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# South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
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[2023] ZAWCHC 78
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## Forty Squares (Pty) Ltd and Another v Noris Fresh Produce (Pty) Ltd t/a Golden Harvest and Others (4200/2023)
[2023] ZAWCHC 78;
2023 (5) SA 249 (WCC) (20 April 2023)
Forty Squares (Pty) Ltd and Another v Noris Fresh Produce (Pty) Ltd t/a Golden Harvest and Others (4200/2023)
[2023] ZAWCHC 78;
2023 (5) SA 249 (WCC) (20 April 2023)
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sino date 20 April 2023
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
FLYNOTES:
LIQUIDATION AND BUSINESS RESCUE
BUSINESS
RESCUE – Application – Liquidation proceedings –
Plan would not be adopted by creditors –
Liquidators having
cancelled leases – Substantial liabilities – Workforce
depleted and reputation damaged such
that unlikely to get credit
from suppliers – Three years for the plan extraordinarily
long – Haste in bringing
application suggests it was not
bona fide – Business rescue application dismissed –
Companies Act 71 of 2008
,
s 131.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
WESTERN CAPE DIVISION,
CAPE TOWN
REPORTABLE
CASE NO: 4200/2023
In
the matter between:
FORTY
SQUARES (PTY) LTD
First
Applicant
THE
EMPLOYEES LISTED IN SCHEDULE “A”
Second
Applicant
and
NORIS
FRESH PRODUCE (PTY) LTD
First
Respondent
t/a GOLDEN HARVEST (in
final liquidation)
Registration number
1[...]
Registered
address:
1[…] C[...] Avenue,
Epping
1, Cape Town
JOHAN
KRYNAUW
N.O.
Second
Respondent
In his capacity as
provisional liquidator
of the First Respondent
THE
COMPANIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Third
Respondent
COMMISSION OF SOUTH
AFRICA
THE
SOUTH AFRICAN REVENUE SERVICE
Fourth
Respondent
THE
CREDITORS LISTED IN SCHEDULE “B”
Fifth
Respondent
THE
EMPLOYEES LISTED IN SCHEDULE “C”
Sixth
Respondent
CAPESPAN
(PTY) LTD
Seventh
Respondent
BRIAN
LULAMILE MBOLEKWA N.O.
Eighth
Respondent
In his capacity as joint
provisional liquidator
of the First Respondent
ERF
3459 GEORGE (PTY)
LTD
Intervening
Creditor
Bench: P.A.L. Gamble, J
Heard: Tuesday 11 April
2023
Delivered: Thursday 20
April 2023
This judgment was handed
down electronically by circulation to the parties' representatives
via email and release to SAFLII. The
date and time for hand-down is
deemed to be 10h00 on Thursday 20 April 2023.
JUDGMENT
GAMBLE, J:
INTRODUCTION
1.
The first respondent (“Golden
Harvest” or “the company”, where convenient)
formerly operated a large wholesale
fruit distribution business at
premises in Cape Town and Johannesburg. Its business model involved
the delivery of produce to its
premises by suppliers where the fruit
was stored and ripened prior to the onward transmission to its
purchasers. The staff compliment
of Golden Harvest in its heyday was
of the order of 180 employees.
2.
The shares in a Golden Harvest are held by
the first applicant (“Forty Squares”) whose shareholding
in turn is held
by two family trusts, each respectively under the
control of Messers Faiek and Jasseen Davids (no relation). For the
sake of convenience,
and to avoid any confusion, they will be
referred to as “Faiek” and “Jasseen” where
necessary. Faiek and
Jasseen are both directors of Golden Harvest and
intimately involved in the running of the business. To be sure they
are to be
regarded as the guiding minds of Golden Harvest.
3.
The Davids’ family trusts’
interests in Forty Squares were acquired in mid-2020 from three other
family trusts, each
controlled by persons involved in the business of
Golden Harvest since its inception in 1993. One such trust was the
S Voyatjes
Family Trust which is controlled by Mr. Stelios
Voyatjes, a former director of Golden Harvest. The other former
directors were
Mr. Basilis Apostolellis, who controlled the E
Apostolellis Family Trust and Mr. Peter Dimatellis, who controlled
the E Dimatellis
Family Trust. These three persons are also the
directors of Erf 3459 George (Pty) Ltd (“Erfco”), which
is an intervening
creditor in this matter.
