Case Law[2023] ZAKZDHC 94South Africa
K.S v N.S (D1137/2021) [2023] ZAKZDHC 94 (1 December 2023)
High Court of South Africa (KwaZulu-Natal Division, Durban)
1 December 2023
Judgment
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# South Africa: Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Durban
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## K.S v N.S (D1137/2021) [2023] ZAKZDHC 94 (1 December 2023)
K.S v N.S (D1137/2021) [2023] ZAKZDHC 94 (1 December 2023)
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sino date 1 December 2023
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWA-ZULU
NATAL LOCAL DIVISION, DURBAN
CASE
NO:D1137/2021
In
the matter between:
[K……….]
[S…………]
APPLICANT
And
[N………..]
[S….…….]
RESPONDENT
ORDER
1.
In respect of the main application: -
1.1
The respondent is declared to be in contempt of the order of court
which was
granted on17 May 2021 under case number D1137/2021.
1.2
The respondent is committed to imprisonment for a period of 30 days
which is
wholly suspended for a period of three years on condition
that the respondent pays:-
1.2.1
all outstanding rental in respect of the immovable property situate
at [……………………….]
up to and including 30 November 2023 within 30 days of the granting
of this order;
1.2.2
all arrear school fees due to […………………]
in respect of the minor
children on or before 4 December 2023.
1.3
the respondent is directed to pay the costs of the main application
on a scale
as between attorney and client.
2.
In respect of the counter-application, the order granted on
17 May
2021 under case number D1137/2021 is varied as follows: -
2.1
Paragraphs 1.3.1, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.5 and 1.3.7 are deleted.
2.2
The respondent is directed to pay the following expenses
pendente
lite
:
2.2.1
Maintenance in respect of the minor children at the rate of R10
500-00 per month;
2.2.2
two thirds of the monthly rental in respect of the immovable property
situated at 4[...] M[...] R[...],
1[...] B[...] Drive, Durban,
KwaZulu-Natal;
2.2.3
fifty percent of the rates, electricity, water and utilities in
respect of the said immovable property;
2.2.4
the monthly instalments in respect of the Mercedes Benz C180 motor
vehicle;
2.2.5
the costs of all reasonable educational expenses incurred in respect
of the minor children, including private
school fees, stationery,
extra mural activities, sports equipment, uniforms and allied
expenses;
2.3
The applicant is directed to pendente lite:-
2.3.1 retain
the minor children as beneficiaries on her medical aid scheme and pay
all premiums relating to them, including
any excess medical expenses
not covered by the said medical aid scheme;
2.3.2
pay one third of the monthly rental in respect of the immovable
property.
2.4
The costs of the Rule 43(6) counter-application are reserved for the
trial court hearing the divorce
action.
JUDGMENT
DELIVERED :01 DECEMBER
2023
R
SINGH AJ:
INTRODUCTION
[1]
A divorce action is pending between the parties.
The applicant
launched an application in terms of the provisions of Rule 43 and the
parties obtained an order by consent where,
inter alia
, the
respondent was directed to pay
pendente lite:
-
1.1
maintenance in the sum of R15 750.00 per month in respect of the
applicant and the minor
children;
1.2
the rental in respect of the immovable property occupied by the
applicant and minor children;
1.3
the minor children’s educational expenses;
1.4
the applicant and minor children’s medical aid premiums,
including any excess medical
expenses which may be reasonable and
necessary; and
1.5
the respondent was also directed to sign a lease agreement with the
landlord in respect
of the immovable property occupied by the
applicant and minor children for a fixed period of no less than 12
months.
(“the
Rule 43 Order”)
THE
FACTS WHICH ARE COMMON CAUSE
[2]
The following facts are common cause: -
2.1
the respondent was present at court and legally represented at the
time the Rule 43 order
was granted;
2.2
the respondent failed to sign a lease agreement with the landlord in
compliance with the
Rule 43 order.
2.3
the respondent defaulted in payment of the monthly rental, the
medical aid premiums and
has been in arrears with the payment of the
minor children’s educational expenses;
2.4
the landlord has instituted ejectment proceedings against the
respondent and all those occupying
the immovable property by through
or under him who would the applicant and minor children.
