Case Law[2025] ZALCC 48South Africa
Nelutshindwi Community and Another v Nwanedi Communal Property Association and Others (LCC 175/2020) [2025] ZALCC 48 (20 November 2025)
Land Claims Court of South Africa
20 November 2025
Headnotes
SUMMARY: Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994; effect of settlement in terms of section 42D and whether the applicants may avoid an agreement to consolidate claims without reviewing and setting aside the administrative decisions underlying the settlement; exercise of Court’s inquisitorial powers in the interests of justice.
Judgment
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## Nelutshindwi Community and Another v Nwanedi Communal Property Association and Others (LCC 175/2020) [2025] ZALCC 48 (20 November 2025)
Nelutshindwi Community and Another v Nwanedi Communal Property Association and Others (LCC 175/2020) [2025] ZALCC 48 (20 November 2025)
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sino date 20 November 2025
IN
THE LAND COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
HELD
AT RANDBURG
REPORTABLE
CASE NO. LCC 175/2020
In the matter between:
NELUTSHINDWI
COMMUNITY
First Plaintiff
NELUTSHINDWI
ROYAL FAMILY
Second Plaintiff
and
NWANEDI
COMMUNAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATION
First Defendant
NEFOLOVHODWE
COMMUNITY
Second Defendant
THE MINISTER OF RURAL
DEVELOPMENT
AND
LAND REFORM
Third Defendant
THE COMMISSION ON
RESTITUTION
OF
LAND
RIGHTS
Fourth Defendant
THE REGIONAL LAND
CLAIMS COMMISSION
LIMPOPO
PROVINCE
Fifth Defendant
OFFICE OF DEEDS
REGISTRY
LIMPOPO
PROVINCE
Sixth Defendant
DEPARTMENT OF RURAL
DEVELOPMENT
AND
LAND REFORM
Seventh Defendant
NEMALELE
COMMUNITY
Eighth Defendant
RAMBUDA COMMUNITY c/o
RAMBUDA
TERRITORIAL
COUNCIL
Ninth Defendant
NETSHIUNGANI
COMMUNITY
Tenth Defendant
Coram: Cowen DJP
and Majozi AJ
Heard on:
25 August 2025
Delivered
on: 20 November 2025
SUMMARY:
Restitution
of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994
; effect of settlement in terms of
section 42D
and whether the applicants may avoid an agreement to
consolidate claims without reviewing and setting aside the
administrative
decisions underlying the settlement; exercise of
Court’s inquisitorial powers in the interests of justice.
ORDER
1.
It is declared that the relief sought in
the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim dated 22 January 2025 is
incompetent in the absence
of a review of the decision to
administratively settle the merged land claims in terms of section
42D of the Restitution Act taken
by the then Minister on 25 August
2006;
2.
The plaintiffs are, if so advised, directed
to amend their Statement of Claim, within twenty (20) days of this
Order.
3.
There is no order as to costs.
JUDGMENT
MAJOZI
AJ,
Introduction
[1]
The genesis of the dispute before us is an action instituted
by the
first and second plaintiffs, respectively, the Nelutshindwi Community
and the Nelutshindwi Royal Family on 12 November 2020.
In this action
the plaintiffs seek to extract the first plaintiff from a decision of
the then Minister of Land Affairs and Agriculture
(“the
Minister”) taken on 25 August 2006.
[2]
They further seek to have the first defendant’s
ownership of
the farm known as Portions 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the farm Cross 117 MT ,
situated in the Greater Musina District Municipality
in Limpopo (“the
subject farm”) to be effectively rescinded and have the farm
registered in the name of the first plaintiff’s
legal entity,
to be created in due course.
[3]
The subject farm forms part of various immovable properties
that are
registered under and are owned by the first defendant, the Nwanedi
Communal Property Association. These farms were transferred
to the
first defendant as a result of an administrative finalisation of the
restitution of land rights process relating to land
claims lodged by
the ninth defendant, the Rambuda Community.
[4]
The decision to settle the ninth defendant’s
land claim in terms of Section 42D of the Restitution of Land Rights
Act, No.
