Case LawGhana
ARMAR VSRS ADU (J4/18/2023) [2024] GHASC 32 (17 April 2024)
Supreme Court of Ghana
17 April 2024
Judgment
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE SUPREME COURT
ACCRA – A.D. 2024
CORAM: OWUSU (MS.) JSC (PRESIDING)
LOVEVELACE-JOHNSON (MS.) JSC
PROF. MENSA-BONSU (MRS.) JSC
ASIEDU JSC
KOOMSON JSC
CIVIL APPEAL
NO. J4/18/2023
17TH APRIL, 2024
NATHANIEL ADJEIDU ARMAR ………… PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT
VS.
1. MAVIS ADU DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS/
2. SAMUEL ALABI BORTEY APPELLANTS
3. SARAH BORTIOKOR BORTEY
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
KOOMSON JSC:
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 20th January 2022. The
Court of Appeal set aside the Judgment of the High Court which went in favour of the
Defendant/Respondent/Appellant and in its place entered judgment for the
Page 1 of 16
Plaintiff/Appellant/Respondent. It is this decision of the Court of Appeal that the
Defendant/Respondents/Appellants have invoked the appellate jurisdiction of this Court praying
for a restoration of the decision of the High Court.
The Plaintiff/Appellant/Respondent shall be referred to in this judgment as the “Plaintiff” and the
Defendants/Respondents/Appellants as “Defendants”.
This is a land dispute in which both the Plaintiff and the Defendants trace their root of title to the
same grantor, Osu Stool.
FACTS
The Plaintiff per his writ of summons describes his land as:
“All that piece of land in extent 0.061 hectares (0.515 of an acre) more of less being parcel
No. 0.12 Block 9 Section 2 situate at Dzorwulu Accra which is delineated on Land Title
Registry as No. GA14159”.
On the other hand, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants described their land as:
“All that situate and being at Mamobi Dzorwulu. It is the case of the Defendants that their
land is bound on the North by an existing road measuring 200feet more or less, on the
South by a proposed road measuring 200feet more or less, on the East by the property of
Nii Noi Kwame measuring 200feet more or less and on the West by a proposed road
measuring 200feet more or less …”
The Defendants also in a Counterclaim asked for:
i) Delivery up of Plaintiff’s Land Title Certificate for cancellation of same
ii) An order of perpetual injunction against the Plaintiff whether by himself or through his
agents workmen or privies or any of them or otherwise howsoever from entering on
and in any way dealing with or interfering with the said piece of land which is subject
matter of the instant suit.
Page 2 of 16
iii) costs
According to the Plaintiff, he acquired the land from his uncle, Theophilus Quarcoo Armar. The
Plaintiff’s uncle acquired the land from one Abraham Osei on the 15th of July 1969. The said
acquisition by Plaintiff’s grantor in 1969 was subsequently registered at the Land Registry as No.
1096/1970. Plaintiff’s case is that the 1st Defendant trespassed onto his land at the instance of
the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. Plaintiff contends that his uncle transferred the land to him on 2nd
May 1999 and the same was registered on the 17th of December 1999 at the Land Title Registry
with a Land Title Certificate No. GA 14159. The Plaintiff’s main contention is that his land is very
different from the land purportedly granted the Defendants by the then Osu Stool.
Defendants contend that the 1st Defendant was granted permission by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants
to occupy the land. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants claim that they are the owners of the land
described above. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ case is that the said land was granted to them in
1953 by Nii Noi Dowuona IV, the then Chief of Osu. (See page 13 of the Record of Appeal). The
Defendants fiercely dispute Plaintiff’s claim of ownership to the land on the basis that the
conveyance to Theophilus Quarcoo Armar by Abraham Osei Hammond and the transfer by
Theophilus Quarcoo Armar to Plaintiff is void as the same parcel of land had been transferred
earlier in time by the Osu Stool to their mother and two sisters of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants.
Plaintiff nonetheless maintains that the land granted him and his predecessors in title is
completely different from the Defendants’ land.
The learned High Court Judge correctly narrowed the issues down to whether the parties were
claiming the same land, and if that was so, then the party whose interest in the land as granted
by the Osu Stool first in time, succeeds. The High Court decided that the parties were indeed,
litigating over the same land and therefore, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ interest in the land
preceded that of the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal on the basis that the trial judge erred in holding
that the parties were litigating over the same land and it was erroneous for the High Court judge
Page 3 of 16
to disregard the expert evidence tendered by Plaintiff's witness PW1 as being tendered in bad
faith and self-serving.
