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# South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
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[2023] ZAWCHC 96
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## Hendricks v Behardien N.O and Others (2872/2019)
[2023] ZAWCHC 96 (26 April 2023)
Hendricks v Behardien N.O and Others (2872/2019)
[2023] ZAWCHC 96 (26 April 2023)
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sino date 26 April 2023
OFFICE
OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE
CASE
NO: 2872/2019
In
the matter between:
ZUBEIDA
HENDRICKS Plaintiff
and
GADIJA
BEHARDIEN NO and two others Defendants
## JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON
THIS 26THDAY OF
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON
THIS 26
TH
DAY OF
## APRIL 2023
APRIL 2023
1.
This is a dispute between mother-in-law and
daughter-in-law. The plaintiff, Mrs Hendricks (“
Hendricks
”)
issued summons on 22 September 2019. The defendant, Ms Behardien
(“
Behardien
”)
is cited in her capacity as executrix of the estate of her late
husband, Mr Hendricks – who was the son of Hendricks.
I shall
refer to the deceased son of Hendricks and former husband of
Behardien as
Hendricks Jnr
.
Allegations
in the particulars of claim
2.
The dispute concerns a house in Salt River, Cape
Town, which previously belonged to Hendricks and her late
husband.
Hendricks alleges that in 1993 Hendricks Jnr was in dire financial
straits. She and Hendricks Jnr concluded an oral contract.
In terms
of the contract Hendricks undertook to transfer the property to
Hendriks Jnr. He was to obtain a loan of R80 000
secured by a
mortgage bond over the property in order to pay off his debts.
Importantly, Hendricks Jnr was also to register a right
of
habitatio
in favour of Hendricks as a
quid
pro quo
for the transfer.
3.
Hendricks Jnr died in May 2016. Behardien, as executrix, then applied
to evict Hendricks. That revealed
the failure to have registered the
right of
habitatio
. Hendricks’ countered with an action
for an order that the sale be set aside.
4.
Hendricks alleges that, as agreed, she gave transfer of the property
to Hendricks Jnr. In breach of his
obligations, he however failed to
register her right of
habitatio
. Hendricks alleges that
Hendricks Jnr’s breach disclosed a misrepresentation to her
that “
a right of habitatio has been registered in favour of
[Hendricks] and that [Hendricks] was accordingly entitled to occupy
the property
for the rest of her life.”
The
misrepresentation, continue the particulars of claim, was made with
the intention of inducing Hendrix to sign transfer documents,
and
perpetuated by the conduct of Hendricks Jnr in that he permitted her
to continue to occupy the property until his death on
17 May
2016. There is an alternative of negligent misrepresentation.
The
two exceptions
5.
Behardien raises two exceptions which are before me. The first is a
no-cause of action complaint: a right
of
habitatio
amounts to an interest in land, the
alleged agreement is an oral agreement for the alienation of land,
and in terms of section 2
of the Alienation of Land Act, written
authority was required. The particulars, contends Behardien,
therefore disclose no cause
of action.
6.
The second exception is a vague-and-embarrassing complaint - that the
particulars are contradictory.
One paragraph alleges that Hendricks
Jnr was to sell the property for R80 000, the next that he would
“
take out a bond for the purchase price of R80 000”
,
use the money to pay his debt, and ensure that a right of
habitatio
was registered in favour of Hendricks as a
quid pro quo
for the transfer of ownership. A later paragraph is that Hendricks
would not have agreed to transfer ownership of the property
without
receiving any purchase consideration if she knew that the right of
habitatio
was not included in the documents. The
contradiction, says Behardien, lies in the tension between first
alleging a purchase price
of R80 000, and later that transfer
was given without a purchase consideration.
First exception
7.
I must construe the particulars benevolently.
[1]
Hendricks does not seek to uphold the oral contract. Hendricks will
not need to prove the oral contract was lawful to succeed.
Hendricks
will be required to prove the misrepresentation.
8.
Henricks’ cause of action is arguably in delict, based on
intentional, alternatively negligent
misrepresentation.
[2]
Van Huyssteen
et
al
write that “
(a)
reading of the decided cases shows that our courts generally accept
that a misrepresentation in contrahendo which is either
fraudulent or
negligent is treated as a delict”
.
[3]
There may be further debate, at trial, about whether Hendricks’
cause of action is in delict or contract.
[4]
It may suffice for Hendricks to prove a mere misstatement; pleading
the more onerous would permit proof of the less.
[5]
But, at this stage, it need only be observed that a plaintiff is not
required to attach any label to their cause of action; all
that a
plaintiff need do is “
satisfy
the Court that the facts pleaded and proved entitled him to the
claims which he makes”.
[6]
Hence, “
(t)he
importance of such distinctions often appears insignificant”
.
[7]
9.
The alleged misrepresentation was by Hendricks Jnr: that it was
possible for him to register a right
of
habitatio
pursuant to
the oral agreement and he would, when it was not and he could not;
later, that he had registered the right, when he
had not. That there
may be no oral contract for
habitatio
therefore does not
disclose the absence of a cause of action. The cause of action does
not require the oral contract be lawful.
Whether in contract or
delict, the cause of action requires a misrepresentation or
misstatement. Far from being fatal to Hendricks’
case that
there may be no oral contract for
habitatio
, if anything it
may assist her. Her complaint is precisely that she did not get what
Hendricks Jnr initially said she would and
later conveyed she had.
The first exception therefore must fail.
10.
