Case Law[2026] ZAWCHC 21South Africa
Nel and Another v Eckhoff NO and Others (839/2023) [2026] ZAWCHC 21 (29 January 2026)
High Court of South Africa (Western Cape Division)
29 January 2026
Headnotes
by
Judgment
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## Nel and Another v Eckhoff NO and Others (839/2023) [2026] ZAWCHC 21 (29 January 2026)
Nel and Another v Eckhoff NO and Others (839/2023) [2026] ZAWCHC 21 (29 January 2026)
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#
# IN THE
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
# (WESTERN CAPE DIVISION,
THEMBALETHU)
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION,
THEMBALETHU)
# JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
#
# Reportable/ Not Reportable
Reportable
/ Not Reportable
#
# Case no: 839/2023
Case no: 839/2023
#
# In the matter between:
In the matter between:
#
# EUGENE
MARTIN EDWARD NEL
EUGENE
MARTIN EDWARD NEL
# FirstPlaintiff
First
Plaintiff
# ANTHONETTA
NEL
ANTHONETTA
NEL
# Second
Plaintiff
Second
Plaintiff
# and
and
#
# JOCHEN
ECKHOFF N.O.and
JOCHEN
ECKHOFF N.O.
and
MOHAMED
MAHIER TAYOB N.O
(In
their capacity as provisional trustees of the insolvent
estate
of
J[...]V[...] D[...] M[...]
)
# FirstDefendant
First
Defendant
# J[...]
P[...] V[...] D[...] M[...]
J[...]
P[...] V[...] D[...] M[...]
# Second
Defendant
Second
Defendant
NUMIWELL
INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD
Third
Defendant
CS
HENTIQ 1044 (PTY) LTD
Fourth
Defendant
JOANIES
PROPERTIES CC
Fifth
Defendant
J[...]
V[...] D[...] M[...] BELEGGINGS CC
Sixth
Defendant
GOUSSARD
& ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED
Seventh
Defendant
# Coram:Honourable Justice HM Slingers
Coram:
Honourable Justice HM Slingers
# Heard:
24 November 2025
Heard:
24 November 2025
# Delivered:
29 January 2026
Delivered:
29 January 2026
This judgement is
delivered electronically by circulation to the parties’ legal
representatives’ email addresses and
will be deemed to have
been delivered on 29 January 2026.
ORDER
#
(a)
the plaintiffs are entitled to the payment of the amount of R2
million, together with any
accrued interest, which amount was
deposited into the trust account of Raubenheimers Attorneys by the
third defendant in terms
of the court orders dated 9 September 2022
and 1 June 2023;
(b)
the costs of suit, save for the costs of the two applications in
procuring the orders of
9 September 2022 and 1 June 2023, shall be
borne by the second defendant on scale C, which costs shall include
the costs of two
counsel where so employed; and
(c)
the cost of the two applications in procuring the orders of 9
September 2022 and 1
June 2023 shall be borne by the first and second
defendants jointly and severally, the one paying to absolve the
other, on scale
C, which costs shall include the costs of two counsel
where so employed.
JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
[1]
In this action the plaintiffs seek a
declaratory order that they are entitled to payment of the amount of
R2 million, together with
any accrued interest thereon.
[2]
These trial proceedings are only opposed by
the second defendant as the plaintiffs seek no substantive relief
against the third
to fifth defendants and the first defendant filed a
notice to abide.
TIMELINE
[3]
During 2016, the plaintiffs concluded an
agreement of sale of shares in terms whereof they purchased 33.3% of
the first defendant’s
company, Century Western Cape (Pty) Ltd
at a purchase price of R2 million rand. This sale agreement
made provision for the
purchase price to be paid into the account of
the fifth defendant, Joanies Properties CC.
[4]
On 23 January 2017, the first defendant and
the plaintiffs concluded an addendum to the agreement of sale of
shares. However,
payment would still be paid into the bank
account of Joanies Properties CC, the fifth defendant.
[5]
The first payment installment was paid into
the account of the fifth defendant but the subsequent payments were
made into a different
bank account. However, it is not disputed
that the full purchase price of R2 million was paid.
Notwithstanding payment
of the agreed purchase prices, the plaintiffs
were not given the 33.3 percent shares in the first defendant’s
company.
[6]
On 23 May 2017, the second defendant
emailed the first plaintiff wherein she proposed that the plaintiffs
be refunded the amount
of R2 million. She stated
inter
alia
that:
‘
...
My eerlike opinie is dat ons ‘n transaksie moet uitwerk wat jul
tot geen nadeel sal strek vir die geld wat jy reeds belê
het en
as vriende uitmekaar elkeen ons eie padjie gaan.’
