Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 966South Africa
Seboka and Another v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others (2022-39227) [2022] ZAGPPHC 966 (9 December 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
9 December 2022
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Seboka and Another v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others (2022-39227) [2022] ZAGPPHC 966 (9 December 2022)
Seboka and Another v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others (2022-39227) [2022] ZAGPPHC 966 (9 December 2022)
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sino date 9 December 2022
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO.: 2022-39227
REPORTABLE:NO
OFINTEREST
TO OTHER JUDGES:NO
REVISED
9/12/2022
In
the matter between:
THAKA
FREDERICK SEBOKA First
Applicant
STEPHANUS
JOHANNES VAN WYK
Second
Applicant
and
MINISTER
OF JUSTICE AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES First Respondent
SOUTH
AFRICAN BOARD FOR SHERRIFFS Second
Respondent
ANDRE
LESIBA
SHABALALA Third
Respondent
NKWADI
SIMON MAREMANE Fourth
Respondent
JUDGMENT
van
der Westhuizen, J
[1]
This matter is reminiscent of the tale of a Series of Unfortunate
events.
[1]
The parties have been
at logger heads in a number of jurisdictions, this jurisdiction
probably not being the last.
[2]
The saga commenced in the Western Cape Division during March this
year. The applicants
brought an urgent application before Ally, J.,
wherein certain relief was sought against the South African Board for
Sheriffs.
An order was granted on that application and the reasons
therefor were reserved. When the Board for Sheriffs did not comply
timeously
with that order, a second urgent application was launched
during April this year before van Wyk, AJ. Again the reasons for that
order by van Wyk, AJ., were reserved. Subsequently, the reserved
reasons in both matters were delivered. The Board for Sheriffs
applied for leave to appeal both orders, and leave to appeal in both
instances were granted to the Full Court of that Division.
Those
appeals are presently pending.
[3]
Not being satisfied with those orders, the Board for Sheriffs
launched an application,
by way of an urgent application, in this
Division against the first applicant. That application was launched
during September this
year and was enrolled in the urgent court
before Strijdom, AJ., who struck that application from the roll for
want of urgency.
The applicants sought reasons for the striking off
of the matter before Strijdom, AJ. The reasons were subsequently
delivered.
Nothing turns thereon and that application is presently
pending. Also during September this year, the Board of Sheriffs
launched
a further urgent application against the second applicant in
the North West Division which was heard by Hendricks, JP. The relief
granted was
inter alia
an interdict against the second
applicant prohibiting him from practising as an acting sheriff.
Hendricks, JP., granted the order
and reserved the reasons for that
order. Subsequently, the reasons were delivered. The second applicant
applied for leave to appeal,
which application was refused. The
second applicant thereafter petitioned the Supreme Court of Appeal
for special leave to appeal.
That petition is pending.
[4]
The applicants retaliated by launching this application during
October this year.
A special hearing thereof was granted by the
Office of the Deputy Judge President of this Division and the
application was set
down before me on an urgent basis.
[5]
Although the effect of the various orders granted were divergent, the
underlying issue
in all the matters related to the continuous serving
of the applicants as acting sheriffs in the jurisdictions of Pretoria
and
Potchefstroom respectively.
[6]
Both the applicants have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65
years. However,
on attaining the age of retirement, they were
re-appointed, from time to time, as acting sheriffs as provided for
in the Act. The
latest re-appointment occurred during the earlier
part of 2022, and was to endure until 28 February 2023. The Board for
Sheriffs
was of the view that the further extension of their
appointments as acting sheriffs was not warranted under the
particular circumstances
and consequently refused to issue the
required Fidelity Fund Certificates. In that regard, various
correspondence was exchanged
between the applicants, their attorneys,
the Deputy Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and the
Board for Sheriffs. That
correspondence, although relevant in the
pending matters, has no relevance in the present proceedings.
[7]
In view thereof that the matters in the Western Cape Division, the
North West Division
and this Division, as recorded earlier, were
pending, I am prohibited from commenting thereon or indicating any
prima facie
view in relation thereto. I am only to consider
and adjudicate upon the present application before me. Despite the
fact that the
matters in the Western Cape Division, the North West
Division and the pending application in this Division have no bearing
on this
matter, as those were pending before other courts, the
applicants have placed all the papers in those matters before me.
Those
papers are irrelevant to these proceedings. It resulted in an
unnecessary burdening of the present application. This application
stands to be adjudicated upon its own merits and the documentation
directly relevant thereto.
