Case Law[2024] ZAKZDHC 31South Africa
Kistnasamy and Others v Pillay and Another (D5841/2023) [2024] ZAKZDHC 31 (24 May 2024)
Judgment
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# South Africa: Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Durban
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## Kistnasamy and Others v Pillay and Another (D5841/2023) [2024] ZAKZDHC 31 (24 May 2024)
Kistnasamy and Others v Pillay and Another (D5841/2023) [2024] ZAKZDHC 31 (24 May 2024)
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sino date 24 May 2024
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL
LOCAL DIVISION, DURBAN
Case
no:
D5841/2023
In
the matter between:
INDRA
LOGAN
KISTNASAMY
FIRST APPLICANT
LEANE
VENTURELLA AND CAROL COETSEE
SECOND RESPONDENT
PARTNERSHIP
INSTRUMENT
- PROJECTS CC
THIRD RESPONDENT
and
DAYALAN
PILLAY
FIRST RESPONDENT
ETHEKWINI
MUNICIPALITY
SECOND RESPONDENT
Coram:
Mossop J
Heard:
24 May 2024
Delivered:
24 May 2024
ORDER
The
following order is granted
:
1.
It is declared that the oral sub-lease agreement concluded between
the first applicant and the first respondent has been cancelled.
2.
The first respondent, and any and all persons occupying by,
through
or under him, are hereby ordered to vacate the immovable property
with the physical address of Unit 2[...], 1[...] L[...]
Road, Athlone
Park, Amanzimtoti, within 10 days of the service of this order upon
the first respondent.
3.
In the event of the first respondent and any or all persons
occupying
by, through or under him, failing to comply with the order in
paragraph 2 hereof, the sheriff of this court is authorised
and
directed to forthwith eject the first respondent and any and all
persons occupying by, through or under him from the property
and to
hand vacant possession thereof to the applicants.
4.
The first respondent is directed to pay the costs of this application
on scale A.
JUDGMENT
MOSSOP
J
:
Introduction
[1]
This is an ex tempore judgment.
[2]
The third applicant is the juristic entity that owns commercial
business
premises situated at 1[...] L[...] Road, Athlone Park,
Amanzimtoti (the premises). The third applicant has two members who
are
also the partners in the second applicant in this application.
The second applicant acts as the agent of the third respondent in
letting out the premises and concludes lease agreements on its behalf
with selected tenants. The first applicant claims that he
is the
tenant in lawful occupation of the premises, having concluded a lease
agreement with the second applicants.
[3]
The first applicant uses the premises to conduct the business of a
restaurant
and pub that rejoices under the name of ‘Hot Rock
Café’ (the Café). The first applicant claims that
he
purchased the Café from the first respondent but later
orally agreed that the first respondent could sub-let a portion of
the premises to run a video games business. He now alleges that the
first respondent has breached the oral agreement of sub-lease
and all
of the applicants join together in this application to seek his
ejectment from the portion of the premises that he sublets.
[4]
To the contrary, the first respondent claims that he is entitled to
be
in occupation of the premises because the lease that he concluded
with the second applicant is extant and has never been cancelled.
He
accordingly rejects his eviction from the premises and does not
acknowledge the sub-lease to which he is purportedly a party.
[5]
There is a second respondent joined in this application, namely the
eThekwini
Municipality. Why this has occurred is a mystery as no
reference is made to it and no relief is claimed against it and I
shall
accordingly make no further mention of it as a result.
Representation
[6]
Ms Athmaram appeared for the applicants this morning and Ms Miranda
appeared
for the first respondent. I am indebted to both counsel for
their helpful argument.
The
lease agreements
[7]
There appear to be two lease agreements that have been concluded
between
the second applicant and their tenants that are relevant to
this matter. Having mentioned two lease agreements, it is so that
three
lease agreements have in fact been attached to the application
papers but one of them does not appear to constitute a binding
agreement.
I mention all three lease agreements in chronological
order:
(a)
The
earliest of the lease agreements is one put up by the first
respondent and is between himself and the second applicant. I shall
call this ‘the first lease agreement’. It was signed by
both parties on 1 March 2019
[1]
and records that the lease would commence on that date and would
endure for a period of five years, terminating on 29 February
2024.