THE WINDING-UP
4.
Early in 2022 the business of Golden
Harvest ran into financial difficulties. As a consequence of, inter
alia, a cash flow crisis,
it defaulted on payments to suppliers and
generally gave its creditors the runaround. Eventually, on 9 December
2022 one of Golden
Harvest’s disgruntled suppliers, the seventh
respondent herein, Capespan South Africa (Pty) Ltd (“Capespan”),
which was owed some R1,4m, lodged an application in this Division for
the provisional winding up of Golden Harvest under case number
20961/22. The matter was to be heard urgently the following week, on
Thursday, 15 December 2022, which was during court recess.
5.
The
application was served on Jasseen personally (so says the return of
service of the Sheriff) at 12h02 on 9 December 2022 at the
company’s
premises at 1[…] C[...] Avenue, Epping 1, Cape Town
[1]
.
There was no opposition on 15 December 2022 and accordingly Francis J
granted a provisional order of winding-up returnable on
23 February
2023. On that day, there was no opposition to the winding-up but
counsel for Golden Harvest put in an appearance and
sought a
postponement of the matter ostensibly to prepare an application to
place the company under business rescue. Ndita, J refused
a
postponement and granted a final order of winding-up.
6.
Subsequent to the grant of the provisional
order of winding-up, the second and eighth respondents herein,
Messers Johann Krynauw
and Brian Molekwa, were appointed by The
Master as the provisional liquidators of Golden Harvest. They remain
the provisional liquidators
as the first meeting of creditors has not
yet been convened by The Master but for the sake of convenience I
will refer to them
as “the liquidators”. On 1 March 2023
the liquidators obtained an order extending their powers under
section 386 (5)
of the Companies Act, 61 of 1973 (“the Old
Act”) and on 8 March 2023 they procured an order under sections
417 and
418 of the Old Act to convene a confidential inquiry into the
affairs of the liquidated company.
THE BUSINESS RESCUE
APPLICATION
7.
On 10 March 2023, Forty Squares and certain
of the employees of Golden Harvest lodged the present application
under case number
4200/2023 for an order placing the liquidated
company into business rescue in terms of section 131 of the Companies
Act, 71 of
2008 (“the
Companies Act&rdquo
;). The matter was set
down for hearing on 30 March 2023, again during court recess, and was
heard by this Court in the Fast Lane
of the Motion Court. The papers
required supplementation and the parties needed to prepare full heads
of argument and accordingly
the business rescue application was
postponed for hearing before this Court on the first day of the
second term, Tuesday, 11 April
2023. There is no issue that the
application is urgent and this judgment is delivered against the
background of such urgency. The
right is reserved to amplify the
Court’s reasons later should the need arise.
8.
The business rescue application is formally
opposed by the liquidators and by Erfco which has intervened herein
by virtue of its
interest as a landlord in the winding-up of Golden
Harvest where it says it has claims for arrear rental of at least of
R12,5m
in respect of the company’s premises in Johannesburg and
at C[...] Street in Epping. In Erfco’s affidavit, Mr. Voyatjes
in fact lays claim to a debt by Golden Harvest of more than R44m but
notes that, to the extent that the company may dispute liability
for
part of that debt, the amount of R12,5m is undisputed.
9.
In formally opposing the business rescue
application on behalf of the company, Mr. Krynauw delivered a
comprehensive affidavit which
included affidavits by some other major
creditors who allege that they too have substantial claims against
the company in liquidation.
These include – (i) Golden
Harvest’s bankers, Mercantile Bank, which says it is owed more
than R56m; (ii) Growth Point
Management Services (Pty) Ltd, the
landlord of the Gunners Circle premises which says it is owed almost
R1,1m in arrear rental
and (iii) Capespan with its aforesaid claim of
R1,4m. In addition, Mr. Krynauw notes that the Revenue has a claim
against the company
for unpaid PAYE of some R6,6m. There are also
unpaid municipal bills at the various premises – R2,17m is said
to be due to
the City of Johannesburg and R86 084,35 is due to
the City of Cape Town.
10.