22 of 1994 (“
the
Restitution Act
”) and restore
inter alia
the subject property to the first defendant (“
the
Decision
”), was taken by the then
Minister on 25 August 2006
[5]
The
precursor to the Decision was an agreement concluded on 29 May 2004
by the first plaintiff, the second defendant (the Nefolovhodwe
Community), the eighth defendant (the Nemalele Community) and tenth
defendant (the Netshiungani Community) that their land claims
be
merged / consolidated into a single land claim, under the name
of the ninth defendant
[1]
[6]
The acceptance criteria memorandum (dated
25 June 2004) which led to the publication of the land claim in terms
of section 11 (1)
of the Restitution Act, similarly records that the
first plaintiff, the second defendant as well as the eighth defendant
and tenth
defendants (who represented the Nephambani and Nelutshindwi
communities) agreed on 29 May 2004 to merge their claims into one
Community
land claim under the name of the ninth defendant.
[7]
Pursuant to this 29 May 2004 agreement, the
recommendation made to the fifth defendant, the Regional Land Claims
Commissioner, Limpopo,
was that the land claim of the Rambuda
Territorial Council (the ninth defendant) be accepted as
prima
facie
valid and be published in the
Government Gazette. The Section 42D memorandum that led to the
Decision, records that the land
claim was in terms of section 11 (1)
of the Restitution Act, published in the Government Gazette on
2 July 2005 and 23 September
2005 respectively.
[8]
The relief that the plaintiffs now seek is
to resile from the agreement and its effects as well as the
consequences of the Decision.
They in effect seek to “
unscramble
the egg”
that is the settlement
of the ninth defendant’s merged land claim. They want to have
the subject property for themselves
and for it to be registered in a
different communal property association.
[9]
The first defendant, which currently owns
the subject property, was borne of the Decision. It was established
in terms of
section 2B
of the
Communal Property Associations Act, 28
of 1996
, with the object of holding land subject to conditions set
out in its Constitution and the
Communal Property Associations Act.
[10
]
The first defendant’s Constitution
states that the Nemalale (eighth defendant), Nefolovhodwe (second
defendant), Nelutshindwi
(first plaintiff), Netshiungani (tenth
defendant) and Rasigidi are communities that were removed from,
inter
alia
, the subject farm as a result of
past racially discriminatory laws and practices.
[11]
The first defendant’s Constitution
further records that the Community, are “
all
members and bona fide members of the households who are entitled to
live on the land”.
It further
records that the “
Community
was successful with their land claim under the
Restitution of Land
Rights Act”
and that it is the
Community’s objective that farms which include the subject farm
be transferred to the first defendant.
[12]
The Constitution of the first defendant
further states that if successful with the application for the
restitution of land rights
(“
the
land claim
”) they shall be
granted,
inter alia
,
the subject property and that, in terms of clause 5 of the
Constitution, the objectives of the first defendant are to hold,
manage,
develop and administer the land on behalf of the Community,
amongst others.
THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY
THE PLAINTIFFS
[13]
Initially, and prior to a Court directed
joinder of the eighth to tenth defendants, the plaintiffs had sought
the following relief:
“
(1)
that the plaintiffs are entitled to restoration of Portion 1, 2, 3
and 4 farm Cross 117
in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act,
No. 22 of 1992 (sic) (as amended);
(2)
that the plaintiff secede from the Nwanedi Communal Property
Association (first Defendant)
with Portion 1, 2, 3 and 4 farm Cross
117 (sic);
(3)
that the third, fourth, fifth and seventh defendants be ordered to
facilitate all
the necessary processes of formation of the new CPA
for the plaintiffs and amendment of the first defendant’s
section 42D
and settling of the new section 42D with the plaintiffs
in respect of Portion 1, 2, 3 and 4 farm Cross 117 M.T within 180
days
from the date of the Court Order (sic);
(4)
that the fourth, fifth and seventh defendants be ordered to take the
necessary steps
for determination of the boundaries of Portion 1, 2,
3 and 4 farm Cross 117 M.T and withdrawal of the first defendant’s
Gazette
and gazetting of the new Gazette for plaintiffs claim in
respect of Portion 1, 2, 3 and 4 farm Cross 117 MT within 180 days
from
date of the Court Order (sic);
(5)
the first defendant be ordered to sign all necessary transfer
documents of Portion
1, 2, 3 and 4 farm Cross 117 MT into the names
of the plaintiffs’ new CPA within 10 days from the date in
which the transferring
attorneys requested them to do so, failing
which the Sheriff with jurisdiction be authorised to sign the
transferring documents
on behalf of the first defendant;
(6)
that the sixth defendant be ordered to transfer Portion 1, 2, 3 and 4
farm Cross 117
MT into the names of the Defendant’s (sic) new
CPA within 30 days from the date of receipt of transferring documents
from
transferring attorneys;
(7)
Costs of suit including the costs of two counsels;
(8)
Further and/or alternative relief.”