The first lease agreement does not record the existence of a right of
renewal;
(b)
The second lease agreement is also put up by the first respondent. I
shall continue
to refer to it as the second lease agreement. It
indicates that the parties to it are the second applicant and an
entity described
as ‘K2022335257 t/a The Rock (Restaurant and
Bar)’ (K2022335257). The second lease agreement would commence
on 1 March
2022 and would run for a period of 5 years, with an option
to renew, expiring on 28 February 2027. Despite referencing the right
of renewal, the second lease agreement does not provide any
particularity as to how it is to be exercised. It is signed by the
erstwhile three principals of K2022335257, which included the first
applicant and the first respondent, but it is not signed by
the
second applicant and is, therefore, inchoate; and
(c)
The third and final lease agreement (the third lease agreement) is
put
up by the applicants and it records that it was concluded between
the first and second applicants. It was signed by the last signing
party on 10 February 2023 and it incorporated an option to renew the
lease and a first option to purchase the premises. As
with the
second lease agreement, no particularity is provided in this
agreement about how these conferred rights were to be exercised.
The
third lease agreement was to run from 1 March 2023 for a period of
four years and eleven months, expiring on 31 January 2028.
[8]
All the lease agreements acknowledge that the premises are to be
utilised
by the respective tenants as a sports bar and restaurant and
for purposes of gaming.
The
issue
[9]
From the heads of argument delivered by the first respondent, there
is
but a single issue raised by him. It is that the first lease
agreement was never cancelled by the second applicant and therefore
he is the lawful tenant and he is entitled to resist any attempt to
dislodge him from the premises.
[10]
To be entirely accurate, the first respondent did also raise a point
in limine in his answering
affidavit dealing with an alleged lack of
locus standi in respect of the first applicant but Ms Miranda, who
appears for the first
respondent, did not persist with the point in
argument. It was an entirely sensible decision not to do so, in my
view.
The
sale of the Café
[11]
It is not to be doubted that the first respondent was the prime mover
regarding the Café;
he founded it, set it on its feet and
conducted its business. But it appears that with the passage of time
he began to experience
financial difficulties, falling into arrears
with his payment obligations to the second applicant regarding the
consumption of
utilities at the premises. There is objective evidence
of this liability in the form of an acknowledgement of debt signed by
the
first respondent in favour of the second applicant in which the
first respondent admits to owing it slightly more than R250 000
in respect of unpaid utility charges. The acknowledgment of debt is
dated 8 April 2022.
[12]
About a month before he signed the acknowledgment of debt, the first
respondent put pen
to paper and signed a sale agreement in terms of
which he sold the Café to the first applicant (the sale
agreement). That
document is also before the court and it reveals
that it was concluded on 1 March 2022.
[13]
It appears
that initially the first respondent intended to sell the Café
to K2022335257, for the sale agreement appears to
indicate that it
was designed for the signature of a corporate entity.
[2]
That did not occur for reasons that need not detain us. The sale
agreement date of 1 March 2022 coincides with the date of the
second
lease agreement, being the inchoate lease agreement, to which
K2022335257 is a party. The fact that the sale between the
first
respondent and K2022335257 did not eventuate may explain why the
second lease agreement remains inchoate. The agreement prepared
for
that sale was then utilised to record the sale to the first
applicant. There can be no doubt as to who the purchaser of the
Café
was: clause 2.2 of the sale agreement unambiguously defines the
purchaser as being the first applicant. This morning
Ms Miranda, who
appears for the first respondent, confirmed that it was not in
dispute that the sale agreement was concluded between
the first
respondent and the first applicant.
[14]
The sale agreement is not an elegantly drafted document but it has
the basics that one
would expect to find in a business sale
agreement. Several terms of the sale agreement invite attention:
(a)
Clause 7.1 provides the following:
‘
The
Seller undertakes to discharge all its liabilities to creditors in
respect of the business as at the preceding date.’