In the list of creditors which is annexed
to the notice of motion herein, the total liabilities of Golden
Harvest are said to be
R136 767 282, 00 but Mr. Krynauw
says the figure is much higher. Not only has the indebtedness to
Erfco been understated
as pointed out above, there is also a
liability to Standard Bank which has not even been included in the
list of creditors to whom
notice has been given. Suffice it to say
that the position of the company in liquidation is dire.
11.
As part of the founding papers herein,
Forty Squares has presented a 51-page business rescue plan (“the
plan”) prepared
by a senior business rescue practitioner
(“BRP”), Mr. Stefan Steyn which it says will save the
business of Golden Harvest.
Shorn of all the fine print, the plan
proposes the introduction of post commencement finance (“PCF”)
under
section 135
of the
Companies Act of R20m
which will be
contributed to the company by Forty Squares, which it in turn will
borrow from two lenders – R15m from Al Baraka
Bank and R5m from
Freshco (“a Namibian customer” seemingly with familial
ties). The plan is proposed to be of 3 years’
duration and will
allegedly give creditors a dividend of 30c in the Rand. Mr. Steyn has
calculated what he considers to be a likely
dividend under winding-up
and has come up with a figure of 7 cents in the Rand.
RESPONSE TO THE PLAN
12.
The plan has been severely criticized by
the liquidators, Erfco, Mercantile Bank, Capespan and Growth Point as
vague (particularly
in respect of the sourcing of the PCF) and
speculative and unworkable as far as its, assumptions, facts and
figures are concerned.
13.
The liquidators point out that upon receipt
of their extended powers under section 386(5) of the Old Act they
cancelled all of the
leases over the properties from which Golden
Harvest traded. They note too that many of the key staff members of
the company had
left before the provisional winding-up order was
granted and that presently the company has no active workforce, its
operations
having ceased upon the granting of the final order. I
mention
en passant
that it is common cause that the Davids’ caused the company to
continue to trade while it was in provisional winding-up without
the
consent of the liquidators or The Master and that it is more than
likely that in so doing it has preferred certain creditors
over
others. Be that as it may, the liquidators and Mr. Voyatjes, who has
an intimate understanding of the business of Golden Harvest,
take the
point that there is really no business to be saved.
14.
But perhaps the most important development
in regard to the plan is that already certain of the major creditors
of Golden Harvest
– Mercantile Bank, Erfco, Capespan and Growth
Point – have stated under oath that they will not support the
plan, either
in its present form or any similar iteration. The
attitude of SARS is not known at this stage but the liquidators say
that it would
be hard to imagine that the Revenue would adopt a
stance different to the other major creditors.
THE APPROACH TO
BUSINESS RESCUE
15.
The
principles applicable to the consideration of a business rescue
application are by now well established. Given the pressing
nature of
this matter now is not the time to embark on a scholarly re-statement
of the law. Suffice it to say that in
Oakdene
Square
[2]
the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) set forth the general
principles to be applied in a matter such as this. With reference
to
the statutory requirement under section 131(4)(a) - that a court must
be satisfied that there is “
a
reasonable prospect of rescuing the company
”
- Brand JA had the following to say.
“
[29]
This leads me to the next debate which revolved around the meaning of
‘a reasonable prospect’. As a starting point,
it is
generally accepted that it is a lesser requirement than the
‘reasonable probability’ which was the yardstick
for
placing a company under judicial management in terms of s 427(1) [of
the Old Act]… On the other hand, I believe it requires
more
than a mere prima facie case or an arguable possibility. Of even
greater significance, I think, is that it must be a reasonable
prospect - with the emphasis on ‘reasonable’ - which
means that it must be a prospect based on reasonable grounds.
