Case Law[2025] ZAWCHC 462South Africa
Nomavila v S (Bail Appeal) (A86/2025) [2025] ZAWCHC 462 (14 October 2025)
Headnotes
Summary: Bail – Appeal against refusal of bail – Accused charged with multiple counts of extortion – Flight risk – More than one address for purposes of bail – Likelihood of interference with witnesses – Strong prima facie case against accused - Bail conditions and difficulty in monitoring accused if released on bail – Magistrate’s finding correct – Appeal dismissed
Judgment
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# South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
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## Nomavila v S (Bail Appeal) (A86/2025) [2025] ZAWCHC 462 (14 October 2025)
Nomavila v S (Bail Appeal) (A86/2025) [2025] ZAWCHC 462 (14 October 2025)
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sino date 14 October 2025
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
Case
no.: A86/2025
Lower
Court case no.: C405/2024
In the matter between:
PEZILE NOMAVILA
Appellant
And
THE STATE
Respondent
Coram: Pangarker J
Delivered:
14 October 2025
(delivered via email to
the parties’ legal representatives)
Summary:
Bail
–
Appeal against refusal of bail – Accused
charged with multiple counts of extortion – Flight risk –
More than one
address for purposes of bail – Likelihood of
interference with witnesses – Strong prima facie case against
accused
- Bail conditions and difficulty in monitoring accused if
released on bail – Magistrate’s finding correct –
Appeal
dismissed
ORDER
On appeal from the
Magistrates’ Court, Mossel Bay, the following is ordered:
The
appeal against the refusal of bail is dismissed.
JUDGMENT
PANGARKER J
Introduction
[1]
On 20 December 2024, the Mossel Bay Magistrates’ Court refused
bail in respect
of the appellant’s bail application which was
opposed by the State. This appeal against the Magistrate’s
decision is
dealt with in terms of
section 19(a)
of the
Superior
Courts Act 10 of 2013
, thus without the hearing of oral submissions.
[2]
It is apparent from the record of proceedings in the Magistrates’
Court that
the appellant, accused 1 in the matter, was legally
represented throughout the bail proceedings. I have had regard to the
record,
the Magistrate's judgment in the bail application, the
grounds of appeal as well as the legal representatives’ written
submissions
in the appeal in reaching the conclusion herein.
[3]
The appellant is charged along with a co-accused, Lazola Perry Mtini
(accused 2),
with 25 counts of extortion. The State alleges that on
or about 14 June 2024, near Asla and KwaNonqaba, Mossel Bay, the
accused
acted with a common purpose with persons known and unknown to
the State and unlawfully and intentionally induced, threatened,
subjected
to pressure or inspired fear in the minds of shop owners
and shop assistants at 25 shops, by demanding cash payments for
so-called
protection. Furthermore, by means of these threats,
inducements or pressure, the accused unlawfully and intentionally
obtained
an advantage not due to him in that he received R500 per
shop totalling R12 500.
[4]
The parties were agreed that the offence falls under Schedule 1 of
the Criminal Procedure
Act 51 of 1977 (the CPA) and that section
60(1) applied to the bail proceedings in that an accused is entitled
to be released on
bail if the Court is satisfied that the interest of
justice permits it.
Grounds of appeal
[5]
The grounds of appeal in relation to the Court
a quo’s
order are, in summary, the following: (i) the Magistrate committed an
error in finding that it was not in the interests of justice
to
release the appellant on bail; (ii) the Magistrate erred in finding
that there was a likelihood that the appellant would evade
his trial
and would influence or intimidate witnesses; (iii) the Magistrate
overlooked the fact that the appellant resided permanently
outside
the Court’s jurisdiction thus suitable bail conditions could
have been fixed, and (iv) the Magistrate misdirected
himself in
failing to consider granting bail coupled with the appropriate
conditions as set out in section 62 of the CPA. The State
presented
its case first in the bail application.
The State’s
opposition to the granting of bail
[6]
The State presented the testimony of Captain Carel Cornelius
(Cornelius) who also
provided a detailed affidavit which included the
reasons for opposing bail. At the time of the application, Cornelius
was a police
officer of 39 years’ experience. He testified that
incidents of extortion were reported to have occurred amongst mainly
Ethiopian
shop owners in KwaNonqaba and Da Gamaskop police precinct.
