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# South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
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## Zybutz v Body Corporate of Helianthus and Others (17944/23)
[2024] ZAWCHC 233 (2 September 2024)
Zybutz v Body Corporate of Helianthus and Others (17944/23)
[2024] ZAWCHC 233 (2 September 2024)
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sino date 2 September 2024
SAFLII
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Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
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SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
Case
number: 17944/23
In
the matter between:
MICHAEL
DAVID ZYBUTZ
Applicant
and
BODY
CORPORATE OF HELIANTHUS
First
Respondent
LONGITUDE
SECURITIES (PTY) LTD
Second
Respondent
HERSCHEL
PHILIP MAYERS
Third
Respondent
ROBIN
ARTHUR HORNE
Fourth
Respondent
ELIO
SECONDA RITA ROVETTI
Fifth
Respondent
CHARLENE
ETHNE MAYERS
Sixth
Respondent
THE
COMMUNITY SCHEMES
OMBUD
SERVICE
Seventh
Respondent
MNINAWA
BANGILIZWE N.O.
Eighth
Respondent
Corum
: Sidaki, AJ
Heard
on : 3 June 2024
Delivered
on: 2 September 2024
JUDGMENT
Introduction
1.
This is a
statutory appeal against the order of the Adjudicator acting in terms
of the
Community Schemes Ombud Service Act (the
CSOS Act)
[1]
.
2.
An affected
person who is dissatisfied by an adjudicator’s order may appeal
to the High Court, but only on a question of law.
[2]
3.
The appeal is opposed by first, third, fourth,
fifth and sixth
respondents (the respondents). The seventh and eighth respondents
filed a notice to abide.
Background
4.
The
applicant owns a unit in a sectional title residential building,
Helianthus, situated at V[...] Road, C[...], Cape Town. The
first
respondent is the Body Corporate of Helianthus (the body corporate),
a community scheme
[3]
under the
CSOS Act. The second to sixth respondents are owners of the other
units in the scheme. The applicant and second to sixth
respondents
are members of the body corporate. The eighth respondent is the
adjudicator (the Adjudicator) who performs his duties
under the
auspices of the seventh respondent.
5.
In about
2014 the applicant initiated a process to obtain the body corporate’s
approval for alterations involving extensions
and improvements which
he intended to effect to his unit. The alterations would entail
certain layout changes and room extensions,
the execution of which,
it is common cause, would have some effect to the common property.
The Sectional Title Schemes Management
Act (STSMA),
[4]
provides that the body corporate is responsible for the enforcement
of the rules and for the control, administration and management
of
the common property for the benefit of all owners.
[5]
6.
The body corporate gave consent for the applicant
to seek municipal
approval for any departures required from existing land use
restrictions.
7.
During
2015, the City of Cape Town (the City) granted the departures sought
in order to effect the alterations, subject to the passing
of any
related building plan application in terms of the National Building
Regulations and Building Standards Act
[6]
.
8.
The applicant has over time presented several
building plans of the
intended alterations to meetings of the body corporate for approval.
It is out of this process that sharp
disagreements have arisen
between the applicant and certain members of the body corporate.
9.
In 2018,
the applicant filed a complaint with the Community Schemes Ombud
Service (the Ombud Service),
[7]
alleging that members of the body corporate had unreasonably refused
to grant consent to his proposed building plans. That complaint
was
dismissed. The applicant appealed to the High Court.
[8]
The outcome of those court proceedings was a remittance of the matter
to the body corporate for a consideration of the alterations
sought
by the applicant.
[9]
10.
Further engagements took place between the parties. Various
members
of the body corporate demanded modifications to the applicant's
building plans that would suit their personal preferences.
In 2021,
the applicant effected several changes to the building plans aimed at
accommodating the diverse interests. The applicant
obtained the
City’s approval of the amended building plans, which he then
took to the body corporate for its approval.
11.
The STSMA
provides that in addition to the body corporate’s main
functions and powers under sections 3 and 4, the body corporate
must,
on application by an owner and upon special resolution by the owners,
approve the extension of boundaries or floor area of
a section in
terms of the Sectional Titles Act (Sectional Titles Act)
[10]
.
[11]
12.