COURT OF APPEAL DECISION
In the Court of Appeal, the learned Justices upon perusing the entire record of appeal before
them reached a different opinion from that of the High Court. The Court of Appeal delivered
itself as follows:
“And as we have found that the lands of the parties are different contrary to the finding
or the trial judge. Respondents have completely mistaken the location or where their
lands lies …. Little wonder, therefore, that the site plan produced gave an expanded land
to the Respondents exposing them as having claim to a land that has never been for their
mother Rebecca Mosoperh and her siblings. And with Respondents land falling not as
CW1 found but at a different location, the Appellant succeeds on the three grounds of
appeal.
Beyond the above Appellant has shown by Exhibit “B” that it has indefeasible title to the
land with the registration and certificate. There is merit in this Appeal. We reverse the
learned trial Judge and enter judgment for the Appellant in the reliefs he sought at the
trial below. We dismiss the counterclaim of 3rd Respondent”.
APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT
The Defendants, dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeal have appealed the decision
to this Court on the following grounds:
1. That the learned justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law when they held that
the identity of the land being claimed by the Plaintiff/Appellant/Respondent is
substantially different from the land occupied by the
Defendants/Respondents/Appellants.
Page 4 of 16
Particulars of Errors
a. That the learned justices of the Court of Appeal erred when they held that the Trial
Court failed to avert its mind to the original site plan of the
Defendants/Respondent/Appellants.
b. That the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred when they held that on the
examination of the evidence on Record and on the law, the trial judge tripped on
the law and evidence in his assessment of the evidence of the plaintiff’s witness,
PW1.
c. That the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred when they held that the
testimony of PW1 must be sustained in spite of it being without notice of the
Respondents and directions of the Court.
d. That the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law and in fact when they
accepted Exhibit A3 by the Plaintiff’s witness are rejected Exhibit CW1 by the Court’s
expert witness.
2. That the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law when they failed to
consider the possessory rights of the Defendants’ mother and her sisters of the
disputed land since the customary grant in 1953.
3. That the Judgment of the Court of Appeal is against the weight of evidence on Record.
It is trite learning that an appeal is by way of rehearing. The principles that guide the approach
of this Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction is that where a trial court makes findings
of fact, which had been concurred in by the first appellate court, and those findings are not
perverse or inconsistent with the evidence on record, then the second appellate court, like this
court should be slow in departing from those findings. See Obeng v Assemblies of God
Church, Ghana [2010] SCGLR 300:
“Where findings of fact had been made by the trial court and concurred in by the first
appellate court (as in the instant case), the second appellate court must be slow in
Page 5 of 16
coming to a different conclusions unless it was satisfied that there were strong
pieces of evidence on record which were manifestly clear that the findings of
the trial court and the first appellate court were perverse. It was only in such
cases that the findings of fact could be altered thereby disregarding the
advantages enjoyed by the trial court in assessing the credibility and demeanor
of witnesses. In the instant appeal, the court found no such compelling reason to disturb
the findings of fact so ably formed by the trial court and concurred in by the Appeal Court”.
Emphasis supplied.
The above principle does not prohibit the Court from making findings of fact that are contrary to
that of the trial Court and the first appellate Court. In essence, when this Court determines an
appeal as a second appellate Court, it is in a unique position to either affirm, dismiss or substitute
findings of fact made by the courts below.
ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES
It is the opinion of this Court that Grounds 1 and 3 ought to be considered together as these
grounds require an evaluation of the evidence presented during the trial.
The first issue we have to consider is as to whether the parties are claiming the same parcel of
land purportedly granted by the Osu Stool.
A cursory reading of the pleadings of the parties herein indicates that the identity of their
respective lands was described therein. Nonetheless, it became necessary for the court below
to order a composite plan to ascertain if the lands overlap, are the same or differ. The trial judge
ordered a composite plan based on the respective site plans of the parties and this was carried
out and tendered in evidence. The learned trial judge in his judgment interestingly observed as
follows – See page 528 of ROA:
“It is observed that, per the Order of the Court, the superimposition was to be done
through the respective site plans of the parties. However, the parties were invited
Page 6 of 16
to the site and what they physically showed, as their respective land was included
in Exhibit “CW1”. It is particularly noted from the Record that the learned lawyer
for Defendants protested against the inclusion of what the parties showed as not
emanating from the Order of the Court. I may want to agree with him and
admonish that surveyors who are mandated by Court orders to carry out specific
tasks are supposed to carry the tasks in strict compliance with the dictates of the
Order of the Court”.