A mere
speculative suggestion is not enough. Moreover, because it is the
applicant who seeks to satisfy the court of the prospect,
it must
establish these reasonable grounds in accordance with the rules of
motion proceedings which, generally speaking, require
that it must do
so in its founding papers…
[30]
Self-evidently it will be neither practical nor prudent to be
prescriptive about the way in which the appellant (sic) must
show a
reasonable prospect in every case. Some reported decisions laid down,
however, that the applicant must provide a substantial
measure of
detail about the proposed plan to satisfy this requirement…
But in considering these decisions Van der Merwe
J commented as
follows in
Propspec
[3]
…
‘
I
agree that vague averments and mere speculative suggestions will not
suffice in this regard. There can be no doubt that, in order
to
succeed in an application for business rescue, the applicant must
place before the court a factual foundation for the existence
of a
reasonable prospect that the desired object can be achieved. But with
respect to my colleagues, I believe that they place
the bar too high…
‘
[15]
In my judgment it is not appropriate to attempt to set out general
minimum particulars of what would constitute a reasonable
prospect in
this regard. It also seems to me that to require, as a minimum,
concrete and objectively ascertainable details of the
likely costs of
rendering the company able to commence or resume its business, and
the likely availability of the necessary cash
resource in order to
enable the company to meet its day-to-day expenditure, or concrete
factual details of the source, nature and
extent of the resources
that are likely to be available to the company, as well as the basis
of terms on which such resources will
be available, is tantamount to
requiring proof of a probability, and unjustifiably limits the
availability of business rescue proceedings.’
[31] I agree with these
comments in every respect. Yet, the appellants contended that the bar
should be set even lower than that.
Relying on the reference in s
128(1)(b) to ‘the development and implementation, if approved,
of a plan to rescue the company’
their argument was that the
reasonable prospect for rescuing the company in s 131(4) demands no
more than the reasonable prospect
of a rescue plan. According to this
argument, the applicant for business rescue is therefore not required
to show a reasonable
prospect of achieving one of the goals
contemplated in s 128(1)(b). All the applicant has to show is that a
plan to do so is capable
of being developed and implemented,
regardless of whether or not it may fail. Once it is established that
it is the intention of
the applicant to develop and implement a
rescue plan which has that as its purpose, so the argument went, the
court should grant
the business rescue application even if it is
unconvinced that this will result in the company surviving insolvency
or even achieve
a better return for creditors and shareholders. I do
not agree with this line of argument. As I see it, it is in direct
conflict
with the express wording of s 128(h). According to this
section ‘rescuing the company’ indeed requires the
achievement
of one of the goals in s 128(1)(b). Self-evidently the
development of a plan cannot be a goal in itself. It can only be the
means
to an end. That end, as I see it, must be either to restore the
company to a solvent going concern, or at least to facilitate a
better deal for creditors and shareholders than they would secure
from a liquidation process. I have indicated my agreement with
the
statement in
Propspec
that the applicant is not
required to set out a detailed plan. That can be left to the business
rescue practitioner after proper
investigation in terms of s 141. But
the applicant must establish grounds for the reasonable prospect of
achieving one of the two
goals in s 128(1) (b).”
16.
The approach in
Oakdene
Square
was applied in a situation in
which the distressed company had not yet been finally wound up: the
approach of the applicant in
that matter was an attempt to avert
winding-up by applying for business rescue. It was however clear that
if the business rescue
application failed, the company would be put
into liquidation, and that is what happened in the court
a
quo: business rescue was refused and
the company was wound up. The matter proceeded to the SCA which
dismissed the appeal, thereby
confirming the winding-up order.
17.
Counsel
for the liquidators, Mr. Ferreira, argued that that the present
matter was in a different category in light of the fact
that Golden
Harvest has been finally wound up. Relying on
Richter
[4]
counsel suggested that the bar was now higher and that an applicant
had to show “something more” to clear the hurdle.
18.
Richter
focused on the question whether the business
rescue provisions in the
Companies Act contemplate
a company being
placed into business rescue after a final order of winding-up had
been made. The SCA found that there was nothing
in the Act which
precluded this, particularly since
s7(k)
of the
Companies Act states
that the purpose of business rescue is –
“
to
provide for efficient rescue and recovery of financially distressed
companies in a manner that balances the rights and interests
of all
relevant stakeholders.”
19.
Dambuza AJA observed in this regard
that –
“
[14]
Of significance is the fact that in respect of business rescue the
Act refers to the interests of ‘stakeholders’
in contrast
to the interest of creditors and shareholders which take center stage
in liquidation proceedings. The rights of employees
through trade
unions, as stakeholders, are expressly recognized in the Act. Section
128(1)(a) defines the following as principal
stakeholders and
affected persons who may apply for business rescue in respect of the
company: shareholders, creditors, registered
trade unions
representing employees, and employees not represented by a registered
trade union. Business rescue therefore seeks
to protect interests of
a wider group of persons than liquidation. The role of companies as a
means of achieving economic and social
benefits is given prominence.
