Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 839South Africa
Tax Faculty NPC v South African Institution of Taxation NPC (48140/21) [2022] ZAGPPHC 839 (28 October 2022)
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Tax Faculty NPC v South African Institution of Taxation NPC (48140/21) [2022] ZAGPPHC 839 (28 October 2022)
Tax Faculty NPC v South African Institution of Taxation NPC (48140/21) [2022] ZAGPPHC 839 (28 October 2022)
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sino date 28 October 2022
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO:
48140/21
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
REVISED:
NO
28
October 2022
In
the matter between
THE
TAX FACULTY NPC
Applicant
and
SOUTH
AFRICAN INSTITUTION OF TAXATION NPC
Respondent
JUDGMENT
DE
VOS AJ
Introduction
[1]
This Court is seized with a review
application. The applicant contends it enjoyed accreditation with the
respondent, until September
2021 when the respondent decided that the
applicant had to re-apply for accreditation.
The applicant seeks to review the
September 2021 decision.
The
applicant's case is premised on the principles of administrative law.
It contends the September 2021 decision
was administrative in nature and was taken without prior notice or a
hearing.
[2]
The respondent disputes the applicant's
case in relation to accreditation.
The
respondent places the dispute between the parties much earlier than
September 2021 when accreditation was allegedly revoked.
The
respondent disputes the applicant's version of accreditation.
In particular, the disputes the
authenticity and validity of the accreditation document the applicant
relies on as the basis for
its accreditation.
The respondent contends that the
accreditation document the applicant relies on is irregular (if not
fraudulent) and does not have
any validity at all. The respondent
raises a host of reasons why it contends the accreditation document
is irregular.
[3]
I must first determine if the applicant
enjoyed accreditation on the basis it contends. If not, then the
applicant's review does
not get out of the starting blocks.
The
parties
[4]
Both parties are non-profit companies.
The respondent is a Controlling Body in
terms of Section 240A of the Tax Administration Act.
The respondent's recognition as a
Controlling Body is on the basis that it maintains, in respect of
natural persons who provide
advice on the application of the Tax Act
or to complete tax returns, relevant and effective continuing
professional education requirements.
The
respondent's members must undertake a minimum of 15 tax related
Continuous Professional Education hours per year.
Of the required CPD, 60% must be
verifiable by the respondent and the remaining 40% by be
non-verifiable.
The
respondent is also a registered professional body recognised by the
South African Qualifications Authority ("SAQA")
in terms of
section 31(1)(i)
of the
National Qualifications Framework Act, 67 of
2008
. SAQA is charged with overseeing the further development and
implementation of the National Qualifications Framework and promotes
the framework as a system of communication, co-ordination and
collaboration across education, training, development and work.
[5]
The applicant provides CDP training
courses to benefit person who hold professional designations
registered with SAQA.
Factual
background to the alleged accreditation
[6]
Much of the background relating to the
creation and functioning of the applicant is in dispute.
This is however not where the action
lies.
Instead,
the focus is the alleged accreditation and the circumstances under
which the accreditation was allegedly obtained.
[7]
On 13 July 2018, the Head of CPD at the
applicant, Ms Whitehead, sent an email to the respondent’s
(then) head of Education,
Ms C Laubscher, enquiring whether the
applicant should apply to the respondent for accreditation.
[8]
On 16 July 2018 Ms Laubscher replied to
Ms Whitehead.
Ms
Laubscher provided Ms Whitehead with the policy and advised that in
terms of the current accreditation policy it will
not
be feasible to accredit the
applicant given that the respondent will have to accredit the
applicant as an institution as well as
each of the CPD's offerings.
Ms Laubscher advised Ms Whitehead that
the parties will either have to revisit Institutional Accreditation
or put out a tender notice
for a CPD provider for a period of five
years. To summarise the position that Ms Laubscher conveyed to Ms
Whitehead: [i] the applicant
could not apply [ii] the parties would
have to revisit its policy if the applicant were to apply and [iii]
even then an accreditation
period of five years would require certain
further steps.
[9]
The answer to applicant's question
whether it should apply for accreditation was categorically no.
[10]
On 18 July 2018, despite the categorial
no, the applicant sought to apply for accreditation as a tax CPD
provider.
The
application letter is addressed to Ms Laubscher (in the capacity as
Head of Education and Standards for the respondent). The
letter notes
that there is no policy for the accreditation sought but that the
applicant seeks an exemption. The letter contains
nothing other than
an indication of the applicant's current accreditations and approvals
to provide certain short courses.
