Case Law[2025] ZAWCHC 590South Africa
Liv Padel (Pty) Ltd and Another v Executive Mayor of Knysna Municipality and Others (2025/242003) [2025] ZAWCHC 590 (18 December 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Western Cape Division)
18 December 2025
Headnotes
Summary:
Judgment
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# South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
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## Liv Padel (Pty) Ltd and Another v Executive Mayor of Knysna Municipality and Others (2025/242003) [2025] ZAWCHC 590 (18 December 2025)
Liv Padel (Pty) Ltd and Another v Executive Mayor of Knysna Municipality and Others (2025/242003) [2025] ZAWCHC 590 (18 December 2025)
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sino date 18 December 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE
DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
JUDGMENT
Not Reportable
Case No: 2025-242003
In the matter between:
LIV
PADEL (PTY)
LTD
First Applicant
PERRY
BRIDGE CITRUS ESTATE (PTY) LTD
Second Applicant
And
THE
EXECUTIVE MAYOR OF KNYSNA MUNICIPALITY
First Respondent
(In his capacity as The
Appeal Authority)
KNYSNA
LOCAL
MUNICIPALITY
Second Respondent
THANDO
CHARLES
MATIKA
Third Respondent
Coram:
DA SILVA SALIE, J
Heard
on
:
17 December 2025
Delivered
on:
18 December 2025
Summary:
Administrative
law — interim interdict — municipal land-use decision —
appeal decision imposing immediate prohibition
on public use —
delayed communication of appeal outcome — urgency —
interim suspension pending review —
non-joinder —
residents as complainants acting through municipality — joinder
assessed contextually with reference
to nature and effect of relief —
balance of convenience — interim relief granted — review
to be instituted within
60 days — each party to pay own costs.
ORDER
1.
The implementation and enforcement of the appeal decision
communicated on 3 December
2025 is suspended, pending the
determination of the review application to be instituted by the
applicants.
2.
The applicants shall institute review proceedings within 60 (sixty)
days of the
date of this order.
3.
Each party shall pay its own costs.
JUDGMENT
DA SILVA SALIE J
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This is an urgent application brought in two parts relating to Padel
Courts situate
in Knysna-Hollow. In Part A, the applicants seek
interim relief suspending the implementation of an appeal decision
taken by the
first respondent, pending the determination of review
proceedings to be instituted under Part B.
[2]
Only Part A serves before this Court. The merits of the review fall
to be determined
in due course.
[3]
The respondents oppose the application on several grounds, including
urgency, non-joinder,
legal standing, the absence of a prima facie
right, lack of irreparable harm, the balance of convenience,
availability of alternative
remedies, and costs.
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
[4]
The first applicant operates padel courts in the Knysna area trading
as Liv Padel-Knysna
Hollow (“the padel courts”) situated
on land owned by the second applicant, pursuant to a lease agreement
concluded
during 2022. The facility has been operational and open to
the public since March 2023. Subsequent to a decision by the
Municipality,
the subject of this application, the padel courts have
been shut since 4 December 2025 to the public.
[5]
The property is zoned “Resort Zone”. Building plans,
including those relating
to the padel courts, were approved in
January 2023.
[6]
During 2023 a limited number of neighbouring residents lodged
complaints, principally
relating to noise and lighting. An
independent acoustic report commissioned during that period concluded
that no disturbing noise
levels were present.
[7]
A consent-use application was accepted by the municipality in April
2024. A planning
report issued in November 2024 supported the
continuation of the use, recommending mitigation measures such as
reduced operating
hours and operational management. Enclosure of the
courts was not recommended.
[8]
Owing to a non-quorate meeting and a request for postponement which
the applicants
believed had been acceded to, the consent-use
application was determined in their absence on 3 December 2024.
[9]
An appeal was lodged. The applicants contend that the appeal decision
was taken on
27 November 2025. However, the notice provided to the
applicants records that the decision was concluded on 15 August 2025.
The
appeal outcome was only communicated to the applicants on 3
December 2025, approximately 110 days later, notwithstanding a
statutory
obligation to notify the outcome of the appeal within 21
days.
[10]
The appeal outcome upheld a requirement that the padel courts be
enclosed within six months and,
for the first time, imposed an
immediate prohibition on public use pending enclosure, limiting
access to resort residents only
and restricting floodlighting.
The resort residents make up about 5% of the padel court’s
revenue.
[11]
The applicants wish to have the interim decision suspended pending
the outcome of the review
of the enclosure decision in due course.
In terms of the respondent’s decision, the first applicant is
permitted to
continue to operate the padel courts for guests of the
Knysna Hollow but not for the public. The Knysna Hollow is
small,
and the first applicant will not survive if its business is
limited to those guests which only account for a small portion of its
revenue.
THE
RELIEF SOUGHT IN PART A
[12]
At this stage, the applicants do not seek to set aside the appeal
outcome. They seek the interim
suspension of its immediate
implementation, contending that enforcement would cause irreparable
harm and render the contemplated
review nugatory.
