Case LawGhana
Agyei v Owoo (LD/0014/2018) [2025] GHAHC 89 (13 March 2025)
High Court of Ghana
13 March 2025
Judgment
INTHE SUPERIORCOURT OF JUDICATURE,
INTHE HIGHCOURT OF JUSTICEFINANCIAL &ECONOMIC CRIME
DIVISION1SITTINGINGENERAL JURISDICTION14
HELDINACCRA
ONTHURSDAY THE 13TH DAYOF MARCH, 2025BEFORE
HIS LORDSHIP JUSTICEDR. ERNESTOWUSU-DAPAA JA
SITTINGAS ANADDITIONALHIGH COURT JUDGE
SUITNO.: LD/0014/2018
GLADYSANITA AGYEI PLAINTIFF
VRS
BENATTIPOE OWOO DEFENDANT
PARTIES: PLAINTIFF–PRESENT
DEFENDANT–PRESENT
COUNSEL: GEORGINA NERTELEYNETTEY HOLDINGTHE BRIEF OF
K. ADJEILARTEYFORTHE PLAINTIFF –PRESENT
NAA-KAIASHRIFIE HOLDING THE BRIEFOF FAUSTELL
COFIEFOR THE DEFENDANT –PRESENT
JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
[1]. By a Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim filed in the Registry of the High
Court, Land Division, Accra, on the 10th day of January, 2018, the Plaintiff claimed
thefollowing reliefs:
(i) A Declaration of title to all that piece or parcel of land described in the schedule
hereto.
(ii) An Order of the Court directing the Defendant to remove all the sand and stone
deposited on Plaintiff’s land.
1
(iii) An Order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant, his agents, workers,
assigns, privies or anybody who claims through him from using the land of the
Plaintiffas a way to go tohis house.
(iv) Any other Order that the Court may consider appropriate in the circumstance of
this case.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
[2]. The Defendant having been duly served with Plaintiff’s Writ of Summons and
Statement of Claim entered appearance and filed his Statement of Defence on the 5th
day ofFebruary,2018 defending the claims ofthe Plaintiff without any Counterclaim.
The Plaintiff filed her Reply to the Statement of Defence of the Defendant on the 20th
day of June, 2023 and joined issues generally with the Defendant on his Statement of
Defence. Upon an Application by the Plaintiff and the Defendant, the Court ordered
for a Composite plan to be drawn by the Mapping Division of the Lands
Commission to determine the location of both Plaintiff and defendant’s land on the
28th day of February, 2020. On the 20th day of June 2024, the Court differently
constituted (Coram: His Lordship Justice Dr. Ernest Owusu-Dapaa, JA) gave
directions and adopted the issues proposed by Plaintiff’s Application for Direction s
filed on the 20th day of June, 2023 and (1) Additional issue filed by the Defendant as
issuesfor thedetermination in thetrial.
[3]. After Directions had been taken and Orders of the Court at Directions complied
with, the Honourable Court ordered the Parties to file their respective Witness
Statements in accordance with the Provisions of C.I 87 and the suit was adjourned
for Case Management Conference on the 16th of July, 2024 at 9am. The Honourable
Court subsequently conducted a Case Management Conference on the 16th of July
2024and adjourned the matterfortrial.
2
PLAINTIFFCASEAS PLEADED
[4]. The Plaintiff, who is a Ghanaian citizen ordinarily resident in Belgium, avers that
she acquired the parcel of land in dispute (hereinafter referred to as “the suit land”)
sometime in the year 2000 from the late Mr. Thomas Ohene-Djan. She contends that
all relevant documents in respect of the suit land were duly executed in her favour
upon purchase. Having taken possession, the Plaintiff began constructing a one-
storey building on the suit land, which remains incomplete. At the time she
completed the ground floor, she placed a caretaker on the property and returned
overseas. When the Plaintiff returned to Ghana in 2006, she discovered that the fence
wall she had erected around the disputed land had been demolished. She did not
initially know who had carried out this act. Subsequently, in 2007, the Plaintiff
provided funds forthe reconstructionofthe fence wall.
[5]. Shortly thereafter, the new fence wall was again demolished, and the Plaintiff
came to learn that it was the Defendant who had demolished it. The Defendant, she
avers, made it clear to her workers that any renewed attempt to rebuild the fence
wouldbe equally thwarted.