[7]
On 22 January 2018, the plaintiffs wrote to
the first and second defendants wherein they expressed understanding
that they (the
first and second defendants) did not, at that stage,
have the funds to repay them the amount of R2 million. In an
effort
to accommodate the first and second defendants the plaintiffs
requested that a sale agreement in respect of certain erven held by
the fourth defendant, CS Hentiq 1044 (Pty) Ltd be drafted as soon as
possible in lieu of the repayment of R2 million. This
proposal
did not materialise.
[8]
The second defendant instituted divorce
proceedings against the first defendant and on 3 February 2020 they
concluded a settlement
agreement. In terms of the divorce
settlement agreement:
(i)
the
first defendant ceded sixty percent of the future proceeds of his
remaining fifty one percent shares he held on date of signature
of
the agreement in CS Hentiq 1044 (Pty) Ltd to the second defendant and
will sign the necessary cession document within 7 days
after
signature of the divorce settlement agreement. The divorce
settlement agreement further provided that ‘
Defendant
(the
first defendant)
shall
immediately after signature hand the cession document over to
Plaintiff.
[1]
’
(own
emphasis);
(ii)
the first defendant ceded to the second
defendant the right to claim fifty percent of any capital amounts
due, costs due and/or
loan accounts due to him by CS Hentiq 1044
(Pty) Ltd on date of signature of the divorce settlement agreement
and agreed to sign
the necessary cession document within 7 days after
signature of the divorce settlement agreement. The first
defendant also
agreed to immediately, after signature, hand the
cession document over to the second defendant; and
(iii)
the first defendant ceded to the second
defendant the right to claim fifty percent of the outstanding amount
of R13 128 000.00
due to him as a result of the sale of his
forty nine percent share to the third defendant. The first
defendant undertook
to sign the necessary cession document within 7
days after signature of the divorce settlement agreement and to
immediately thereafter,
hand over the cession document to the
plaintiff.
[9]
On 2 August 2021 the plaintiffs and the
first and fifth defendants reached a settlement agreement, which was
made an order of court
on 3 September 2021. This settlement
agreement provided that:
‘
1.
The first defendant
[J[...] V[...]
D[...] M[...]]
will pay the Plaintiffs
the amount of R2, 000, 000.00.
2.
Each party to pay their own legal costs.
3.
Interest is payable on the amount of R2, 000,000.00 from 1 February
2022 at the
rate of 6% per annum.
4.
Payment will be made upon final settlement of the disputes between
the first
defendant and Numiwell Investments (Pty) Limited in their
capacities as shareholders of CS Hentiq 1044 (PTY) Ltd.
5.
The first and second defendants herewith cedes a portion of their
claim against
Numiwell Investment / CS Hentiq 1044 (Pty) Limited in
the amount of R2, 000.000.00 plus interest, if payable in terms of
clause
3 above, in favour of the plaintiffs.’
[2]
[10]
The settlement agreement was signed by
V[...] D[...] M[...] and J[...] P[...] V[...] D[...] M[...], the
second defendant.
[11]
On
or about 25 July 2022, V[...] D[...] M[...] and Numiwell Investments
(Pty) Limited
(‘Numiwell’)
settled
their disputes. Thus, in terms of the settlement agreement of 2
September 2021, V[...] D[...] M[...] had to pay the
plaintiffs the
amount of R2 million. This was not done. The plaintiffs
aver that V[...] D[...] M[...] intentionally
failed to inform them
that he and Numiwell had settled their dispute. In response to
this averment, the second defendant
pleaded that she had no
knowledge, could not admit or deny same and therefore put the
plaintiffs to the proof thereof.
[3]
[12]
In terms of the settlement agreement
reached between V[...] D[...] M[...] and Numiwell:
(i)
V[...] D[...] M[...] would transfer all his
shares in CS Hentiq 1044 (PTY) Ltd
(‘CS
Hentiq’)
to Numiwell;
(ii)
V[...] D[...] M[...] would cede all his
loan accounts in CS Hentiq to Numiwell;
(iii)
the reciprocal payment by Numiwell to
V[...] D[...] M[...] for the transfer of his shares and loan accounts
to Numiwell was R5 million;
(iv)
this payment was to be made to the second
defendant.
[13]
The plaintiffs aver that in accordance with
the settlement agreement made an order of court on 3 September 2021,
the first defendant
was divested of any right to deal with the R2
million of the R5 million reciprocal payment. However, the
second defendant
challenges the validity and enforceability of the
cession relied upon by the plaintiffs for payment of the R2 million
on the basis
that it constitutes a splitting of the one debt.
[14]
In the alternative, the plaintiffs assert
that V[...] D[...] M[...] acted
mala
fide
to defraud them of the R2 million
resulting in them suffering damages in the amount of R2 million.