2.5
the school which the minor children attend sent a letter asking for
immediate payment of
the outstanding school fees failing which, the
minor children face exclusion from the school.
2.6
the applicant has removed the children from the respondent’s
medical aid and placed
them on her own medical aid. She has been
paying the monthly premiums relating thereto.
THE
CONTEMPT APPLICATION
[3]
It was against the aforesaid background that the applicant launched
the main application
seeking an order that the respondent be declared
to be in contempt of the Rule 43 order.
[4]
On 15th June 2023, a Rule Nisi was granted calling upon the
respondent to show cause
why he should not be declared to be in
contempt of the Rule 43 order and sentenced to a period of
imprisonment to be determined
by the court, with or without the
option of a fine, which sentence was to be suspended for a period of
3 years on condition that
the respondent complies with the Rule 43
order within 7 days. The applicant also sought that the respondent
pays costs of the application
on a scale between attorney and client.
[5]
Very briefly, the respondent’s opposition to the application is
as follow: -
5.1
he admits that he is in arrears with the rental but contends that he
can no longer afford
to pay the rental;
5.2
he was only obliged to pay rental for a period of 12 months from the
date of the order because
of the Rule 43 order obliged him to enter
into a lease agreement for a period of 12 months;
5.3
he further alleges that he was not obliged to pay maintenance for the
applicant after a
period of 18 months. He was advised that the
divorce action would be settled before then;
5.4
in respect of the medical aid premiums, he alleges that he could not
afford to pay same
and therefore the medical aid was cancelled in
2021.The applicant has joined a more expensive medical aid scheme and
he should
not have to pay more than R2 700 per month which was the
monthly premium for the previous medical aid scheme.
5.5
in relation to the school fees, the respondent contended that since
2018 he paid lump sums
towards school fees as and when the monies
from his business came in. He has “every intention” of
paying the school
fees on or before 6 December 2023.
THE
RULE 43(6) COUNTER- APPLICATION
[6]
The respondent together with his opposition to the contempt
application also launched
a counter-application in terms of the
provisions of the Uniform Rules 43(6) for a variation of the Rule 43
order.
[7]
In support of the Rule 43(6) counter application, the respondent
relies on the following:
-
7.1
that the Rule 43 order is exorbitant and at the time he agreed to pay
the said amount, he
was under the impression that the divorce action
would not take more than a year to finalise and it was for that
reason that he
agreed to enter into the lease agreement for a period
of 12 months;
7.2
that due to Covid and a downturn in his business, he fell into
arrears with the rental payments
and at the time the Rule 43 order
was made, he was already in arrears with the rental payment;
7.3
as he was in arrears with the rental payment, the landlord was not
willing to conclude a
written lease agreement with him;
7.4
he was the main member of the Momentum Basic Hospital Plan together
with the applicant and
the two minor children as beneficiaries and
paid the sum of R2 700.00 per month at the time of the interim order;
7.5
he fell into arrears in February 2021 and the medical aid was
cancelled. During May 2021,
he joined Affinity Health but the
applicant was not happy with that medical aid scheme and advised that
she would obtain her own
medical aid. She joined Discovery Medical
Aid which is more expensive. She paid the sum of R4 500.00 per month
in respect of the
minor children and herself. The respondent
reiterated that he was happy with the instalments of Affinity Health
as it was the same
as his Momentum medical aid scheme;
7.6
since May 2022, the applicant has not asked for contributions towards
her medical aid scheme
and he understands that she pays same;
7.7
in relation to the payment of school fees, the respondent alleges
that he has a long-standing
arrangement with the school whereby he
makes a lump sum payment and that the next payment due is 6 December
2023. The interim order
does not specify a date by which the school
fees needs to be paid nor does the school have an issue with same.
[8]
The respondent alleges that his income varies from R30 000.00 to R150
000.00 per month.
His expenses include material, labour and other
expenses in respect of his business. The respondent put up his
business bank statement
from First National Bank for the period
January 2023 to October 2023 as proof of his expenses. He alleges
that his expenses are
R57 400-00 per month. When his business
sites are running, he also pays salaries in the sum of R30 000.00 per
month.
