Case Law[2024] ZALAC 2South Africa
Africa Online Operations (Mauritius) Limited v Scanlon and Others (CA01/2023) [2024] ZALAC 2; (2024) 45 ILJ 790 (LAC); [2024] 4 BLLR 357 (LAC) (31 January 2024)
Headnotes
a controlling share of providers of internet services to several companies in Africa, including Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, Zambia, Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.
Judgment
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# South Africa: Labour Appeal Court
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## Africa Online Operations (Mauritius) Limited v Scanlon and Others (CA01/2023) [2024] ZALAC 2; (2024) 45 ILJ 790 (LAC); [2024] 4 BLLR 357 (LAC) (31 January 2024)
Africa Online Operations (Mauritius) Limited v Scanlon and Others (CA01/2023) [2024] ZALAC 2; (2024) 45 ILJ 790 (LAC); [2024] 4 BLLR 357 (LAC) (31 January 2024)
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sino date 31 January 2024
FLYNOTES:
LABOUR – Transfer of contract – Going concern –
Court
below declared transfer had occurred – Placed emphasis on
board’s decision to apply for company liquidation
–
Same directors that served respondent’s board were directors
of appellant – Conclusion of independent
contracts with
appellant and individual employees previously of respondent
confirmed – Appellant manifestly replaced
respondent as
relevant business entity – Transfer confirmed –
Labour
Relations Act 66 of 1995
,
s 197.
THE
LABOUR APPEAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, CAPE TOWN
Reportable
Case
No: CA01/2023
In
the matter between:
AFRICA ONLINE
OPERATIONS (MAURITIUS)
LIMITED
Appellant
and
MICHELE SCANLON AND 13
OTHERS
First to Fourteenth Respondent
ECHO INTERNATIONAL
MANAGEMENT SERVICES
(PTY) LTD (IN
LIQUIDATION)
Fifteenth Respondent
ANGELENE POOLE
N.O.
Sixteenth Respondent
MARLENE ELIZABETH
RETIEF N.O.
Seventeenth Respondent
ECHOTEL PROPRIETARY
LIMITED
Eighteenth Respondent
ECHOTEL INTERNATIONAL
PROPRIETARY LIMITED
Nineteenth
Respondent
ECHO SP SA PROPRIETARY
LIMITED
Twentieth Respondent
Heard:
21 November
2023
Delivered:
__ January 2024
Coram:
Waglay JP, Mlambo JA
et
Davis AJA
JUDGMENT
DAVIS
AJA
Introduction
[1]
This
appeal from the court
a
quo
concerns the question as to whether there was a transfer of business
as a going concern to the appellant from ECHO International
Management Services (Pty) Ltd (EIMS) after the latter was placed in
liquidation in terms of
s 197
A (2) of the Labour Relations Act
[1]
(LRA).
[2]
The court
a
quo
declared that, with effect from 12
March 2020, the employment of first to twelfth respondents had been
so transferred in terms
of s 197 A (2) to the appellant. The order
further directed the appellant to instate the first to twelfth
respondent with full
backpay and without loss of benefits from 12 May
2020 until the date of the order together with interest at the
prescribed rate.
It is against this order that the appellant has
approached this Court on appeal.
The factual background
[3]
The respondent employees were all employed
in the management services company IWays Management Services (IMS)
prior to 1 November
2019. As a subsidiary of the Gondwana
International Networks (GIN) group of companies, IMS provided
management services to business
entities thereof. The GIN group held
a controlling share of providers of internet services to several
companies in Africa, including
Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, Zambia, Namibia,
Tanzania and Zimbabwe.
[4]
In 1990, the ECHO group (through its
holding company ECHOTEL) acquired the business of the GIN Holding
Company and the shares of
businesses in several of the African
subsidiary companies, including the business of IMS. It was agreed
between ECHO group (as
ultimate purchaser) and GIN (as seller) that
the business of IMS would transfer to EIMS as a going concern. The
employees (including
the applicants) would accordingly transfer to
EIMS in terms of s 197 of the LRA.
[5]
The main business of IMS was to provide
Shared Services to the GIN Group. The Shared Services are essentially
centralised management
and support services. These services include
the following, which were provided to the operating companies within
the GIN Group:
1.
Human Resources;
2.
Legal and Regulatory;
3.
Finance;
4.
Technical;
5.
Operations;
6.
Business Support Systems including in
respect of billing; and
7.
Sales and Marketing functions.