[15]
On 9 September 2022, the plaintiffs
obtained a
rule nisi
in terms whereof, the third defendant was restrained and interdicted
from paying the amount of R2 million from the amount of R5
million to
the second defendant and was directed to pay it into an
interest-bearing trust account of Raubenheimers Inc Attorneys,
6[…]
C[...] Street, George. On 1 June 2023 the
rule
nisi
was confirmed pending the outcome
of the action or application for a declaratory order to be instituted
by the plaintiffs pertaining
to their entitlement to payment of R2
million.
[16]
These
proceedings pertain to the dispute between the parties as to whether
the plaintiffs or the second defendant is entitled to
the amount of
R2 million which has been deposited into the trust account of
Raubenheimers Attorneys, George.
[4]
THE EVIDENCE
[17]
The plaintiffs called two witnesses to
testify on their behalf.
The first
witness called was Mr Jaques Gouws
(‘Gouws’)
.
He testified that he knows the first and second defendants and that
he is a director of the third defendant, Numiwell which
is currently
the sole shareholder of CS Hentiq. Gouws identified the sale of
shares and shareholder agreement entered into
between J[...] V[...]
D[...] M[...] as the seller, Numiwell as the purchaser and CS Hentiq
as the company on 19 March 2018.
In terms of this agreement, Mr
J[...] V[...] D[...] M[...] sold 49 percent of his shares to
Numiwell. The second defendant
was not involved in this
transaction at all.
[18]
Gouws was taken to paragraph 19 of the said
of sale of shares and shareholder agreement which provides that:
‘
19
ASSIGNMENT CESSION AND
DELEGATION
The Parties shall not
be entitled to assign, cede, pledge, sub-lease, make over, delegate
or transfer any rights, obligations, title
or interest acquired in
terms of this Agreement, in whole or in part, to any other party or
person, without the prior written consent
of the other Parties.’
[19]
Gouws testified that at no time was any
written permission given to the first defendant in terms of clause 19
of the sale of shares
and shareholder agreement. This evidence
was not disputed nor challenged during cross-examination conducted on
behalf of
the second defendant.
[20]
In
the absence of any cross-examination on this aspect, it can be
accepted that the second defendant did not dispute this evidence.
[5]
[21]
Gouws further testified that he was present
at court when the settlement agreement resolving the disputes between
V[...] D[...]
M[...] and Numiwell was reached. He testified
that the payment of R5 million in terms of this agreement was
initially to
be made to J[...] V[...] D[...] M[...]. However,
after the draft agreement was discussed between the attorneys, the
request
was made that payment should rather be made to the second
defendant. The recipient of the payment was of no concern to
Gouws
who was only concerned with the culmination of the settlement
agreement.
[22]
Gouws went on to testify that the third
defendant, Numiwell had no interest in paragraph 4.1 of the
settlement agreement which is
the so-called gagging provision.
[23]
Gouws’ evidence that the first and
second defendants continue to share the same residential address post
their divorce was
left unchallenged.
Gouws
was also taken the divorce settlement agreement between the first and
second defendants. Clauses 3.3 and 3.4 of the
divorce
settlement agreement provides that:
‘
3.3
CS Hentiq 1044 (Pty) Ltd
3.3.1
Defendant hereby cedes 50% of the future proceeds of it’s
remaining 51% shares that he hold on date of signature
of this
agreement in CS Hentiq 1044 (Pty) Ltd to Plaintiff and will sign the
necessary cession document within 7 days after signature
of this ...
agreement. Defendant shall immediately after signature hand the
cession document over to Plaintiff.
3.3.2
Defendant will furthermore cede to Plaintiff the right to claim 50%
of any capital amounts due, costs due and/or
loan accounts due to him
by CS Hentiq 1044 (Pty) Ltd on date of signature of this agreement
and sign the necessary cession document
within 7 days after signature
of this Settlement Agreement. Defendant shall immediately after
signature hand the cession
document over to Plaintiff.
3.4
Numiwell Investments (Pty) Ltd
Defendant hereby cedes
to Plaintiff the right to claim 50% of the outstanding amount of
R13 128 000.00 due to him as a
result of the sale of his
49% share to Numiwell Investments (Pty) Ltd, Defendant shall sign the
necessary cession document within
7 days after signature of this
Settlement Agreement and immediately thereafter hand the cession
document over to Plaintiff.’
[24]
The divorce settlement agreement also
contained an amendment clause which provides that no waver, addition,
amendment of any nature
would be of any force and effect unless it
was ordered by a competent court or reduced to writing and signed by
both parties.
The divorce settlement agreement furthermore
provided that that it constituted the full settlement between the
first and second
defendants.
[25]
It is clear from the wording of clauses 3.3
and 3.4 of the divorce settlement agreement that parties intended to
reduce the cessions
referred to therein to writing and that the
cessionary documents were to be signed within 7 days after signature
of the divorce
settlement agreement and thereafter handed to the
second defendant.
The divorce
settlement agreement was signed on 3 February 2020.