Due to
their immense fear for their safety
and that of their property, many of the foreign shop owners were
unwilling to come forward and
report these cases to the police.
Consequently, various meetings were held between senior police
officials and the shop
owners and eventually two
complainants came forward.
[7]
Cornelius testified that the police applied for a section 252A
operation authorization
and this set in motion covert surveillance to
crack the extortion syndicate in the area. Pursuant to information
received from
the complainants that the shops were visited every
middle of the month, search and seizure warrants in respect of the
taxis were
applied for. Thereafter, Cornelius and his colleagues
commenced surveillance at a guest house which was identified as a
place where
a taxi, which stopped at the various spaza shops in the
area, visited regularly. The taxi’s registration details
corresponded
with information which the police had obtained.
[8]
The surveillance team decided to apprehend the occupants of the taxi
and in the police’s
attempt to block the taxi on or about 14
June 2024, a chase ensued which saw the taxi fleeing the police
blockade. Eventually,
the occupants of the taxi were apprehended,
with the result that the appellant, an occupant of the taxi, was
apprehended and arrested
while the other occupants fled the scene.
Later, another suspect (also an occupant of the taxi) was arrested
but released on the
basis that he would be utilised as a section 204
witness in the case against the appellant. This witness also linked
the appellant
to multiple instances of collecting protection money in
his presence.
[9]
The search and seizure warrant for the taxi yielded a notebook
containing the names
of 41 spaza shops and its owners and it was
noted that blue “ticks” appeared next to 25 of these
names, which corresponded
with R500 (per shop) paid by 25 shop
owners, totaling R12 500. Cornelius testified that the police
seized R12 180 in
cash along with the notebook.
Furthermore,
it was confirmed that a VW Polo found at the guesthouse was rented by
the appellant and had travelled from Cape Town
to Mossel Bay.
Cornelius emphasised that the police investigation illustrated that
the appellant, his co-accused and other individuals
were engaged in
extortion activity as part of a criminal enterprise. It was
evident that a pattern emerged from the collection
dates of the
extortion money in that it differed from area to area, which
underscored the organised manner in which the offences
were
committed.
[10]
According to Cornelius, the appellant was linked to the offences in
that he was pointed out in
photographs as being the person who
collected the money from the spaza shops. The police investigation
illustrated that the appellant,
his co-accused and other individuals
were engaged in an enterprise as a group who collected protection
money.
[11]
In respect of the appellant’s address, Cornelius testified that
the appellant provided
5[…] N[…] Street, Khayelitsha as
his residential address. He requested the appellant to show him the
address on Google
Maps but was informed that […] N[…]
Street was one and the same address. The information was checked on
Google Maps
and was followed up: it was found that one Bulelani
Somlenzi was found to occupy 5[…] N[…] Street, that he
knew the
appellant but that he and his girlfriend occupied the
property for several months at the time the police attended the
address.
Somlenzi advised that the appellant did not occupy the
premises.
[12]
The police were also provided with the appellant's girlfriend’s
address, 2[…] M[…]
Street, Eerste River. It is noted
that the record of the bail proceedings indicates several variations
on the name of the street
but nothing much turns on this uncertainty
and confusion. The aforementioned address was followed up by Warrant
Officer Williams,
whose feedback was that on visiting the address,
the police found an Eddie Rose who was residing at the property for
16 years and
did not know the appellant. A further follow-up by the
police led them to the landlady, and it turned out that the landlady
(who
knew the appellant but not his girlfriend) indicated that the
appellant paid the rent.
[13]
As for the section 62(f) report, the address supplied by the
appellant was occupied by tenants
for several months who rented from
the appellant. Cornelius was concerned that as nobody was home when
the police attended the
premises, the verification of the address was
therefore questionable.
Furthermore, he
testified that the appellant’s taxis and business documents
were registered on another address, 5[…]
N[…] Street,
Kuyasa.
[14]
Having regard to these factors, Cornelius regarded the appellant as a
flight risk due to inconsistencies
with his address(es). Thus, the
likelihood existed that should he abscond from attending Court, it
would be difficult for the police
to monitor him should bail be
granted and tracing him would be problematic. It was also unclear to
the police where in the Eastern
Cape the appellant’s family
resided.