URGENCY
[13]
Where the immediate implementation of an administrative decision
threatens to cause irreversible
consequences before its lawfulness
can be tested, urgency is established (
Luna Meubel
Vervaardigers (Edms) Bpk v Makin and Another
1977 (4) SA 135
(W)
at 137F–G). In this matter, the operative alleged
prejudice arose once the appeal outcome was communicated on 3
December
2025 and implemented immediately at the commencement of the
festive season. The applicants were required to shut down public
operations,
with the consequence that bookings already made had to be
cancelled and reimbursed, giving rise to immediate and tangible
prejudice.
[14]
The applicants acted promptly thereafter in the launch of this
application. It is submitted that
the matter is urgent as substantial
and meaningful redress in due course would not be available and
without the anticipated revenue,
they would suffer financial loss to
the extent that liquidation is inevitable and employees of the padel
courts would lose their
jobs. I pause to add that the
applicants no longer seek relief against the third respondent.
[15]
The matter was accordingly urgent.
NON-JOINDER
[16]
The respondents contend that the application is fatally defective by
reason of the non-joinder
of residents who lodged complaints with the
municipality.
[17]
The principle is trite that a party must be joined where it has a
direct and substantial interest
in the order which the Court may
grant.
[18]
However, the rule relating to joinder is not mechanical. Whether
non-joinder is fatal must be
assessed contextually, with reference to
the nature and effect of the relief sought.
[19]
In
Bester NO v Mirror Trading International (Pty) Ltd
2024 (1)
SA 112
(WCC)
paras 22–25, this Court reaffirmed that a
practical and common-sense approach must prevail.
[20]
The relief sought in Part A is interim in nature. It does not finally
determine any land-use
rights, nor does it confer or extinguish
rights held by residents.
[21]
The residents are not decision-makers. Their role was that of
complainants invoking municipal
oversight. Their concerns were
ventilated within the administrative process and are relied upon by
the respondents in opposition.
[22]
The municipality, as the repository of the public power exercised, is
cited and properly before
this Court.
[23]
To require the joinder of all affected residents in these
circumstances would elevate form over
substance and would be
impractical. Even if joinder were desirable, it would not be just to
non-suit the applicants (
Marais v Pongola Sugar Milling Co Ltd
1961 (2) SA 698
(N)
at 702F).
[24]
The non-joinder objection cannot be sustained.
LOCUS
STANDI:
[25]
The respondents further contend that the first applicant lacks
standing to seek the relief claimed
on the basis that it was not the
formal applicant in the consent-use or appeal process. The
submission is however misconceived.
Legal standing does not
depend on whether a party initiated the underlying administrative
application but on whether it has a direct
and substantial interest
in the relief sought and is adversely affected by the decision in
issue. The first applicant is
the operator of the padel
facility. It is the entity that conducts the business,
contracts with members of the public, employs
staff and bears the
immediate consequences of the appeal decision, including the shutdown
of operations and the cancellation and
reimbursement of bookings.
[26]
The appeal outcome has direct and immediate operative effect on the
first applicant’s existing
activities. That is sufficient to
confer standing to seek interim relief pendente lite.
[27]
The second applicant is the owner of the property on which the padel
facility is situated and
the lessor under a subsisting lease.
The impugned decision directly affects the use of its property and
the viability of
the lease arrangement.
[28]
A landowner whose property use is curtailed by an administrative
decision has a direct and substantial
interest in seeking relief.
The second applicant’s interest in neither remote or indirect.
A party whose proprietary
or operational interests are directly
affected by an administrative decision is not deprived of standing
merely because another
entity initiated the planning application.
I am satisfied that it is sufficient that an applicant demonstrates a
prima facie
right deserving of protection and a material interest in
preventing irreparable harm pending review.
SUBSIDIARITY
AND SECTION 33
[29]
The respondents contend that reliance on section 33 of the
Constitution impermissibly bypasses
PAJA.
[30]
The submission misconceives the nature of Part A. The interim relief
sought is ancillary to,
and in support of, review proceedings to be
brought under PAJA. The principle of subsidiarity does not
preclude interim judicial
intervention where immediate implementation
may render review relief academic or moot.
[31]
In relation to this submission counsel for the respondents herein
relied on
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of
Environmental Affairs
[2004] ZACC 15
;
2004 (4) SA 490
(CC),
however,
this authority concerns the source of review rights, not the
availability of interim protection as sought herein.
REQUIREMENTS
FOR INTERIM RELIEF
Prima
Facie Right
[32]
An applicant must establish a prima facie right, though open to some
doubt (
Setlogelo v Setlogelo
1914 AD 221
at 227).
[33]
The applicants do not assert an unqualified right
to operate free of regulation. They assert a right to
lawful and
procedurally fair administrative action and to have a review
determined before irreversible consequences ensue.
[34]
Whilst I agree with counsel for the respondents herein that the
prospects of the review do not
come in to question in this
application, I am however satisfied that a serious, non-frivolous
challenge has been demonstrated.
This suffices at the interim stage
(
OUTA v SANRAL
2013 (4) SA 639
(CC)
).
Irreparable
Harm
[35]
The test is whether there is a reasonable apprehension of harm not
capable of adequate later
remedy.