[14]
The second defendant opposed the action,
delivered a plea wherein they raise a special plea of
non-joinder of the eighth defendant
and alleging that the Rambuda
Community also had an interest. The second defendant also dealt
with the merits of the plaintiffs’
Statement of Claim,
effectively opposing the relief sought by the plaintiffs.
[15]
On 2 March 2023, the plaintiffs delivered a
replication wherein they denied that the Nemalele and Rambuda
Communities have a direct
and substantial interest in the matter, and
in effect sought that the second defendant’s second plea of
non-joinder be dismissed.
THE CASE MANAGEMENT
AND PRELIMINARY ISSUES
[16]
From about 20 July 2022, the matter was
case-managed in an attempt to have it ready for a hearing. Ultimately
at a pre-trial conference
held on 8 August 2024, the trial readiness
of the matter was discussed and the trial was set down for 25
November 2024 to 6 December
2024.
[17]
Pursuant to the parties’ compliance
with the Directives of this Court, in relation to the certification
of this matter as
ripe for hearing, the matter was in October
2024 certified trial-ready and the latter dates were confirmed for
set down.
[18]
In the course of preparation for trial, the
Court identified preliminary technical issues that required prior
determination before
the matter got immersed into a costly full blown
trial for two weeks. This led to the Court directing
correspondence to the
parties on 23 November 2024. This
correspondence alerted the parties to the Courts’ concerns
about the preliminary technical
issues.
[19]
The Court issued Directives on Monday, 25
November 2024 on the further conduct of the matter.
[20]
The issued Directives set down two issues
for determination. The first was the questions of the Special Plea of
non-joinder raised
by the second defendant. The second but more
primary issue was whether the plaintiffs’ relief is competent.
The second issue
was raised by the Court
mero
motu.
[21]
The question that relates to the second
issue was whether all or any of the relief sought by the plaintiffs
was precluded by the
plaintiffs’ failure to review the
Decision. This issue was then set down for argument on Wednesday, 27
November 2024.
[22]
The parties, including the State
Defendants, were further invited to address the Court by way of
written and oral argument on the
non-joinder of the Nemalele
Community and/or any other Community that has an interest in the
subject farm.
[23]
On 27 November 2024, with the parties’
acquiescence , the matter was converted to a pre-trial conference in
line with the
provisions of section 25(1) read with section 35 of the
Land Court Act, 6 of 2023 and Rule 30 of the Rules of the Land Court.
[24]
In
the interests of justice the Court also invoked its inquisitorial
powers on the relief sought by the plaintiffs and their Statement
of
Claim
[2]
. The Court
explained that the conversion of the hearing into a pre-trial
conference, was for purposes of simplification of
the issues for
determination and a consideration of whether the relief sought by the
plaintiffs was competent in the light of the
administrative decisions
taken by the third to fifth defendants in terms of the Restitution
Act. It was further explained that
the Court’s
prima
facie
view
was that without an attack on the administrative decisions that led
to the settlement of the land claim, those administrative
decisions,
including the Decision, are valid and extant until set aside.
[25]
A further issue discussed at this pre-trial
conference was whether there was a need for the joinder of
other interested and
affected parties.