Furthermore, the Plaintiff alleges that in 2011, the Defendant broke part of the fence
wall constructed along a small stream bordering the disputed land and proceeded to
erect a two-bedroom single-storey building that straddled the stream and
encroached onto the Plaintiff’s land. After erecting this house, the Defendant is said
to have reconstructed another fence wall on the Plaintiff’s land and installed a gate,
therebyasserting adegree ofpossessorycontrol.
[6]. The Plaintiff maintains that the Defendant went further by depositing sand and
stones on her land, all in an apparent attempt to establish rights or claims of
ownershipover portions oftheproperty.
The Plaintiff statesthat the Defendant, lacking a properbuilding permit, also created
a right of way over the Plaintiff’s land to gain access to his newly constructed house.
3
Plaintiff maintains that she has, at all material times, held a valid land title certificate
over the land, issued on 26 May 2017, pursuant to the applicable legal framework
governing land title registration in Ghana. The Plaintiff further alleges that the
Defendant has not only trespassed onto her land but has also threatened her and her
caretakerwithharm and death,prompting herto lodgeacomplaint with thepolice.
[7]. By reason of these facts the Plaintiff seeks a declaration of title to the disputed
land, an order directing the Defendant to remove the sand and stones he has
deposited on her land, a perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant (and all
those claiming through him) from using the Plaintiff’s land as a passageway, and
any further orders the Honourable Court deems appropriate in the circumstances.
Plaintiff pleaded the exact identity of her land per what she called Schedule to
Plaintiff Land asfollows:
All that piece or parcel of land situate, lying, and being at Kisseman, Accra,
containing measurements more or less as follows: on the South by the assignor’s land,
measuring 80.0 and 120.0 feet respectively, more or less; on the West by the
assignor’s land, measuring 100.0 and 60.0 feet respectively, more or less. The said
pieceor parcel of land is more particularlydelineated on the plan attached and thereon
shown edged pink, illustrating the relevantmeasurements.
[8]. The Defendant categorically denies all allegations in the Plaintiff’s Statement of
Claim, except where the Defendant’s account accords with facts already established
by the Plaintiff. Central to the Defendant’s position is his assertion that the land in
question belongs to the Owoo family, of which he is a member. He maintains that
this family holds the allodial title to the area encompassing the Plaintiff’s purported
land. The Defendant claims to have lawfully obtained his own parcel within that
area from the then Head of the Owoo family, Mr. John Nee Kwartey Owoo, on 24th
May, 2004. Since that time, he avers, he has taken steps to register his interest in the
land—including acquiring a Yellow Card in or around 2011—and has constructed a
4
two-bedroom single-storey house thereon, where he has allegedly resided for
approximatelyeight years.
[9]. The Defendant emphatically denies any involvement in demolishing or breaking
down any structures that the Plaintiff might have constructed. He further denies
depositing sand or stones on the Plaintiff’s land, contending that while he has
observed such materials on the Plaintiff’s property, they do not belong to him, nor
did he place them there. According to the Defendant, the layout of the area, as
provided to him by the Ga East Municipal Assembly (G.E.M.A.), indicates that his
plot is numbered 47, whereas the Plaintiff’s plots are shown as Nos. 21, 22, and 26
respectively. He also references a Papao Residential Planning Scheme, which he says
confirms that apublic road—ratherthana private right ofway created by him—runs
throughthearea incontention.
[10]. The Defendant insists that he does not dispute the Plaintiff’s title to her own
land and that the two parcels are entirely distinct. In his view, the conflict arises
from the Plaintiff’s attempts to block what he refers to as a public access road. He
maintains that various neighbours have resisted these attempts, which they perceive
as infringing upon their right to use a road recognised by local planning authorities.
From the Defendant’s standpoint, the Plaintiff’s claims regarding trespass,
obstruction, and threats to her land rights are entirely unfounded. He denies
threatening her or her caretaker and characterises her allegations as an unlawful
effort to deny him access to his legitimately acquired property. Consequently, the
Defendant submits that the Plaintiff is not entitled to any of the reliefs sought in her
Statement of Claim, and he invites the Court to visit the locus in quo should there be
any doubt about the geographical layout and the separate locations of the two
properties.
ISSUESADOPTEDFORTRIAL
5
[11].The following issueswere adoptedas issues forthe determinationin the trial on
the20th ofJune, 2023.