The court-appointed surveyor admitted under cross-examination by Plaintiff’s Counsel that he did
not personally carry out the superimposition order but these were done by cartographers who
went onto the land to execute the orders of the court.
Q: Then I am suggesting to you that in carrying out this exercise in order to
have a site plan for the purposes of identifying the Defendant’s land the
Survey Department requested the Defendant to produce another site plan
which was used after the survey order was made.
A: My Lord like I said earlier on I am not aware of that because my work has
been finished and I submit to the cartographers for their work. So I don’t
know anything about this that you are saying my Lord.
Q: So it is your evidence that your work is related to the physical
identification of the land.
A: The physical identification of the land and the superimposition of
the site plan was done by the cartographers, that is their work.
Q: So you did not do the superimposition.
A: Yes my Lord , that is not my work.
The evidence of CW1 who was the High Court-appointed surveyor was that he did not do the
superimposition but presented a report based on work carried out by some other individuals.
The Plaintiff not satisfied with the report of the Court witness went ahead and commissioned
another expert witness to conduct another superimposition of the site plans of the parties. This
Page 7 of 16
was done by Plaintiff’s expert witness and the same was tendered in evidence and subjected to
cross-examination. It is to be noted that, the conclusion of the court-appointed surveyor was
that the parties were essentially claiming the same land, in other words, Defendant’s land was
within Plaintiff’s land. On the other hand, Plaintiff’s expert witness came to a different conclusion
that Defendant’s land lay somewhere north of Plaintiff’s land whereas Plaintiff’s site plan
confirmed the location of Plaintiff’s land.
But why did the trial judge prefer the Court witness’s conclusion to that of the Plaintiff’s expert
witness as to the location of the land of the parties? In the opinion of the trial judge, the evidence
of PW1 was self-serving and done in bad faith. Moreover, the trial judge stated that PW1 was
not called by the Court and did not put any weight on the evidence given by PW1 and upheld the
report of CW1 to make a finding that the parties were litigating over the same land.
The vexed question is, is a party precluded from calling his expert witness to testify on a matter
in which a Court expert witness has given evidence?
Procedurally, Order 26 of the High Court Rules, 2004. (C.I. 47) permits parties from calling an
expert witness to testify in a matter which the court has received prior evidence from a Court
expert witness. Order 26 rule 6 of C.I 47 provides:
Rule 6 – Calling of Experts
(1) When a court expert is appointed, any party may call one expert witness
to give evidence on the matter reported on by the court expert if the party
gives notice of such intention within a reasonable time to the other party
(2) A party may not call more than one expert witness without leave of the
Court, and the Court shall not grant leave unless it considers the
circumstances to be exceptional.
Since it is permitted by the Rules of Court for a party to call his expert to give evidence on a
matter, it is proper for the court to ascertain whether the so-called expert meets the requirements
Page 8 of 16
to testify as an expert witness in a matter. Section 112 of the Evidence Act provides the criterial
for an expert witness to give his opinion. The said section provides:
“If the subject of the testimony is sufficiently beyond common experience that
the Opinion or inference of an expert will assist the court or tribunal of fact in
understanding evidence in the action or in determining any issue, a witness
may give testimony in the form of an opinion or inference concerning any
subject on which the witness is qualified to give expert testimony”.
By section 67 of the Evidence Act, 1975, NRCD 323, a person is qualified to testify as an expert
witness
“If he satisfies the Court that he is an expert on the subject to which his
testimony relates by reason of this Special skill, experience or training”.
From the facts, it was necessary to ascertain whether the parties were claiming the same land.