At the meeting held on 7 December 2021, the majority of the
members
of the body corporate voted against the applicant’s proposed
special resolution to adopt the building plans already
approved by
the City. On this occasion, various further concerns about the shape
and form of certain other aspects of the proposed
extensions were
cited. Several further engagements ensued between the parties
concerning adjustments that would satisfy each of
the other owners.
Throughout this process the applicant incurred substantial additional
costs for services of the engineer, architect
and other related
professionals.
13.
In 2022, a written settlement agreement to resolve the issues
between
the applicant and the fifth respondent was reached. In terms thereof,
the applicant undertook to pay for further works
to be especially
undertaken by a waterproofing contractor to be appointed by the fifth
respondent and to furnish a structural engineer’s
report
endorsing the structural integrity of proposed extensions. This
settlement agreement was conditional upon the body corporate’s
special resolution approving all the elements of the building plans.
14.
The matter returned to a special general meeting held on 17
February
2023, where there was mixed reaction to certain elements of the
modified building plans. Not all the alterations sought
were
approved.
15.
An owner
who is unable to obtain a special or unanimous resolution may
approach the chief ombud for relief.
[12]
Chief ombud is as defined in section 1 of the CSOS Act.
16.
Aggrieved by the body corporate’s failure to reach consensus
on
the full set of the proposed extensions, the applicant, once again,
on 31 May 2023, lodged an application with the Ombud Service,
alleging that members of the body corporate had, for various reasons,
acted unreasonably in refusing to pass the remaining special
resolutions.
Inter alia
, the applicant asserted that:
16.1.
There had been an unreasonable refusal by a meeting of the body
corporate to pass all
the necessary resolutions for the proposed
building plans;
16.2.
The body corporate had in the past approved a similar type of
extensions sought by other
of its members and that the refusal in
this instance was indicative of the body corporate’s
inconsistency in dealing with
such matters.
16.3.
Some of the concerns put forward for refusing the outstanding special
resolutions were
unjustifiable.
16.4.
Concerns raised by one particular member of the body corporate were
not
bona fide
.
16.5.
Certain members of the body corporate sought deliberately to
frustrate the applicant’s
plans for alterations to his unit.
16.6.
Members of the body corporate had violated section 5(1)(h) of STSMA
by declining to approve
building plans which had already been
approved by the City. According to the applicant, this provision did
not give members of
the body corporate any discretion in approving
the special resolutions sought.
17.
The relief sought from the Adjudicator was in terms of section
39(4)(d) of the CSOS Act, which provides:
“
39. An
application made in terms of section 38 must include one or more of
the following…
(4) In respect of
meetings-
(d) an order declaring
that a motion for resolution considered by a general meeting of the
association was not passed because the
opposition to the motion was
unreasonable under the circumstances, and giving effect to the motion
as was originally proposed,
or a variation of the motion proposed.”
18.
Having considered the matter, the Adjudicator issued an order
dated
11 September 2023, dismissing the application and stating the
following:
“
6.33 It is the
Adjudicator’s considered opinion that this application should
rather be directed to the Chief Ombud and dealt
with in terms of a
section 6(9) application. In this regard the applicant ought to lodge
an application with the Ombud in terms
of section 6(9) of the STSMA.”
19.
Thus, the Adjudicator dismissed the application on the basis
of a
lack of jurisdiction.
20.
On 18 October 2023, the applicant instituted this appeal against
the
Adjudicator’s order, citing jurisdiction as one of the grounds
of appeal involving an error of law.
Issues
for determination
21.
The underlying cause or main basis upon which the Adjudicator’s
decision is premised is one of a lack of jurisdiction. That is indeed
the main point taken by the respondents in defending the
Adjudicator’s finding.
22.
Mr Morrissey, for the applicant, contended in argument that
the
Adjudicator made errors of law, firstly, by failing to apply the
reasonableness requirement in the assessment of the application
lodged under section 38 read with section 39(4)(d) of the CSOS Act
and, secondly, by interpreting section 6(9) of the STSMA in
a manner
which ousted the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction to determine the
application before him. He stressed that the matter
involved the
required standards for proper exercise of governance, conduct of
meetings and application of reasonableness in the
decision-making
process of body corporates.
23.
The respondents set out in the heads of argument that the Adjudicator
“…
did in fact find that he lacked jurisdiction to
entertain the application, on the ground that the relief sought by
the applicant
fell within the ambit of section 6(9) of the STSMA
”.