[6]
IMS was the central management hub for the
operating companies which were acquired by ECHOTEL. As a result of
the acquisition of
the business of the GIN Group, ECHO took over the
role of IMS.
[7]
According to Mr Jacques Rautenbach, a
director of the appellant, ECHOTEL decided in 2020 that it would no
longer pursue the provision
of centralised management services to its
group subsidiaries. It considered it more effective to move away from
a centralised model
so that each operating company would thus build a
network and add its own or obtain relevant services within their own
market.
The directors of ECHO and EIMS considered that the business
of the latter had no economic prospects and would have to be closed
down. Accordingly, a decision was made to place the company into
voluntary liquidation, a decision that was taken on 28 February
2020.
[8]
Significantly prior thereto, on 31 January
2020, ECHOTEL sought to embark on a s 189 process with the first to
fourteenth respondents
which was aimed at their retrenchments.
However, this process was abandoned prior to the decision to
liquidate EIMS.
[9]
The key to the case of the individual
respondents was their contention that since March 2020, the appellant
carried on the function
of providing shared services which had
previously been undertaken by EIMS. Pursuant thereto, the first to
the twelfth respondents
launched proceedings before the court
a
quo
. They were successful in obtaining
a declarator to the effect that their contracts of employment had
been transferred to the appellant
with effect from 1 March 2020
and that the appellant was obliged to ensure that they receive the
requisite backpay.
The reasoning of the
court
a quo
[10]
The court
a
quo
placed emphasis on the decision of
the board of EIMS to apply for the company to be placed into
liquidation. The very same directors
that served on its board or, at
least some of them, in the view of the court
a
quo
; were directors of the appellant.
Accordingly, De Kock AJ held:
‘
there
was obviously not a sale given that EIMS was voluntarily placed into
liquidation. There was however a transaction that put
the business
into different hands, the transaction being the decision taken to
place EIMS in voluntary liquidation and the decision
that at least
‘some of the shared services’ rendered by EIMS be
continued with or honoured by AOOML This decision taken
allowed ‘some
of the shared services’ to be continued with or
communicating to the MD’s that it will be
business as usual and
that specifically that EIMS’ obligations towards them would be
honoured... resulted in some of the
shared services moving from one
person to the other.’
[11]
De Kock AJ went on to hold that:
‘
insofar
as the same directors were involved in the decision to apply for EIMS
to be voluntarily liquidated and were also involved
in the business
of AOOML, their decision to do so amounts to a transaction which
created rights and obligations that required EIMS
to transfer or at
the very least to undertake to honour any such obligation or at least
part of their ‘shared services’
in favour of AOOML. This
is also then the very action that the respondents argued must have in
place for s197 transfer to take
place, that is some deliberate
handing over or shifting of a business. The transfer did not happen
by coincidence ... and did not
have to arise from the purchase of an
insolvent business. There were indeed two positive steps in this
transfer being the directors
of EIMS and the directors of AOOML who
happen to also have been directors of EIMS.’
The appellant’s
case
[12]
Mr Redding, who appeared together with Mr
Bosch on behalf of the appellant, submitted that the three
fundamental requirements, which
are contained in s 197 of the LRA,
and which must be met before it can be concluded that a transfer of a
going concern had taken
place, are an act of transfer, that the
transfer be of a business which had to be in the form of a going
concern.
[13]
To the extent relevant s 197 of the LRA
reads as follows:
‘
197.
Transfer of contract of employment
(1)
In this section and in section 197A –
(a)
“
business” includes the whole
or part of any business, trade, undertaking or service; and
(b)
“
transfer” means the transfer
of a business by one employer (‘the old employer’) to
another employer (‘the
new employer’) as a going
concern.’
[14]
Mr Redding therefore submitted that the key
to a case of this kind was to locate the identity of the economic
entity which existed
prior to the transfer and the economic entity
that existed after the transfer had taken place. Thus appellant’s
central submission
was that AOOML did not perform the same tasks as
had been undertaken by EIMS prior to its liquidation. It was a
different economic
entity that performed different tasks. In short,
the appellant’s case was based on its contention that the
evidence did not
show that there was an entity (AOOML) which was
designated as a shared services company which would assist the
operating companies
in the same manner as EIMS had prior to its
liquidation. Neither EIMS as an entity nor its business in providing
shared services
in the operating companies was replicated by any
other identity.