[11]
The respondent contends that aside from
the non-compliance with the policy and non- payment of the fees, the
application is curious
in circumstances where -
a)
The applicant had already been advised
by Ms Laubscher that it will not be feasible to accredit the
applicant in respect of the
existing policy.
b)
To the extent exemption was sought from
the policy, that in itself is curious, as the policy does not provide
for exemption.
c)
The basis on which the applicant sought
exemption - its accreditation as a Skills Development Provider in
respect of the Respondent’s
Occupation Qualifications - are not
connected to the provision of CPD.
The
very basis for the exemption appears flawed.
The respondent contends that the grounds
for exemption was nonsensical.
d)
The application was not made in terms of
the policies and procedures determined by the respondent for
applications for accreditation
as a CPD provider.
e)
The applicant had not paid any of the
prescribed application fees in respect of either institutional
accreditation or programme
accreditation.
[12]
On 20 August 2018 Ms Laubscher drafts a
response to the application.
This
draft is central to the dispute.
Ms
Laubscher's version of these events are that she became
"uncomfortable" with the application as Mr Klue (the
applicant's
CEO and deponent to their affidavits) "
effectively
dictated the content of her reply to her under the implied threat
that, should she refuse, there would be consequences
".
Ms Laubscher' version is that this
threat resulted in a first draft of the accreditation document.
Ms Laubscher, "still uncomfortable"
forwarded the draft accreditation document to the respondent’s
COO as well as
Ms Whitehead.
The
Court has been provided with this email. In the body of her email Ms
Laubscher asks for "input".
Ms
Laubscher contends that the matter did not go any further and, to the
best of her recollection, the letter was in draft format
only and
never finalised.
[13]
The allegation that the applicant's CEO
(and deponent), Mr Klue, dictated the contents under threat of
repercussions receives a
bare denial
in the replying affidavit. It is a
serious allegation made in detail and supported with objective,
albeit circumstantial evidence,
in the form of an email.
The
20 August 2018 letter (the accreditation document)
[14]
The applicant relies on a letter dated
20 August 2018 as the basis for its accreditation. The accreditation
document, which is essentially
a letter, states that the applicant is
accredited with the respondent as a Tax CPD provider.
It contains a host of conditions and
explanations of what the accreditation entails.
It is signed by Caretha Labuscher: Head
of Education and Standards.
The
accreditation document appears on a SAIT letterhead.
It is this accreditation document on
which the applicant hinges its case for accreditation.
[15]
Ms Laubscher contends that -
a)
She first had sight of the accreditation
document in 2021 when it was brought to her attention by the
respondent's attorney of record.
b)
The accreditation document came as a
surprise to her since, to the best of her recollection the
draft accreditation document was never
formalised.
c)
She notes that the accreditation
document was ostensibly signed using a scanned copy of her signature.
d)
She denies having approved the draft
accreditation document or having affixed her electronic signature to
the accreditation document,
or that she gave instructions for the
accreditation document to be signed on her behalf.
e)
Even had she signed the accreditation
document she did not have the requisite authority to do so or to
grant any form of accreditation
or exemption in respect of CBD to the
applicant.
The
deponent, Mr Klue, having been intimately involved in the affairs of
the respondent, and especially with CPD, was well aware
of this fact.
f)
The CPD Accreditation policy
specifically provides that any application for accreditation is to be
considered by the respondent’s
accreditation committee.
g)
The committee was never convened nor did
it at any time consider or approve the applicant's application for
exemption or, for that
matter, accreditation.
[16]
The respondent provides a confirmatory
affidavit from Ms Laubscher. The confirmatory affidavit specifically
refers to the paragraphs
in the main affidavit that deals with her
version of events.
[17]
The applicant's dispute of Ms
Laubscher's version hinges on the email sent from Ms Laubscher on 27
August 2018 in which the decision
as conveyed to the applicant with
the approval document attached.
The
respondent raised this allegation in reply.
The respondent attached this email for
the first time in reply.
The
applicant contends that the respondent's deponent has access to Ms
Laubscher's emails and must have known of this email.
The applicant requests the Court to draw
a negative inference from the respondent's failure to mention the 27
August 2021 email.
The
applicant also, based on this email, seeks to cast aspersions on the
"reliability of Mrs Laubscher’s confirmatory
affidavit'.
The
agreement
[18]
At
the same time, the parties were concluding an agreement.
It
is common cause that this agreement was concluded on 18 August 2018
and terminated on 29 June 2021. The agreement is for services
provided by the applicant in the context of CPD. The respondent
expressly does not rely on any rights contained in this agreement.