Therefore, a surveyor’s report was relevant to assist the court in resolving the matter. In this
case PW1 is a professional surveyor who retired as a Regional Surveyor and satisfies the condition
as an expert witness in the field of survey and mapping. That by reason of his training skill and
experience was qualified to testify in that respect. Again PW1 satisfied the requirements of
section 112 in that, the subject matter had to do with mapping and surveying which was a matter
outside common experience. Accordingly, we hold that the reasons assigned by the trial judge
in not putting weight on the testimony of PW1 were not supported by law and we correctly uphold
the reasons given by the Court of Appeal in that regard.
Other pieces of evidence suggest that CW1’s report was highly suspicious. Under cross-
examination from Plaintiff, CW1 admitted that the site plan submitted to him for the work by
Defendant was the one in Exhibit CW2, which was prepared in 2003. Plaintiff also tendered
through CW1, the original indenture of the Defendants' grant in 1960 to their mother and her
siblings by the Osu Mantse as Exhibit CW3. This same indenture of the Defendants Exhibit “K”
has a site plan attached, this was also tendered by PW3, Emmanuel Agbeko, Records Officer of
the Lands Commission, who was subpoenaed by the Plaintiff. Exhibit K was registered at the
Page 9 of 16
Deed Registry and can be found on page 282 of the Record of Appeal. When one compares the
site plan of the Plaintiff submitted for the survey work by CW1, it is not different from the site
plan found in Exhibit “B”, the indenture of July 1969 between Abraham Osei Hammond and
Theophilus Quarcoo Armar, Plaintiff’s grantor. It is again substantially the same site plan as seen
in Exhibit “G” being the indenture that transferred the land from Theophilus Quarcoo to the
Plaintiff. This indenture is reflected as Exhibit “J” at the Deed Registry. It is substantially the
same plan that was used in the registration of the land that produced Exhibit “B”, the title
certificate. Finally, it is the same site plan that was submitted for the work of CW1.
We agree with the Court of Appeal in its finding that the Defendants' land had changed in size
through the various site plans when the Court of Appeal found that:
“The site plan attached to the 1960 indenture, being the grant to the mother of
the Respondents and which was registered at the Deed Registry was produced
from official sources by PW3 as Exhibit “K”. That described the land as 0.91
acreage of land at Mamobi Dzorwulu. On the other hand, the site plan prepared
by the Respondent in 2003 and presented for the survey work by the court
expert, the land which was 0.91 acreage had grown in size, as if land was
capable of enlarging itself with the passage of time, to 1.08 acreage or 0.44
hectare”.
The rejection of Plaintiff’s composite plan, Exhibit A, by the learned High Court Judge was
improper. The Defendants, instead displayed bad faith and attempted to deceive the Court.
Unfortunately, they succeeded in doing so in the Trial High Court; however, the Court of Appeal
did not fall for this. It should therefore be noted that a Court of law cannot be simply overreached
by such pranks. Indeed, the Defendants, through their Counsel, had the opportunity to cross-
examine the Plaintiff’s expert on the subject matter. They failed even to challenge the position
of PW1 that the land of the Plaintiff was different from the land of the Defendants. We therefore
hold that the composite plan tendered by CW1 into evidence at the High Court was inherently
flawed based on the reasons above.
Page 10 of 16
The Court upon reading the Record of Appeal and in determining the central issue of the identity
of the land claimed by the parties found it prudent on 25th October 2023, to order the Regional
Surveyor (Greater Accra Region), Survey and Mapping Division of the Lands Commission to draw
up a new composite plan indicating the respective position of each party’s land. This Court
further directed the parties to file their survey instructions but limit the documents they relied on
to only their original documents, especially, the site plans attached to those Deeds that were
registered; that is the 1962 Deed that was registered by the Defendants’ grantor at the Deed
Registry as No. 732/1962 and that of the Plaintiff at the Lands Registry as No. 1096/1970. This
restrictive directive to the parties to solely use the documents originally registered at the Deeds
Registry (which has now been subsumed by the Lands Commission) in 1962 and 1970 by their
respective grantors was because they traced their root of title to these documents exclusively.
The Plaintiff traced his grant to the 1970 instrument and the Defendants traced their grant to the
1962 instrument.
The Surveyor prepared the composite plan and tendered the same into evidence on 31st January
2024 as Exhibit “CE1/SC”. The parties cross-examined the Surveyor and leave was granted for
the Parties to file a supplementary statement of case if they desired. Both Counsel filed their
respective supplementary statement of case. Counsel for Defendants has invited us to ignore the
Composite plan tendered by SC/CW1. We do not think such invitation by Defendants Counsel
requires any serious consideration by us. We do not believe that Counsel for Defendants want to
cause us to believe that the orders made by this Court and proceedings taken thereon should be
ignored as if the order made was of no importance.