Further, “
It is submitted… the applicant’s
application did not fall within the ambit of sections 38 and 39 of
the CSOS Act and
accordingly that the eighth respondent lacked the
jurisdiction necessary to determine the application. It is submitted
further
and in any event that the eighth respondent was correct in
finding that the course for the applicant to follow would have been
under section 6(9) of the STSMA Act
”.
24.
Mr Sievers SC, for the respondents, contended in argument that
the
Adjudicator lacks jurisdiction to entertain an application under
section 38 of the CSOS Act. I understood the argument to be
that
there is a distinction between the types of applications to be
resolved by the Chief Ombud and those that can be resolved
by an
Adjudicator. In this case, as further contended, the applicant ought
instead to have approached the Chief Ombud for relief,
described as a
different person who would apply a different procedure and a
different test to the complaint.
25.
The Adjudicator’s finding on jurisdiction raises the
question
as to whether a correct legal interpretation was applied when
determining the pathway through which an application to
the Ombud
Service may be instituted.
26.
It is accordingly necessary to first address this antecedent
question
of jurisdiction as its resolution may be determinative of the outcome
of this appeal.
Legislative
framework
27.
The STSMA provides,
inter alia
, for the establishment of
bodies corporate to manage and regulate sections and common property
in sectional titles schemes and
to apply rules applicable to such
schemes.
28.
The CSOS Act, on the other hand, provides,
inter alia
, for the
establishment of the Community Schemes Ombud Service; the mandate and
functions of the Ombud Service; for a dispute resolution
mechanism in
community schemes.
29.
As I see it, sectional titles schemes which are regulated by
the
STSMA fall within the definition of community schemes in the CSOS
Act. For purposes of dispute resolutions, the two pieces
of
legislation must be read together.
30.
The Chief
Ombud as the head of the administration of the Ombud Service,
inter
alia
,
manages the affairs of the Service.
[13]
Any of the powers and responsibilities of the Chief Ombud may be
delegated to an employee. The Ombud Service employees include
the
Chief Ombud, who designates an Ombud and Deputy Ombud for each
regional office, as well as full-time and part-time Adjudicators.
[14]
31.
Any person
may submit an application to the Ombud Service if such person is a
party to, or materially affected by a dispute.
[15]
A dispute means a dispute in regard to the administration of a
community scheme between persons who have a material interest in
that
scheme, of which one of the parties is the association, occupier or
owner, acting individually or jointly.
[16]
32.
An
application referred to in section 38(1) of the CSOS Act must be made
by submission of an application by physical delivery or
electronically, in accordance with the practice directive issued by
the Chief Ombud.
[17]
33.
In terms of
the Practice Directive on Dispute Resolution issued by the Chief
Ombud (Practice Directive)
[18]
,
its objective is to provide information on the procedures and content
requirements for dispute resolution applications lodged
with the
Ombud Service.
34.
The
Practice Directive’s scope of application is in regard to all
applications for dispute resolution in CSOS. In order to
determine
whether a dispute should be referred directly for adjudication, the
Ombud will consider the following factors,
inter
alia
,
if it relates to governance issues, meetings, a declaration
invalidating a scheme rule and termination of a managing agent’s
contract.
[19]
35.
The word ‘Ombud’ is defined in the Practice Directive:
“
means the Chief Ombud and/or regional Ombud appointed in
terms of the CSOS Act.
”
36.
The CSOS Act, the STSMA and the Sectional Titles Act are listed
as
some of the ‘pieces of legislation’ which ‘govern’
the Practice Directive on dispute resolution.
Discussion
37.
The
Constitutional Court
[20]
has
approved the definition of the term ‘jurisdiction’ given
by Watermeyer CJ in
Graaf-Reinet
Municipality
[21]
as
follows:
“
Jurisdiction
means the power or competence of a Court to hear and determine an
issue between parties.”
38.
Pollak
The South African Law of Jurisdiction
[22]
refers
to the following more comprehensive definition in
Wright
:
[23]
“
[A]
lawful power to decide something in a case, or to adjudicate upon a
case, and to give effect to the judgment, that is, to have
the power
to compel the person condemned to make satisfaction.”
39.