1. Whetherthe plaintiffbuilt anuncompleted onestorey building onherland
and constructed afence wallaround the land.
2. Whetherthe defendant caused the fence wallconstructed by the plaintiff tobe
demolished.
3. Whetherthe defendant developedtwo (2) bedroomsingle storeyhouse across
thestreamandontoaportion ofplaintiff’s land.
4. Whetherthe defendantsdeposited quantities ofsand and stonesonPlaintiff’s
land.
5. Whetherthe plaintiff’s land is differentand distinct fromthatofthe
Defendant.
6. Whetherthe Defendant is liable.
THELAW ONBURDENOF PROOF AND ITSALLOCATION TOTHEPARTIES
[12] . In civil litigation, the standard of proof is the preponderance of probabilities.
This standard requires the tribunal or court to be convinced that the existence of a
fact is more probable than its non-existence. This standard and its application are
enshrined inthe Evidence Act, 1975, NRCD323,specifically in sections 10,11, and 12,
which define the elements of burden of proof, burden of persuasion, and burden of
producing evidence. Section 10 establishes the "burden of persuasion," which is the
obligation on a party to create the requisite degree of belief about a fact in the mind
of the court. This burden may require a party to either raise a reasonable doubt
about a fact or establish the fact by a preponderance of probabilities or beyond a
reasonable doubt. Section 11 discusses the "burden of producing evidence," and
imposes the responsibility on a party to introduce enough evidence to avoid a ruling
against the party on an issue. Section 12(1) asserts that, in civil cases, the burden of
persuasion generally requires proof by a preponderance of the probabilities. Section
6
12(2) further clarifies that this preponderance is the degree of certainty needed in the
mind ofthe court toconclude thatafact’sexistence is morelikely thannot.
[13]. In an action for declaration of title to land, the Plaintiff must succeed on the
strength of his own case, not merely on the weakness of the Defendant’s See: Klah v
Phoenix Insurance Co Ltd [2012] SCGLR 1139. Where both parties claim from the
same stool or family, the Court must determine whose grant followed the lawful
procedure or was first in time. See: Mondial Veneer (Gh) Ltd v Amuah Gyebu XV
[2011]SCGLR 466.
In Ackah v Pergah Transport Ltd [2010] SCGLR 728 at 736, Adinyira JSC reiterated
this principle, when she noted that, "It is a basic principle of the law of evidence
that a party who bears the burden of proof is to produce credible evidence of the
factsin issue. Withoutsuch credible evidence, theclaim may fail."
This sentiment is echoed in Aryee v Shell Ghana Ltd & Fraga Oil Ltd [2017-2020]
SCGLR 721, where the court reiterated essentially that matters capable of proof must
indeed be provenwithadequate evidence.
[14]. It is trite law that the Plaintiff carries the initial evidential burden of
establishing facts crucial tothe reliefs sought. S.A. Brobbey,in Essentials of GhanaLaw
of Evidence (p. 28), illuminates this point: "In the normal run of affairs, since the plaintiff
is the one asking for something from the defendant, he should start the proceedings by giving
testimony. That testimony will show what he wants from the defendant and why the court
should orderthe defendantto give ittohim."
[15]. Brobbey J.A., in Duah v Yorkwa [1993-94] 1 GLR 217, further distinguishes the
burden of persuasion from the burden of producing evidence, noting that the former
is the degree of evidence a litigant must adduce to satisfy a fact, while the latter
pertains towhich partymust beginby leading evidence.
7
[16]. The burden on the Plaintiff to establish his case by a preponderance of
probabilities means the Plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to make their
claim more probable than the Defendant’s version. This principle was restated by
AnsahJSC inTakoradiFlour Mills vSamir Faris [2005-2006] SCGLR882at900:
“This being a civil suit, the rules of evidence require that the Plaintiff produces
sufficient evidence to make out his claim on a preponderance of probabilities, as
defined in section 12(2) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323). The party in whose
favour the balance tilts is the party whose case is more probable among the rival
versions.”