[36]
The immediate restriction of public operations during a finite peak
period cannot later be reconstructed.
Lost opportunities and
disruption to contractual and employment relationships are not
readily quantifiable. It was argued for the
respondents that the
applicants' reliance of loss of revenue over this period; inevitable
consequent liquidation; that employees
would have to be dismissed
from their employment; and similar other grounds are not supported by
financial statements, bank statements
or confirmatory affidavits and
thus the Court cannot accept their contention of irreparable harm. I
am not persuaded that absent
these supporting documents, the
applicants must fail in their illustration of irreparable harm. I am
satisfied that the festive
season, especially in the Knysna area
known for festive goers and tourists, is a revenue generating season
for a business such
as this type of leisure activities.
[37]
The apprehension of irreparable harm is thus established.
Balance
of Convenience
[38]
The residents’ interests are legitimate and were considered
administratively. However,
the Court is not required in Part A to
determine whether those interests ultimately justify the impugned
condition.
[39]
Whilst the respondents retain regulatory powers, the applicants face
immediate and irreversible
prejudice absent interim relief. I
am mindful of the fact that there was a delay in the issue of the
notice, some 110 days
later. Even if this time period is
challenged as it is by the respondents in that they contend it was
concluded on 27 November
2025, the timing as well as framing of the
notice is pertinent. The notice requires the padel courts to be
enclosed immediately
(the interim decision). At the time of the
notice (3 December 2025), the enclosure could not be constructed
immediately given
the close of business in the building industry and
the municipal offices itself to approve the enclosure structure.
The notice
was thus an effective and immediate shut down of the
business as opposed to affording the applicants an opportunity to
install
the enclosures. It is also significant a fact that the
initial decision, the enclosure decision, which was appealed against,
afforded the applicants time to enclose the padel courts, whilst the
outcome of the appeal against it was in practical terms substantially
different. The decision stemming from the appeal amounts to an
effective shut down.
[40]
In assessing the balance of convenience, it is material that the
applicants have operated the
padel facility in its present form since
March 2023. The interim relief sought from this Court does not
introduce a new state of
affairs or situation but preserves the
position that has prevailed for a substantial period pending the
determination of the review.
Alternative
Remedy
[41]
The submission advanced on behalf of the respondents that the
applicants ought instead to have
pursued an urgent review as an
alternative remedy is misplaced. I agree with counsel for the
applicants that an urgent review would,
by its very nature, require
substantially more preparation, a fuller record, and the compilation
of extensive papers. To suggest
this as an effective alternative at
this stage is to overlook the very purpose of the interim relief
sought, namely, to preserve
the status quo and prevent irreparable
prejudice pending the proper ventilation of the review. The existence
of a more onerous
and time-consuming process does not constitute an
adequate alternative remedy in circumstances where immediate
implementation threatens
to render the review academic.
CONCLUSION:
PART A
[42]
The applicants have established all the requirements for interim
relief pendente lite.
[43]
The relief sought is limited and does not pre-empt the determination
of the review process contemplated
in Part B.
COSTS
[44]
The applicants have succeeded in obtaining interim relief in Part A.
The question of costs nonetheless
remains one for the discretion of
the Court, to be exercised judicially upon a consideration of all the
relevant circumstances.
[45]
The ordinary principle that costs follow the result is a useful
starting point, but it is not
a rigid rule. It yields where
considerations of fairness, the nature of the proceedings, or the
conduct of the parties justify
a different outcome.
[46]
This application was brought in a public-law context, implicating the
exercise of statutory powers
by a municipality, the interests of
surrounding residents, and the regulation of land use. It raised
issues of urgency, interim
relief pending review, non-joinder,
standing and the balance between competing interests.
[47]
Importantly, the relief granted is interim and preservative in
nature. It does not finally determine
the lawfulness of the appeal
decision, nor does it resolve the substantive rights of the parties.
Those issues remain to be ventilated
in the review proceedings under
Part B.
[48]
The respondents’ opposition, although ultimately unsuccessful,
cannot be characterised
as frivolous, vexatious or unreasonable. The
points raised were genuine, arose within a complex regulatory
framework, and were
advanced in the discharge of public functions.
[49]
Having regard to the nature of the dispute, the interim character of
the relief, and the absence
of conduct on the part of either side
which warrants an adverse costs order, I am satisfied that it
is just and equitable
that each party bear its own costs.
ORDER
[50]
Wherefore I make the following order:
1.
The implementation and enforcement of the appeal decision
communicated on 3 December
2025 is suspended, pending the
determination of the review application to be instituted by the
applicants.
2.
The applicants shall institute review proceedings within 60 (sixty)
days of the
date of this order.
3.
Each party shall pay its own costs.
G.
DA SILVA SALIE
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
WESTERN
CAPE
Appearances
For
Applicant:
Adv. G Rüther
Instructed
by:
Sohn and Associates Attorneys
c/o
Sohn and Wood Attorneys
For
Respondent:
Adv. A Nacerodien
Instructed
by:
Webber Wentzel Attorneys
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