[8]
The present proceedings only relate to the alleged conduct of the
first and second
respondents that led to the removal of the
applicants as acting sheriffs. Much of the content of the founding
affidavit by the
first applicant related to what led to the launching
of urgent applications in the Western Cape Division as recorded
earlier. In
similar vein, the second applicant’s supporting, or
founding affidavit, contained much of the history before the Western
Cape Division. That content is irrelevant to this matter, as it forms
the subject of pending appeals.
[9]
In terms of the Sheriffs Act, Act 90 of 1986 (the Act), the
appointment of sheriffs,
and consequently their removal, are
entrusted to the Minister of Justice and Correctional Services. That
duty was delegated to
the Deputy Minister of Justice and Correctional
Services.
[2]
During the course
of the aforementioned litigation, and in particular those in the
Western Cape Division, the Deputy Minister requested
the Minister to
be relieved from that task. The reasons for such request are not
relevant in the present application. The Minister
resumed the power
of the appointment and removal of sheriffs as provided for in the
Act.
[10]
This application was launched due to the fact that the Minister of
Justice and Correctional Services
has recalled the acting
appointments of the applicants and subsequently appointed two other
persons (the third and fourth respondents)
as acting sheriffs in the
respective areas of jurisdiction.
[11]
The relief sought by the applicants in the Notice of Motion in the
present application has a
Part I and a Part II element. Only Part II
was placed before me. That relief reads as follows:
“
Take
Notice that on such condition as the court may determine, and at a
time to be arranged with the registrar, the applicants intend
to
bring under review the decisions of the 1
st
respondent to:
·
remove the
1
st
applicant as the Acting Sheriff Pretoria Higher and Lower Courts;
·
remove the
2
nd
applicant as the Acting Sheriff Tlokwe (Potchefstroom) Higher and
Lower Courts”
[12]
This application purports to be a review application in terms of the
provisions of the Promotion
of Administrative Justice Act, 3 of 2000
(PAJA).
[13]
The first respondent is the Minister of Justice and Correctional
Services and the second respondent
is the South African Board for
Sheriffs. The applicants have joined the third and fourth
respondents, although no relief is sought
against them as could be
gleaned from the relief sought as recorded above.
[14]
From the notice of motion of this application, and in particular with
reference to Part II thereof,
the applicants required the first
respondent to show cause why his decision should not be reviewed and
corrected or set aside.
The first respondent was required to provide
to the Registrar of this Division with the record of proceedings
sought to be corrected
or set aside, together with such reasons as he
is by law required to do.
[15]
From the papers filed in this application, it could not be discerned
whether that record of proceedings
were provided. It appeared not to
have been provided. None of the parties commented thereupon and
appeared to be nonplussed. This
application stood to be determined on
the specific documents which the respective parties relied upon in
their papers in this application.
[16]
In the applicants’ heads of argument it was clearly indicated
that they relied upon a specific
document in respect of each
applicant. Those documents constituted the respective notices of
removal of the applicants as acting
sheriffs which led to the
launching of these proceedings. That decision by the first respondent
purports to be the “unlawful”
administrative action that
was the subject of the review sought.
[17]
The applicants have taken a point
in limine
, namely that the
answering affidavit filed on behalf of the first respondent
constituted hearsay evidence and contained inadmissible
allegations.
The premises for that point related to the fact that the first
respondent did not personally depose to the answering
affidavit filed
on his behalf, although a confirmatory affidavit by him was
subsequently filed. The first respondent gave reasons
why he did not
initially depose to the allegations. It is trite that hearsay
evidence can be admitted provisionally, and that the
evidentiary
value thereof would be decided at a later stage in the proceedings.
It was submitted on behalf of the first respondent
that the
applicants have not indicated any allegation that was allegedly
within the exclusive knowledge of the first respondent,
and thus
constituted hearsay.
[18]
A number of points
in limine
were taken on behalf of the
respondents. Those included: mootness of issues raised; urgency;
costs; non-joinder; and alleged incompetent
relief. On the issues of
mootness, urgency and non-joinder, nothing turns thereon and required
no further consideration. The issue
of non-joinder related to the
fact that the Deputy Minister was not joined. That issue became moot
when he was released from his
task to attend to the appointment and
removal of Sheriffs as recorded earlier. Furthermore, the decisions
that form the basis of
the review application were taken by the
Minister himself and not by the Deputy Minister. The latter was
clearly not part of the
decision taking under scrutiny. The issues of
costs no longer applies as the parties reached an agreement in that
regard. The alleged
incompetent relief was not pursued in the
respondents’ heads of argument nor during oral argument and
likewise required no
further consideration.
