PETROZIM LINE (PRIVATE) LIMITED v HOVA (16 of 2026) [2026] ZWLC 16 (26 January 2026)

**IN THE LABOUR COURT OF ZIMBABWE JUDGMENT NO. LC/H/16/26** **HELD AT HARARE 14 JANUARY 2026 CASE NO. LC/H/997/25** **AND 26 JANUARY 2026** **IN THE MATTER BETWEEN:** **PETROZIM LINE (PRIVATE) LIMITED APPLICANT** **AND** **SAMUEL HOVA RESPONDENT** **Before Honourable Mr. Justice L.M. Murasi** **For Applicant Mr. C.J. Mahara** **Respondent In Person** **MURASI J.,** **INTRODUCTION** Applicant is Respondent’s former employer. Applicant determined that Respondent had committed an act of misconduct and Respondent was brought before a disciplinary committee which committee found the Respondent guilty and recommended his dismissal from employment. Respondent was dissatisfied with this outcome and approached this Court on review. This Court, per MUSARIRI J in case number LCH 180/24, determined that the disciplinary committee’s proceedings were fraught with irregularities and set aside those proceedings, ordering a hearing _de novo_ to be held within sixty (60) days of the date of that Order. Applicant failed or neglected to comply with the Court’s Order resulting in the Respondent knocking on the Court’s door for a second time. The matter was brough before CHIVIZHE J. The Learned Judge made the ruling that Applicant was to hold the hearing within thirty (30) days. A further order was made that if the Applicant failed to comply with the latest order, it was to reinstate the Respondent or alternatively pay him damages _in lieu_ of such reinstatement. The hearing ordered by CHIVIZHE J was not held within the 30-day period resulting in another review application in Case Number LCH/468/25. This Court granted the application for review and further ordered compliance with the previous order made by CHIVIZHE J. Applicant is disgruntled and intends to approach the Supreme Court on appeal. Applicant failed to make the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court in terms of the Rules and therefore applies for condonation of the late filing of an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and leave to appeal to that Court. Applicant has branded the application a “hybrid application for late filing of an application for leave to appeal and for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court…The application is being made in terms of section 92 F (2) of the Labour (Court) Act (Chapter 28:01) as read with Rules 14, 32 and 43 of the Labour Court Rules, 2017.” Applicant’s prospective grounds of appeal are as follows: 1. The Court _a quo_ erred in law by failing to hold that the Respondent waived his right to challenge the procedural propriety of the disciplinary hearing, in circumstances where his appointed Disciplinary Committee members had accepted an extension of the notice period to prepare for the hearing. 2. _A fortiori_ , the Court _a quo_ erred in law by making a finding that the Respondent (Appellant) had not complied with paragraph 3 of the operative part of Judgment LCH 101/25, which required the disciplinary hearing to be conducted within thirty days. 3. The Court _a quo_ erred in law by ordering the Appellant to comply with paragraphs 5 and 6 of the operative part of Judgment LCH 101/25, without considering that those provisions were inapplicable to the Respondent, who remained suspended and was not dismissed from employment. Consequently, payment of damages _in lieu_ of reinstatement cannot be competent. **PRELIMINARY ISSUES** At the commencement of the proceedings, Respondent who was representing himself, stated that Applicant was approaching the Court with dirty hands as it was refusing to pay the taxed bill of costs from previous proceedings. He stated that Applicant was bent on wearing him down so that he will be unable to sustain the relentless avalanche of court proceedings. He produced the taxed bill of costs from the Supreme Court for Case Number SC 96/24 with a taxed amount of USD 1784-08. He prayed that the matter be stayed pending the payment of the taxed bill of costs. In response, _Mr. Mahara_ stated that he was unaware of the taxed bill of costs as another law firm, Maguchu and Muchada, was handling the matter in the Supreme Court. When asked by the Court why he had not acted when the issue was raised in the present application, he responded that he had not received the correct information from the Applicant as the taxation took place after the present application had been filed. A look at the proceedings being brought against the Respondent, any reasonable person would be apprehensive of the nature of costs that Respondent needs to meet. On record, there are two different law firms who are seized with the same matter against the Respondent. The Applicant decided to appeal against the decision of MUSARIRI J. That matter before the Supreme Court was struck off the roll and Applicant intends to revive it. Meanwhile, this Court is also saddled with another matter arising from the same cause of action. Respondent has been to this Court on numerous occasions regarding the same matter. It would be a sad indictment on the justice system were it to be truth that the intention behind the legal proceedings is to ‘wear down the other party.’ This Court declines to go in that direction without facts. _Mr. Mahara_ undertook, as an officer of the Court, to ensure that the payment was attended to by the Applicant as expeditiously as possible. To this end, the Court was of the view that the present proceedings could be held. **THE ‘HYBRID’ APPLICATION** Before dealing with the merits, the Court had occasion to interact with _Mr. Mahara_ as regards the ‘hybrid’ application he had filed. The fact that he used the acronym ‘hybrid’ clearly indicates that it is an application not provided for in the Labour Court Rules. The Court informed him that an application for condonation of the late filing of an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court would of necessity contain the following information: * The explanation for the delay. * The judgment sought to be appealed against. * The prospective grounds of appeal. * The prospects of success on appeal and other ancillary matters connected with such an application. The Court further explained that in dealing with such an application, a Court would of necessity deal with the condonation first and then the prospects of success based on the prospective grounds of appeal. _Mr. Mahara_ pointed out that he was relying on the decision in**ZACC v Mangwiro & Anor **SC 11/22. He did not go further to make the observation that there was another case which conflicted with the **ZACC v Mangwiro case**. This case is **Chomurema v TelOne** SC 86/24. It must be recorded that both these cases were determined by Judges of Appeal sitting in Chambers. The conundrum was later addressed in **Muriel Mandengu and Twelve Others v Shearwater Adventures (Private) Limited & Anor **SC 48/25. The decision seeks to resolve the apparent confusion emanating from the aforementioned judgments of the same Court. MATHONSI JA had this to say at page 11 of the cyclostyled judgment: “A conundrum has been created where two judges of this Court, sitting in chambers, have issued conflicting judgments on the same issue.” Later, on the same page: “The time has come to unravel the conundrum that eventuates from the judgments from this Court penned by single judges in Chambers. This is because the litigating public expects the highest Court in the land to give a definitive position of what the law is and the current position is undesirable to say the least. In that regard it has become necessary for me to secure the concurrence of two other judges of this Court on the position I take.” This Court makes the observation that the Learned Judge begins of that decision in the following manner: _“This is a_ _**composite application**_ _for condonation of the late filing of an application for leave to appeal and also for leave to appeal and the extension of time within which to appeal.__**It is made in terms of rr 66 and 67 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2025.”**_ Rule 66 of the Supreme Court Rules generally provides for the timelines within which appeals may be filed with the Supreme Court. Rule 67 is more telling. It provides: “Save where it is expressly or by necessary implication prohibited by the enactment concerned, a judge may, if special circumstances are shown by way of an application in writing, condone the late noting of the appeal and extend the time laid down, whether by rule 66 or by the enactment concerned, for instituting an appeal; Provided that where the judge dismisses an application filed in terms of this rule, he or she shall do so with the concurrence of two other judges appointed for that purpose by the Senior Judge of the Court.” This shows that the Supreme Court is also a creature of statute and it cannot go outside that which is provided in terms of statute. Page 12 of the judgment contains the following pertinent observations by the Learned Judge: “I take the view that the circumstances of this case demand that the grant of condonation be considered if for nothing else, but for the conflicting judgments alluded to above which have led applicants to where they are now.__In any event, both the Labour Act and the Rules of Court are silent__ on what happens where condonation for the late approach for leave is refused resulting in the Labour Court not considering the application for leave.” It is apposite that I should make the observation that no legal practitioner appearing in this Court has pointed to a specific finding or wording from the **ZACC and Chomurema** judgments that the Labour Court is permitted in terms of existing statutes to hear a “Conjoined’ or “Hybrid” application. As pointed out by MATHONSI JA, both the Labour Act and the Rules of Court ‘are silent’. Presently, Applicant purports to file the ‘hybrid’ application in terms of Rules 14, 32 and 43 of the Labour Court Rules. Rule 14 deals with applications in general. Rule 32 deals with Departure from the Rules. Rule 32 is prefaced thus: “At any time before or during the hearing of a matter, a Judge or Court may..” A reading of the Rule leads to the inescapable conclusion that there must be a matter already before the Court when one