Case Law[2025] ZAWCHC 467South Africa
S.N v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (5883/2020) [2025] ZAWCHC 467 (14 October 2025)
Headnotes
public carriers like Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (“PRASA”) have always been regarded as owing a legal duty to their passengers to protect them from suffering physical harm while making use of their transport between carrier and passenger, usually, but not always based on contract. It also stems from its public law obligations, and this merely strengthens the contention that a breach of those duties is wrongful in the delictual sense and could attract liability for damages. The reference to "PRASA" in Mashongwa was a reference to the same Defendant in this matter.services. This duty, in the case of PRASA, arises from the existence of the relationship
Judgment
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# South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
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## S.N v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (5883/2020) [2025] ZAWCHC 467 (14 October 2025)
S.N v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (5883/2020) [2025] ZAWCHC 467 (14 October 2025)
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sino date 14 October 2025
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
### JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
Not Reportable
Case no:5883/2020
In the matter between:
S[...]
N[...]
PLAINTIFF
and
PASSENGER RAIL AGENCY
OF SOUTH
AFRICA
DEFENDANT
Coram:
BARENDSE AJ
Heard
:
6 & 7 October 2025
Delivered:
14 October 2024
ORDER
1.
The Defendant is ordered to compensate the
Plaintiff for 100% of such damages that the Plaintiff may prove.
2.
The Defendant is liable to pay the
Plaintiff's party-party costs as taxed or agreed on scale A,
including the costs of counsel.
# JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
BARENDSE
AJ
[1] The Plaintiff
instituted this damages action against the Defendant arising from an
incident that occurred while he was commuting
on a train as a
fare-paying passenger on 15 June 2017.
[2] The Plaintiff was
born on 18 December 2003 and was thirteen years old at the time of
the incident. His mother initially instituted
the action while he was
a minor, and he later substituted her as Plaintiff after reaching the
age of majority.
[3] By agreement between
the parties, the issues of merits (liability) and quantum were
separated, and the trial was set down on
the merits only.
[4] In the Particulars of
Claim ("POC") the Plaintiff pleaded that the Defendant was
established in terms of section 22
of the Legal Succession to the
South African Transport Services Act 9 of 1989 ("the Act").
[5] It was further
alleged in the POC that by virtue of the provisions of sections 15
and 23(1) of the Act, it was a function of
the Defendant to provide
transport within, to and from the Republic in the public interest.
[6] Plaintiff pleaded
that the Defendant owed him the duty to take such steps as are
reasonably necessary to ensure his safety while
travelling on one of
its trains.
[7] Plaintiff further
averred that the Defendant's legal duty arose from the statutory
provisions referred to in paragraph 4 above,
alternatively from the
legal convictions of society.
[8] In support of the
alternative basis for the Defendant's legal duty, mentioned above,
the Plaintiff averred that:
(a)
Defendant was established in the public
interest for the very purpose of providing a rail commuter service,
which in turn had to
ensure the safe travelling of its commuters;
(b)
Defendant is maintained and operated by
public money;
(c)
The vast majority of passengers are
compelled to make use of trains because they cannot afford other
transport;
(d)
Defendant commands the resources, manpower,
and/or security with which to prevent any danger to its commuters;
and/or
(e)
Defendant is expected to operate carriages
which are safe for the purpose of conveying passengers.
[9] The Plaintiff gave
evidence and was the only witness called at the trial. In brief, his
version was that at the time of the
incident, he was a learner in
Grade 7 and used a train daily to commute to and from school. He
would use a train in the morning
from Phillipi to Mitchells Plain and
on his return journey, a train from Mitchells Plain to Phillipi.
[10] On the day in
question, he boarded a train in the afternoon in Mitchells Plain, to
return home. The train was full so he remained
standing as there were
no vacant seats. He was positioned about two meters from the door of
the carriage. The door of the carriage
was open, and some windows
thereof were broken. There were no security personnel on the train.
[11] The train moved off,
but the door of the carriage remained open. Commuters moved through
the carriage to an adjoining carriage
and in this process, pushed him
towards the open door. He was unable to grab onto one of the rails in
the centre of the carriage.
Given his age at the time, he was small
in stature compared to the commuters around him, ended up being
pushed through the open
door of the carriage and fell from the moving
train. He at no stage suggested that this resulted from deliberate or
criminal acts
by other commuters.
[12] Plaintiff testified
that his last memory was being pushed off the moving train, and he
only regained consciousness when in
the Mitchells Plain day hospital,
where he learned from a nurse that a person brought him into the
hospital.
[13] In its Plea, the
Defendant denied all the averments made in the POC. Defendant did
not, in the alternative plead, that there
was any negligence on the
part of the Plaintiff.
[14] The POC reflected
the date of the incident as 14 June 2017, during his evidence in
chief, the Plaintiff also testified that
the incident occurred on 14
June 2017.
[15] During cross
examination, it was put to the Plaintiff that the hospital records
forming part of the trial bundle reflected
the date of admission to
the hospital as 15 June 2017. Plaintiff's counsel moved for an
amendment of the date in paragraph 3.1
of the POC from 14 June 2017
to 15 June 2017. The amendment was allowed.