[19]
The saga apparently commenced when the second respondent refused to
issue Fidelity Fund Certificates
to the first and second applicants
for the year 2022/2023.
[20]
In terms of the provisions of the Act, the second respondent is
empowered to issue Fidelity Fund
Certificates to appointed
sheriffs.
[3]
In terms of the
definition of “sheriff “in the Act, an acting sheriff is
included. It was submitted on behalf of the
applicants that acting
sheriffs required no Fidelity Fund Certificates to act as sheriffs.
Reliance was placed on the term “or”
appearing in section
30(1)(c) of the Act. There is no merit in that submission. It is
trite that the term “or” in legislation,
or other
document, may have the meaning of the term “and”. It
depends on the context in which it appears. It is clear
from a
purposive reading of the Act as a whole that the term “or”
in section 30(1)(c) of the Act has the meaning of
the term “and”.
[4]
To hold otherwise would render the requirement in section 30(1)(c)(i)
nugatory. Further, in the context of the Act read as a whole,
it
would make no sense not to require an acting sheriff to hold a
Fidelity Fund Certificate. It is to be recorded that the applicants
have since their various appointments as acting sheriffs, annually
applied for the issuing of Fidelity Fund Certificates. That
conduct
clearly indicated that they were obliged as acting sheriffs to hold
Fidelity Fund Certificates. Furthermore, the respective
letters of
appointment as acting sheriffs obliged the applicants to hold
Fidelity Fund Certificates.
[21]
The decision by the second respondent to refuse to issue a Fidelity
Fund Certificate in itself
is an administrative decision which stands
until set aside by a competent court.
[5]
The applicants have not pled that the decision by the second
respondent to refuse to issue the Fidelity Fund Certificates did not
constitute an administrative action, and further has not pled that
that decision has been reviewed and set aside. It would follow
that
that decision still stands.
[22]
In terms of the definitions of PAJA, an administrative action is
defined as follows:
“’
administrative
action’ means any decision taken, or any failure to take a
decision, by –
(a)
an
organ of state, when –
(i)
…
(b)
A
natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when
exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms
of
an empowering provision, which adversely affects the rights of any
person and which has a direct, external legal effect, but
does not
include –
(aa)
…”
None
of the exclusions listed in the subsection find application.
[23]
The definition of a “decision” contained in PAJA reads as
follows:
“’
decision’
means any decision of an administrative nature made, proposed to be
made, or required to be made, as the case may
be, under an empowering
provision, including a decision relating to –
(a)
…
(b)
giving,
suspending, revoking or refusing to give a certificate, direction,
approval, consent or permission;
(c)
…”
[24]
An “empowering provision” is defined in PAJA as follows:
“’
empowering
provision’ means a law, a rule of common law, customary law, or
an agreement, instrument or other document in terms
of which an
administrative action was purportedly taken”
[25]
The second respondent was created and established in terms of the
provisions of section 7 of
the Act. That section further provides
that the second respondent is a juristic person.
[26]
It follows that PAJA applies in respect of any administrative action
taken by the second respondent.
Such action would include, as per
definition in PAJA, the issuing or refusing to issue a Fidelity Fund
Certificate. As recorded
earlier, the decision by the second
respondent not to issue Fidelity Fund Certificates stands.
[27]
The primary point of criticism against the first respondent’s
decision to remove the applicants
as acting sheriffs, related to the
alleged “dictates” by the second respondent to the first
respondent and the first
respondent’s doing the “bidding”
of the applicants. That criticism smacks of alleged puppetry of the
first respondent.
It implied that the first respondent only acts on
what he is told to do, in particular by the second respondent. No
supporting
evidence for that criticism was placed before the court.
It is opportunistic and disrespectful to the office of the first
respondent
and wholly unwarranted.
[28]
In terms of the provisions of section 4 of the Act, a sheriff may be
removed from office under
certain circumstances. The Act further
provides that a sheriff may be removed from office where the sheriff
was found guilty of
improper conduct.
[6]
[29]
Although the documentation provided by the applicants to support
their application for review
were limited, it could be gleaned from
the papers that the second respondent addressed a request to the
first respondent for the
suspension or removal of the applicants as
acting sheriffs. That much is gleaned from the letter, dated 22
September 2022, by the
first respondent to the applicants.