has regard to the use of the word ‘the’. It cannot be stretched to mean departure to accommodate a matter which has not been filed in terms of the Act or other enactment as stated in **NRZ v ZARU** by ZIYAMBI JA. The reference by the Applicant to Rule 43 of the Labour Court Rules is a mere red herring as that Rule provides for an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court _made timeously_ and **NOT** condonation. It is therefore my considered view that a ‘hybrid’ application is not provided for both in terms of the Labour Act and the Rules of Court. At the end of the discourse, _Mr. Mahara_ stated that he appreciated the Court’s position in that regard. The Court was however prepared to ‘look the other way’ and proceed to deal with the application for condonation on the merits. _Mr. Mahara_ also informed the Court that the appeal against the decision by MUSARIRI J had now been set down in the Supreme Court. The Court’s view was that Applicant’s disgruntlement with this Court ‘s decision was in respect of the Order by CHIVIZHE J, which decision had not been appealed against and was extant. **THE MERITS** **APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS** In submissions on the extent of the delay, _Mr. Mahara_ stated that Applicant had initially filed an application for leave to appeal timeously. He further stated that the application was later struck off the roll as it was deemed to be defective. He also stated that after the application had been struck off the roll, it took the Applicant some fifteen (15) days to file the present application. He surmised that the period amounted to some two (2) months and that this could not be regarded as inordinate in the circumstances. Asked by the Court whether the defect had not been brought to Applicant’s attention, he confirmed that indeed the defect had been raised in Respondent’s documents. Further asked by the Court as to why the Applicant had not attended to the defect prior to the date of the hearing, Mr. Mahara responded by stating that Applicant formulated the view that the documents filed depicted the correct legal position. In the heads of argument, argument was placed on the precedent such as **Mbatha v Ncube & Anor** CCZ 07/23 and **Cordier v Cordier** 1984 (4) SA 520. On the issue of prospects of success, _Mr. Mahara_ submitted that the first and second grounds of appeal essentially raised one issue which was concerned with waiver. He reiterated what was in the documents filed of record that Respondent had waived his rights to complain as he had agreed to the process through his appointed representatives. Particularly paragraphs 26 to 28 of the Founding Affidavit reveal the following: “26. The Applicant’s complaint in the first and consequently, in respect of the second intended grounds of appeal is that the Court _a quo_ erred in failing to find that the Respondent had waived his right to challenge the procedural propriety of the disciplinary hearing, particularly in circumstances where his nominated members of the Disciplinary Committee had expressly accepted an extension of the notice period granted to prepare for the hearing. 27\. I am advised by the Applicant’s legal practitioners that such waiver specifically pertains to the alleged irregularity surrounding notice of the hearing, which was extended and accepted by the committee members appointed by the Respondent. 28\. The waiver is based on the committee members’ acceptance of the extended notice period for receiving documentation pertinent to the disciplinary hearing, as contemplated under section 15 (d) of the Zimbabwe Industry Employment Code of Conduct. It must be noted that no objection was raised regarding the extension, and the record reflects unequivocal acceptance of the proceedings.” It was _Mr. Mahara’s_ contention that Respondent could not run away from the decisions made on his behalf by the persons appointed to the disciplinary committee. In respect of the third ground of appeal, it was submitted that the Court _a quo_ had erred in law by ordering the Applicant to comply with paragraphs 5 and 6 of the operative part of the CHIVIZHE J judgment without considering that those provisions were inapplicable to the Respondent who remained suspended and was not dismissed from employment thus making the order for payment of damages in lieu of reinstatement incompetent. The following cases were relied upon in the heads of argument: * **Selk Enterprises v Chimenya & Ors** SC 10/03 * **Chikurunhe f Zimbabwe Financial Holdings** SC 08/08 * **Godfrey Mugari v Chinhoyi University of Technology** SC 126/23 * **Essop v S** [[2016] ZASCA 114](/akn/za/judgment/zasca/2016/114). During submissions on the third ground of appeal, _Mr. Mahara_ started by alluding to the fact that this Court was entitled to discard the operative part of the CHIVIZHE J Order as it was allowed to regard it as persuasive. The Court brought to his attention that a Judge could regard reasons for arriving at a decision as persuasive but could not ignore an Order issued by another Judge as it amounted to being a judgment of the Labour Court and not that of a particular