[15]
Cornelius testified that there was a J50 Bench warrant circulating
for the appellant in a 2014
Khayelitsha matter. Cornelius feared that
there was a likelihood that if bail were fixed, the appellant would
re-connect with the
other suspects in the taxi as he had all the
information in the matter. He also feared the likelihood that the
appellant, if bail
were fixed, would commit other crimes.
[16]
In cross-examination, Cornelius confirmed that there were in total,
11 complainants (shop owners)
and others were prepared to come
forward but awaited the outcome of the bail application. He testified
that the individual shops
were known or identified by the appellant
even though the police had deliberately withheld the identities of
the complainants/shop
owners.
[17]
Cornelius conceded that there were measures in place to protect
witnesses including the section
204 witness and that it was possible,
but not likely, that the appellant would return to the Mossel Bay
area if bail were granted.
Cornelius admitted that the police did not
know why the J50 warrant was circulated when the Khayelitsha matter
was withdrawn against
the appellant
[1]
.
He confirmed that in a previous Blue Downs matter, bail was refused
and the appellant was held in custody awaiting trial.
[18]
Insofar as the appellant’s address issue was concerned,
Cornelius testified that he was
given two notes containing address
details for 2
[…]
M[…]
Street and the reference to a Rosetta Martins as the appellant’s
girlfriend. These notes were attached to his
affidavit opposing the
granting of bail. A follow-up on the address indicated on the note
brought the police to a landlady, Noloyiso,
who did not know a Ms
Martins, but referred to 1
[…]
M[…] Street (not 2
[…]
M[…] Street) and when prompted, indicated
that she knew the appellant and his girlfriend.
[19]
Cornelius did not know that Busisiwe Sikili was the appellant’s
girlfriend and only became
aware of her at the bail proceedings. It
was put to the State’s witness that the appellant’s
version would be that
1
[…]
M[…] Street was the appellant's alternative
address where he lived with his girlfriend, Ms Sikili, and that he
rented from
the landlady, Noloyiso.
[20]
From his further testimony, it was clear that Cornelius had an issue
that yet another address
was used, 5
[…]
N[…] Street, Kuyasa, for the hired Polo. He
was concerned that this address was not the one provided at the time
of arrest,
but he agreed that it was the address on the section 62(f)
report and used in the paperwork related to the appellant’s
taxis.
The appellant had three taxis registered in his name and no
further extortion activity occurred while he was in custody.
[21]
In re-examination and in response to the Court’s questions, the
witness confirmed that
the appellant used the N[…] Street
address for his other cases. He could not confirm that the
handwriting on the notes handed
into Court belonged to the appellant.
This concluded the State’s case in the bail application.
[22]
The appellant called Ms Sikili to testify in his application. It
seems from an exchange between
the prosecutor and Ms Sikili, that
despite a request by the defence that she remains outside the
Courtroom during the State’s
case, she failed to heed the
request and was present during Cornelius’ testimony. Ms Sikili
testified that she and the appellant
resided at 1
[…]
M[…] Street, she was seven months pregnant
at the time of testifying and her testimony regarding the landlady
Noloyiso, who
was contacted by the police regarding the appellant’s
girlfriend, mirrors the testimony of Cornelius.
[23]
Ms Sikili testified further that she moved from 1
[…]
M[…] Street after the appellant’s
arrest and that the appellant lived with his cousin, Siyabulela, in a
rented room
at 5
[…]
N[…]2
Street. She testified that she and the appellant were in a
relationship for 4 years prior to his arrest and that he
is a taxi
owner.
[24]
In cross-examination, Ms Sikili testified that she was unaware that
the appellant contended that
his family home was in Khayelitsha.
According to her, the appellant’s family home was in the
Eastern Cape. However, she also
testified that the appellant’s
family home in Cape Town was sold and that his family had relocated
to the Eastern Cape.
The family home which she referred to was
5[…] N[…] Street, the same address provided for the
taxi business, SARS
documentation and for hiring the VW Polo. She
testified that she was not aware of the appellant visiting Mossel Bay
monthly, does
not know Rosetta Martins and the appellant would sleep
over 3 to 4 times per night.
The appellant’s
application for bail
[25]
The appellant did not testify but relied on an affidavit which was
placed before the Court and
admitted into evidence as Exhibit D. The
content of the affidavit is not repeated herein at length; however,
certain information
is referred to.