The respondent admits that the agreement was terminated in 2021.
[1]
The
respondent contends that the cancellation of the agreement is not the
subject of the review proceedings.
[2]
The respondent contends that any accreditation rights the applicant
enjoyed were granted and regulated by this agreement. As the
agreement has been terminated, contends the respondent, the applicant
enjoys no further rights to accreditation.
[19]
The
communications surrounding the termination of the agreement, however,
is relevant to the dispute and will be set out. On 29
June 2021 the
respondent terminated the agreement with effect from September
2021.
[3]
The
termination letter states that the agreement provided for a 3-month
notice period for terminating the agreement and the respondent
asserts the right to do so.
[20]
On 10 September 2021 the respondent
writes to the applicant. The letter refers to correspondence of 29
June 2021 in which the respondent
gave notice of termination of the
agreement effectively as of close of September 2021. The letter
states that "in the absence
of an agreement going forward"
the respondent will only continue to recognise the applicant's
courses accredited with the
respondent until the end of September
2021.
The
respondent invites the applicant to apply for accreditation as a
third-party service in future.
[21]
On 14 September 2021 the respondent
placed a public notice on its website that as of 1 October 2021 the
respondent will not be providing
accreditation of CPD provided by the
applicant.
On
14 September 2021 the applicant's CEO
wrote to the respondent's Board of
Directors in response to the public notice.
The complaint was not the termination of
the agreement, but rather the public notice. The email is then
followed up two days later
with a letter from the applicant's lawyers
complaining about the notice as well as the termination.
[22]
The lawyer's letter results in a
response from the respondent's CEO on 17 September 2021 is of
assistance.
The
core aspect of the letter is that -
3.
We are also fully aware of the 2018
accreditation document to which you refer.
Our
investigation releveled that this accreditation never went through
the formal process an approval normally requires. None of
the
standard documentation required was submitted based on our records,
and all fees were waived. The agreement was set for a 5-year
term as
opposed to the normal three-year term for reasons unknown.
Given these deviations, the
alleged accreditation is grossly irregular, contrary to policy and
has no status whatsoever
.
4.
It is patently evident from our
understanding of the situation that
you
once again acted contrary to policy and outside of your scope of
authority (if any). The SAIT staff operated under your instruction
and implicit understanding that they had to act as you commanded
.
I (as CEO) was never properly apprised of the details of this CPD
accreditation until long after it was drafted.
Given that the alleged 2018
accreditation was provided under circumstances wholly outside of its
policy, this unique deviation can
only be justified form a SAIT
governance perspective as being in support of the SAIT/Tax Faculty
agreement.
.....
The
Tax Faculty was in a false monopoly over SAIT membership CPD. The TAX
Faculty was allowed to offer COD to SAIT members while
the other had
effectively been pushed away.
[23]
The contents of this letter plus Ms
Laubscher's version of events creates the factual matrix on which the
respondent disputes the
applicant's reliance on the accreditation
document.
The
parties' positions
[24]
The applicant accepts that the agreement
was lawfully terminated.
However,
the applicant contends that it enjoyed accreditation outside the
agreement in terms of the accreditation document.
The respondent's decision of September
2021 termination the accreditation as conferred by the accreditation
document in an administratively
unfair manner.
[25]
The respondent contends that the
only
accreditation the applicant enjoyed
was in terms of the agreement.
As
everyone concedes the agreement has been terminated, there are no
rights the applicant enjoys outside the agreement.
The respondent contends that there was
no decision in September 2021 that had to be exercised in a manner
that complied with administrative
rights.
In fact, the "decision" of
September 2021 was a letter in which the respondent reminded the
applicant of the termination
of the agreement a month earlier.
Consideration
of the dispute
[26]
The applicant's case stands and falls on
the accreditation document.
The
respondent disputes the authenticity and validity of the
accreditation document. The respondent's version regarding the
accreditation
document is devastating.
[27]
The respondent contends that the
accreditation document was in fact the result of the applicant's CEO
asserting authority over the
respondent's employees to draft the
document.
The
applicant's CEO, the deponent, did not deny this allegation with any
seriousness. Detailed allegations that Ms Laubscher felt
threatened
and the type of threat presented to her was pleaded.
Ms Laubscher then pleaded that her
discomfort resulted in her emailing the draft accreditation document
(dictated to her by the
applicant) to her COO and an employee of the
applicant asking for "input".
It is bizarre for Ms Laubscher to ask
the applicant for accreditation for input on the accreditation
document.
But
it makes sense if Ms Laubscher had been told what to state in the
letter by the applicant's CEO and was checking if she had
correctly
captured it.