[16] Defendant's counsel
called Plaintiff's reliability as a witness into question because of
the initial discrepancy around the
date of the incident. Plaintiff
was also cross-examined on the contents of a page forming part of the
Mitchells Plain Hospital's
records. This document reflected the
mechanism of the injury as a "Fall" and the location of the
incident as a "Street/Highway".
[17] Not much turned on
the entries in the hospital records. No evidence pertaining to the
contents thereof was produced by either
party, and the records were
not admitted into evidence. In other parts of the hospital records
there were references to "Thrown
from train" (page 38 of
the bundle) and "fell from train" (page 41 of the bundle).
[18] The court found
Plaintiff to be a reliable witness, and there was no reason to reject
his evidence. In accepting Plaintiff's
evidence, the court finds that
he fell from a moving train in the circumstances as described by him.
This is however not the end
of the matter. The further requirements
for a finding of liability on the part of the Defendant are
considered and dealt with below.
Legal Duty
[19] Plaintiff had the
onus to establish a basis for the legal duty which according to him,
rested on the Defendant. Reference to
this was made in paragraphs 5,
6 and 7 above.
[20]
In argument, Plaintiff's counsel referred the court to the judgment
by the Constitutional Court in
Mashongwa,
[1]
where it was held that public carriers like
Passenger
Rail Agency of South Africa
(“PRASA”)
have always been regarded as owing a legal duty to their passengers
to protect them from suffering physical
harm while making use of
their transport between carrier and passenger, usually, but not
always based on contract. It also
stems from its public law
obligations, and this merely strengthens the contention that a breach
of those duties is wrongful in
the delictual sense and could attract
liability for damages. The reference to "PRASA" in
Mashongwa
was a
reference to the same Defendant in this matter.services. This
duty, in the case of PRASA, arises from the existence
of the
relationship
[21]
Mashongwa
also confirmed,
[2]
that:
'
Safeguarding
the physical well-being of passengers must be a central obligation of
PRASA. It reflects the ordinary duty resting
on public carriers
and is reinforced by the specific constitutional obligation to
protect passengers’ bodily integrity that
rests on PRASA, as an
organ of state.'
[22]
Therefore, there can be no doubt that the Defendant owed the
passengers who made use of its services, including the Plaintiff,
the
legal duty as contended for by the Plaintiff. Next, it has to be
considered whether there was a negligent breach of this duty.
Negligence
and Causation
[23]
The uncontroverted evidence by the Plaintiff was that the door of the
carriage in which he was a passenger remained open while
the train
was moving. His evidence that there were no security personnel on the
train was also not rebutted.
[24]
In
the matter of
Chauke
v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa
,
[3]
with reference to
Transnet
Limited t/a Metrorail and Another v Witter
,
[4]
the court confirmed that a train moving with open doors constitutes
negligence.
[25] A reasonable person
in the position of the Defendant would have foreseen that moving
trains with open doors posed a risk of
harm to its commuters and
would have taken reasonable steps to prevent such harm. On the
evidence in this matter the carriage in
which Plaintiff was conveyed
was moving with an open door thereby exposing Plaintiff to risk of
harm.
[26] While the Plaintiff
also relied on the absence of security personnel as a ground of
negligence, there is no evidence on which
the court can make a
finding that their mere absence amounted to negligence. Further,
there is no evidence on which it can be found
that their presence
would have prevented the incident.
[27] In the
circumstances, a finding of negligence is made. The next question
that arises is whether causation was established between
the
Defendant's negligence and the Plaintiff being pushed or falling from
the moving train. The answer to this question is a very
simple one.
Had the doors of the carriage in which the Plaintiff was conveyed
been closed, Plaintiff would, on the probabilities,
not have been
pushed from or would not have fallen off the moving train.
Wrongfulness
[28]
Having found that there was a negligent omission, it must be
considered whether this omission was wrongful. As a matter of
legal
policy, an omission is wrongful when the legal convictions of the
community regard it as wrongful. The convictions of the
community
must be determined with reference to the norms and values embedded in
our Constitution.
[5]
[29] In
Mashongwa,
it
was held that:
'
The
norms and values derived from the Constitution demand that a
negligent breach of those duties, even by way of omission, should,
absent a suitable non-judicial remedy, attract liability to
compensate injured persons in damages'
[6]
[30]
The court accordingly finds that the omission by the Defendant was
wrongful. The Plaintiff has therefore discharged the onus
of
satisfying all the elements of the delict on which his action is
based.
[31]
For the reason contained in paragraph [12] supra, this court cannot
and may not assess, on Plaintiff's own version, whether
he was
contributory negligent. The provisions of the Apportionment of
Damages Act 34 of 1956 were not triggered.
[32]
The Defendant is therefore liable for one hundred percent of such
damages that the Plaintiff may prove.
R
BARENDSE
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
Appearances
For Plaintiff:
Adv R Liddell
Instructed
by: Laubscher & Hattingh Attorneys
For Defendant:
Adv R Maisela
Instructed
by: Makhubela Attorneys
[1]
Mashongwa
v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa
2016 (3) SA 528
(CC) at para 20.
[2]
At
[26].
[3]
(8394/13)
[2015] ZAGPPHC 1075 (9/12/2015).
[4]
2008
(6) SA 549 (SCA).
[5]
Minister
of Safety and Security v Van
Duivenboden
2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA).
[6]
Mashongwa
at para 26.
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