It is to be noted that, Land Surveyors use various techniques such as GPS (Global Positioning
System) to actually establish land boundaries according to legal descriptions and Cadastral Maps:
See A.A ADU, J. AYER and A.D. GRANT (2016). Establishing boundaries for sustainable Land use
and development in Ghana. Journal of Surveying, Construction and Property 7 (2), 1-14.
Page 11 of 16
It is further noted that, surveyors assist in verifying land titles and documenting land parcels
through cadastral surveys. It is therefore unacceptable for defence counsel to invite this court to
ignore such an important exercise ordered by the court itself.
From Exhibit CE1/SC the land on the ground as shown to the surveyor by Plaintiff is edged green
and measures 0.40 acre. The land on the ground as shown to the surveyor by 2nd Defendant is
edged red and measures 1.35 acres. The land shown on the site plan of Plaintiff is edged
magenta and it measures 0.30 acre while the land shown on the site plan of the Defendants is
edged blue and measures 0.87 acre. The area in dispute on ground is hatched green and
measures 0.39 acre.
The image of the composite plan reveals that a portion of Plaintiff’s land per his site plan overlaps
the land claimed by him on the ground. The composite plan also shows that the disputed area
is squarely within the Plaintiff’s land on the ground and significantly within Plaintiff’s land per his
site plan. In the words of the surveyor, “the Plaintiff’s site plan overlaps on the land in dispute
by 38%”. Regarding this overlap, it was urged on this Court by Counsel for the Plaintiff to accept
the explanation given by his expert witness PW1 under cross-examination on page 115 of the
ROA:
Q: In Exhibit A3, the land plaintiff showed you does not correspond with his land. Is
that correct?
A: There is a shift.
Q: Can you explain the basis of this shift?
A: I examined the site plan and I saw that there has been change of the
layout of the area so those who were down have ….... to the top because
there is now an existing road.
Q: I put it to you that the change in the capture of the area must not lead to the shift
in plaintiff’s site plan.
A: The site plan is exactly at its position but what the plaintiff showed has
moved up a bit towards the north.
Page 12 of 16
In Plaintiff’s Exhibit B, tendered on the 11th of March 2015 and at page 246 of the Record of
Appeal, the site plan therein shows that the Plaintiff’s land is only abutted by a road on the South.
In Exhibit C, and on page 252 of the Record of Appeal, the Plaintiff’s Land Certificate also had a
site plan therein at page 255 of the Record, which also shows that the Plaintiff’s land is abutted
on the South by a road. On page 255, the said road is named as “Dzorwulu Crescent”. The
Plaintiff’s expert witness, PW1 in Exhibit A on page 242 of the Record of Appeal, observed as
follows in paragraph 2 of the report:
“On site plan ‘B’ – referred to property of Theo Q. Armah, situate at Dzorwulu
Accra. Area 0.309 Acre. Scale l: 2500 feet. The site plan was prepared based
on Ghana National Grid and when plotted on the same Accra Town Sheet, it fell
at Dzorwulu on a portion of the disputed land shown edged Blue. The name of
the street on the Southern side is Dzorwulu Crescent”. (Emphasis ours).
Indeed, a portion of Plaintiff’s land indicated on the site plan falls within a road. In this Court,
we find per Exhibit CE1/SC that a portion of Plaintiff’s land per his site plan falls within an existing
road. The basis for the 38% overlap as explained by Plaintiff’s witness is plausible and we hold
so accordingly.
Interestingly, the Defendants’ site plan was at least 2000 feet away from the land on the ground
as shown to the surveyor. The explanation given by the surveyor which was unchallenged under
cross-examination was that the site plan of the defendant as annexed to the Deed Instrument
registered in 1962 was in local coordinates and had to be converted to National Coordinates using
the prescribed formulae. This explanation was consistent to the evidence given by Plaintiff’s
expert witness, PW1. A look at Exhibit CE1/SC places Defendant’s land completely outside the
disputed area by a distance of at least 2000 feet away. This corroborates Plaintiff’s claim that
his land is different from Defendants' land. In other words, Defendants' claim that their land was
the same as Plaintiff’s land was not supported by the composite plan.