Judge. However, _Mr. Mahara_ did not seem to appreciate the Court’s sentiments, and the issue will be addressed fully later in the judgment. **RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS** Respondent’s oral submissions were brief. He stated that the Applicant’s Code of conduct is clear as to how matters are handled. He further stated that the Code provides for when and how hearings are to commence and that all preliminary issues are supposed to be dealt with before the hearing. He added that section 20 of the Code provides that when all preliminary issues are dealt with, the hearing would then commence and as such section 19 deals with housekeeping issues. He submitted that on the 23rd, Respondent raised issues dealing with the appropriateness of proceeding with the hearing on the last of the permitted period granted by the Court. He stated that the Committee agreed to deal with this preliminary and the Respondent and his representative were told to leave the hearing. He further submitted that the deliberations were done and the decision arrived at in their absence. He added that they were only called in to be told of the decision by the Committee. As far as the issue of suspension was concerned, Respondent stated that the Code provided that an employee was not supposed to be suspended for a period in excess of 14 days without salary and benefits. Respondent also stated that the issue had been raised before the same Committee on the 23rd and that the matter should be resolved before the hearing could proceed. He stated that the response was as follows: “Our hands are tied, we can’t do that.” On the issue of waiver, Respondent submitted that he had his own representative, one Mr. Mutasa as the Code provided that an employee was entitled to bring a representative of his/her choice. He argued that any members that were appointed become part of the Committee as provided by the Code of Conduct and do not represent the employee being charged with misconduct. He further argued that his representative and himself could not have agreed to the postponement as they are the ones who had raised the issue in the first place. He pointed out that the Committee had declined to deal with the suspension issue when this had been resolved by the Court Order which Applicant had not appealed against and was extant. The following pertinent points are raised in Respondent’s opposing affidavit: “21. Ground 1 and2. It is absurd and legally untenable for the Applicant to suggest that a disciplinary committee, convened to adjudicate over a matter, could waive the rights of a litigant without that litigant’s consent. The inclusion of Workers’ Committee members on a disciplinary panel does not transform them into representatives of the accused employee. Their role is not to act on my behalf but rather to ensure that the proceedings are conducted fairly and judiciously in accordance with the applicable Code of Conduct. 22\. I was entitled to representation of my own choosing, and I was so represented. My duly appointed representative never waived any of my procedural or substantive rights. The Applicant’s contention to the contrary is a desperate distortion of both fact and law. This ground of appeal is therefore baseless, misconceived and incapable of overturning this Honourable Court’s well-reasoned judgment. It is a ground that carries no iota of merit and should be dismissed outright. 23\. The Applicant’s argument under Ground 3 is devoid of merit and cannot stand in the face of the extant judgment in LC/H/101/25, which remains valid and has never been challenged, appealed or set aside. In that judgment, the Court expressly directed the Applicant to convene a fresh hearing within thirty (30) days, during which I would remain on suspension. The Court further ordered that should the Applicant fail to comply within that period, I would be reinstated with full pay and benefits, or, where reinstatement was no longer tenable, the Applicant would be required to pay damages in lieu of reinstatement.” **ANALYSIS** Generally, in nearly every court, applications for condonation of the failure to comply with the court’s rules have become commonplace. As observed by a learned judge, the courts have been seen to be dealing more with pleas for mercy and exercising indulgence rather than being requested to deal with the merits of a matter. This has resulted in a plethora of judgments dealing with the principles which are applicable to condonation applications. This is not to say such applications are unwelcome but rather to make the observation of the extent to which the non-observance of court rules has reached. In **Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union on behalf of Zungu v SA Local Government Bargaining Council and Others** (2010) 31 ILJ 1413 LC at para [13], it was held as follows: “In explaining the reason for the delay, it is necessary for the party seeking condonation to fully explain the reason for the delay in order for the court to be in a proper position to assess whether or not the explanation is a good one. This in my view requires an explanation which covers the full length of