[30]
The letter by the first respondent reads as follows:
“
I
refer to your appointment as Acting Sheriff for Pretoria Central
Higher and Lower Courts made pursuant to section 5 of the Sheriffs
Act, 1986 (Act no 90 of 1986) effective from 01 April to 28 February
2023.
Your
appointment is subject to, amongst others, the following conditions:
·
You are not
charged with improper conduct by the South African Board for Sheriffs
(SABFS) during your period of appointment; and
that
·
You are in
compliance with the necessary requirements to be issued with a
Fidelity Found Certificate by the SABFS.
The
SABFS has written to me and advised me that you are in breach of your
appointment letter, specifically that you are not in compliance
with
the necessary requirements to be issued with a Fidelity Fund
Certificate and that you have been charged with improper conduct.
The
SABFS has further advised me that you are presently performing the
functions of a Sheriff without a Fidelity Fund Certificate
and that
this poses a danger to the public and the Fidelity Fund. The Board
has requested your suspension or removal as an acting
Sheriff.
Kindly
provide me with reasons on or before the close of business on
Wednesday, 28 September 2022 as to why I should not remove
you as the
Sheriff for Pretoria Central Higher and Lower Courts.
I
await your urgent response.”
[31]
A similar letter was addressed to the second applicant, referencing
the area of jurisdiction
as Potchefstroom.
[32]
It is gleaned from the above quoted letter that the second respondent
approached the first respondent
for either the suspension or the
removal of the applicants as acting sheriffs. The first respondent of
his own accord sought reasons
to be supplied in respect of why the
applicants should not be removed, as opposed to a mere suspension.
There is glaringly no indication
of any “
unauthorised or
unwarranted dictates of the Chairperson”
of the second
respondent or its “bidding” as alleged by the applicants.
[33]
Both the applicants, through their attorneys, responded to the
aforesaid. Despite their respective
responses, that appear to be
echoing each other, the first respondent addressed a second letter,
dated 10 October 2022 wherein
the applicants were advised that they
were removed as acting sheriffs with immediate effect. These letters
form the basis for the
review. They read identical, except for the
area of jurisdiction, and read as follows:
“
I
refer to my letter of 22 September 2022 wherein I requested you to
provide reasons as to why I should not remove you as the acting
Sheriff for Pretoria Central Higher and Lower Courts, and your
responses thereto.
I
have in addition to your responses considered the following
documents:
·
Your
appointment letter dated 1 April 2022;
·
The request
for suspension or removal by the South African Board for Sheriffs
(SABFS) dated 19 September 2022;
·
The
applications in the Gauteng Division of the High Court (Case no:
020856/2022) and the North West Division of the High Court
(Case no:
UM 169/2022)
·
The court
order of Hendricks JP dated 15 September 2022 in case number
(UM169/2022) concerning the acting Sheriff of Potchefstroom
(Tlokwe);
and
·
The reasons
of Hendricks JP dated 20 September 2022 in case number (UM 169/2022)
concerning the acting Sheriff of Potchefstroom
(Tlokwe).
I
have taken into consideration that you have not complied with a
condition of your appointment as imposed in terms of section 5(1B)(b)
of the Sheriffs Act 90 of 1986 (Act), in that you are not in
compliance with the necessary requirements to be issued with a
Fidelity
Fund Certificate (FFC) by the SABFS.
I
have further taken into account that the reason for your failure to
comply with the abovementioned condition of your appointment
is that
you have refused to provide additional particulars to the SABFS as
mandated by section 31(3) of the Act.
Part
of my functions in terms of the Act is to maintain effective and
reliable service to the courts and the public. After consultation
with the SABFS as per the provisions of section 4(3) of the Act and
having considered the above-mentioned documents, I am of the
opinion
that your performance of the functions for a Sheriff without a FFC
and outside the abovementioned condition of your appointment
poses a
risk to the public at large and the administration of justice. This
is not in the interest of the maintenance of effective
and reliable
service to the courts and the public.
For
the above reasons, I have decided to remove you as acting Sheriff of
Pretoria Central Higher and Lower Courts effectively immediately.
Your
attention is drawn to Regulation 2F(4) read with Regulation 10 of the
Regulations to the Act, in terms of which the acting
Sheriff, when he
or she vacates office, shall hand all court processes and other
documents which were in his or her possession
to the Director-General
of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development delegated
to the Court Managers.
You
are hereby directed to forthwith hand over all court process and
other documents in your possession to the Court Manager for
the
Pretoria Magistrates Court who will thereafter schedule a hand-over
meeting with yourself and a representative of the SABFS.”