[15] It takes little to
imagine instances, developing after the issue of the final order,
that could lead to the circumstances of
the company improving
radically, such that it would become profitable if allowed to trade.
It could be awarded a contract for which
it had earlier tendered or
secure funding for future projects; a major creditor might indicate a
willingness to subordinate its
claim. Accordingly, in the scheme of
things, where, during liquidation, evidence becomes available that
business rescue proceedings
will yield a better return for
shareholders and creditors and jobs will be retained, there could be
no reason to deny business
rescue only because the company is in
final liquidation. Indeed, to allow it to do so would fall into the
very scheme of business
rescue envisaged by the Act and fulfill the
objectives of providing for revival of a financially distressed
company with all its
attendant social benefits.
[16] Counsel for Absa
expressed concern that a liberal interpretation of s131(1) may have
negative results for the liquidation process.
These include
repetitive disruptions and uncertainty that may result from various
affected parties making applications for business
rescue at different
times during the winding-up process, reversion of business control to
the same directors who may have been
the cause of the financial
distress experienced by the company, and the capacity of the company
under final liquidation to conduct
effective business, including
concluding contracts, during the implementation of the rescue plan.
All these concerns are valid
and appeared to have been uppermost in
the mind of [the judge in the court
a quo
] when he considered
the issues. Indeed implementation of the Act may produce some
seemingly awkward results in the initial stages.
However, that does
not justify an unduly restrictive approach in the interpretation of
the provisions of the Act. The simple answer
is that the court can
dismiss any application for business rescue that is not genuine and
bona fide or which does not establish
that the benefits of a
successful business rescue will be achieved.”
20.
As I read
Richter
it does not say anything that goes beyond the approach advocated in
Oakdene Square
:
a court considering business rescue must exercise its discretion
properly with due regard for all the relevant statutory criteria.
What Dambuza AJA does, however, contemplate in para 15 is that the
court must be satisfied that there is a realistic prospect of
the
company being returned to profitably (“improving radically”)
before it will grant the order. This makes sense,
because a court has
already found that it is just and equitable for the insolvent company
to be wound up and in this case, importantly,
it did so without any
objection from shareholders, creditors or employees. One would thus
not want to send a hopelessly insolvent
company with little prospect
of commercial rehabilitation through a process of business rescue
only for its winding-up to be later
resumed after an unnecessary
waste of time and resources to the prejudice of the waiting
creditors.
FACTORS FOR
CONSIDERATION IN THE PRESENT CASE
21.
The loss of continued employment to some
180 workers in this company is tragic in the current financial
climate. One would generally
seek to promote fixed employment rather
than contribute to the staggering unemployment figures which plague
our economy. But that
end can only be achieved if a reasonable case
has been made out by Four Square for Golden Harvest, post
liquidation, to be successfully
returned to its former status as a
solvent going concern.
22.
In my considered view, the facts of this
case demonstrate unequivocally that there are no anticipated
circumstances that will “radically
improve” the prospects
of Golden Harvest being returned to solvency and commercial
viability. On the contrary, the evidence
presented to the Court
points the other way. I shall briefly endeavour to list the most
important factors.
23.
Firstly, in the affidavits filed by the
liquidator and the intervening creditor, the major creditors already
referred to (Mercantile
Bank, Erfco, Growth Point and Capespan) have
all stated that they will not vote in favour of the business plan
placed before the
Court, nor any similar plan. These creditors are,
by value, in the clear majority of the very long list of creditors
attached to
the notice of motion. And, as I have said, one does not
know what the attitude of SARS and Standard Bank is, but, as counsel
said,
it would be surprising to see them go against the firmly
expressed view of the majority.
24.
The significance of this stance by these
creditors is to be found in the provisions of
s152(2)
of the
Companies Act which
deals with a meeting of creditors which must be
convened by the duly appointed BRP within 10 days of such a plan
being put up.
Creditors are called upon by the section to cast a
preliminary vote in favour of such plan.
“
152(2)
In a vote called in terms of subsection (1)(e) the proposed business
rescue plan will be approved on a preliminary basis
if –
(a) it was supported by
the holders of more than 75% of the creditors’ voting interests
that were voted…”
25.