[3]
The
second applicant was a creditor of the first respondent and the
wording of that term may explain why the acknowledgment of debt,
referenced earlier, was agreed to by the first respondent shortly
after the sale agreement was signed;
(b)
Clause 12.1 provided as follows:
‘
the
Seller undertaking (sic) to transfer all licenses to the Purchaser
immediately, upon payment of the deposit as stipulated in
the payment
clause. The seller undertakes that he will take full responsibility
to transfer all licenses to the purchases (sic)
as his cost.’
As
is discussed hereunder, the first respondent met his obligations in
this regard.
(c)
The issue of the lease with the second applicant was dealt with as
follows:
‘
The
Purchaser shall be liable for the payment of the rental and utilities
for the business premises on a monthly basis.’
[15]
It is evident that the sale agreement was given effect to. The
clearest evidence of this
appears from the facts relating to the
liquor licence. The first applicant required the liquor licence to be
transferred into his
name in order to be able to continue to run the
bar at the premises. That the first respondent honoured his
obligations in this
regard is confirmed by the following pieces of
evidence:
(a)
The first respondent sent the following WhatsApp message to an agent
who was
to attend to the transfer of the liquor licence on his behalf
on 25 January 2023:
‘
My
partner from hot rock will contact u. His name Logan so he is buying
the busines (sic) so u going to do his liquor transfer.’
(b)
The first respondent completed annexure ‘ILK2’ to the
founding affidavit,
which is a document entitled ‘Resolution to
transfer the liquor licence and manage business’, in which the
following
wording appears:
‘
I,
Dayalan Pillay, id no: would like to state that I sold the business
and have agreed to transfer the liquor licence for hot (sic)
Rock
Café (Licence no: K[...]) to Indra Logan Kistnasamy, id no:
7[...]).’
(c)
The first applicant has put up documentation that shows that he has
submitted
all documentation to the relevant authorities to secure the
transfer of the liquor licence into his own name.
The
oral agreement of sub-tenancy
[16]
The first
applicant indicates that the relationship between himself and the
first respondent soured after concluding the sale agreement
and he
was ultimately required to obtain a high court interdict against the
first respondent to prevent him from reselling the
Café and
from retreating from his obligation to transfer the liquor
licence.
[4]
[17]
Notwithstanding
that, the first applicant states that he was prepared to permit the
first respondent to continue to operate a business
called ‘V-Slots’
(V-Slots) from a portion of the premises.
[5]
That business had been run from the premises by the first respondent
prior to him selling the Café to the first applicant.
[18]
To this end, the first applicant asserts that he concluded an oral
agreement of sub-lease
with the first respondent that would permit
the business of V-Slots to continue to be conducted from the
premises. This was intended
to be a temporary arrangement. The rental
agreed upon was R8 000 per month.
[19]
The first respondent, however, made no payments whatsoever and after
four months, he was
R32 000 in arrears. Payment was formally demanded
from him by the first applicant’s attorneys, but had no effect
other than
eliciting a denial that there was an agreement of
sub-tenancy. The first applicant thereafter cancelled the oral
agreement in writing,
a copy of which cancellation is before the
court, and the first respondent was directed to vacate the premises.
He declined to
do so and this application was consequently launched.
The
defence
[20]
The first respondent does not recognise the sub-tenancy agreement. He
makes that plain
both in his answering affidavit and in the content
of his legal representative’s letters that were written on his
behalf
from time to time. His principal defence is that he remains
the tenant of the second applicant by virtue of the fact that the
first
lease agreement has never been cancelled. He is thus entitled
to occupy the premises and does so independently of the so-called
sub-tenancy agreement. In addition, he is the rightful holder of the
liquor licence and only he may thus sell liquor from the premises.
[21]
There is a fundamental difficulty that the first respondent faces
with the pointed defence
that he has taken. This application is being
argued today, which is Friday, 24 May 2024. The lease agreement
relied upon by the
first respondent to justify his continued
occupation of the premises is the first lease agreement: that must be
so because the
second lease agreement is inchoate and he is not a
party to the third lease agreement. The first lease agreement had a
limited
life span of five years and did not permit of a renewal. It
expired on 29 February 2024. It follows that the first respondent’s
right of occupation of the premises, assuming that he is correct in
asserting that the first lease agreement was never cancelled,
has
also come to an end. On his own version, he therefore cannot remain
in occupation of the premises.