[17]. The rule is further clarified by Lord Hoffman in Re B [2008] UKHL 3, where he
explained the binary nature of fact-finding in litigation. In his view, a tribunal must
decide if afact did or did not occur, leaving no room forambiguity. The law setsa“0
or 1” value on a fact's existence, making it clear that if a party fails to satisfy their
burden of proof, the fact is treated as if it did not happen. For the fear of diluting the
wisdom ofLordHoffman’s dictum in ReB,it isworthquoting his ownwordshere:
“If a legal rule requires a fact to be proved (a fact in issue)a judge or jury mustdecide
whether or not it happened. There is no room for a finding that it might have
happened. The law operates a binary system in which the only values are O and
1. The fact either happened or it did not. If the tribunal is left in doubt, the doubt is
resolved by a rule that one party or the other carried the burden of proof. If the party
who bears the burden of proof fails to discharge it, a value of O is returned and the
fact is treated as having not happened. If he does discharge it, a value of 1 is returned
and the factis treated as having happened.”
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE ADDUCEDDURING TRIAL
8
[18]. The Plaintiff, a Ghanaian resident in Belgium, in her evidence in chief as per
Witness Statement filed testified that she acquired a parcel of land at Kisseman in
Accra in the year 2000 from the late Mr. Thomas Ohene-Djan. According to her, the
property measures approximately 0.50 acres (0.20 hectares). It took some time before
her vendor, upon her persistent efforts, finally executed formal documents in her
favour in 2010. She says she then took possession and commenced building a one-
storey structure, though the house remains unfinished. After completing the ground
floor,she placed acaretakerin thebuilding and returned overseas.
[19]. She states that on her return in 2006, she found her original fence wall
demolished and another erected in its place. Unable initially to identify the culprit,
she arranged for funds in 2007 to reconstruct her wall. Almost immediately after its
reconstruction, it was again demolished, and the Plaintiff discovered that the
Defendant, Mr Ben Attipoe, was allegedly behind this second demolition. She
testifies that the Defendant boasted he would continue to demolish any fence she
built. In 2011, she says, the Defendant broke a portion of the fence she had
constructed near a small stream and built a two-bedroom single-storey house that
encroached approximately five feet onto her land. She further alleges that the
Defendant erected another fence wall, complete with a gate, on her property and,
without a valid building permit, created a right of way across her land to access his
newly constructed house.
[20]. The Plaintiff avers that she undertook the formal registration process,
culminating in a Land Title Certificate being issued on 26th May, 2017, which noted
encroachments on her parcel. She claims that a corrected Land Certificate, bearing
Certificate No GA.51728, Volume 69, Folio 386, was later issued on 6th July, 2022. She
has tendered both certificates in evidence. She further attests that on 5th November
2019, she petitioned the Director-General of the Criminal Investigations Department
in connection with issues arising from the Defendant’s activities on her land and
lodged related complaints with the police, citing threats of harm and death directed
9
at both her and her caretaker. She maintains that these acts by the Defendant
constitute trespass, interference with her ownership, and breaches of her lawful
rights to quiet enjoyment of the property, and she now seeks the Court’s
interventionin obtaining the necessaryreliefs tosafeguard herinterest in the land.
DEFENDANT’SEVIDENCE
[21]. Defendant testified himself per Witness Statement of Ben Attipoe filed on 16th
July, 2024 adopted during his examination in chief. Defendant states that he is a
businessman and resident at Westland near Kisseman. He is a member of the Owoo
family and concedes that it is the same family which Plaintiff claims to have derived
root of title from. The Defendant, asserts ownership and possession of land distinct
fromthat ofthe plaintiff. He claims his landwas granted tohim by hisfamily inMay
2004, evidenced by an indenture (Exhibit "1"- an indenture of lease dated 24th May,
2004 between the Owoo family and Defendant in respect of approximately 0.06 acre
or 0.02 hectare) and that he has lawfully occupied it for over nine years, having
constructed a two-bedroom single-storey house. He denies any encroachment on the
plaintiff’s land, contending that his propertyisseparate.
[22]. A key issue in the dispute concerns an alleged public access road. The
defendant asserts that the land in dispute has always been used as a public road by
himself and other residents, without restriction or objection, and is recognized as
such by the Ga East Municipal Assembly (Exhibit "2"). He maintains that both his
and the plaintiff’s land fall within the Papao Planning Scheme, as confirmed by
GEMA (Exhibits "3 Series"), and that he has paid property rates for his land (Exhibit
"4"). The defendant denies claims that he deposited materials on the plaintiff’s land
and further refutes allegations that he has threatened the plaintiff or her caretaker.
Instead, he accuses the plaintiff of attempting to block the public road by digging
trenches and constructing a wall, which he supports with photographic evidence
10
(Exhibit "5"). He contends that upholding the plaintiff’s claims would deny him
lawfulaccessto hisproperty.