Consequently, the cession of J[...] V[...] D[...] M[...]’s
interests in CS Hentiq had to be effected within 7 days thereafter.
[26]
Gouws testified that the second defendant
was not a shareholder of CS Hentiq nor did she have a loan account in
her favour.
Thus, there was no reason
for the R5 million to be paid into her account.
He
confirmed that when the settlement agreement dated 25 July 2022 was
reached at court and which was entered into between J[...]
V[...]
D[...] M[...], J[...] V[...] D[...] M[...] Beleggings CC and CS
Hentiq, Numiwell, Joanies Properties CC and J[...] P[...]
V[...]
D[...] M[...], he was represented by attorney Magda Van Biljon.
[27]
The original agreement made provision that
payment would be to V[...] D[...] M[...] but subsequently their
attorneys requested that
payment be made to the second defendant.
Numiwell did not have an issue with it. During
cross-examination, Gouws confirmed
that the change in the recipient
of the money was a last minute development which required a
handwritten correction. This
evidence was not challenged nor
was a contrary version put to Gouws.
[28]
During cross- examination, Gouws testified
that he only became aware of the cession agreement in favour of the
plaintiffs upon receipt
of the application in the urgent
application. However, he had no objections to paying the amount
due in two amounts and he
was not prejudiced thereby.
[29]
Gouws was also taken to the answering
affidavit filed in response to the urgent interdict application
issued under case number 348/2022
where Mr V[...] D[...] M[...]
stated under oath that:
‘
108.
It seems that the Applicants are trying to portray me as a man of
straw. With respect, it seems that
the Applicants are trying to
launch a whole range of applications and actions in one single
application, to prove that I cannot
pay the R2, 000, 000.00, I humbly
submit that this is not proper.’
V[...] D[...] M[...]
deposed to his answering affidavit on 10 October 2022. Gouws
was also taken to the
nulla bona
return issued under case
number 18282/2019 in respect of the writ of execution which was
served on J[...] V[...] D[...] M[...]
on 8 May 2023. The
nulla
bona
return recorded that J[...] V[...] D[...] M[...] owned no
valuable assets that could satisfy the judgment debt of R2 million.
[30]
In his answering affidavit, V[...] D[...]
M[...] explicitly stated that there was no connection between himself
and the second defendant.
[31]
Gouws testified that Numiwell had no
objections to splitting the payment of R5 million and confirmed that
it had filed a notice
to abide in those legal proceedings.
[32]
During cross examination, Gouws testified
that the R2 million was paid into the trust account as a result of
being directed to do
so by a court order. During
re-examination, Gouws confirmed that at all relevant times Numiwell
was represented by Ms. Van
Biljon of the law firm Savage and Jooste
Attorneys. He was also referred to correspondence dated 23
August 2022 addressed
to Ms. Van Biljon which noted that she would
recall that the separate action between the first plaintiff (Mr Nel)
and V[...] D[...]
M[...] were settled in terms of a settlement
agreement dated 2 September 2021. It furthermore referenced the
knowledge of
Mr Gouws of the action instituted by the first plaintiff
against V[...] D[...] M[...] and that their respective clients had
various
discussions in pertaining hereto.
[33]
Mr Eugene Martin Edward Nel, the first
plaintiff was the second witness to testify in support of the
plaintiffs’ case.
[34]
Nel testified that he knows the first and
second defendants who were married but who are now divorced. It
was clear from the
documents to which Nel was taken in the trial
bundle that although they have divorced, the first and second
defendants still reside
on the same premises.
[35]
Nel testified that V[...] D[...] M[...] was
sequestrated at his instance.
[36]
Nel testified that the plaintiffs agreed to
purchase 33.3 percent of the first defendant’s company for an
amount of R2 million
rand and went on to identify this sale agreement
concluded on 5 August 2016 at George. This agreement recorded
that the plaintiffs
were the purchasers and that V[...] D[...] M[...]
was the seller.
[37]
In terms of the agreement, payment would be
made into the bank account of Joanies Properties CC. Nel
furthermore identified
the addendum to the sale agreement and
testified that
t
he
original agreement was amended to reflect a change in the purchase
price and method of payment. It was not disputed that
the
purchase price was paid in installments, with the first payment being
made into the account of Joanies Properties CC and the
subsequent
payments being made into a different bank account.
[38]
Nel further testified that they had not
received the shares for which they paid. On the contrary, he
testified that things
became sour and they had regard to the exit
clause as they wanted to get their money back.
[39]
He testified that the second defendant is
also known as ‘Kotie’. Kotie sent email
correspondence to him on 23
May 2017 to which he responded on the
same day. In her correspondence Kotie proposed that the Nels be
refunded their money
and that each party then go their own way.
Nel accepted this proposal.
[40]
On 22 January 2018, the second plaintiff
sent email correspondence to the first and second defendants.