He alleges that he does not have a personal bank
account.
[9]
The allegation in relation to his monthly income is bald. No schedule
of monthly income
or annual financial statements have been put up by
the respondent in support of the income he alleges he receives.
One would
have expected him to do this bearing in mind that as the
applicant in the Rule 43(6) application, he bears the onus of
establishing
a material change in circumstances.
[10]
The further change in circumstances which the respondent relies on is
that the applicant has
been employed for the last 19 months and that
she has failed to disclose same to this honourable court in her
contempt application.
He further submits that the applicant also has
a duty of support towards the minor children and that the cash sum of
maintenance
which he has been paying included maintenance for the
applicant which she surreptitiously accepted.
[11]
The respondent seeks that the Rule 43 order be varied to delete
payment of the monthly rental
payment, household insurance premiums
and medical expenses. He tenders a cash amount of R15 750.00 per
month in respect of maintenance
for the minor children, fifty percent
of rates, electricity, water and utility charges , he agrees to
continue to pay the instalments
in respect of a Mercedes Benz C180
and two thirds of the costs of the minor children’s educational
expenses.
[12]
The applicant in reply, states as follows: -
12.1
she denies that she has the resources to find other accommodation and
therefore requires the respondent to
pay all the arrear rentals;
12.2
she changed to the Discovery Hospital Plan as she required surgery
and the waiting period was two months
whereas if the respondent’s
medical aid scheme was reinstated, she would have a waiting period of
three months;
12.3
the school policy regarding the payment of fees is that fees must be
paid on or before the first day of each
month.
12.4
the respondent has shown no attempt to reduce his expenditure and has
instead embarked on a luxurious lifestyle
which included regular
liquor, cannabis, expensive branded clothing and jewellery purchases
as well as holidays and spa treatments.
12.5 she
earns approximately R22 800.00 per month and has annexed her
most recent payslip in support thereof.
The renovations to the
immovable property which the respondent mentioned was a gift from her
boyfriend.
THE ISSUES TO BE
CONSIDERED
[13]
On the papers, the issues to be considered are as follows: -
13.1
whether this application is urgent;
13.2
whether the applicant has made out a case for the respondent to
be
declared to be in contempt of the Rule 43 order;
13.3
if the respondent is found to be in contempt of the Rule 43 order,
what a suitable
sanction to be imposed is;
13.4
whether the respondent in his counter-application has
demonstrated that
there has been a material change in circumstances
to warrant the varying of the Rule 43 order.
URGENCY
[14]
The court order of the 15 June 2023 recorded that the respondent did
not consider the application
to be urgent and reserved his right in
this regard. At the hearing of the matter, Ms Ameer who appeared on
behalf of the respondent
persisted that the application lacked
urgency. It is common cause that the respondent has failed to
timeously pay the rental
amounts for the leased premises and has been
in arrears with the educational expenses in respect of the minor
children. In an urgent
application, the applicant must demonstrate
that he will not be afforded substantial redress at the hearing in
due course.
[1]
[15]
Courts have recognised that the payment of the maintenance
obligations is not a debtor/creditor
type of situation and that
maintenance arises out of an ongoing duty of support. In the
case of child support, the duty is
fortified by a minor child's
constitutional right to parental and family care. Ultimately the best
interest of a minor child is
paramount. Whilst not every contempt
application is urgent, it is evident in
casu
that the
application was urgent, firstly because of the very real threat of
ejectment of the applicant and minor children from
the immovable
property as well as the letter received from the minor children's
school that the school fees in respect of the minor
children must be
paid otherwise they face exclusion from the school.
[16]
I am therefore satisfied that the main application is urgent.
THE
LAW IN RELATION TO CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
[17]
Civil contempt procedure has been a useful mechanism in securing
compliance with orders of court
and has survived constitutional
scrutiny.
[2]
It is clear that
contempt of court proceedings exist to protect the rule of law and
preserve the honour of the judiciary. This
lies at the heart of any
constitutional democracy.