[23]. Finally, the defendant maintains that the plaintiff is unjustly seeking to obstruct
access to a recognized public road that he and other residents have used for years.
He argues that her actions are an attempt to alter longstanding access rights, and her
claims should thereforebe dismissed.
EVALUATIONOF EVIDENCE AND RESOLUTION OF TRIABLEISSUES
ISSUE 5: Whether the plaintiff’s land is different and distinct from that of the
defendant.
[24]. All the issues set down for trial and the reliefs being sought by the Plaintiff turn
on the question of true identity of the parcel of land claimed by Plaintiff and also
contested by the Defendant. Consequently, I deem it apposite to deal with this issue
beforethe rest.
[25]. In any action for declaration of title or land related reliefs like trespass it is
fundamental for the true identity of the relevant parcel of land to be established.
Thus, the Supreme Court in ANANE VRS DONKOR and KWARTENG VRS
DONKOR (consolidated) [1965] GLR 188, at 192 S.C. propounded the proposition
that “a claim for declaration of title or an order for injunction must always fail, if the
plaintiff fails to establish positively the identity of the land claimed with the land the subject
matter of hissuit,”
[26]. However, the requirement that a party must establish the identity of the land
with certainty in order to obtain a declaration of title does not necessitate
mathematical exactitude or absolute precision. This principle was affirmed in JASS
CO. LTD. & ANOTHER v. APPAU & ANOTHER [2009] SCGLR 265 at 275, holding
2. In BENJAMIN QUARCOPOME SACKEY v ISSAKA A MUSA (2010) JELR
69498 (CA), the Court of Appeal emphasized that although a clear and certain
11
identification of the disputed land is essential, the evidence need only demonstrate
that both parties refer to the same parcel on a practical and evidential basis. Minor
discrepancies in measurements, for example, a slight difference in acreage or
variations in grid values between documents, may be attributed to surveying error
rather than signifying distinct properties. The Court of Appeal held further that
when both parties are “ad idem” regarding the identity of the land, additional
measuressuch asthe preparationofacomposite plan areunnecessary.
[27]. The Plaintiff by paragraph 16 of Statement of claim and the scheduled alluded
thereto provided compendious geographical description of land that she is claiming.
In substance, all that piece or parcel of land situate, lying, and being at KISSEMAN –
ACCRA, containing an approximate area of 0.46 acre, more or less, and bounded as
follows: North/East: By a proposed road, measuring 225.0 feet, more or less. East: By
assignor’s land, measuring 150.0 feet, more or less. South: By assignor’s land,
measuring 80.0& 120.0feet,respectively, moreorless.
West: By assignor’s land, measuring 100.0 & 60 feet, respectively, more or less.
Plaintiff pleaded in paragraph 14 of her statement of claim that she has a land title
certificate over her land, issued on the 26th day of May, 2017. The Defendant tacitly
accepted Plaintiff’s assertion of ownership of land covered by the land title
certificated issued on 26th May 2017. Thus, in Defendant pleaded in paragraph 16 of
her Statement of Defence as follows: Paragraph 14 of the statement of claim is of no
consequence to Defendant, as he is not contesting title to Plaintiff’s land. Defendant
asserts that his land is separate and distinct from Plaintiff’s and prays for the Court to
visit thesite to ascertain the facts.
[28]. To assist the court in resolving the exact identity of land claimed to be occupied
by the parties the court differently constituted (coram: H/L Ellen Vivian Amoah J)
uponrequest of Plaintiff ordered composite plan to be drawn by LandsCommission.
In the said order the parties were to “submit their relevant documentation to the
12
Survey and Mapping Division of the Lands Commission to determine the location of
bothplaintiff and Defendants’land.
[29]. From the Surveyor’s Composite Plan and both parties’ documents, the official
site plans show no direct overlap. However, the Surveyor clarified that the
Defendant’s land “as per his site plan” and the Plaintiff’s land “as per her site plan”
do not intersect on paper, but, in reality, the Defendant’s structures cross onto the
Plaintiff’s side. During cross examination of the Court Expert ( Surveyor) by counsel
forPlaintiff this is what transpired:
Q: You will also agree with me that the land of the Defendant as depicted
by hissite plan doesnotintersect withPlaintiff’s landperhis site plan?