Wherein she noted that
they had to refund them their R2 million but
that they understood that the first and second defendants did not
have that sum available
at that specific stage. In an attempt
to accommodate them, the plaintiffs proposed a sale agreement for the
purchase of certain
erven held by CS Hentiq.
[41]
It was not disputed that the contract was
cancelled and that the plaintiffs were not refunded their money they
paid as the purchase
price.
[42]
The matter resulted in litigation and on
the day of the trial, Nel’s attorney asked him if he was
prepared to settle out of
court, to which he agreed. This
resulted in a settlement agreement being drafted. While it
appeared on paper as if
the disagreement had been settled, in reality
it had not been as the plaintiffs had not yet received their money.
[43]
Although he was not informed that V[...]
D[...] M[...] and Numiwell had settled their dispute, he had learnt
thereof which caused
him to contact his attorney to find out what was
happening. It was at this stage that he was advised to take
immediate action
as they only had a few days to object. This
resulted in the interdict proceedings resulting in the granting of
the
rule nisi
which was later confirmed.
[44]
During cross examination, Nel testified
that to him Joanies Properties CC and V[...] D[...] M[...] were part
of one entity.
Payment was made into Joanies Properties CC’s
account because V[...] D[...] M[...] did not have a bank account and
requested
that the money be paid into that bank account. He saw
no harm in that request.
[45]
Mr Nel was admittedly a nervous witness but
impressed as an honest witness who gave his evidence in a clear and
consistent manner.
[46]
The plaintiffs closed their case after
Nel’s testimony.
[47]
The second defendant closed her case
without taking the witness stand and without calling any witnesses.
THE LAW
[48]
As
the plaintiffs’ main claim is for declaratory relief the court
must undertake a two-stage inquiry. Firstly, it must
ascertain
whether the plaintiffs have satisfied the court that they have an
interest in an existing or contingent right or obligation.
Should this inquiry be answered positively, then the court has to
consider whether this is a case where the court should exercise
its
discretion favourably under section 21(1)(c) of Act 10 of 2013.
[6]
[49]
As
stated in
Rail
Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail
[7]
the grant of declaratory orders is discretionary and flexible.
When determining whether or not to grant a declaratory order,
a court
is required to consider all the relevant circumstances. This
consideration must be done in a manner which promotes
the protection
and enforcement of our Constitution and its values.
[50]
Therefore, the right a party seeks to be
declared in his favour must be acknowledged and enforceable in law.
[51]
The second defendant admits that there is a
dispute between the plaintiffs and the second defendants in respect
of the R2 million
deposited by Numiwell into the trust account of
Raubenheimers Attorneys. However, she argues that the cession
relied upon
by the plaintiffs is unenforceable as it constitutes an
impermissible splitting of the debt without the consent of the
debtor.
Secondly, the second defendant pleaded that the payment
of R5 million by Numiwell to her in terms of settlement agreement is
not
subject to the settlement agreement relied upon by the
plaintiffs.
[52]
As the second defendant’s
defence is that the cession relied upon by the plaintiffs is invalid
and unenforceable because it
amounts to splitting of a debt, she
would have to establish such splitting.
[53]
Gouws’ evidence that no consent was
requested in accordance with clause 19 of the sale of share agreement
was not disputed.
[54]
In
Paiges
vs Van Rhyn Gold Mines Estates Ltd
[8]
the
court held that:
‘
the
stipulation against cession is part and parcel of the agreement
creating the right, and the right is limited by the stipulation.
The
observation that the debt is pars patrimonii and can
therefore be ceded in spite of the agreement likewise loses
sight of
this consideration.’
[55]
Thus, any cession contrary to a contractual
stipulation against cession is without any legal effect.
[56]
Further,
clothing the cession with legal validity when it was executed
contrary to a contractual stipulation against it would offend
against
the sanctity of contract as recognised in
Beadica
231 CC and Others v Trustees, Oregon Trust and Others
[9]
[57]
Thus, any cession in contravention of
clause 19 would be without any legal effect.
[58]
It is clear from the wording of the divorce
settlement agreement that the first and second defendant intended the
cessions referred
therein to be in writing and that they were
conditional. These cessionary documents were not discovered.
Nor was it
put to either Gouws or Nel that the cessions referenced in
the divorce settlement agreement were recorded in writing and that
the
formalities pertaining thereto, as set out in the divorce
settlement agreement were complied with.
[59]
Paragraph
6.6 of the particulars of claim expressly states that the cessions
contained in the divorce settlement agreement were
conditional and
that these conditions were never complied with. In responding
hereto, the second defendant merely pleaded
a bare denial.
[10]
[60]
Cession
is the bilateral juristic act in terms of which a right is
transferred by agreement between the transferor and the transferee.
While no formalities are generally required for the act of cession,
the parties may agree on formalities required to render the
cession
valid.