[15]
Mr
Redding submitted that the individual respondents could not identify
the individual entity which carried out the EIMS business,
that is
providing shared services to the operating companies. In this
connection, Mr Redding relied on the judgment of the Constitutional
Court in
Road
Traffic Management Corporation v Tasima (Pty) Ltd
[2]
(
Tasima
):
‘
Legal
causa
is a
prerequisite for the application of s197. It follows that only once
the source of the respective rights and obligations to
effect and
receive transfer has been identified, can it be determined whether
the jurisdictional facts for the application of s
197 are present.
Once the legal causa is identified, the factual enquiry outlined in
NEHAWU can be conducted. Thus, an enquiry
as to the
causa
must be conducted before applying the test in s 197 to the facts.’
[16]
In Mr Redding’s view this
dictum
clearly illustrated that, whatever form it takes, a transfer for the
purpose of s 197A involves rights and obligations on or between
the
transferor and the transferee where the former has the obligation to
effect a transfer or allow a transfer to happen and the
transferee
will receive the transfer. In the present case, he submitted that no
transaction was taken to move the business of EIMS
to any other
entity in the Group. No rights or obligations were created in respect
of EIMS which was the alleged transferor or
between EIMS or between
any transferee where EIMS had the obligation to effect a transfer or
allow a transfer to happen and the
transferee would receive the
transfer.
[17]
Furthermore, Mr Redding submitted that the
court
a quo
had no basis for emphasising that the board of directors of EIMS was
the same as AOOML nor was there evidence of a decision by
the board
of AOOML to transfer anything to AOOML nor that it undertook to
honour any obligations or do anything else in respect
of EIMS’
provision of shared services. There was thus no evidence of a
decision by the board of directors of AOOML that the
shared services
performed by the employees in EIMS should be so transferred nor was
there any decision that AOOML would honour
the obligations of EIMS
with respect to shared services.
Evaluation
[18]
The essence of the respondents’ case
was to urge this Court to examine the substance of the steps taken to
liquidate EIMS
and thus the consequent role of AOOML. In this
connection, there was much debate about a letter generated by Mr
Rautenbach of 12
March 2020 in which he informed the interested
parties within the group of the consequences of the liquidation of
EIMS. He wrote:
‘
Please
note that the liquidation of the EIMS does not effect [sic] any of
the businesses outside of South Africa which are held
under a
different group of legal entity so it should be business as usual for
you and your teams.’
He then went on to say:
‘
The
following important points regarding the running of the business are
effective immediate.’
[19]
He noted that a country MD within the group
should report directly to him. He then wrote “
Solid
support calls – need to be logged directly with the Solid
team…
” and further
“
Mauritius and SA client support –
Rudy Cloete would be contracted to Echo Service Provider and would be
responsible for ensuring
that these clients are supported
.”
[20]
Of even greater significance was a letter
written to the Namibian operating company by Mr Rautenbach on 12
March 2020 in which he
said the following:
‘
As
a result, we cannot meet obligations to suppliers and other trading
partners, and the company is as of today, in the hands of
the
liquidators once they are appointed by the court. This means that
with immediate effect, the offices in Parow, Cape Town and
Monte
Casino, Johannesburg are closed and all employees including those
working remotely from Pretoria/ Centurion are no longer
employees of
any Echo Group company.
Please note that the
liquidation of EIMS does not affect any of the businesses outside of
South Africa, which are held under the
different Group legal entity,
so it is business as usual for the teams.
Dharmesh and I remain on
the Board and we would like to reassure you that the Interim Services
Agreement you have with EIMS will
remain unchanged and will be
honoured under Africa Online Operations Mauritius Limited t/a Echo
International.’
[21]
Mr Rautenbach was carefully cross-examined
about a passage in his letter of 12 March 2020 which read thus:
‘
Please
note that the liquidation of EIMS does not affect any of the
businesses outside of South Africa, which are held under a different
Group Legal entity, so it should be business as usual for you and
your teams.’
[22]
The significance of this passage was that
the six individuals mentioned had been employed by EIMS and then,
subsequent to the liquidation,
were contracted to AOOML. Mr Leslie,
on behalf of the individual applicants, put the following to Mr
Rautenbach:
‘
You
were the CEO and you are now telling the OPCOs that you still have
business as usual, you still have access to the following
investment
management team resources who contracted to Echo International
Mauritius in the following capacities.’
To this proposition, Mr
Rautenbach was constrained to answer in the affirmative.