A:Yes, myLord.
Q: Can you also confirm that the land of the Defendant as shown by him
overlapsinto Plaintiff’s land?
A:Yes, myLord.
[30]. At the 22 January, 2025 hearing, Defendant’s Counsel conceded “We are not
contesting the Plaintiff’s land or her land title. We are simply stating that part of the land is
a public access route,” implying that on paper, the Defendant’s land stands apart from the
Plaintiff’s. The Surveyor’s evidence also confirms that “if the Defendant had constructed his
houseusing the measurementon hissite plan, there wouldn’tbe an area indispute.”
It is undisputed that, in theory, these are distinct plots on paper. However, the
encroachment arises because the Defendant’s building is erected in a way that
crosses from his distinct plot onto the Plaintiff’s. Thus, the Court finds the two lands
are indeed “distinct” in their documentation, but the Defendant’s occupation does
not respect that documentary separation on the ground when he embarked upon
developmentofhis land.
Issue 3. Whether the Defendant developed a two-bedroom single-storey house across
thestreamandontoaportion ofthePlaintiff’s land
13
[32]. The first part of the issue is not really germane to matters before the court as
building on a stream or into a stream is a matter which is regulated by specialised
state regulatory bodies and if there has been any such unapproved development the
first point of recourse should be those bodies before any resort to court through
those bodies or against those bodies if they fail or refuse to act on any such
grievance properly lodged with them. Consequently, I decline to deplore scarce
judicial resources pf time and energy on the first limb of the issue. The second limb
that is whether Defendant has built on a portion of the Plaintiff’s land is the crux of
the matter. This issue is very much related to the issue regarding whether the parcel
of lands claimed by the parties are distinct or one and the same. Strangely, the
Defendant under cross examination could not tell the Honourable Court the size of
his land as granted by his grantors. This was his response when Counsel for the
Plaintiff asked;
Q: What was the size of the landgranted you by the OwooFamily?
A: I can’ttell now unless the site plan. The land was givento me as a gift.When it
was given to me, there was a big gutter in front of the land, they had not
constructed it, just bare gutter. When my family was selling the land, they
were winning smooth sand from the land for various construction purposes. So,
when they gave acontract to a contractor to build a gutter around the area. The
contactor came to see all the tenants, those who had the land so that they can
use where they dig the sand.
[33]. The inability of Defendant to state the size of his land on which he claims to
have put up his building raises questions about his credibility. Particularly so since
Defendant had access to his site plan and could have just sought the leave of the
court to refresh his memory. The Court is justified in making Defendant’s credibility
a matter of concern here because during the cross-examination Defendant had
boldly insisted that he was representing his family (that gifted the land to him) in all
14
matters concerning their lands in the area. Indeed, during cross examination of
Defendant by Counsel forPlaintiff on20/11/2024 this is what transpired.
Q: I am suggesting to you that you are not part of the Owoo Family and the land
was notgranted to you by way of Giftby your own indenture.
A: My grandfather was twins. The senior is the Head of Family. He iscalled Amos
George Tawiah Owoo and my grandfather was the junior called Agoe Owoo. I
walked with them over thirty years now so they have left the place for at West
Legon and I am taking care of the whole area. There is no case which does not
pass through my office inthe whole of the area.
[34]. A person who for many years has been taking care of the whole area within
which disputed land falls and is unable to tell the size of his land despite having
access to size plan and other title deeds he relies on must be suppressing a certain
truth relevant to matters in controversy. See Section 80 (2) of Evidence Act 1975
(NRCD 323). Also see: KWASI ABENE V. MADAM YAA AFRA (2017) JELR 64862
(CA).
The Defendant was highly selective in what specific information he presented
during cross examination. While he could not tell the court the size of his land even
having access to his site plan, he could give detailed geomatic information regarding
length of walls. For example, under cross examination by counsel for Plaintiff this is
howDefendant demonstrated hisappreciation offigures;
Q: Are you aware that the gutter your house sits on, is supposed to serve as a
boundary between the land of the Plaintiffand her neighbours.
A: Yes. My Lord that gutter, they called all of us who were in that lane. So, they
approached all of us that because the gutter is supposed to be at the other lane
because of the sand that they dug, they want to use that place to construct the
gutter. Instead of 2 feet gutter, it has become about 7 feet gutter so that we can
cover. When they finished the gutter, they covered it for all of us, about 10
houses. The gutter iscovered so all of us are enjoying it. So, I am not the person
15
who is sitting on the gutter. If the Assembly wants to do something now, they
come to consult us not only me. It is in front of our house, some people their
houses are on it.