In the present matter, jurisdiction would entail the power
or
competence of the Ombud Service under the CSOS Act to hear and
determine the issues between parties as set out in the application
for dispute resolution to the Ombud Service.
40.
The finding by the Adjudicator has two dimensions to it.
41.
The Adjudicator initially expressed an opinion that the applicant
had
failed to prove on a balance of probability that the decision of the
owners sitting as the body corporate to reject the special
resolution
was unreasonable. The Adjudicator is criticised for having only
considered procedural fairness aspects without looking
at the
substance of the issues that were brought before him. I agree.
42.
It is unclear in the Adjudicator’s finding how the
‘reasonableness’
factor of the decision of the body
corporate was evaluated. It seems to me that this exercise still
needs to be carried out. The
Adjudicator merely expressed a general
sense of satisfaction that the owners had applied their minds without
pertinently engaging
with the nub of the applicant’s complaint.
At the core of the complaint is the inconsistency of the body
corporate’s
decision-making process, a lack of
bona fides
in respect to at least one of the owners sitting on the body
corporate, etc.
43.
An
Adjudicator’s evaluation of reasonableness of the impugned
decision of the body corporate should entail assessing factors
such
as the nature of the decision, the identity and expertise of the
decision-maker, the range of factors relevant to the decision,
the
reasons given for the decision, the nature of the competing interests
involved and the impact of the decision on the lives
and well-being
of those affected.
[24]
In this
case, whilst, on the one hand, the Adjudicator acknowledged, at para
6.22 of the ruling, the minimal effect of the applicant’s
proposed changes to the other owners, on the other hand, this
important factor does not appear to have been appropriately weighed
or explored further in the analysis of the evidence before the
Adjudicator.
44.
The Adjudicator made a definitive finding that he lacked jurisdiction
to entertain this particular application because it had been brought
in terms of section 38 of the CSOS Act and, on that basis,
found that
the “
application should rather be directed to the Chief
Ombud and dealt with in terms of a section 6(9) application. In this
regard the
applicant ought to lodge an application with the Ombud in
terms of section 6(9) of the STSMA.
”
45.
There does not appear to be any mechanism for lodgement of
applications with the Chief Ombud or Ombud Service other than the
procedure that is prescribed in Chapter 3 of the CSOS Act. The
STSMA
points to the CSOS Act for the definitions of the Chief Ombud and
Ombud. And, as I have pointed out above, the Practice Directive
defines Ombud and meaning the Chief Ombud and/or regional Ombud
appointed in terms of the CSOS Act.
46.
In this
case, the Adjudicator ought first to have established whether the
applicant and the body corporate were parties to a dispute
involving
the administration of a community scheme, as envisaged in the CSOS
Act.
[25]
This is clearly the
case.
47.
The next step would involve determining the process though
which a
party aggrieved by the conduct of the meetings of the body corporate
may approach the Chief Ombud for relief. Section 6(9)
of the STSMA is
a non-prescriptive provision which merely alerts a dissatisfied party
to a recourse available to them in the event
they are unable to
obtain a special or unanimous resolution.
48.
The CSOS Act created Ombud Service appears to be the only alternative
dispute resolution body designed to resolve disputes involving all
types of community schemes including sectional title schemes
and
home-owners associations.
49.
Thus, the pathway through which to approach the Chief Ombud
for the
relief foreshadowed in section 6(9) of the STSMA, would require
following the mechanism prescribed in Chapter 3 of the
CSOAS Act.
50.
Such would be following an unduly strained interpretation of
the
language used by the legislature when one considers the architecture
of the applicable legislation.
51.
There is one dispute resolution office, headed by the Chief
Ombud who
is assisted by the regional Ombuds and Adjudicators, which
administers all the disputes arising from community schemes.
52.
The Adjudicator’s ruling makes mention in its introduction
that
the application under consideration was made in the prescribed form
to the Ombud Service in terms of section 38 read with
section 39 of
the CSOS Act. The application underwent the prescribed screening
process, came before the Ombud who, in the exercise
of his
discretion, accepted the application and referred the dispute
directly for adjudication before an adjudicator in accordance
with
section 48 of the CSOS Act, read with the Practice Directive.
53.