[26]
It was agreed by the parties and directed
by the Court that:
a.
the eighth defendant was joined to the
proceedings as a defendant;
b.
The trial set down for 25 November 2024 to 6 December 2024 in
Mathale Magistrates' Court would be postponed
sine die
.
c.
The second defendant was directed to consult with members of
the first defendant and file an affidavit by no later than 13
December
2024–
i.
confirming whether there are communities that have been
subsumed under the second defendant and, if so, identify such
subsumed communities;
ii.
indicate whether there are communities that have lodged land
claims on the subject property amongst others but are not part of the
second defendant;
iii.
provide confirmatory affidavits from any other representative
of the subsumed communities.
[27]
The plaintiffs were also granted leave to amend their
pleadings by no later than 24 January 2025 and deliver their amended
pleadings
on all interested and affected parties.
[28]
A pre-trial conference was to be held on 7 March 2025 at 09:00
to consider the further conduct of the matter. This pre-trial
conference
was eventually held on 18 March 2025.
[29]
Significantly, the plaintiffs amended their
pleadings on 22 January 2025 and the second defendant delivered the
affidavit identifying
other communities. This affidavit led to the
joinder of the eight to tenth defendants who were identified as
parties who have a
direct and substantial interest in this matter.
THE PLAINTIFFS’
AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM
[30]
The plaintiffs’ amended Statement of
Claim pertinently does not seek to review and set aside any
administrative decisions
including the Decision. The consequence of
failing to do so now arises for consideration, in circumstances where
the plaintiffs
seeking to detach themselves from the binding
consequences of both the merger and settlement of the land claim.
[31]
Put differently, notwithstanding the
opportunity to amend its pleadings, have the plaintiffs fallen short
of pleading a proper case
that can be adjudicated so as to resolve
the dispute between the parties? This issue was again discussed at
the pre-trial conference
held on 18 March 2024 where further
Directives were issued on the further conduct of the matter.
[32]
At the 18 March 2025 pre-trial
conference the Court reflected on the amended Statement of Claim and
noted that the plaintiffs had
still not sought to review and set
aside the third defendant’s Decision. The plaintiffs’
stance
inter alia
was
that it remained open to it to review the Decision, to the extent
necessary, in the event that it was successful in its action.
[33]
The effect of the settlement of the land
claim in terms of the Decision was again explained to the parties and
the parties were
then invited to file written submissions dealing
with the following issues –
a.
whether or not the relief sought by the
plaintiffs is competent in the light of the authorities listed in the
Directive; and
b.
whether it would be fair to the third
defendant and convenient for the Court and parties to seek a review
and setting aside of the
Decision only if the plaintiffs succeeded in
its action.
[34]
The authorities that the parties were
referred to included –
a.
Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others
2004 (3) All SA 1
(SCA);
b.
MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty)
Ltd t/a Eye and Lazer Institute
2014 (3) SA 481
(CC)
c.
Minister of Land Reform and Others v Thamsanqa Davis Bisset
(982/2023)
[2024 ZASCA 164
(2 December 2024); and
d.
Concerned Land Claimants Organisation of
PE v PE Land and Community Restoration and Others
[2006] ZACC 14
;
2007
(2) SA 531
(CC).
[35]
The parties were further directed to
deliver written argument on this issue and secondly
whether or
not it would be fair to the Minister and convenient for the Court and
parties to seek to review and set aside of the
Decision only if the
plaintiffs succeed in the action
. A hearing was
thereafter scheduled for 25 August 2025.
THE HEARING OF 25
AUGUST 2025
[36]
With the plaintiffs having elected to not
impugn the Decision, amongst other administrative decisions of the
fifth defendant, the
hearing proceeded on 25 August 2025, with the
plaintiffs and the second defendant having delivered written
argument.
[37]
At the hearing, and pursuant to the Court
engaging in a debate on the nature of the decisions taken by the
third to fifth defendants,
the plaintiffs’ Counsel Adv Mulaudzi
accepted that:
a.
the decision to publish a land claim in
terms of section 11 of the Restitution Act is a decision which had
been taken by the fifth
defendant which constitutes administrative
action; and,
b.
that the Decision in terms of section 42D
of the Restitution Act is administrative action.