Behardien’s counsel sought to persuade me that there can be no
actionable misrepresentation as to a matter
of law, with the
consequence that the particulars disclose no cause of action for that
reason.
[8]
That however is not
raised in either of Hendricks’ exceptions. I cannot consider
whether the contention is correct, and,
if it is, whether it is fatal
to Hendricks’ case.
Second exception
11.
It used to be the law that a vague-and-embarrassing complaint had to
pertain “
to
the whole cause of action, all of which must be demonstrated to be
vague and embarrassing”
.
[9]
The correct position now is that a vague and embarrassing complaint
can be made apropos particular paragraphs of a particulars
of claim,
regardless of whether the problem “
infects
the whole cause of action”
.
[10]
12.
Dealing with a vague and embarrassing exception, the court usually
reasons in two steps: does the vagueness amount
to embarrassment?
Does the embarrassment in turn result in prejudice? And, a
vague-and-embarrassing exception is not upheld unless
the excipient
would be seriously prejudiced if the offending allegations were not
expunged.
[11]
On
contradictoriness: an allegation has been held to be vague if it is
either meaningless or capable of more than one meaning;
or where the
reader is unable to distil from the allegation a clear, single
meaning.
[12]
13.
In this case the reader of the particulars is well able to distil the
meaning of Hendricks’ allegations. The
true purchase
consideration was the registration of a right of
habitatio.
The term-of-the-oral-agreement consideration of R80 000 was part
of Hendricks Jnr’s scheme, to enable him as owner in
due course
to borrow R80 000. The
quid pro quo
for Hendricks was the
promised-and-not-delivered
habitatio
. Behardien is not
prejudiced, let alone seriously. Behardien is able to plead. The
second exception is therefore dismissed.
Order
14.
The defendant’s exceptions to the particulars of claim dated
9 April 2019 and 15 May 2019 are dismissed
with costs on
the party and party scale.
PATRICK,
AJ
HEARING
DATE: 17
APRIL 2023
DATE
OF JUDGMENT: 26
APRIL 2023
REPRESENTATION
FOR PLAINTIFF: IN PERSON - MR EBRAHIM TOYER
COUNSEL
FOR 1
ST
DEFENDANT: ADV
K PERUMALSAMY
INSTRUCTED
BY: TOEFY
ATTORNEYS
c/o VELILE TINTO CAPE
INC
[1]
First
National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v Perry NO
2001
(3) SA 960
(SCA) at paragraph 6;
Theunissen
v Transvaalse Lewendehawe Koöp Bpk
1988
SA 493
(A) at 500E-F.
[2]
Van
Huyssteen
et
al
Contract
General Principles
6
ed paragraphs 4.17 – 4.22 pages 118 – 119.
[3]
Van
Huyssteen
et
al
supra
paragraph
4.22 page 119.
[4]
Van
Huyssteen
et
al
supra
also write, at paragraph 4.21 on page 119, that “
(i)t
is preferable, from the point of view of principle, to rather focus
on the quality of the conduct involved as being improper
and
material without resorting to the more technical concept of delict.
The importance of such distinctions often appears insignificant
when
one considers that in practical terms a misrepresentee is required
to
‘
Satisfy
the Court that the facts pleaded and proved entitle him to the
claims which he makes’ [referring to Davidson v Bonafede
1981
(2) SA 501
(C) at 505D]. So, if a misrepresentee has proved all the
elements of the delict of misrepresentation and claims rescission
and
damages in the strict sense of the word he will not have to
plead two causes of action, one contractual and one delictual.”
[5]
A
misstatement is as wider and less technical concept than a
misrepresentation. A misstatement includes such things as false
opinions or predictions and negligent advice – see Hutchinson
et
al
The
Law of Contract in South Africa
paragraph 4.2 footnote 21 page 120, citing
Administrateur,
Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk
1979
(3) SA 824
(A) at 829E – G.
[6]
Davidson
v Bonafede
1981
(2) SA 501
(C) at 505E.
[7]
Van
Huyssteen
et
al
supra
paragraph
4.21 page 119.
[8]
I
was referred to Hutchinson et al
supra
paragraph
4.2 page 120: “
(a)
misrepresentation is a form of misstatement. Whereas a misstatement
is simply an assertion that does not accord with the true
facts, in
the law of contract, the term ‘
misrepresentation
’
has gradually acquired a narrower, more technical meaning –
namely a false statement of past or present fact,
not
law
or opinion, made by one party to another before or at the time of
the contract concerning some atter or circumstance related
to it.”
(Bold
in original, underlining added.) I was also referred to
Mann
v Sydney Hunt Motors (Pty) Ltd
1958
(2) SA 102
(GWLD) at 105H – 106B: “…
a
distinction must be drawn between a misrepresentation of fact and a
misrepresentation of the legal effect of a contract. Where
a party
expresses an opinion that in law a clause has a particular meaning
that does not constitute a representation of fact
and is therefore
not a representation inducing a contract.”
[9]
Jowell
v Bramwell-Jones
1998 (1) SA 836
(W)
at
899G.
[10]
Paulsmeier
v Media 24 (Pty) Ltd
(15855/21)
[2022] ZAWCHC 85
(20 May 2022).
[11]
Levitan
v Newhaven Holiday Enterprises CC
1991 (2) SA 297
(C) at 298A.
[12]
Leathern
v Tredoux
1911 NPD 346
at 348,
Venter
NO v Barritt Venter NO v WolfsbergArch Inv 2 (Pty) Ltd
2008 (4) SA 639
(C) at 644B.
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