[23]
In order to ensure that the operating
companies enjoyed the services of these key individuals hitherto
employed by EIMS, Mr Rautenbach
conceded that independent contractor
contracts with AOOML and six key individual employees previously of
EIMS had been concluded.
[24]
Mr
Rautenbach
had extreme difficulty in
denying that, with the liquidation of EIMS, AOOML did not ensure
‘business as usual’ as is
evident from the following
extract of cross-examination by Mr Leslie:
‘
In order to ensure
business as usual for the OPCOs you are looking for a new home for
certain of the things that EIMS does.
To ensure business as
usual for the operating companies certain of the services that EIMS
did had to be housed elsewhere within
the group. You are looking for
a new home for them.
MR RAUTENBACH: Can you be
specific around those services, whether they are shared services or
...
MR LESLIE: Yes, the
shares services.
MR RAUTENBACH: Okay.
Well no, I do not agree with that.’
[25]
However, in the cross-examination that followed, Mr Rautenbach could
not rebut
the point that AOOML was not exclusively performing
services itself but it continued to provide shared services as had
EIMS previously.
The way in which Mr Rautenbach described the
post-liquidation position was that it was not feasible immediately to
implement a
decentralised model in that the group was “
building
an aeroplane in the air
”; that is the implementation of a
decentralised model would take time.
[26]
In summary, Mr Rautenbach’s luminously evasive evidence pointed
to one
conclusion,
AOOML
had assumed the
key obligations to the group precisely undertaken by EIMS.
[27]
Of further relevance to the dispute was the treatment and role of the
SOLID
platform. It
was
described as a
‘Single End to End Internet Service Provider’ automation
platform built for fibre, wireless VSAT and
ADSL providers. SOLID
automates lead generation and customer management. It enables
provisioning, billing, collections and customer
support and
self-service functions to customers. It was described by Ms Scanlon,
in her founding affidavit as “
the engine room for the
services provided by the ECHOTEL Group particularly those services
provided by the operating companies
”. According to Ms
Scanlon, without access to the SOLID platform and the services
related to it, the operations of the ECHOTEL
Group would simply not
be able to function. Previously had been centrally managed by EIMS.
After the liquidation of EIMS, AOOML
entered into a contract with
SOLID Tech (Pty) Ltd to retain the SOLID platform. The implication
was that the retention of the SOLID
platform meant the retention of
uninterrupted services to the OPCOs after the liquidation of EIMS,
now to be provided by AOOML.
[28]
Perhaps more tellingly was the basis by which AOOML at the same time
as the
liquidation of
EIMS
took place
sought to contract with six of the previously employed key EIMS
personnel. Further attempts were also made to obtain
the services of
Mr Sedeya and Ms Adams. The independent contracts concluded by these
personnel revealed that in effect they were
to perform the same
activities as they had done as employees of EIMS which had the aim of
ensuring that similar services as previously
provided by EIMS would
now be undertaken by AOOML.
[29]
In its decision, the court
a quo
was correct to look at the
substance as opposed to the form of
these
transactions. Manifestly AOOML replaced EIMS as the relevant
business entity and ensured, as had been promised by Mr Rautenbach
in
his letter of 12 March 2020, to which reference has been made, that
there would be no interruption in services so provided.
[30]
In this,
the
court
a quo
followed a
dictum of the Constitutional Court in
Tasima, supra
at para
15:
‘
Section 197
requires that there must be a transfer of the business. A transfer
entails the movement of the business from one party
to another, and
is a concept that was intended to be widely construed. A transfer
under s 197 can take the form of a myriad of
legal transactions,
including mergers, takeovers, restructuring within companies,
donations and exchanges of assets. In
NEHAWU
, this court held
that the substance rather than the form of the transaction is
relevant to the determination of whether a transfer
has taken place.
The mode of transfer is irrelevant, and it is of no consequence
whether there is a contractual link between the
transferor and the
transferee.’
[31]
To find for the appellant in this case would effectively be to place
form over
the manifest
substance
of the
transaction. The latter was designed to effect a transfer of a going
undertaking but in circumstances where it would subvert
the purposes
of s 197 and the protection that which it provides to employees.
Order
[32]
In the result, the appeal must be dismissed with costs.
DAVIS
AJA
Waglay
JP and Mlambo JA concur.
APPEARANCES:
FOR
THE APPELLANT:
FOR
THE RESPONDENTS:
[1]
Act
66 of 1995, as amended.
[2]
[2020] ZACC 21
; [2020] 41 ILJ 2349 (CC) at para 37.
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