[18]
In respect of issues pertaining to maintenance of minor children, the
Constitutional Court in
the matter of Bannatyne v Bannatyne &
Another
[3]
declared that failure
to comply with a maintenance order is a criminal offence and is
contrary to the provisions of Sections 28(2)
of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
[19]
Once it is shown that the order is granted and served or has come to
the notice of the respondent
and that the respondent has disobeyed or
neglected to comply with the order , wilfulness and mala fides will
be inferred and the
applicant will be prima facie entitled to a
committal order
[4]
[5]
The evidentiary burden then rests on the respondent to advance
evidence that establishes a reasonable doubt as to whether he is
in
contempt of the order.
[20]
It is fundamental principle of law that orders must be complied with
until they are properly
set aside and it is not for a respondent to
impute that an order was improperly made or that he cannot meet his
obligations in
terms of the order to justify non-compliance of the
order.
[6]
[7]
THE
LAW IN RESPECT OF APPLICATIONS IN TERMS OF THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 43
(6)
[21]
The provisions of Rule 43 (6) allows the court to vary its decision
where there has been a material
change in circumstances in one of the
parties or a child. That change must be subsequent to the hearing of
Rule 43 application
which gave rise to the order that the court is
being called upon to vary.
[8]
[22]
An applicant in Rule 43 (6) proceedings bears the onus of
establishing that there has been a
material change in circumstances
and must place sufficient facts before the court in order for the
court to determine the extent
and the impact of the change in
circumstances.
APPLICATION
OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS
[23]
I, first turn to consider the contempt application.
[24]
The starting point is that the respondent was legally represented and
the Rule 43 order was taken
by consent. He therefore not only
consented to the order but, in my view, would have had full knowledge
by virtue of being legally
represented of his obligations in terms of
the order. There is nothing to infer that his previous legal
representatives did
not advise him of his obligations. Therefore, I
am satisfied that the first requirement of a contempt application,
namely that
the respondent was aware of the existence of the order,
has been met.
[25]
The next requirement to be considered is whether the respondent
disobeyed or neglected to comply
with the order and in so doing,
whether wilfulness or mala fides can be inferred from his conduct.
[26]
In relation to the rental, the respondent acknowledges that he is in
arrears with the rental
but contends that such failure was not
wilful. A perusal of rental schedule, however indicates that the
respondent as at the time
the Rule 43 order was granted, was already
in arrears with his rental payments but nonetheless consented to an
order that he pay
the rental. In my view, he knew full well that he
would have been unable to comply with the order. To add insult to
injury, he
contends that he was only obliged to pay the rental for a
period of twelve months from the date of the order and his
obligations
extended no further because Rule 43 order contained
provisions for him to enter into a lease agreement of twelve months.
It is
also common cause that since December 2022, the respondent has
not made any payment towards the rental.
[27]
Likewise in consenting to an order that he signs a lease agreement,
he ought to have realised
that given the already outstanding rental,
he would be unable to enter into any lease agreement with the
landlord and hence comply
with his obligations in terms of the order.
In my view, it was disingenuous of the respondent to consent to the
Rule 43 order requiring
him to sign a new lease agreement when he
knew that he would not be able to meet his obligations. I therefore
find that he wilfully
disobeyed the Rule 43 order in this regard.
[28]
In relation to the medical expenses, the respondent contends that he
ought not to be held responsible
for the costs of the monthly
premiums because the applicant chose to change her medical aid
scheme. It is clear from the court
order that he was responsible for
all medical expenses for the applicant and the minor children.
He therefore would have
been required to comply with the order. His
version that he was not asked to contribute to the medical aid by the
applicant and
he therefore inferred that the applicant would pay the
premiums for the medical aid scheme cannot pass muster. Likewise, in
my
view, he is also in default of his obligation to cover all medical
expenses in respect of the minor children in terms of the Rule
43
order.
[29]
His defence that he had an arrangement to pay school fees in lump
sums as and when he had money
flies in the face of the demand from
the school for payment of the school fees as well as the possible
exclusion of the minor children.
There is nothing on the papers to
suggest that the respondent was only obliged to settle school fees by
6 December 2023. The letter
states that if the fees are not paid, the
children face exclusion on 6 December 2023. It is also evident that
school fees are substantially
overdue and likewise the respondent has
been in default with provision of Rule 43 order.