[22]
But the first respondent’s proposition that the first lease
agreement was never cancelled
cannot just be accepted as being
correct and must be critically and carefully assessed. Overlooking
the expiration of the first
lease agreement for a moment, the first
respondent states that he is still the second applicant’s
tenant and he remains cloaked
in the rights of a tenant. That is a
false defence. The following WhatsApp messages and conversations
reveal what really occurred:
(a)
Message from the first respondent to the second applicant
:
‘
Spoke
to Logan
[6]
he is happy to move
forward providing you give him the lease’;
(b)
Message from the first respondent to the second applicant
:
‘
Need
you to do a new lease on logans (sic) name’;
(c)
Conversation between the first respondent and the first applicant
:
First
respondent
:
‘
When
do you want to sign the lease? And starting date?’
First
applicant
:
‘
15
Feb if pissible (sic)’
‘
Possible’
‘
Even
1
st
March’
First
respondent
:
‘
Will
do that as you helping me out big time. I will send to you by
tonight. Just at OR Tambo now.’
(d)
Message from the first respondent to the first applicant
:
‘
Bru
leane
[7]
(sic) is doing the
lease in ur (sic) name’.
[23]
These
WhatsApp messages were exchanged in January and February 2023.
[8]
Ms Athmaram drew my attention to two further pieces of
correspondence, in the form of emails. Chronologically, the first
email
is dated 20 January 2023. It was sent by Ms Leane Upton (Ms
Upton), a member of the second applicant, to both the first applicant
and the first respondent. It stated the following:
‘
Please
see attached Drafted (sic) Lease Agreement for your perusal, as per
our telephonic conversation between myself and you both.
Please
note that this lease can only come into effect if we can resolve the
eThekwini Payment Agreement.’
Then
on 7 February 2023, Ms Upton communicated further with the first
applicant and first respondent, again by email. She stated
the
following:
‘
This
email is a confirmation that a new Lease agreement will be put in
place on Logan name for a period of 5 years with option to
renew or
should we sell the premises then Logan will have first option to
purchase.’
[24]
That then is precisely what happened: the terms mentioned in the
email of 7 February 2023
appear in the third lease agreement.
Clearly, in the eyes of the second applicant, a satisfactory
arrangement had been concluded
in respect of the unpaid utility
charges.
[25]
This correspondence is not disputed by the first respondent and he
raised no objection
at the time to what Ms Upton proposed. It is
therefore clear that the first respondent knew of, consented to and
actively sought
the conclusion of the third lease agreement. The
first lease agreement was accordingly replaced by the third lease
agreement with
the consent of the first respondent. The issue of
cancellation is consequently of no moment as regards the first
respondent and
offers him no basis to claim an entitlement to remain
in the premises.
[26]
Accordingly, the only basis upon which the first respondent could
notionally remain in
occupation of a portion of the premises is in
terms of the oral sub-lease that the first applicant states that he
concluded with
him. The first respondent, however, disavows the
existence of the agreement of sub-tenancy.
[27]
In my assessment, the first respondent has been frugal with the
truth. Virtually every
allegation that he made in his answering
affidavit appears to be untrue:
(a)
He stated that the first applicant was not tax compliant. The first
applicant
was compelled to put up documentation from the South
African Revenue Service which establishes that he is in good standing
with
the tax authorities;
(b)
He stated that only he holds a liquor licence in respect of the
premises and
only he can sell liquor there. Again, documentation put
up by the first applicant establishes that the first respondent
signed
the forms required to effect a transfer of the liquor licence
to the first applicant and, further, that the first applicant has
in
the interim been approved as a person who manages the premises in
terms of s 77 of the Liquor Act 60 of 2010 (KZN) and can,
thus, sell
liquor at the premises;
(c)
He stated that the sale agreement was actually concluded between
himself
and K2022335257 and not the first applicant. He, however,
puts up no proof of such an agreement and the sale agreement already
mentioned and considered establishes that the first applicant was the
purchaser; and
(d)
Finally, he appears to contradict his assertion that he sold the
business only
to K2022335257, for he states the following:
‘
Due
to the First Applicant’s failure to pay the outstanding balance
of the purchase price of the business on behalf of the
Company, I
duly instructed my attorneys to place them in breach.’