[38]
In relation to the failure to review the
Decision, the plaintiffs contended that the Cout may
mero
motu
review and set aside
administrative action that stands in the way of the relief they seek.
[39]
The plaintiffs further contended that the
Court may dissolve the first defendant and vary the section 42D
Settlement Agreement.
This, we were told, could be done in terms of
the Court’s inherent powers.
[40]
Adv Mulaudzi also submitted that the
decision to review and set aside the Decision in the manner suggested
by the plaintiffs, would
not be prejudicial to any party.
[41]
Even though he failed to deliver written
argument as directed, the Court permitted Mr Mathebula on behalf of
the State defendants
to make oral submissions. Mr Mathebula argued
that a significant part of this matter is the constitutional promise
of section 25(7)
of the Constitution, being that land must be
restored to those who lost land rights in terms of racially
discriminatory practices
or laws of yore.
[42]
He further argued that there was no need to
revisit the issue of the administrative decisions that were taken by
the third to fifth
defendants. He however submitted that insofar as
the State defendants were concerned, the land claim had been
finalised.
[43]
Mr Mathebula then referred this Court to
the matter of
Tshakuma Community Trust
and Another v Regional Land Claims Commissioner for Province of
Limpopo and Others
(LCC 194/2013
[2023]
ZALCC 20
(11 July 2023). In
Tshakuma
Community Trust
, this Court per Ncube J
held that the acceptance, approval and subsequent publication of a
land claim of the Dombo Community in
terms of Section 11 of the
Restitution Act was irregular and was liable to be set aside on
review.
[44]
In terms of paragraph 2 of the Order
granted at paragraph 19 of the Judgment, Ncube J reviewed and set
aside the acceptance and
publication the Dombo Community land claim.
[45]
Considered in context, the judgment of
Ncube J in
Tshakuma Community Trust
accentuates the concerns that this
Court raised in this matter. The learned Judge found that
the decision to accept
the claim and publish it in a Government
Gazette in terms of section 11 of the Restitution Act was a
reviewable decision and, in
the circumstances of that case, went on
to review it and set it aside.
[46]
On behalf of the second defendant, the
submissions by Adv Ngwana were that the Directive of this Court given
on 2 May 2025 was clear
and the plaintiffs had failed to deal
therewith. The second defendant contended that the plaintiffs’
failure to impugn
the Decision as well as the failure to review and
set aside administrative decisions that led to it were fatal to the
application.
The effect of the relief that the plaintiffs
sought is that the Court would, if it granted it, be creating an
untenable situation
of creating two Communal Property Associations
that would have ownership of the subject property.
[47]
Mr Ngwana further submitted that the
plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim defines the case that second
defendant was called upon
to meet. He argued that the plaintiffs had
not pleaded a case supporting the submission that the Court could
mero motu
review the Decision and other administrative decisions.
[48]
The competent order, according to the
second defendant would be to declare the plaintiffs’ Statement
of Claim to be incompetent
for failure to impugn the foundational
decisions that led to the settlement of the land claim.
[49]
It is clear, on trite authorities including
the
Oudekraal
judgment, that administrative decisions stand and are valid until
reviewed and set aside by a competent court. We have also searched
in
vain for authority supporting the proposition that a court may
mero
motu
review and set aside decisions of
an organ of state.
[50]
This means that but for the joinder of
interested and affected parties, the substantive issues have not been
progressed, and the
pleadings are in practically in the same position
as they were in, when the pre-trial conference of 27 November 2024
was held.
THE
RELIEF SOUGHT IS INCOMPETENT
[51]
The issue of land and restorative justice
which is what the land restitution programme is about is an emotive
one and central to
the transformative ideals of the Constitution.
This is why matters that are before this Court and pivot on
constitutional rights
ought not be approached with tabulated
legalism. Approaching matters such as this one with the legal
rigidity of a commercial
dispute would stultify restorative justice
and be antithetical to the interests of justice. This
consideration and tenet,
informs the inquisitorial approach we have
taken in this matter.