[11]
In the
divorce settlement agreement the parties agreed to record the cession
in writing and for the cessionary document to
be handed to the second
respondent. On the evidence presented, these formalities were
not complied with.
Therefore,
the divorce settlement agreement contained an undertaking to cede
rather than actual cessions.
[12]
[61]
In the circumstances it cannot be found
that the second defendant established the impermissible splitting of
a debt.
[62]
Notwithstanding my finding that the second
defendant has failed to show an impermissible splitting of a debt, I
deal with the case
law on this aspect.
[63]
In
Lief,
N.O. v Dottmann
[13]
the Appellate Division (as it was then known) settled the
longstanding uncertainty as to whether a single debt could, without
the consent of the debtor, validly be split among two or more
cessionaries, or among the cedent and one or more cessionaries.
The rationale for this was set out in
Kotsopoulos
v Bilardi
[14]
as follows:
‘
...
“the splitting” of the debt would impose upon the debtor
a greater burden than that to which he would otherwise
be subject in
then he would be obliged to make separate payments to different
creditors and, if unable to pay, could be subjected
to separate
actions, and the costs thereof, at the suit of different creditors.
This cannot be allowed without the consent
of the debtor.’
[64]
The
test for validity of a split cession is prejudice to the debtor.
[15]
This
was emphasised in
The
Liquidators of Tirzah (Private) Limited and Other Companies v
Merchant Bank of Central Africa Limited and Others
[16]
the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe held that a cession which results in a
splitting of debts could, at the instance of the debtor who
proves
that he is prejudiced by the cession, be declared invalid and
unenforceable. Thus, the test is not the potential prejudice
apparent at the time of the grant of the cession but whether the
cession results in prejudice to the debtor.
[65]
The
respondents in that case, without conceding that there was a
splitting of debts, argued that a splitting of debts would render
the
cession unenforceable as opposed to invalid in that the debtor could
consent to it at a later date. Furthermore, the
debtors having
paid the debts, waived their right to question the validity of the
cessions and that it could not be raised by the
appellants as
representatives of the cedents.
[66]
Support
for this view can be found in
Anglo
African Shipping Co (Rhodesia) (Pvt) Ltd v Badderey and
Another
[17]
where
the splitting of the cession occurred without the debtor’s
consent. In such circumstances, the debtor is entitled
to raise
the question of prejudice of such cession and may thereby render the
cession invalid and unenforceable.
[67]
Evins
v Shield Insurance Co Ltd
[18]
the court held that:
‘
Ordinarily
,
a creditor cannot divide and separate or split such a rights of
action or debt without the consent of the debtor. The reason
is
the possibility that it may render the debtor’s position more
burdensome by causing him prejudice, hardship or inconvenience.’
(own emphasis)
[68]
At the end of
the hearing the parties were invited to provide supplementary notes
on
inter
alia
whether it was the cedent’s or the cessionaries’
obligation to obtain the debtor’s consent when a single debt
is
ceded to more than one cessionary, resulting in splitting of the
debt. The plaintiffs’ legal representative accepted
the
invitation while the second defendant’s legal representatives
elected not to.
[69]
The
plaintiffs’ counsel argued that:
‘
...
where a debtor’s prior consent is required, the only nexus
which exists at the time, is between the creditor/cedent and
the
debtor; there is no nexus between the potential cessionaries and the
debtor.
For
that reason, it would ordinarily be the obligation of the cedent to
obtain the required consent, because without such consent,
it cannot
validly cede the right – for which it ordinarily would receive
a quid pro quo.’
[70]
Therefore, it
follows that it was for the first defendant or the second defendant
in her capacity as a representative of the fifth
defendant to obtain
the consent of the third defendant, which they failed to do.
Alternatively, the first defendant or the
second defendant in her
capacity as a representative of the fifth defendant were obliged to
notify the plaintiffs of the envisaged
settlement on the cedents.
Not only did the first defendant or the second defendant in her
capacity as a representative of
the fifth defendant fail to do so,
but they also incorporated a gagging provision in the settlement
agreement which settled the
disputes between the first and third
defendants.
[71]
The argument
that it fell to the first defendant or the second defendant in her
capacity as a representative of the fifth defendant
to obtain the
consent of Numiwell cannot be faulted and must be upheld.
Similarly, the argument that it was the first defendant
and/or the
second defendant in her capacity as a representative of the fifth
defendant to, at the very least, inform the plaintiffs
of the
envisaged settlement with the fifth defendant has merit and must be
upheld.
[72]
As stated above, the rationale against
splitting of debts is to protect the debtor. Gouws’
evidence that Numiwell suffered
no prejudice was not contested and is
therefore accepted.