In
Oakdene
Square
[5]
the SCA noted that the creditors’ declared intention to oppose
a business rescue plan had to be taken into account by the
court
considering the application and went on to say that the court was
unlikely to interfere in that decision unless it was unreasonable
and
mala fide. Mr. van Reenen, for Four Square, readily conceded that
Mercantile Bank holds the “swing vote”, so to
say, and
that its opposition alone to the plan was problematic for the
applicant. Counsel was unable to point to any factors suggesting
that
the attitude of Mercantile Bank (which alone is a creditor with 38%
of the company’s debt) and the other major creditors
referred
to above, was unreasonable or mala fide.
26.
In my considered view, this factor alone
renders the application for business rescue very problematic. No
court is going to put
a moribund company through the expectation of
commercial resurrection, with all the concomitant expense and delay,
if the plan
is not going to be adopted by the creditors. And, might I
add, most certainly not where it has already been wound up without
opposition
from the very parties who now seek to achieve that
resurrection.
27.
Secondly, there is the fact that the
liquidators have cancelled all of the company’s leases. It no
longer has any premises
from which to trade either in Cape Town or
Johannesburg. This means that new premises will have to be located,
leases concluded,
deposits put up and rentals paid. Given the poor
trading history of Golden Harvest, it is not difficult to imagine
that prospective
landlords will not easily take on an entity that has
been put into final liquidation as a prospective tenant, let alone to
ask
who is likely to put up the requisite deposit and security (such
as personal suretyships) which any commercially-minded landlord
is
likely to demand.
28.
Thirdly, the evidence establishes that the
company’s workforce was sorely depleted during 2022 and that
many of its top managers
have drifted away over the last year or so
to join more profitable competitors. Moreover, the company ceased
trading on 23 February
2023 and now, almost 2 months later, it has no
employees. Further, as I have said, the company has failed to pay
over to SARS the
PAYE tax which it deducted in respect of its
employees for a protracted period during 2022.
29.
In such circumstances, it is fair to assume
a measure of reluctance on the part of erstwhile employees to resume
working for a company
that has not looked after their tax
obligations. In any event, if there is insufficient PCF funding (as
discussed below) to ensure
the viability of the company going
forward, it would be irresponsible in the extreme to consider
re-employing a workforce which
would not be properly remunerated,
with the prospect of their short-lived employment being terminated
when the creditors vote against
the plan.
30.
Fourthly, the company has suffered severe
reputational damage in the marketplace and is no doubt likely to
experience difficulty
in procuring produce from suppliers who, having
been once burnt, are likely to be twice shy of extending any further
credit to
Golden Harvest in business rescue. In this regard it must
be mentioned that after the provisional order was granted against the
company, its directors permitted it to trade - quite unlawfully - up
until the end of January 2023. The amount paid out over a
period of
approximately six weeks is of the order of R3,5m, payments which fall
to be recovered by the liquidators. To the extent
that such amounts
will be recovered from suppliers and logistics companies with which
the company expects to trade henceforth,
they are unlikely to do
business with Golden Harvest in business rescue.
31.
Fifthly,
there is the issue of the PCF which can allegedly be sourced in the
sum of R20m. It is said that R15m will be put up by
an entity known
as Borroka (Pty) Ltd (which it in turn has borrowed from Al Baraka
Bank) and the balance from Freshco, a fruit
supplier in Namibia with
familial affinity. It appears that Borroka too has some ties with one
of the Davids families. While the
terms upon which these monies are
to be borrowed are described in the founding papers in decidedly
vague detail,
[6]
it is rather
the manifest insufficiency of the amount which is of critical
concern.
32.
Ms. Morgan, on behalf of Erfco, pointed out
that the once the PCF had been put towards payments in respect of
rentals, salaries,
utilities and motor vehicles, there would be very
little money left to properly equip new premises or to procure
produce and on-sell
it to purchasers. Not only that, said counsel,
the repayment of the Mercantile Bank loan would take around 9 years
(excluding interest)
and the repayment of the PCF would be of the
order of 6 years.
33.