[30]
In considering the respondent’s failure to comply with Rule 43
order and whether he is
in contempt thereof, it is necessary to
consider whether lack of affordability is a defence available to the
respondent.
[31]
The respondent makes the bald allegation that his income varies from
R30 000 to R150 000 per
month. He does not take this court into his
confidence and place a schedule of his monthly income or his annual
financial statements
given that he is self-employed. Against that,
there are sufficient entries on his bank statements which suggests
that the respondent
has incurred unnecessary and luxurious expenses
ranging from regular purchases of liquor and cannabis, branded
clothing, frequent
restaurant and take away purchases as well as
holidays and spa treatments. Ms Ameer who appears for the respondent
tried to explain
away these extravagant expenses by submitting that
some of these expenses were for the minor children and further that
the respondent
is entitled to enjoy luxuries. Even if these
submissions were correct, the expenses in respect of luxuries do not
trump the respondent’s
obligation to obey the letter of the law
and comply with his obligation in terms of the Rule 43 order.
[31]
I am not satisfied that the respondent was unable to meet his
financial obligations in terms
of the order due to lack of
affordability. Indeed, if he was unable to meet his financial
obligations, he ought to have approached
this court to vary the Rule
43 order which was granted two and a half years ago. He simply
chose not to do so until faced
with the contempt application.
[32]
I am therefore satisfied that the respondent is in contempt of the
order of 17 May 2021. Having
found same, I must consider what a
suitable sanction in respect of his contempt.
[33]
Sitting as upper guardian of minor children, the court will not
tolerate failure to meet maintenance
obligations in respect of minor
children. Mr Skinner SC who appears on behalf of the applicant
submits that the respondent ought
to be sentenced to a period of
imprisonment but that same be suspended on condition that he settles
all the arrear school fees
within 7 days of the court granting an
order. I do not believe that this will resolve his contempt of the
court order in totality.
The respondent must also settle all
outstanding rental otherwise the Rule 43 order would be meaningless.
The outstanding rental
is substantial and the respondent must be
afforded 30 days from the granting of this order to pay same.
[34]
In relation to the Rule 43(6) application, the respondent contends
that the order must be varied
to the extent that he can no longer
afford to pay the amounts which he was ordered to pay. Further since
the granting of the Rule
43 order, the applicant has found
employment. Indeed, the applicant admits this and she has put up her
salary advice slip which
reflects her as earning approximately R22
800.00 per month. Mr Skinner SC advised the court that the applicant
may be unemployed
before the end of the year and that the Rule 43(6)
application must therefore be adjourned to be determined when that
event occurs.
I do not believe that this is necessary. The applicant
must cross that bridge when she comes to it.
[35]
The respondent, like in dealing with his opposition to the contempt
application has not taken
this court into his confidence and stated
exactly how much he earns. His bank statements, reflect unnecessary
expenses and a luxurious
lifestyle which I have already mentioned.
The applicant is, however in receipt of an income and has been for
the last nineteen
months. I am thus satisfied that there has been a
material change in circumstance for the Rule 43(6) application to
succeed. The
applicant does have a duty of support to the minor
children and must make some contribution to their financial needs.
[36]
The respondent suggests that the Rule 43 order be varied to delete
the monthly rental payment,
household insurance and medical expenses.
He tenders the cash amount of R15 750.00 per month per child as
maintenance towards the
minor children; payment of fifty percent of
the monthly rates, electricity, water and utilities charges; payment
of the instalments
in respect of the Mercedes-Benz C180 and two
thirds of the educational expenses to the minor children.
[37]
I am satisfied that the applicant must be responsible for payment of
the medical aid contribution
and any excesses not covered by the
medical aid scheme in respect of the minor children. In addition, she
ought to pay one third
of the monthly rental in respect of the leased
premises. I am not satisfied that the respondent has demonstrated
that the applicant
must be ordered to pay one third of the minor
children’s educational expenses. In respect of the cash
maintenance for the
minor children, the sum of R10 500.00 (Ten
Thousand Five Hundred Rands) per month for both children is adequate.