As
already noted, a sale agreement between the first respondent and
K2022335257 is nowhere to be found in the papers. If the first
respondent sold the Café to K2022335257, why would it then be
necessary to place the first applicant in breach?
[28]
On a careful conspectus of the competing allegations, I am driven to
conclude that the
first respondent is not a reliable witness. His
version is largely unsupported by the documentary evidence available.
On the other
hand, the version advanced by the first applicant is
capable of objective verification by reference to documents. I
therefore reject
the first respondent’s version where it does
not conform to what the first applicant states.
[29]
I accordingly find that the first applicant did conclude an oral
agreement of sub-tenancy
with the first respondent, that the first
respondent breached its terms and that the first applicant thereupon
cancelled the oral
agreement of sub-tenancy. The first respondent
relinquished his rights as tenant in terms of the first lease
agreement by permitting
the conclusion of the third lease agreement.
It follows that the first respondent has not established a basis in
law that entitles
him to remain in occupation of the premises.
[30]
I accordingly grant the following order:
1.
It is declared that the oral sub-lease agreement concluded between
the first applicant and the first respondent has been cancelled.
2.
The first respondent, and any and all persons occupying by,
through
or under him, are hereby ordered to vacate the immovable property
with the physical address of Unit 2[...], 1[...] L[...]
Road, Athlone
Park, Amanzimtoti, within 10 days of the service of this order upon
the first respondent.
3.
In the event of the first respondent and any or all persons
occupying
by, through or under him, failing to comply with the order in
paragraph 2 hereof, the sheriff of this court is authorised
and
directed to forthwith eject the first respondent and any and all
persons occupying by, through or under him from the property
and to
hand vacant possession thereof to the applicants.
4.
The first respondent is directed to pay the costs of this application
on scale A.
MOSSOP J
APPEARANCES
Counsel
for the applicants:
Ms
R Athmaram
Instructed
by:
LGR
Incorporated
Ridge
8 Office Block (Suite 1103)
39
Vuna Close
Umhlanga
Ridge
Durban
Counsel
for the first respondent:
Ms
J L Miranda
Instructed
by:
Deepika
Ramduth Attorneys
Shop
19 Southern Cross Building
Arbuthnot
Street
Scottburgh
Locally
represented by:
K
and N Attorneys
Suite
LG08, The Square
250
Umhlanga Rocks Drive
uMhlanga
Counsel
for the second respondent:
No
appearance
[1]
The premises are described in the second and third lease agreements
as being situated at 1[...] L[...] Road, Athlone Park, Amanzimtoti.
The first lease agreement describes the premises as being unit
2[...], L[...] Road, Athlone Park, Amanzimtoti. This simply appears
to be another way of describing the premises, for there is no
suggestion that unit 2[...] is situated anywhere other than at
1[...] L[...] Road, Athlone Park, Amanzimtoti.
[2]
The first page of the sale agreement, being a cover page, has space
for the insertion of a registration number and indicates
that the
purchaser was being represented by the first applicant. The
signature page also states that the first applicant is duly
authorised to sign the agreement.
[3]
The phrase ‘preceding date’ is a defined term and means
the day immediately before the ‘effective date’.
The
‘effective date’ is also a defined term and means ‘1
March 2022; or by a date of mutual agreement’.
[4]
The order was granted by this court on 12 April 2023.
[5]
The name ‘V-Slots’ is apparently an abbreviated trading
name of Vukani Gaming Corporation (Pty) Ltd.
[6]
‘Logan’ is the first applicant.
[7]
Leane Upton (Venturella) is a partner in the second applicant.
[8]
The third lease agreement was signed on 10 February 2023 and became
effective on 1 March 2023.
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