, the
defendant
had already engaged the services of an estate agent to
advertise and sell the property. The first plaintiff informed the
defendant
that the property fell within the deceased estate, and was
not the defendant’s property, albeit that the defendant was the
sole heir thereto. The defendant was also informed that the executor,
and by parity of reasoning the administrator of the estate,
held the
property in terms of the principles relating to deceased estates. The
first plaintiff agreed to grant the appointed estate
agent a period
within which to promote and advertise the sale of the property, or
alternatively to arrange for the sale thereof
on auction.
[9]
The agreed period having elapsed with no progress in the sale of the
property, either
on the open market or on auction, the first
plaintiff cancelled the mandate of the defendant’s appointed
estate agent as
he was entitled to do. Thereafter, the first
plaintiff instructed a potential auctioneer to provide a value of the
property should
it be sold on an auction. The probable value that the
property would reach on auction was less than that which the
defendant was
promised by his erstwhile appointed estate agent. This
upset the defendant. He wanted more. The defendant was not alive to
the
realities of selling a property on auction and in the persisting
economic climate.
[10]
The first plaintiff arranged for the auction to be held. At the
auction there was only one real
bidder who represented the only
possible purchaser. The latter offered an amount close to the value
provided by the auctioneer
prior to his appointment to undertake the
auction. This irked the defendant. He attempted to intervene at the
auction and refused
the offer outright.
[11]
After the auction, the defendant was under the impression that the
bidder was the true purchaser,
and that he did not represent someone
else. After much toing and froing, the defendant, in writing,
accepted the offer. This was
disputed by the defendant during the
leading of evidence. His defence was that he did not sign the e-mail
which contained the acceptance.
Reluctantly the defendant conceded
the point.
[12]
The defendant remained irked. He accused the bidder, the true
purchaser and the first plaintiff
of collusion and underhandedness in
the process of the auction and the sale of the property. Those
accusations were eventually
extended and levelled at the second and
third plaintiffs.
[13]
The accusations were repeated in complaints to Sanlam Trust -
Forensic Services, the Master of
the High Court, the South African
Legal Practice Council, and to various other individuals.
[14]
The complaint to Sanlam Trust - Forensic Services, contained the
following statements:
(a)
The unlawful conduct was perpetrated by the
lawyer appointed to administer the deceased estate;
(b)
The said unlawful conduct comprised of the
illegal unauthorised acquisition of the deceased estate to an
unauthorised buyer through
fraudulent and deceptive means;
(c)
The first plaintiff was implicated in
fraudulent dealings that resulted in the property being sold;
(d)
The first plaintiff was involved in
fraudulent dealings to enrich his friends behind the defendant’s
back and without his
knowledge in order to acquire the property at a
reduced price;
(e)
The purchase agreement was forged with
criminal intent in the defendant’s absence;
(f)
The first plaintiff betrayed the
defendant’s trust while acting on behalf of Sanlam Trust.
[15]
The defendant in his complaint lodged with the Master of the High
Court, Pretoria, raised similar
statements and included the
following:
(a)
The sale of the property was illegal and
the sale agreement was forged with criminal intent, suing falsified
buyer’s information;
(b)
The sale agreement was forged using shell
names to create two identities, one which is nothing more than a
front company, most likely
created by the third plaintiff for their
client, Leon Smith, to illegally seize and occupy the property;
(c)
The sale agreement, signed by the first
plaintiff, was forged without any written agreement between the
defendant and Leon Smith;
(d)
The purchase agreement was forged with
criminal intent to enrich Leon Smith, Dirk Pienaar and the first
plaintiff.
[16]
Leon Smith, who did the bidding at the aforesaid auction, was the
representative of the true
buyer, one Esther Nel. Dirk Pienaar was
the auctioneer who acted on behalf of Root, the auctioneering entity
and who had provided
a forced sale value that could be expected at an
auction of the property.
[17]
The plaintiffs denied that Leon Smith was their client and they were
unaware of his existence
until the auction. That evidence was not
challenged by the defendant at the trial.
[18]
The statements made by the defendant to the Legal Practice Council
that related to all the plaintiffs
were as follows:
(a)
The first plaintiff and Dirk Pienaar took
steps to derail and de-route the investigation launched by Sanlam;
(b)
The first plaintiff deceived the defendant
with falsified information, lied to the defendant in his face to
acquire the property.