The
appellant stated under oath that he was 33 years old and resided at
5[…] N[…]2 Street, Kuyasa, Khayelitsha, where
he lived
with his cousin Siyabulela, prior to arrest. He was engaged to Ms
Sikili, who lived at 1[…] M[…] Street,
Eerste River,
and his family had relocated to Qumbu, Eastern Cape.
[26]
The appellant has a minor son aged 1 from a previous relationship
whom he maintains at R3 000
per month. Furthermore, the section
62(f) report confirmed his address as being 5[…] N[…]2
Street, Khayelitsha and
it favoured his release pending finalisation
of the matter. The appellant was the owner of a number of taxis, some
of which were
still under vehicle finance, while others were bought
in cash. He was a registered taxpayer.
[27]
The appellant’s release on bail was premised on the following
factors: having a fixed/determinable
address; a favourable section
62(f) report; a good bail profile; that he gave his full
co-operation to the police investigation,
and that the likelihood of
endangering the public safety, of being a flight risk, of
interference with witnesses and evidence and
jeopardising the bail
and criminal justice system, did not arise.
The Court
a quo’s
judgment
[28]
In the judgment, the Magistrate found that although the appellant had
not threatened witnesses,
the charges were of such a nature that a
threat(s) was/were implied. He found
prima facie
, that the
State had a strong case against the appellant, that the appellant
holds no property within the Court’s jurisdiction
and that
additionally, because the remaining suspects were not yet
apprehended, it showed how easily the appellant could disappear.
A
lengthy period or imprisonment if convicted was, in the Court’s
view, sufficient reason to flee.
[29]
Furthermore, the Magistrate was not satisfied with the appellant's
explanation as to his actual
residence and found the explanations
related to the various addresses, to be ambiguous. Furthermore, the
identities of witnesses
were easily determinable. Accordingly, bail
was denied in view of the Court
a quo
holding that there was a
likelihood that the safety of the public or a person may be
endangered and a likelihood that he would attempt
to evade his trial
and influence or intimidate witnesses.
Discussion and
findings
[30]
To commence the discussion, it is trite that in terms of section
65(4) of the CPA, interference
on appeal in respect of a lower
Court’s decision to refuse bail may only occur where that Court
committed an error or mistake
[2]
.
In my view, the main issue in the bail application relates to the
appellant’s address or addresses and whether he was a
flight
risk. Having regard to the record and submissions, it is clear that
Cornelius’ affidavit, supported by his oral testimony,
was
quite detailed.
[31]
The appellant was entitled to exercise his right to remain silent
regarding questions related
to the merits of the charges against him.
That said, it is evident that a detailed police operation led to his
arrest. Significantly,
the appellant was arrested as an occupant in
the taxi which, according to the police’s information and
surveillance, stopped
at the spaza shops and in which a notebook
containing details of the alleged extorted spaza shops and R12 000
[3]
were found. The appellant was thus found on the scene, as an occupant
of the same taxi and at least
prima
facie
,
is considered to be directly connected to the charges.
[32]
The appellant is linked to the crimes of extortion in two ways:
firstly, he was arrested after
the ambush of the taxi resulted in the
occupants thereof, fleeing from the scene, and he was one of the
occupants thereof. Secondly,
the complainants identified the
appellant through photo identification as being a/the person who
visited the spaza shops monthly,
demanding R500 protection money.
[33]
As for the charges, the evidence presented by Cornelius and the
finding of the Magistrate that
a threat is implicit in the charge of
extortion, is correct. In view of the above, it stands to reason that
the case against the
appellant, at least
prima facie
, is
strong, and a successful conviction could lead to a lengthy period of
imprisonment.
[34]
The appellant’s submission that the full detail of the charge
sheet (at the time of the
bail application) was not yet available to
the defence, is ultimately not that significant. It must be
remembered that Cornelius’
testimony that further complainants
exist and that therefore more charges may be added in respect of the
other spaza shops, was
not materially challenged during the bail
proceedings.
[35]
It is important to also note that while the appellant submits that
there was no likelihood that
he posed a flight risk
[4]
,
the following undisputed facts must be taken into account: the
appellant has a passport and travelled once outside South Africa,
to
Lesotho. He possesses several taxis, some of which were paid for in
cash or in large cash instalments, and he was able to hire
a motor
vehicle without trouble to travel from Cape Town to Mossel Bay prior
to his arrest. It is furthermore apparent from the
appellant’s
affidavit that he was able to access large amounts of cash with ease,
for example, R220 000 for a Hi-Ace
in 2021 and R170 000 for
another taxi in 2018, bought in cash.