[34]
I have quoted the relevant letters in full as the contents thereof
are particularly relevant
to a determination of whether or not the
particular administrative action taken by the first respondent
warranted a review as prayed
for by the applicants.
[35]
The applicants clamour that the first respondent simply “ignored”
their reasons advanced
in response to the letter dated 22 September
2022, is without merit. Their unhappiness stems from the fact that
they were simply
not vitiated as they demand to be.
[36]
The grounds for the review sought were stated as follows:
(a)
The decision
by the Minister was taken because of the unauthorised or unwarranted
dictates of the Chairperson of the SABFS;
(b)
There are
several facts which indicated that the Minister did not apply his
mind when he took the decision to remove the applicants
and simply
did the bidding of the SABFS. Those included the appointment of the
third and fourth respondents who were
inter
alia
“outside” respective areas of jurisdiction.
(c)
That the
reason for the second respondent’s “refusal” to
issue Fidelity Fund Certificates to the applicants was
due to the
alleged intention of the second respondent to have their “own
people” appointed in the areas.
(d)
That the first
respondent’s letter contained factual inaccuracies.
(e)
That the
action taken by the first respondent was materially influenced by an
error of law. That error related allegedly to the
fact that the
applicants were performing the functions of acting sheriffs without
Fidelity Fund Certificates and that that posed
a danger to the public
and the Fidelity Fund.
(f)
The first
respondent allegedly did not consider the provisions of the law when
he took the decision to remove the applicants as
acting sheriffs.
(g)
That the first
respondent did not take into consideration that two judges had found
that the SABFS’s refusal to issue the
Fidelity Fund
Certificates were unlawful. A view allegedly shared by the Deputy
Minister and other views of the Deputy Minister.
(h)
That the first
respondent had failed to consider that the judgments of the Western
Cape Division and the North West Division were
pending appeals and a
petition for leave to appeal and that accordingly, his decision
pre-empted those pending issues.
[37]
I have already dealt in substance with the ground relating to the
alleged “dictates”
and “bidding” of the
second respondent. There is no merit in those grounds for what is
recorded above in that regard.
[38]
The issue of the appointment of the third and fourth respondents is
equally unmerited and totally
irrelevant to the present proceedings.
That decision is an independent and unrelated decision by the first
respondent. It follows
that there is no merit either in that ground
of review.
[39]
There is likewise no merit in the ground that the second respondent’s
refusal to issue
Fidelity Fund Certificates was due to an intention
to appoint its “own people” in the respective areas. The
applicants
approbated and reprobated on the issue of the refusal to
issue Fidelity Fund Certificates. On the one hand they allege that
acting
sheriffs require no Fidelity Fund Certificates to function as
sheriffs, and on the other that they allege that that they are
obliged
and entitled to be issued with Fidelity Fund Certificates. It
is to be noted that their respective letters of appointment as acting
sheriffs obliged them to hold Fidelity Fund Certificates. For what
has been recorded above in respect of the obligatory holding
of a
Fidelity Fund Certificate, there is no merit in the grounds for
review listed above that relate to the holding of an issued
Fidelity
Fund Certificate.
[40]
I have already recorded that the matters in the Western Cape Division
and in the North West Division
were irrelevant to these proceedings
and accordingly those grounds for review are unmerited and
irrelevant.
[41]
The letters of 22 September 2022 to the applicants respectively are
clear. The applicants were
specifically directed to the specific
issues raised therein to which they were invited to respond to. Their
attention was specifically
drawn to the conditions of their
appointment.
[42]
The first respondent clearly spelt out in his letter of 10 October
2022 the reasons for the decision
to remove the applicants as acting
sheriffs.
[43]
In this regard the following is gleaned from the said letter:
(a)
The particular
documents that were considered were clearly stipulated;
(b)
The
applicants’ non-compliance with the conditions stipulated in
their respective letters of appointment, in particular the
condition
imposed by section 5(1B)(b) of the Act, namely, obtaining a Fidelity
Fund Certificate;
(c)
The
applicants’ reasons why they did not comply with the second
respondent’s request for additional particulars as mandated
by
section 31(3) of the Act;
(d)
Compliance by
the first respondent of his obligation to maintain the effective and
reliable service to the courts and public as
mandated by the Act;
(e)
The
undertaking of the prescribed consultation with the second respondent
as required by section 4(3) of the Act.
[44]
From the foregoing it is clear that the first respondent did not
summarily take a decision to
remove the applicants as acting
sheriffs. He followed a process before coming to a conclusion and
subsequent decision.