[52]
Had the matter run its ordinary, course,
the Court would have proceeded to hear evidence over a potentially
extended period, at
great cost to the parties and expenditure of
judicial resources, only to conclude at that stage that an amendment
to the pleadings
was necessary for the relief to be competent or that
the action should be dismissed.
The
interests of justice in a land restitution setting, dictate that we
should have a more considered approach.
[53]
This
Court has inquisitorial powers that have to be invoked in the
interests of justice. Albeit opaquely pleaded, this court cannot
be
oblivious to the substantive issues averred in the plaintiffs’
Statement of Claim which summon judicial intervention.
There are many
judgments of this Court that dealt with the fourth defendant’s
unlawful merging or “piggy-backing”
of land restitution
claims
[3]
. Justice demands
that the averments pertaining to an unlawful merger of land claims be
ventilated.
[54]
Instead of dismissing the plaintiffs’
actions, the interest of justice directs us to ensure that the
plaintiffs are not precluded
from ventilating their case. This is
also done in terms of this Court’s inquisitorial powers and our
obligation to ensure
that there is a just and equitable outcome to
the dispute.
[55]
The relief sought by the plaintiffs in the
amended Statement of Claim is incompetent in the absence of a review
of the decision
to Gazette the merged claim and the Decision, and the
Court does not have an inherent power to
mero
motu
review and set aside
administrative or statutory decisions. This inhibits us from
presiding over the matter at a protracted trial
when it is clear that
the plaintiffs’ pleading is fatally defective, as currently
framed. Doing that would be a misuse of
strained judicial resources.
[56]
Due to the fact that the issue relating to
the decision to publish the ninth defendant’s land claim in
terms of section 11(1)
of the Restitution Act was not directly raised
in the directives we issued, we do not make an order relating to it.
However, the
issue was ventilated in the hearing and it is apposite
to state that the same considerations would apply to that decision,
which
would accordingly also have to be reviewed and set aside. Had
we raised it in the Directives, we would have been in a position to
direct that the same approach be adopted by the Plaintiffs in
relation to the amendment of their Statement of Claim.
[57]
The approach we take in this matter is
analogous to a High Court finding that a pleading is in terms of
Uniform Rule 23 of the Rules
of the High Court, excipiable. This we
do in the interest of justice and in the exercise of our
inquisitorial powers.
[58]
The order we hand down directs the
plaintiffs, if so advised, to amend their Statement of Claim to
ensure that the Decision is impugned
in their Statement of Claim and
the prayers they seek. This amendment must be effected with 20 days
of this order. Should
they fail to do so, the defendants will
be at liberty to approach this Court and seek the dismissal of the
plaintiffs’ claim.
[59]
In the premises the following order is
granted:
1.
It is declared that the relief sought in the plaintiff’s
Statement of Claim
dated 22 January 2025 is incompetent in the
absence of a review of the decision to administratively settle the
merged land claims
in terms of section 42D of the Restitution Act
taken by the then Minister on 25 August 2006;
2.
The plaintiffs are, if so advised, directed to amend their Statement
of Claim,
within twenty (20) days of this Order.
3.
There is no order as to costs
MAJOZI
AJ
COWEN
DJP
For
the Plaintiffs:
Adv
MR Mulaudzi
Instructed
by Mabuku Mangena Attorneys Inc
For
the Second Defendant:
Adv
TI Ngwana
Instructed
by Denga Attorneys
For
the Third to Fifth Defendants:
Mr. S
Mathebula
State
Attorney, Pretoria
[1]
These
Communities had lodged land claims through Ndwakhulu Alfred
Nefolovhodwe and Thifhulufheli Muvhango Phineas Nelutshindu.
[2]
Mlifi
v Klingenberg
1999
(2) SA 674
(LCC) para 110 and 111
[3]
Shongwe
No and 3 Others v The Regional Land Claims Commissioner: Mpumalanga
and 18 Others
(Unreported judgment) ZALCC 1 (12 April 2012) and
Mdumane
Community Trust and Others v Land Claims Commission and Others
[2015] ZALCC 1
(19 November 2015)
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