This statement was further disclosed to Ms
Linda Duvenhage, the first plaintiff’s personal assistant;
(c)
The first plaintiff has a criminal
character;
(d)
The first and second plaintiffs intended to
make a profit from an illegally acquired property sale transaction
based on falsified
buyer’s information;
(e)
The first and second plaintiffs blackmailed
the defendant;
(f)
The second plaintiff admitted to being an
accessory to the illegal acquisition of the property;
(g)
The first plaintiff admitted to fraud and
theft in an attempt to steal the property from the defendant;
(h)
The first and second plaintiffs were in the
pocket of Leon Smith, who directs the first and second plaintiffs and
uses them to acquire
property to the detriment of beneficiaries of
deceased estates;
(i)
The first and second plaintiffs conduct
themselves without any care about the deceased estates or their
beneficiaries. The first
and second plaintiffs render professional
services in an unprofessional manner and that they, through the
rendering of services,
benefit their clients by handing valuable
properties to them for “an apple and onion”;
(j)
The first and second plaintiffs rigs
property sales at auctions;
(k)
The first and second plaintiffs are a
greedy duo that submit falsified registration papers to the Master of
the High Court on such
frequent scale that they are over-confident
and arrogant in their malpractice to rip off deceased estate
inheritors;
(l)
The first and second plaintiffs should be
struck from the roll of attorneys;
(m)
The first and second plaintiffs blackmailed
and bullied the defendant.
[19]
It is clear from the foregoing statements that the accusations
levelled against the plaintiffs
by the defendant, were
per
se
defamatory.
[1]
It was wrongful.
The intention of the defendant was clearly likely to injure the good
esteem of the plaintiffs held by the reasonable
or average person to
whom the statements were published.
[2]
The plaintiffs denied the allegations.
[20]
In his plea, the defendant admitted publication to Sanlam Trust. In
his evidence in defence,
the defendant admitted the publication to
the Master of the High Court and the Legal Practice Council as well
as to various other
individuals. In respect of the publication to
Sanlam Trust, the defendant in his plea raised the defence that the
statements were
true and that the publication was for the benefit of
all parties, alternatively that it was fair comment, true, necessary
for the
purposes of investigating the complaint and that it was not
made with malicious intent. The defendant pled in his plea that the
complaint was lodged with Sanlam and would be understood by Sanlam
that the third plaintiff acted improperly and irregular. It
was
common cause that the defendant was the author of the statements
recorded above.
[21]
At the trial the defendant failed to prove that any, or all of his
aforesaid statements published,
were true or constituted fair
comment. The defendant further failed to prove lack of wrongfulness,
lack of knowledge of wrongfulness,
or in the public interest. The
investigation by Sanlam Trust - Forensic Services absolved the
plaintiffs from any wrong doing.
The complaint to the Master of the
High Court is pending. The complaint lodged with the Legal Practice
Council apparently did not
result in an investigation on receiving
the plaintiffs’ responses to the complaint lodged by the
defendant.
[22]
The defendant admitted at the trial that the statements were
defamatory and were made with an
intent to harm the esteem,
reputation and professional reputation of the plaintiffs. The
defendant was nonplussed about his conduct
and the effect thereof. He
simply admitted to what he had done and accepted that it was
wrongful. He merely shrugged his shoulders
and repeatedly stated that
what was done was done.
[23]
In argument, the defendant proffered sublimely that he was angry at
the manner in which the property
was sold and not obtaining as a high
purchase price as he had hoped. In my view, at the trial the
defendant still did not appreciate
or understand the principles
relating to deceased estates and the administering thereof. The
defence of
rixa
was not raised in the defendant’s plea, nor in his evidence at
the trial.
[3]
His sublime
mentioning of anger did not comply with the requirements of such
defence. The statements were made long after the sale
of the
property, when he had time to reflect thereon. The plaintiffs
attempted to obtain an apology from the defendant before embarking
on
an action. The defendant blatantly and obtusely refused to apologise,
even at the trial.
[24]
In an attempt to compel the defendant from continuing with his
defamatory statements, the plaintiffs
brought an urgent application
for an interdict to that effect. After the serving of the order
granted, the defendant persisted
with his wrongful and injurious
conduct. Further in that regard, during the course of this year, the
defendant repeated some of
the statements to the Office of the Deputy
Judge President of this Division and in the face of the interim court
order granted
against him during 2021. In my view, such conduct
cannot sustain a defence of
rixa
, should such defence have
been raised in the proper manner.