Had the
Ombud Service lacked jurisdiction to hear such an application, the
Ombud would likely have rejected the application at screening
stage,
[26]
and not referred it
for adjudication.
Conclusion
54.
Accordingly, I am satisfied that the Adjudicator misdirected
himself
materially on a question of law in dismissing the application before
him for a lack of jurisdiction.
55.
The proper course now is to remit the matter to the Ombud Service
to
decide the merits of the application. Given the views expressed by
the Adjudicator who heard this matter, as I have discussed,
prudence
dictates that the merits should be heard by a different staff member
of the Ombud Service to be assigned by the Ombud.
56.
The parties were agreed that costs should follow the result
in this
Court and that the nature of the matter was such that such costs be
pegged on the “C” scale.
Order
57.
The appeal is upheld.
58.
The order of the Adjudicator refusing the application is set
aside.
59.
The applicant’s application in terms of section 39(4)(d)
of the
CSOS Act is remitted to the Community Schemes Ombud Service for
hearing before a different staff member of the Ombud Service
in order
to determine the merits of the application.
60.
The first, third, fourth, fifth and sixth respondents shall
be
jointly and severally liable for the applicant’s costs of suit,
on the “C” scale.
T.S.
SIDAKI
Acting
Judge of the High Court
Appearances:
For
Applicant
:
Adv. Andrew Morrissey
Instructed
by
: BBP
Law attorneys
For
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth
Respondents
:
Adv. Fred Sievers SC
Instructed
by
:
Smith Tabata Buchanan Boyes
For
Second, Seven, Eight
Respondents
: No
appearances
[1]
Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011.
[2]
Section 57(1) of the CSOS Act.
[3]
Section 1 of the CSOS Act defines ‘community scheme’:
“
means
any scheme or arrangement in terms of which there is shared use of
and responsibility for parts of land and buildings, including
but
not limited to a sectional titles development scheme, a share block
company, a home or property owner’s association,
however
constituted, established to administer a property development, a
housing scheme for retired persons, and a housing co-operative
as
contemplated in the South African Co-operatives Act, 2005 (Act No.
14 of 2005) and ‘scheme’ has the same meaning.”
[4]
Sectional Title Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011.
[5]
Section 2(5) of the STSMA.
[6]
National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of
1977.
[7]
‘Service’ is defined in section 1 of the CSOS Act as,
“means the Community Schemes Ombud Service established
by
section 3”.
[8]
In the Western Cape Division, under Case No: 13079/2018.
[9]
Judgment
delivered on 27 November 2019.
[10]
Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986
.
[11]
Section 5(1)(h)
of the STSMA.
[12]
Section 6(9)
of STSMA.
[13]
Section 18 of the CSOS Act.
[14]
Section 21 of the CSOS Act.
[15]
Section 38(1) of the CSOS Act.
[16]
Section 1 of the CSOS Act.
[17]
See Regulation 19(1) of the Regulations on the Community Schemes
Ombud Service.
[18]
Practice Directive on Dispute Resolution No:1 of 2019, signed by the
Acting Chief Ombud, dated 1 August 2019.
[19]
Section 21.5.6 of the Practice Directive.
[20]
Gcaba v
Minister for Safety and Security
2010
(1) SA 238
(CC) at para 74.
[21]
Graaff-Reinet
Municipality v Van Ryneveld’s Pass Irrigation Board
1950
(2)SA 420 (A) at 424.
[22]
DE Van Loggerenberg
Pollak
The South African Law of Jurisdiction
(Juta
3
rd
Ed) p 2 [service 7, 2022].
[23]
Wright
v Stuttaford & Co
1929
EDL 10
at 42, referring to the definition adopted in Vromans
De
Foro Competenti
and
approved in
Spendiff
NO v Kolektor (Pty) Ltd
[1992] ZASCA 18
;
1992
(2) SA 537
(A) at 551 C-D.
[24]
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism and Others
[2004] ZACC 15
;
2004 (4) SA 490
(CC);
2004 (7) BCLR 687
(CC) at
para 45.
[25]
A Community Scheme is any scheme or arrangement where there is
shared use of and responsibility for parts of land and buildings,
including but not limited to a sectional titles development scheme,
a share block company, a home or property owner’s association,
a housing scheme for retired persons, and a housing co-operative.
[26]
See section 42 of the CSOS Act.
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