the delay. The mere listing of significant events which took place during the period in question without an explanation for the time that lapsed between these events does not place a court in a position properly to assess the explanation for the delay. This amounts to nothing more than a recordal of the dates relevant to the processing of a dispute or application, as the case may be.” In **Tel-One (Pvt) Ltd v Communication and Allied Services Workers Union of Zimbabwe** SC 01/06, GWAUNZA JA (as she then was) stated the following: “Essentially, in an application of this nature, the applicant must satisfy the court firstly, that he has a reasonable explanation for the delay in question and secondly, that his prospects of success on appeal are good.” The explanation tendered on behalf of Applicant was that previously, the Applicant had timeously filed an application for leave to appeal. However, this application had been struck off the roll as it was deemed to be defective. Asked by the Court as to whether the defect had not been brought to the attention of Applicant’s legal practitioners, _Mr. Mahara_ responded that the defect had been raised in Respondent’s opposing papers. Further asked by the Court as to why Applicant’s legal practitioners had not attended to the defective application before the hearing. _Mr. Mahara’s_ response was to the effect that Applicant’s legal practitioners formulated the view that what had been filed was legally proper even though no research had been done on the point raised by the Respondent. The present application was filed some fifteen days after the previous application had been struck off the roll. Firstly, there is no explanation tendered by the Applicant’s legal practitioners why it took fifteen days to file the present application. Secondly, there is no Supporting Affidavit from Applicant’s legal practitioners to explain to the Court what really transpired between the Court’s judgment sought to be appealed against and the time of filing the present application. The Applicant’s legal practitioners have not ‘owned up’ to the error made in the defective application by way of explanation. It was stated in **Charles Marevesa v TelOne (Private) Limited** SC 32/19 as follows: “However, as practice would require, no supporting affidavit from the said legal practitioner was attached accepting blame for the defective notice of appeal.” There is therefore a ‘recordal’ of events without the explanation for the delay. No further explanation is tendered as why it took the Applicant’s legal practitioners some fifteen days to file the present application. In **Ganda v First Mutual Life Assurance Society** SC 01/05, it was stated that: “In addition, it is pertinent to note that it has been stated in a number of cases that a person seeking condonation of the late noting of an appeal _should give a reasonable explanation, not only for the delay in noting the appeal, but also for the delay in seeking condonation.”_ As stated earlier, it is not sufficient to list a series of happenings without according to each happening an explanation. Such explanation is to be found in the Founding Affidavit or Supporting Affidavit. This is not so in the present case. As stated in **Zimslate Quartzite (Pvt) Ltd & Ors v Central African Building Society** SC 34/17, an applicant who has infringed the rules of court must explain the reasons for the infraction and must take the court into his confidence and give an honest account of the default. An applicant who takes the attitude that indulgencies, which include condonation, are there for the taking will be taking a calculated risk. In my considered view, no reasonable and acceptable explanation has been proffered for the delay in filing the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. **PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS** The Court notes the precedent cited by the Applicant in addressing the issue on prospects of success on appeal. As stated in **Essop v S,** _supra,_ the prospects of success must show a realistic chance of succeeding and not merely a possibility of success. The Court will first address the third prospective ground of appeal. _Mr. Mahara_ hesitantly conceded that there were remote chances of success as the point he was raising was that the decision of CHIVIZHE J had persuasive authority on this Court and that the Court could have departed from that Order. That is clearly not correct. The Court was not dealing with reasons for the Order but the effect of the Order itself which was extant. This issue was put to rest by MAKARAU JA (as she then was) in **Jacob Bethel Corporation v Emmanuel Chikuya** SC 48/19. At page 4 of the cyclostyle judgment, the Learned Judge makes the following observation: “An appropriate staring point would be to note in passing that a judgment does not belong to the judge who authors it. It is a judgment of the court to which the judge is appointed. Once it is correctly viewed that judgments are passed by the institution and not the individual members who constitute the court, sentiments tending to denote personal claims to judgments as are to be discerned in