COSTS
[38]
The applicant has been successful in the main application and as a
result the costs of the main
application must follow the result. The
applicant seeks costs on a scale between attorney and client. I am
satisfied that she is
entitled to costs on a punitive scale as it was
evident from the papers that the respondent was always in default of
Rule 43 order
and until the main application was launched, no steps
were taken to vary the order. In the circumstances, the respondent is
liable
for the costs of the main application on a scale as between
attorney and client.
[39]
In relation to the counter application being the application to vary
the Rule 43 order, the usual
order made in applications of this
nature is that costs are reserved for the trial court hearing the
divorce action and I see no
reason to deviate from that tradition.
CONCLUSION
[40]
In the circumstances, I make the following order: -
40.1. In
respect of the main application: -
40.1.1 the
respondent is declared to be in contempt of the order of court of 17
May 2021 under case number D1137/2021;
40.1.2 the respondent is
committed to imprisonment for a period of 30 days which is wholly
suspended for a period of three years
on condition that the
respondent pays: -
40.1.2.1 all outstanding
rental in respect of the immovable property situated at […………………………]
up to and including 30 November 2023 within 30 days of the granting
of this order;
40.1.2.2
all arrear school fees due to [……………..]
in respect of the minor children
on or before 4 December 2023.
40.1.3 the
respondent is directed to pay the costs of the main application on a
scale as between attorney and client.
40.2
In respect of the counter-application, the order granted on 17 May
2021 under case number D1137/2021
is varied as follows: -
40.2.1
paragraphs 1.3.1, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.5 and 1.3.7 are deleted;
40.2.2 the respondent is
directed to pay the following expenses pendente lite;
40.2.2 maintenance in
respect of the minor children at the rate of R10 500-00 per
month;
40.2.2.1
two thirds of the rental in respect of the immovable property
situated at […………………..]
into the applicant’s bank account;
40.2.2.2
fifty percent of the monthly rates, electricity, water and utilities
charges in respect of the said immovable
property;
40.2.2.3
the monthly instalments in respect of the Mercedes Benz C180;
40.2.2.4
the costs of all reasonable education expenses incurred in respect of
the minor children, including private
school fees, stationery, extra
mural activities, sport equipment, uniforms and allied expenses
pendente lite.
40.2.3 the
applicant is directed pendente lite:-
40.2.3.1
to retain the minor children as beneficiaries on her medical aid
scheme and pay
all premiums relating to them including any excess
medical expenses not covered by the said medical aid scheme;
40.2.3.2
pay one third of the monthly rental in respect of the immovable
property
40.3
The costs of the Rule 43(6) application are reserved for the trial
court hearing the divorce action.
R SINGH AJ
Date
of Hearing
: 30
November 2023
Date
of Judgment
:
01
December 2023
APPEARANCES
For
Applicant:
Mr BL
Skinner SC
Instructed
by:
Norton
Rose Fulbright S.A Inc.
3
Pencarrow Park
Pencarrow
Park
LaLucia
Ridge
DURBAN
E-mail:
brian.denny@nortonrosefulbright.com
For
Respondent:
Ms S
Ameer
Instructed
by:
Alvia
Nair Attorneys
4
Hillclimb Road
Pinetown
DURBAN
Email:
alvianair@gmail.com
[1]
Luna Meubels Vervaardigers (EDMS) Bpk v Makin & Ano.(t/a Makin’s
Furniture manufactures)
1977 (4) SA 135
(W) at 137F
[2]
Faki N.O v CC11 Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 (4) SA 326 (SCA) at 333
A-B
[3]
[2002] ZACC 31
;
2003 (2) SA 363
(CC) at 375C TO 376A
[4]
Replication Technology Group v Gallo Africa Ltd
2009 (5) SA 531
(GSJ) AT 549
[5]
Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stillfontein Gold Mining
Company Ltd
2006 (5) SA 333
(W) at 353 H-I
[6]
Culverwell
v Beira
1992 (4) SA 490(W)
AT 494 A to B
[7]
Molefe & Ors v Noge & Ors (22894/2) [2021] ZACPJHC 841 (7
June 2021)
[8]
Graumann v Graumann
1994 (3) SA 477
(W) at 480 C
sino noindex
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