[36]
In addition to these facts, and bearing in mind that the State
alleged that the appellant was
an occupant along with other suspects
who fled the taxi at the police blockade, the indications are that
the offences involve a
syndicate and/or persons who operated with
common purpose to extort spaza shops in the Mossel Bay and Garden
Route area. In my
view, the probabilities indicate that that the
appellant and other occupants of the taxi were prepared to flee the
scene, notwithstanding
the police pursuit. This certainly gives the
impression that if he wished, the appellant would take the risk and
flee the authorities,
thus establishing a likelihood that he is a
flight risk.
[37]
The appellant correctly submits that the provisions of section
60(4)(b) of the Act must be read
with the provisions of section
60(6)
[5]
. Not all the provisions
may apply to a particular appellant, and consideration must be given
to the facts and circumstances prevalent
in a bail application.
[38]
In his judgment, the Magistrate referred to the fact – and
indeed made a finding - that
the appellant had no family ties, nor
property in the jurisdiction or area of Mossel Bay. The appellant
takes issue with this finding
both as a ground of appeal and in
argument and submits that the Magistrate overlooked the fact that the
appellant resided permanently
outside the Court’s jurisdiction
and thus bail conditions could be fixed.
[39]
Section 60(6)(a) indicates that the emotional, family, community or
occupational ties to the
place where an accused would be tried are
factors which the bail Court may consider in determining whether
there is a likelihood
that the accused, if released on bail, would
attempt to evade his trial. From the evidence, the alleged offences
occurred in the
Mossel Bay and Garden Route areas, and it is common
cause that none of the addresses provided by the appellant for
purposes of
bail, fall within these areas. Similarly, neither the
appellant’s family members nor Ms Sikili are based in the area.
The
Magistrate was thus correct when concluding that the appellant
resided in Cape Town and held no property in the Mossel Bay
jurisdiction,
and thus the criticism directed at the Magistrate in
that he overlooked this fact, is unjustified.
[40]
Furthermore, the Magistrate also correctly held that the appellant
held no significant emotional
or family ties to the Eden/Garden Route
region. All these factors must be considered along with the State’s
evidence that
the appellant was an occupant in the taxi under
surveillance
[6]
; that he fled
the police and was eventually apprehended; that he travelled from
Cape Town to Mossel Bay in a hired vehicle and
that he has travelled
beyond the country’s borders with a valid passport.
Cumulatively, these factors contribute to reducing
the Court’s
confidence that he will ultimately stand trial on what are very
serious charges.
[41]
The appellant has clearly demonstrated in his bail affidavit that he
has access to financial
resources, and one would conclude that as the
owner of five taxis, he has employees and family members operating
his business while
he is incarcerated. Thus, in all probability, the
appellant can afford to forfeit the amount of bail which may be set.
Given
the testimony of Cornelius, the possibility of more
complainants coming forward and more extortion charges being added
cannot,
therefore, be excluded. Having regard to the above, and while
acknowledging that the Magistrate did not address the issue with
extensive detail and was rather cryptic, his finding in respect of
section 60(4)(b) read with section 60(6), cannot be faulted.
There is
a likelihood that the appellant, if released on bail, will attempt to
evade his trial.
[42]
In respect of the ground in section 60(4)(a), I am satisfied that the
appellant’s counsel’s
submission indeed has merit. Simply
put, there was no evidence presented to indicate that if released on
bail, the appellant would
endanger the safety of the public or any
specific person. Thus, I agree with the appellant that there was no
basis for the Magistrate
to have reached this conclusion, and the
judgment certainly does not elucidate the basis upon which the
finding was made.
[43]
As for section 60(4)(c)
[7]
, the
Magistrate found that a likelihood existed that the appellant would
attempt to intimidate or influence witnesses. Whilst finding
that a
threat is implied in the charge of extortion, the judgment is scarce
on the basis for such finding, and in his submissions,
the
appellant’s counsel criticises the finding in the bail
application. However, it must be remembered that the evidence
from
the State was that the complainants identified the appellant from the
photo identifications and the information from the section
204
witness supports the State’s case that the appellant is
directly linked to the offences.