Page 13 of 16
We think that the site plan of the Parties showed the exact location of their respective lands.
Unfortunately, the Defendants’ land as contained in the registered instruments of their grantor
was not the same land claimed by the Plaintiff.
This fact is fortified by the unchallenged conclusions reached by the various official searches
conducted by Plaintiff using the site plan of the Defendants. These searches and the disclosures
as to the transactions carried out on the parcel of land also buttress the Plaintiff’s position that
the Plaintiff’s land is totally different from that which the Osu Mantse purportedly granted to the
Defendants in 1960.
The said Searches were tendered into evidence as Exhibits D, E, F and G at pages 256 to 270 of
the Record of Appeal. Also tendered as Exhibit H, at pages 271 to 273 of the Record of Appeal
is another search report conducted by the Plaintiff using the Defendants’ site plan which was in
the supposed grant made to them by the Osu Stool. Exhibit “H” shows the transactions on the
land covered by their original site plan. From Exhibits D, E, F, G and H we hereby hold that in
the resolution of this dispute; that is, the lands claimed by the parties hereto are two different
lands, and the Defendants’ documents do not correspond to the land in issue. Instead, the
Plaintiff’s grant and document evidencing his grant correspond to the land in issue.
The document, Exhibit D, is a Search conducted at the then Lands Commission Secretariat as far
back as 1998. The Search on Exhibit D shows that the Defendants’ land is totally different from
the Plaintiff’s land in the site plan attached to the Land Title Certificate issued the Plaintiff and
tendered as Exhibit C, which can be found on pages 252 to 255 of the Record of Appeal.
GROUND 2
This ground is to the effect that the Court of Appeal erred in failing to consider the possessory
rights of the mother of defendants from the date of the customary grant in 1953.
We note that the parties fought this dispute on their respective pleadings. Nowhere in their
pleadings did the Defendants plead adverse possession. Having contested the case as owners in
title, we find it disingenuous on the part of the Defendants to, at this stage when defeat stares
Page 14 of 16
them in the face, switch gears and now want the Court to consider some possession. At the trial
Court, the Defendants did not find it necessary to rely on such possession which will be adverse
but not pleaded. In any case, as at 1953 the Plaintiff's grantors in title had not acquired the
disputed land for any adverse possession to operate against them. The evidence on record
suggest that it was the Plaintiff who erected the fence wall round the disputed land. The
Defendants contended that it was the Osu Stool that erected the fence wall. Why should the Osu
Stool fence a piece of land granted to a lessee, whether he or she is a family member or not.
The Defendants however did not call any member of the Osu Stool (although they claimed their
mother belonged to the Osu Stool family). We find it odd and strange for the Osu Stool to have
erected the fence wall and we accordingly reject this contention. We find no merit in the ground
2. Indeed, having found that the land has always been for Plaintiff, nowhere did the Defendants
claim adverse possession of this land. The evidence which was unchallenged is that Plaintiff has
always defended this land just as his immediate grantor did.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we find that based on the new composite plan ordered by this Court, Plaintiff’s
land on the ground which is the same as the disputed land overlaps the land as per his site plan
by 38%, however, we accept the reason for this overlap. The Defendants’ land is outside the
disputed land and different from the land claimed by the Plaintiff. We hold that Plaintiff’s land is
not the same as Defendant’s land. The issue of a grant first in time does not arise in this case
since the grants by the Osu Stool were not in respect of the same land. Accordingly, we hereby
enter judgment for the Plaintiff on his claim.
The Counterclaim of the Defendants is hereby dismissed as not being proved. The appeal is
dismissed in its entirety. The judgment of the Court of Appeal reversing the judgment of the
High Court is accordingly affirmed.
(SGD) G. K. KOOMSON
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
Page 15 of 16
(SGD) M. OWUSU (MS.)
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD) A. LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS.)
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD) PROF. H. J. A. N. MENSA-BONSU (MRS.)
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD) S. K. A. ASIEDU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
COUNSEL
JOEL ANNOR-AFARI ESQ. FOR THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT.
PHILIP ADDISON ESQ. FOR THE DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS/ APPELLANTS WITH
HIM, JUSTICE OTENG & PRINCE NKETIA.
Page 16 of 16
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