[25]
It follows that the plaintiffs are entitled to a finding of
defamation, all the elements thereof
having been proven by the
plaintiffs.
[4]
[26]
The issue of damages requires consideration and determination. The
purpose of awarding damages
in respect of defamation, is to
compensate a person for the diminution of his or her personality
interest due to the damage-causing
event.
[5]
In effect it is a mere
solatium
for the injury to the personality interests of the defamed plaintiff.
It is trite that the courts are not generous in their awards
for
solatia
.
[6]
[27]
It is notorious to prove the quantum of such damages.
[7]
The main factor in determining the quantum relates to the seriousness
of the defamation. There are other factors that are relevant
in such
determination, namely, the nature and extent of the publication, the
reputation and character and conduct of the plaintiff,
and the
motives and conduct of the defendant.
[8]
[28]
In the present instance, the defamation is serious, the publication
was primarily made to institutions,
Sanlam Trust and the Master of
the High Court, that regularly deal with the plaintiffs and in
particular rely on their professionalism
and good character and
conduct in the plaintiffs’ dealings with those entities. The
defamation published to the Legal Practice
Council is more serious
and damning. The core of the entitlement to remain on the roll of
attorneys is their fitness to practise
as an attorney and as an
officer of the Court. The plaintiffs’ professional reputation
was seriously tarnished and damaged.
It would remain a black spot
against their names in future. No
solatium
could repair that
damage.
[29]
It was submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs, with reference to
alleged comparable cases, that
an amount of R300 000.00 each
would be fair and reasonable in the present circumstances. In
Argus
Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party
[9]
the Court held that the purpose of awarding damages for defamation is
a method whereby a plaintiff vindicates his reputation, and
not as a
road to riches. This may be true as a general principle. However,
where the professional reputation of the plaintiff is
tarnished in
the eyes of entities such as the Mater of the High Court and the
Legal Profession Council, and in the eyes of a client
that has the
plaintiff on a specific panel to do its work, the vindication of the
professional reputation may pose difficulty.
[30]
The conduct of the defendant was inexcusable, yet regard must be had
to the defendant’s
particular circumstances. He had the
opportunity to offer an apology, which if provided, would not have
resulted in an action for
defamation against him. Taking into
consideration that the plaintiffs would have been satisfied with an
apology, the
solatium
to be awarded may not justify an
unreasonable high amount in these particular circumstances, despite
the alleged comparable awards.
[31]
In my view, in the present circumstances, a fair and reasonable
solatium
would be R50 000.00 each in respect of the first
and second plaintiffs.
[32]
In their particulars of claim the plaintiffs entered a second claim
that related to the loss
of profit due to the decline in instructions
received from Sanlam Trust whilst the said investigation was
undertaken. However,
at the trial, the plaintiffs abandoned that
claim.
[32]
There is no reason why costs should not follow the event. However,
the plaintiffs could have
instituted the action in the appropriate
magisterial jurisdiction.
I grant the following
order:
1.
The defendant is to pay an amount of
R50 000.00 to the first plaintiff;
2.
The defendant is to pay an amount of
R50 000.00 to the second plaintiff;
3.
The defendant is to pay the costs of suit
on the appropriate Magistrates’ scale.
C
J VAN DER WESTHUIZEN
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Date
of Hearing:
5 & 6 October 2022
On
behalf of Applicant:
PP Fereira
Instructed
by:
Nel and De Wet Attorneys
On
behalf of Respondent: In Person
Judgment
handed down: 27 October
2022
[1]
Mohamed
v Jassiem
1996(1) SA 673 (SCA) at 703-704
[2]
Tsedu v
Lekota
2009(4) SA 372 (SCA)
[3]
Benson
v Robinson & Co (Pty) Ltd
1967(1) SA 420 (A) at 426
[4]
Khumalo
v Holomisa
2002(5) SA 401 (CC)
[5]
See
in general
Mogale
et al v Seima
2008(5) SA 673 (SCA) at [10]-[11]
[6]
Molgale,
supra,
at [18]
[7]
Mogale,
supra,
at [8]
[8]
Mogale,
supra,
at [13]-[16]
[9]
1992(3) SA 579 (AD) at 590E-F
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