the judgment a quo become clearly misplaced.” In respect of the third ground of appeal, Applicant took issue with this Court’s reference to the Order issued by CHIVIZHE J. This order has not been appealed against or set aside. It is extant. Applicant has refused, neglected or failed to comply with it. There are therefore no prospects of success on appeal as regards this ground of appeal. The first and second grounds of appeal should not detain the Court. Applicant takes the point that Respondent waived his rights in agreeing to a postponement of the matter from the 23rd to the 28th. Firstly, waiver is a factual issue. _Mr. Mahara_ agreed with the Respondent that when the Respondent raised the issue of non-compliance with the Court Order this was on the last day permitted by the Court Order. He also agreed that when the deliberations were made by the Committee, Respondent and his representative were not part of the deliberations and were outside. The Respondent was only advised of the decision at a later stage. Secondly, it is not correct legally that members of a disciplinary committee represent a certain individual. The nominated individuals become part of the committee. Such membership is a statutory requirement. As pointed out by Respondent, if those members referred to by the Applicant were Respondent’s representatives, there would be no need for the Code to provide that an accused employee was entitled to be represented by a person of his choice. I find Applicant’s averments in this regard to be a novel argument which has no legal basis. There was reliance by Applicant on **Pacprint (Pvt) Ltd v Kumbula & Ors** SC 67/17 in support of its contention. That case is clearly distinguishable as the members of the Committee had declined to participate in the Disciplinary Committee and the Supreme Court held that they could not frustrate the disciplinary proceedings. In the present case, the Committee agreed to postpone the proceedings despite the contentions of the Respondent to the contrary. In any event the above case is not authority for the fact that members of the Workers Committee who are part of a Disciplinary Committee represent the individual interests of an accused employee. The facts of this case militate against making a finding that the Respondent waived his rights and his representative was against any postponement or hearing of the matter having regard to the timelines given in the Court Order as raised by the Respondent. The first and second grounds of appeal are based on a factual issue of whether or not the Respondent waived his right to oppose the postponement of the hearing as members of the Committee had accepted such postponement. The facts clearly show that the Respondent and his representative were not part and parcel to postpone the hearing. In letting such a matter proceed to the Supreme Court would be tantamount to asking the Supreme Court to revisit the entire dispute and exercise a fresh discretion in the matter. There are no prospects of success on appeal. I now turn to the issue of costs. In his opposition affidavit, Respondent has gone to some length stating that Applicant’s actions are intended to ‘wear him down’ and that the application is frivolous and has no prospects of success. Respondent has also stated that Applicant should be visited with punitive costs. A reading of the record and hearing the submissions would tend to show that the arguments tendered by Applicant were not those made with intent to have the Supreme Court deal with such issues particularly that raised in the third ground of appeal. The first and second grounds of appeal were not based on any legal principle showing that members of a disciplinary committee ‘represent’ accused employees. In **Selex Es v State Procurement Board & Ors** SC 45/16 it was held as follows: “While parties and lawyers are entitled to have their day in court, they must exercise that right responsibly with due care and diligently not abuse court process. It is rather unethical and abuse of court process for litigants and particularly lawyers to waste the court’s valuable time presenting dead unarguable cases inn the vain hope that flogging a dead horse will somehow resurrect it to life.” It is my considered view that had Applicant’s legal practitioners diligently analysed the law and the facts, they would have arrived at the correct decision as to whether to pursue the present matter or not. The Respondent is thus entitled to costs on a punitive scale. This Court has already pronounced its views on the ‘hybrid’ application and stated that it was proceeding to deal with the Application for condonation and extension of time in which to file an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and not the ‘second leg’ of the application. In the result, the Court makes the following Order. 1. The application for condonation of the late filing of an application and extension of time in which to file an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. 2. Applicant to meet Respondent’s costs on a legal practitioner/ client scale. Muvingi & Mugadza legal practitioners- Applicant’s legal practitioners. 5