[45]
The applicants’ approbation and reprobation that they, as
acting sheriffs, were not obliged
to obtain a Fidelity Fund
Certificate, is telling. The fact of the matter is that they did not
comply with that condition of their
letters of appointment as acting
sheriffs. Furthermore, the decision by the second respondent not to
issue them with Fidelity Fund
Certificates stands. The applicants
were clearly in breach of their obligations as contained in their
respective letters of appointment
as acting sheriffs.
[46]
Furthermore, as set out in their letters of appointment as acting
sheriffs, they were not to
be charged with improper conduct during
their term of appointment as acting sheriffs. It is common cause that
the applicants were
so charged, despite their protestations to the
contrary that the charges were “bogus” and that no
inquiry has taken
place until now. However, from the reasons provided
by the first respondent in respect of his decision to remove the
applicants
as acting sheriffs, it is clear that this issue was not
considered by him. Their protestations in that regard in their
respective
affidavits are much ado about nothing.
[47]
From the letters of removal as acting sheriffs, the primary concern
of the first respondent related
to the non-compliance with the first
condition imposed on them, namely to obtain and hold a Fidelity Fund
Certificate. That appears
to be the overbearing reason for the
decision to remove the applicants as acting sheriffs. This is borne
out by the first respondent’s
reference to his obligations in
terms of the Act, to maintain effective and reliable service to the
courts and the public.
[48]
In view of all the foregoing, the first respondent cannot be found to
have taken an “unlawful”
or “illegal”
decision to remove the applicants as acting sheriffs thereby taking a
decision that is reviewable in terms
of PAJA. As recorded, the
decision to remove the applicants as acting sheriffs was primarily
premised upon their non-compliance
of the condition and obligation to
obtain and hold a Fidelity Fund Certificate. That premise is
unassailable. The first respondent’s
decision in that regard
was not shown to have been arbitrary, unlawfully, illegally or
irrationally taken.
[49]
It follows that the application for review cannot be upheld and
stands to be dismissed.
[50]
During argument, it was submitted that the appointments of the third
and fourth respondents as
acting sheriffs in the stead of the
applicants in the respective jurisdictions, should equally be
reviewed and set aside. No such
relief was sought in Part II of the
Notice of Motion. It is recorded earlier that that decision of the
first respondent was independently
taken and was a separate decision.
It has no bearing on the present proceedings. Different
considerations and requirements apply
in that regard.
[51]
It follows that the applicants’ relief sought in that regard
cannot be considered and cannot
be granted. The joinder of the third
and fourth respondents were unwarranted, unnecessary and resulted in
the incursion of unnecessary
costs.
[52]
The issue of costs remains. The applicants have unnecessarily
burdened the papers in this application
as recorded above.
Furthermore, the applicants have unwarrantedly and unnecessarily
joined the third and fourth respondents to
these proceedings. The
applicants have changed the course of this application in mid-stream
- from an interim interdict as sought
in Part I of the Notice of
Motion - to a review application as sought in Part II of the Notice
of Motion, and consequently curtailing
the time periods relating
thereto. Further in this regard, the procedure relating to a full and
proper review on the specific record
of proceedings to be reviewed
could not be attained. In my view, all the foregoing warrant an
appropriate and punitive costs order.
I
grant the following order:
1.
The
application is refused;
2.
The applicants
are ordered to pay the costs on the scale of attorney and client,
such costs to include any reserved costs and to
include the costs
consequent on the employ of two counsel, where so employed.
C J
VAN DER WESTHUIZEN
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Heard
on: 21
November 2022
On
behalf of Applicants:
A
Vorster
S
J van Wyk
Instructed
by:
Moolman
& Pienaar Inc.
On
behalf of First Respondent:
Ms N Stein
Ms
M S Manganye
Instructed
by:
The
State
Attorney
On
behalf of the Second Respondent:
T
V Mabuda
Instructed
by:
Herold Gie Attorneys
On
behalf of the Third and Fourth Respondents: K Naidoo
Instructed
by: Vezi
De Beer Attorneys
Judgment
delivered on: 9
December 2022
[1]
By
Daniel Handler under the pen name, Lemony Snicket
[2]
Section 63 of the Act
[3]
Section 32 of the Act.
[4]
See for example sections 30(3), 31 read with the definition of
“sheriff”, 32(3) of the Act
[5]
Oudekraal
Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town et al
2004(6) SA 222 (SCA)
[6]
Section49(5) of the Act
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