[44]
It is evident from Cornelius’s testimony and further police
investigation, that at least
prima facie
, the appellant is in
all probability part of the group of people extorting money from the
foreign spaza shops identified in the
notebook found in the taxi,
wherein the appellant was a passenger. As mentioned, the taxi visited
the shops mid-month, and money
was demanded by the occupant(s) of the
taxi. It is therefore highly probable that the shop owners and
complainants are known to
the appellant and/or easily accessible to
him even in circumstances where the identities were not disclosed and
not all the shop
owners had laid charges. Given the strong case
against the appellant, and all stated above, it would not be
unreasonable to conclude
that he would be aware of the names of the
shops marked/ticked off in the notebook.
[45]
S
v Kock
[8]
is authority for the view that a likelihood that the accused may
interfere with State witnesses must not be based on speculation
but
must have some factual support. In this matter, the above factors
amount to actual support for the conclusion that a likelihood
was
established that the appellant would interfere with State witnesses.
To be clear, 11 complainants, who feared for their lives,
came
forward and there was a strong possibility that more would follow.
[46]
The probabilities also indicate that the appellant would at least be
familiar with the shops
(if not the identities of their owners) and
the areas where they are situated. Furthermore, the investigation was
largely completed
in respect of the appellant, and the offence of
extortion consists of the element of influence and the exertion of
pressure on
the witnesses. Thus, it is not a far stretch to conclude
that at least on the State’s evidence, unchallenged by the
appellant,
it had established the likelihood of threats and/or
interference with the witnesses in the matter.
[47]
Moving on, one of the major concerns in the bail application involves
the uncertainty or vagueness
surrounding the appellant's residential
address and Cornelius spent a considerable time on this aspect. In
this regard, the State
argues that the information provided by the
appellant regarding his address was inaccurate or false, which led to
the confusion.
Despite the appellant’s counsel submissions
regarding the correctness of the appellant's address, I would agree
with the
Magistrate that questions arise regarding the appellant’s
address, as highlighted by the State.
[48]
It is evident from Ms Sikili’s testimony that she and the
appellant did not live together.
Rather, either he slept over at her
address, or she slept over at his accommodation a few times per week.
Despite the appellant’s
attempt to confirm his family home (or
former family home) as 5[…] N[…] Street,
Kuyasa,
it was evident that Ms Sikili, his intimate partner of four years,
was unaware that this was his family home. Her further
testimony on
this aspect was also unsatisfactory as she seemed to contradict
herself and thereby assist the appellant’s version
that the
N[…] Street property was his family home.
[49]
Furthermore, the alleged positive address of 5[…]
N[…]2
Street, Khayelitsha, is also known as […]
N[…]2
Street, an anomaly which remained largely unexplained or unclarified
during the bail proceedings. It raises the question
as to why the
appellant did not simply indicate […]
N[…]2
Street as his place of residence. This address, it is submitted, was
occupied by the appellant and his cousin, yet
the permanency thereof
is unclear. The address is listed on the section 62(f) report.
[50]
Aside from the two addresses, there exists the note referring to 2[…]
M[…] Street, provided to Cornelius and
which the appellant distances himself from. Despite valiant efforts
to downplay any
knowledge of the note, it is highly improbable that
the appellant’s erstwhile attorney or the prosecutor at the
time, would
fabricate an address for the police to follow up and hand
it to the investigating officer for that purpose.
[51]
It is more probable that the appellant provided the information to
his erstwhile attorney or
to the prosecutor for purposes of bail
information early in the matter. Then, too there is 1[…]
M[…] Street, which led to the landlady
Noloyiso, whom it seems, needed prodding to confirm that the
appellant was known to
her. This address turned out to be the former
address of Ms Sikili, which then begs the question why the details of
another woman
(purportedly a girlfriend) would be stated on the same
note. None of these aspects were clarified during the bail
application,
leading to uncertainty and confusion regarding the
appellant’s address.
[52]
In view of the differing addresses and confirmation by Ms Sikili that
she
did not live with the appellant, and
notwithstanding the favourable section 62(f) report, the
steadfastness and permanency of residence
were questionable,
certainly leading to doubts with the Magistrate as to the police’s
ability to trace the appellant if he
were to be released on bail. In
view of the above issues, the Magistrate was correct in his finding
that the addresses were vague
or ambiguous.