[73]
I agree with
the arguments presented in
The
Liquidators of Tirzah (Private) Limited and Other Companies v
Merchant Bank of Central Africa Limited and Others
and
the view expressed in
Anglo
African Shipping Co (Rhodesia) (Pvt) Ltd v Badderey and Another
that
it is for the debtor to raise the validity and enforceability of
cession which resulted in the splitting of a debt without
its
consent. This view is consistent with the decisions of
Lief,
N.O. v Dottmann
and
Evins
v Shield Insurance Co Ltd and is consistent with the rationale
against splitting, which exists for the benefit of the debtor,
necessitating his or her consent. It is not for the creditor/
cedent, who acts with full knowledge and either intentionally
or
negligently omits to obtain the necessary permission for splitting,
to then rely thereon to his/her advantage. It is the
debtor who
is entitled to raise the question of prejudice and invalidity, this
follows from the fact that the principle against
splitting of
cessions is to protect the debtor.
[74]
In the present case, V[...] D[...] M[...]
and the second defendant arranged their affairs as the creditors to
result in a splitting
of debts, they failed to inform the plaintiffs
hereof and failed to obtain permission of the debtor (Numiwell).
The second
defendant now seek to take advantage of these failures to
the prejudice of the plaintiffs. This underhanded conduct
offends
against the rule of law and cannot be endorsed and/or
supported by the court.
FRAUD
[75]
I turn now to the plaintiffs’
alternative claim that the amount of R5 million, being the reciprocal
payment for the sale of
the first defendant’s shares in the
third defendant to the second defendant, was done
mala
fide
with the intent to defraud and to
deprive the plaintiffs of the payment of the R2 million due to them.
[76]
The
uncontested evidence is that when the settlement agreement between
the first and third defendant was reached, payment would
have been
made to the first defendant. For reasons which were not
disclosed, the settlement agreement was amended to allow
for payment
to the second defendant. This required a handwritten amendment,
as reflected in in paragraph 3.4 of the settlement
agreement.
[19]
[77]
The second defendant elected to present no
evidence to explain why she was entitled to payment of R5 million.
This election
must be evaluated against the uncontested evidence that
she had no shares in CS Hentiq and that she held no loan account with
CS
Hentiq in her favour. In correspondence dated 31 August
2022, Gousard attorneys offered an explanation as to why the R5
million
had to be paid to the second defendant. This letter
does not constitute evidence and has no evidentiary weight.
[78]
The first and second defendants failed to
furnish any explanation why they failed to inform the plaintiffs of
the settlement agreement
reached between the first and third
defendants. Paragraph 4 of the settlement agreement reached
between the plaintiffs and
the first, fourth and fifth defendants
necessitated such an explanation. While the second defendant
was not
per se
a party to this settlement agreement, she was fully aware of the
contents thereof and the obligations arising therefrom and was
a
signatory to the settlement agreement.
[79]
Furthermore, it was the second defendant
who proposed that the plaintiffs be refunded their payment of R2
million.
[80]
The urgent interdict application was
opposed by the first and second defendants. A possible reason
why the amount of R5 million
was paid to the second defendant and not
the first defendant can be gleamed from paragraphs 24 and 41.3 of the
first defendant’s
answering affidavit where he states that:
‘
24.
Secondly, the Applicants cannot claim R2, 000, 000.00 from the R5,
000,000.00 awarded to the 2
nd
Respondent, as stated above the Applicants have no claims whatsoever
against the 2
nd
Respondent, accordingly, the Applicants can only claim R2, 000,
000.00 from me in terms of the 2021 Court Order.’
’
41.3
Thirdly, the 2
nd
Respondent and I divorced in 2020. The Court Order dated 5
August 2022 awarded R5, 000,000.00 only to the 2
nd
Respondent. I am not going to receive any amount(s) in terms of the
2022 Order.’
[20]
[81]
The
first defendant further stated that he and the second defendant are
divorced and are not connected in anyway. However,
both he and
the second defendant who filed a confirmatory affidavit, failed to
explain why or how they continue to reside on the
same premises.
[21]
[82]
The first defendant also stated under oath
that he is not a man of straw. This denial appears to have been
falsely made when
considered within the context of the subsequent
nulla bona
return and his subsequent liquidation.
[83]
I am satisfied that the evidence presented
shows the payment of the R5 million to the second defendant was
without a legitimate
reasons, was
mala
fide
and done with the fraudulent
intent to deprive the plaintiffs of the payment of the R2 million due
to them by the first defendant.
[84]
The second defendant is not an innocent
bystander who was ignorant of the actions of J[...] V[...] D[...]
M[...]. On the contrary,
the evidence shows that she was at all
times aware of the status of the various claims and settlements
against J[...] V[...] D[...]
M[...]. She is the only member of
Joanies Properties CC, which was the second defendant in the action
instituted by the plaintiffs
for payment of the R2 million as
restitution for payment made to V[...] D[...] M[...].