But
whatever inference the Court may be tempted to draw in this regard,
there is no need to do so, as the applicant has presented
a bare
denial to a devastating and detailed allegation.
[28]
There is thus only one version before
the Court regarding the process through which the
accreditation
letter
was
drafted:
under
threat
from
the
applicant's
CEO
to
Ms Laubscher.
Had this allegation been false it would
have detracted a serious dispute from the applicant.
The severity of the allegation invites a
detailed and comprehensive denial, yet, the applicant provides none.
The absence of a detailed
denial is made worse by the fact that the
person Ms Laubscher accuses of threatening her and dictating the
letter to her - is in
the applicant's deponent.
[29]
The absence of a denial must be seen in
light of the applicant's failure to dispute several other allegations
regarding the process
through which the accreditation document was
created.
The
following facts are pleaded in detail by the respondent:
a)
None of the procedures required to
provide accreditation were followed.
b)
Ms Laubscher never had authority to
grant accreditation.
c)
The applicant's CEO was aware of Ms
Laubscher lack of authority and the absence of the correct procedures
being followed.
d)
The respondent's policy did not permit
accreditation for the applicant nor for exemption from the policy.
e)
The applicant applied for accreditation
after being told categorically that it cannot be granted
accreditation.
f)
The applicant was then bizarrely granted
accreditation (in a letter from the same person who categorically
said it was impossible)
without paying any fees for a period not
provided for in the policy.
g)
Ms Laubscher denies the authenticity of
the accreditation document as she did not append her signature on the
document.
[30]
These facts were pleaded in detail and
not seriously disputed by the applicant.
The Court is essentially faced with only
the respondent's version in relation to the creation of the
accreditation document, its
authenticity and validity.
[31]
The
applicant's case hinges on an accreditation document. The respondent
disputes the accreditation document.
The
respondent disputes it is a letter signed by the person whose
signature appears on the document.
It
is a dispute first about the authenticity of the document.
In
addition, the respondent contends that the document is irregular (if
not fraudulent) and does not have any validity at all.
The
Court in fact only has the version of the respondent before it that
the accreditation document is the result of the applicant's
CEO
dictating the contents of the accreditation document to Ms Laubscher
under threat.
The
accreditation document is not a valid document created by the
respondent as it was drafted under threat and dictated by Mr Klue.
The
applicant's case has not been proven as it has failed to show it
enjoyed accreditation in terms of the accreditation document.
[4]
[32]
Even if the Court were to view the
applicant's bare denial of these events as sufficient to raise a bona
fide dispute of fact, as
these are motion proceedings, seeking final
relief,
Plascon-Evans
is
the Court's touchstone and the version of the respondent is to be
preferred if a bona fide dispute of fact had arisen.
[33]
Lastly, the Court must consider the
email of 27 August 2018 sent by Ms Laubscher to the applicant to
which the accreditation document
was allegedly attached. The
applicant requests the Court to draw an inference, based on this
email, that the respondent’s
CEO must have known about the
accreditation document and is not playing open cards with the Court.
The applicant contends that as the
respondent's CEO had access to Ms Laubscher's emails he must have
known of the 27 August 2018
email.
Firstly, the argument does to follow.
The respondent's CEO having access to Ms
Laubscher's email account does not mean he would know of the 27
August 2018 email. Secondly,
the first time the applicant refers to
the email is in reply. The respondent has not been afforded an
opportunity to respond to
this.
The
Court does not accept the invitation to draw an inference based on
the email of 27 August 2018 as contended for by the applicant.
In any event, even if Ms Laubscher had
sent the email - her unchallenged version is that the accreditation
document was a document
dictated to her by the applicant's CEO and
extracted under threat.
ORDER
[34]
The court orders -
a)
The application is dismissed with costs,
including the costs of senior counsel.
I
de Vos
Acting
Judge of the High Court
Delivered:
This judgment is handed down electronically by uploading it to the
electronic file of this matter on CaseLines. As a
courtesy gesture,
it will be sent to the parties/their legal representatives by email.
Counsel
for the applicants:
EC
LABUSCHAGNE SC
Instructed
by: Johan
Victor Attorneys
Counsel
for the Amici:
B
C STOOP SC DR SHOZI
Date
of the hearing: 01
August 2022
Date
of judgment:
28
October 2022
[1]
CL 10-7 para 14
[2]
CL 10-12 para 30
[3]
CL 2-200
[4]
Of course the applicant enjoyed accreditation in terms of the
agreement - however, everyone agrees that has been terminated
sino noindex
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