[53]
Furthermore, the abovementioned aspects also raise doubt as to the
appellant’s ties to
the area he refers to as his home, Kuyasa,
Khayelitsha. The section 62(f) report does not provide insight as to
when the appellant
commenced living at the N[…]2 Street
address and it would also seem that the second address, 5[…]
N[…] Street
is specifically used for the taxi business and was
used to rent the Polo. The Court was informed that the N[…]
address was
the appellant’s former residence and if this is so,
it is unclear why he would still use such address for his business
enterprise
and for official purposes, especially as on his version he
lived at 5[…] N[…]2 Street. Once again, these issues
were
not clarified in the bail application.
[54]
When I have regard to the above discussion, then the appellant’s
income, possibility of bail conditions,
burgeoning taxi business and
other personal circumstances, do not trump the serious concerns
raised by the State as to the appellant’s
inconsistency
regarding his address, the likelihood of absconding from the trial
and interference with witnesses. As seen from
Cornelius’s
testimony, the State has a strong
prima facie
case against the
appellant.
[55]
Insofar as bail conditions are concerned, Cornelius explained the
serious challenges in monitoring
the appellant were he to be released
on bail. The reality is that, if the appellant’s submissions
were accepted and bail
fixed, the appellant would be in Khayelitsha
and the investigating officer in Mossel Bay, hundreds of kilometres
away. I agree
with the State that the question of bail conditions
must be considered in light of the application as a whole, which
presents compelling
evidence against the appellant in respect of the
likelihood of absconding from the trial, the likely interference with
witnesses,
the strength of the State’s case and the
inconsistencies with regard to his address(es).
[56]
The judgment is criticised for its lack of considering suitable bail
conditions. In my view,
the reference to bail conditions occurs in
the judgment, albeit without a full assessment thereof. In
S
v Branco
[9]
,
the High Court indicated that where no consideration is given to
suitable bail conditions, it may lead to a failure to exercise
a
proper discretion in respect of the consideration of bail. In this
matter, the nature and seriousness of the offences, the strength
of
the State’s case against the appellant, the difficulty in
monitoring the appellant
[10]
,
plus all the other factors mentioned above, militated against bail
conditions being fixed. In my view, the Magistrate’s
decision
not to fix bail conditions when considering an alternative to
incarceration, cannot be faulted.
[57]
On a conspectus of the evidence, the Court
a quo
was correct
to find that it was not in the interests of justice to permit the
appellant’s release on bail. Accordingly, therefore,
I find
that the Magistrate’s decision in refusing bail, was correct.
[58]
The Magistrate seemed to have relied upon social media platforms as a
guide or basis upon which
to briefly discuss the prevalence of the
offence of extortion within the area of jurisdiction of that Court.
My observation is
that the judgment lacks specific detail and
statistics regarding the prevalence of extortion in the area. With
respect to the Magistrate,
it is hoped that in future judgments, the
reference to and reliance upon unverified information on social media
platforms, will
be avoided. In conclusion, while the judgment may be
criticised in certain respects, the exercise of the Magistrate’s
discretion
and his refusal of bail were correct in the circumstances
of the appellant’s application for bail.
Order
[59]
In the result, the following is ordered:
The
appeal against the refusal of bail is dismissed.
M
PANGARKER
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
For appellant:
Adv N Mbangata
Instructed by:
Prince Attorneys
Bellville
For respondent:
Adv S Rambarun
Director
of Public Prosecutions
Cape
Town
[1]
It
is unclear from the testimony whether the Khayelitsha matter was
withdrawn in 2017
[2]
S
v Porthern and others
2004 (2) SACR 242
(C) par [4]
[3]
Rounded off
[4]
Section 60(4)(b) read with section 66 of the CPA
[5]
S
v Petersen
2008 (2) SACR 355
(C) at [59}
[6]
As
the taxi visiting the spaza shops
[7]
As
read with section 60(7)
[8]
2003
(2) SACR 5 (SCA) 13c
[9]
2002
(1) SACR 531
(WLD) at 537 a-b
[10]
Due
to distance and multiple addresses of the appellant
sino noindex
make_database footer start
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