Furthermore, payment of the R2 million
was to be made into the bank
account of Joanies Properties CC. This request could not have
been made without the second defendant’s
knowledge and/or
consent. The evidence established that the second defendant was fully
aware of the facts resulting in the litigation
between the plaintiffs
and Joanies Properties CC and V[...] D[...] M[...] as well as the
terms, impacts and reasons for the settlement
agreement dated 3
September 2021.
[85]
As
stated in
Namasthethu
Electrical (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Another
[22]
‘
[29]
It is trite law that fraud is conduct which vitiates
every transaction known to the law. In affirming this
principle, this court, in Esorfranki Pipelines (Pty) Ltd referred
with approval to Lord Denning’s dicta in Lazarus Estates
Ltd v
Beasley, when he said:
“
No
court in this land will allow a person to keep an advantage which he
has obtained by fraud. No judgment of a court, no
order of a
Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud.
Fraud unravels everything. The court
is careful not to find
fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is
proved, it vitiates judgments, contracts
and all transactions
whatsoever ....”
[86]
Therefore, the second defendant is not
entitled to the R2 million.
[87]
After considering all the evidence and the
applicable legal principles, I am satisfied that the plaintiffs have
established that
they have an interest in an existing right or
obligation, i.e the R2 million which is due and payable to them by
the first defendant
and that this is a case where the court should
exercise its discretion favourably as the amount of R5 million was
paid to the second
defendant to defraud and prevent the plaintiffs
from receiving the said payment of R2 million.
[88]
Therefore, I make the following orders:
(i)
the plaintiffs are entitled to the payment
of the amount of R2 million, together with any accrued interest,
which amount was deposited
into the trust account of Raubenheimers
Attorneys by the third defendant in terms of the court orders dated 9
September 2022 and
1 June 2023;
(ii)
the costs of suit, save for the costs of
the two applications in procuring the orders of 9 September 2022 and
1 June 2023, shall
be borne by the second defendant on scale C, which
costs shall include the costs of two counsel where so employed; and
(iii)
the cost of the two applications in
procuring the orders of 9 September 2022 and 1 June 2023 shall be
borne by the first and second
defendants jointly and severally, the
one paying to absolve the other, on scale C, which costs shall
include the costs of two counsel
where so employed.
HM SLINGERS
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
For the
Plaintiff:
Adv. JY Claasen SC and Adv. GP van Rhyn
As instructed
by:
Raubenheimers Attorneys
For the Second
Defendant:
Adv. DL van der Merwe
As instructed
by:
Goussard & Associates Inc.
[1]
The
second defendant was the plaintiff in the divorce action.
[2]
The
second defendant referenced is Joanies Properties CC.
[3]
Paragraph
5.6 of the particulars of claim on page 10 of the record read with
paragraph 7 of the second defendant’s plea
on page 42 of the
record.
[4]
Paragraph
4.3 of the particulars of claim on page 9 of the record read with
paragraph 2 of the second defendant’s plea on
page 40 of the
record.
[5]
President
of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby
Football Union and Others
2000
(1) SA 1 (CC)
[6]
Pasiya
and Others v Lithemba Gold Mining (Pty) Ltd and Others
2024
(4) SA 118 (SCA)
[7]
2005
(2) SA 359 (CC)
[8]
1920
AD 600
at 617
[9]
2020
(5) SA 247
(CC) at paragraph 84
[10]
Paragraph
13 of the second defendant’s plea on page 44 of the pleadings
bundle read with paragraph 6.6 of the particulars
of claim on page
12 of the pleadings bundle
[11]
Carlswald
& Another v Brews
2017
(5) SA 498 (SCA)
[12]
ibid
[13]
1964
(2) 252 (AD) at 275
[14]
1970
(2) SA 391 (C)
[15]
Spies
v Hansford and Hansford Ltd
1940
TPD 1
at 8 and 9;
Segal
and Another v Segal and Others
1977 (3) SA 247
(C) at 252F
[16]
Liquidators
of Tirzah (Pvt) Ltd., Belmont Leather (Pvt) Ltd., G & D Shoes
(Pvt) Ltd., P B Shoes (Pvt) Ltd. (all in liquidation)
v Merchant
Bank of Central Africa Ltd. and Others
(Civil
Appeal 293 of
2000; SC 123
of 2002)
[2003] ZWSC 123
(9 March 2003)
[17]
1977
(3) 236 (R)
[18]
1980
(2) SA 814
(A) at 827
[19]
Page
44 of the trial bundle (settlement agreement made an order of court
on 25 July 2022)
[20]
See
also paragraph 54 on page 102 of the trial bundle
[21]
Paragraph
1 of his answering affidavit on page 95 of the trial bundle and
paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 of the particulars of claim on
page 6 of the
pleading bundle read with paragraph 1 of the second defendant’s
plea on page 40 of the pleadings bundle.
[22]
(201/19)
[2020] ZASCA 74
(29 June 2020)
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