I agree that on the plan as presently
proposed, the PCF is not likely to be sufficient to put a company so
very heavily burdened
by debt (at least R167m and with minimal assets
available for realization) back into solvency. In reality, to suggest
that the
company can be saved by the injection of capital amounting
to approximately 12% of the liabilities (and that in circumstances
where
the capital injection must also cover the cost of the business
rescue) has only to be stated for the folly therein to become
apparent.
34.
Sixthly, there is the issue of the proposed
duration of the plan, which the BRP has fixed at 3 years. This is an
extraordinarily
long time given that business rescue is meant to be a
speedy process aimed at a so-called “quick-fix solution”.
In
this regard it is to be noted that
s132(3)
of the
Companies Act
contemplates
the completion of business rescue proceedings within 3
months of commencement, failing which the BRP must approach the court
on
a month-by-month basis for an extension of the process.
35.
Seventhly,
Oakdene
Square
directs the Court to have
regard, not only to the restoration of the company to a going
concern, but also to consider whether business
rescue will offer
creditors a more favourable return than winding-up. In the founding
papers, Jasseen refers to the plan and asserts
that with the PCF
injection, the company will be able to achieve a profit margin of 19%
for the 3-year period of the rescue plan.
This, it is claimed, will
offer creditors a return of 30c in the Rand.
36.
In his affidavit, Mr. Voyatjes explains
that this target is unachievable, pointing out that during the years
that he was with the
company, its profit margin was never more than
12% per annum. Ms. Morgan correctly pointed out that this overly
ambitious projected
return has the effect of skewing the calculation
of the return for creditors in the business plan.
37.
In
the replying affidavit, Jasseen changed tack and said that the model
for the business rescue plan would be to focus on the export
market
where higher returns would more likely be achievable. In essence, the
replying affidavit contemplates a completely restructured
business
model: new premises, a smaller workforce and a new target market. Not
only was that model impermissibly introduced in
reply
[7]
,
thus depriving the parties opposing business rescue the opportunity
of commenting thereon, it had the effect of undermining Mr.
Steyn’s
plan which was based on the extant business model.
38.
Indeed, one might rightfully ask in such
circumstances, why the controllers of Forty Square do not take their
R20m and start up
a new business. Their suggestion in that regard
(that they are passionate about the business of Golden Harvest)
sounds rather hollow,
particularly when they claim that the sellers
of the company had breached certain contractual warranties as to the
profitability
of the company. It may thus well be, as counsel for the
liquidators argued, that the move towards business rescue at this
late
stage of proceedings was for an ulterior purpose viz. to avoid
the consequences of the directors’ personal consequences. But
that point need not be decided definitively here.
39.
Turning to the suggestion by Forty Squares
that the projected return of 7 cents in the Rand set forth in the
plan was unchallenged
by the liquidators and Erfco, it is correct
that there is no direct challenge thereto in the papers. But, as Mr.
Ferreira pointed
out, the liquidators are not in a position at this
stage to give consideration to the extent of any dividend in
liquidation for
the simple reason that there are a number of
important unknowns. For instance, the directors of Golden Harvest
have withheld the
debtors’ book from the liquidators and
further have caused the company to continue to trade during
provisional liquidation,
thus concluding potentially impeachable
transactions.
40.
The result is that the liquidators are as
yet uninformed as to the true extent of the company’s assets
and liabilities. That
being so, any consideration of a final dividend
at this stage would amount to uninformed speculation. The Court is
thus unable
to establish that business rescue holds better prospects
than winding-up for creditors and/or shareholders in the company at
this
stage
41.
Lastly, there is the question of the timing
of the application. The facts show that Golden Harvest was already in
serious financial
trouble early in 2022. Further, Messer Davids had
injected additional capital sums into the company in that year and
still it could
not maintain solvency. Then in December 2022 came the
unopposed application for provisional winding-up and in February
2023, a
final order was granted without any opposition having been
filed. The present application for business rescue came some 2 weeks
later.
42.
In my view, an application for business
rescue was thus warranted earlier during 2022, but certainly at
latest by 9 December 2022
when the papers were served on Jasseen and
the employees at the company’s C[...] Street premises. Yet the
directors did not
follow that avenue then. They rather set about
continuing to trade in contravention of the
Companies Act (thereby
preferring such creditors with whom they traded) and also went about
attempting to reach compromises with a limited number of other
creditors.
43.
The haste with which this application was
ultimately brought suggests that it is not bona fide. That impression
is buttressed by
the manifestly inadequate plan which has been so
roundly condemned by the major creditors of Golden Harvest. In this
regard I can
but only repeat what Dambuza AJA stated above in
Richter
. I
am driven to conclude that this application –
“
Is
not genuine and bona fide… [and in any event]…does not
establish that the benefits of a successful business rescue
will be
achieved.”
COSTS
44.
Counsel for the liquidators and the
intervening creditor both urged for a punitive costs order against
the first applicant in the
event that the application failed. That
submission was premised on the fact that the application was a
deliberate tactic on the
part of Messers Davids to advance a personal
agenda – the delay of the recovery of their prospective
indebtedness under suretyships
put up on behalf of the company, and
to protract the
s417
enquiry at which they are likely to be
interrogated.
45.
While
the submissions regarding costs are not entirely without substance, I
prefer to approach the question of an appropriate order
on the basis
of
Alluvial
Creek
[8]
.
“
An
order is asked for that he pay the costs as between attorney and
client. Now sometimes such an order is given because of something
in
the conduct of the party which the Court considers should be
punished, malice, misleading the court and things like that, but
I
think the order may also be granted without any reflection upon the
party where the proceedings are vexatious, and by vexatious
I mean
where they have the effect of being vexatious, although the intent
may not have been that they should be vexatious. There
are people who
enter into litigation with the most upright purpose and a most firm
belief in the justice of their cause, and yet
whose proceedings may
be regarded as vexatious when they put the other side to unnecessary
trouble and expense which the other
side ought not to bear. That I
think is the position in the present case.”
46.
In this matter the liquidators are obliged
to litigate with funds that have been entrusted to them for the
purposes of discharging
their statutory duties. They have been called
upon to oppose a case which is manifestly without merit. In such
circumstances the
interests of justice demand that they should not
have to bear the attorney and client component of the costs of
litigation with
those monies.
47.
The intervening creditor is in a different
position. It was not cited as a respondent and evidently entered the
lists to shore up
the case in order to make sure that all relevant
facts are placed before the Court and the liquidation proceeding
continue. It
has participated with its own funds and I do not believe
that the issue of being put to the unnecessary expense of litigation
applies
to it. Its costs should be on the ordinary scale.
ORDER OF COURT
In the circumstances the
following order is made:
A.
The business rescue application is
dismissed and the suspension of the liquidation proceedings of the
first respondent is lifted.
B.
The first applicant is to pay the costs of
the first, second and eighth respondents in respect of both the
business rescue application
and the applicants’ postponement
application of 30 March 2023 on the scale as between attorney and
client.
C.
The first applicant and the first
respondent are to pay the costs of the intervening creditor in
respect of both of the aforementioned
applications, jointly and
severally, the one paying the other to be absolved. For the sake of
clarity, it is recorded that these
costs are to be paid on the scale
as between party and party.
D.
Such costs for which the first, second and
eighth respondents may liable will be costs in its liquidation.
GAMBLE,
J
APPEARANCES:
For
the first applicant:
Mr.
D. van Reenen
Instructed
by Lionel Murray Schwormstedt & Louw
Cape
Town
For
the first, second
and
eighth respondents:
Mr.
A Ferreira
Instructed
by Werksmans Attorneys
Cape
Town
For
the intervening creditor:
Ms.
C. Morgan
Instructed
by Messina Inc.
Johannesburg
c/o
Anneke Whelan Attorneys
Cape
Town
[1]
The company also has premises at Gunners Circle in the Epping
industrial area.
[2]
Oakdene
Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and others v Farm Bothasfontein
(Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd and others
2013 94) SA 539 (SCA)
[3]
Propspec
Investments v Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd and another
2013 (1) SA 542
(FB) at [11]
[4]
Richter
v Absa Bank Ltd
2015 (5) SA 57 (SCA)
[5]
At [38]
[6]
The attempt to bolster the evidence in the replying affidavit is to
be ignored as suggested by Brand JA in
Oakdene
Square
at [32].
[7]
Oakdene
Square
ibid
[8]
In
re
Alluvial
Creek, Ltd
1929 CPD 532
at 535. See also
Claase
v Information Officer, South African Airways (Pty) Ltd
2007 (5) SA 469
(SCA) at 475A-B.
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