[35]. If the Defendant was capable of providing such detailed measurements yet
deliberately omitted to disclose the actual size of his land on which his building
stands, it raises serious doubts about his willingness to be forthright with the court.
Another glaring indication of Defendant credibility deficit is when he was
challenged regarding non-registration of his interest in the land. He insisted that he
had registered his land and when pushed to produce his evidence of registration he
then conceded that that he had not registered yet but was in the process of doing so.
Undercrossexamination by counsel forDefendant, this iswhat ensued;
Q: Have you registered your interestwith the LandsCommission?
A: Yes, LandTitle.
Q: Do you have any evidence before this Courtto prove your assertion?
A: Yes.
Q: Kindly show the Honourable Courtyour LandTitle Certificate.
A: Yes, Iprocessed toa level,they gave mea card calledYellowCard.
Q: I suggest to you that you haven’t registered your land or made any attempt to
register same.
A: Ihave made attempts. My documents willshow.
Itisnoteworthy thatYellowCardalluded toby Defendant was neverproduced in
courtduring the trial. Although,Defendant didnot makecounterclaim yetsuch
inconsistencies become partofthe generalbackground against which his credibility
and veracity ofhis testimony is evaluated.
[36]. Onthe same day under crossexamination, the Defendant admitted the issue
under contention;
16
Q:Recently they constructedthe gutter upstreaminto the main drainage, isthat correct?
A: Yes
Q:Is italso correctthat they had to break partof yourwall before itcouldbe linked to the
maindrainage?
A: Yes. They cameto beg me that the gutter was notsupposed to be there…….
Q:Are you aware that the gutter your house sits on issupposed to serveas aboundary
between the land of the Plaintiff and her neighbours.
A: Yes, myLord.
A picture which emerges from this is that the Defendant is making admission that
his house is seated on the gutter which ought to serve as a boundary and his
frontage wall is further encroaching on the land of the Plaintiff. Counsel for Plaintiff
could not be falteredfor opining that;
“it is for this reason that the Defendant did not procure a building permit before
constructing his house. The unlawful citing of the building will not permit the
assembly togive authorisation by way of abuilding permit.”
[37]. Under cross-examination, the Defendant initially informed the Honourable
Court that he had applied for a permit and that his application was still being
processed. He did not offer any proof of this supposed application beyond his mere
assertion contrary to the principle in MAJOLAGBE V. LARBI & ORS [1959]. GLR
190 @ 192 However, in response to a subsequent question, he abruptly changed his
account and stated that he had completed construction of his house some 15 years
earlier. Under cross examination by counsel for plaintiff this is how Defendant
entangledhimself;
17
“Q. Didyou procure abuilding permitbefore you builtyour house?
A: It isin process.
Q. Do you have any evidence before this Courtto prove this?
A. Idon’thave itherebut itisin the process.
Q. When didyou finish your house?
A. About 15years ago.
[38]. The Plaintiff claims that in 2011, the Defendant broke part of her fence wall
along a small stream and developed a two-bedroom house that encroaches on her
registered land. The Court-appointed Surveyor’s testimony (as recounted on 25 July,
2024) supports this. When he was cross-examined by Plaintiff’s Counsel, the
Surveyorconfirmed as follows;
Q:Can you alsoconfirmthat the land of the Defendantas shown by himoverlaps into
Plaintiff’s land?
A: Yes, myLord.
Q:On the land, the Defendantstructureis on the drainage as seen on the ground?
A: Yes, myLord.
[39]. The Defendant, in opencourt,admitted that partof his boundary wall had tobe
broken by the authorities “to link the main drainage,” and also conceded, “Yes my
Lord,” when asked if he was aware that the gutter where he built was intended to
serveasaboundary betweenthe Plaintiff’sland and her neighbours.
When the Defendant was asked, “Do you recall that in this matter, a Surveyor was
appointed to do a Composite Plan?” he answered “Yes,” but he insisted it is “not on
the Plaintiff’s land but a public access route.” It was therefore not surprising that
Defendant’s Counsel reiterated on 22 January 2025: “We are not claiming that road
18
as ourseither, nor are we saying it is the Plaintiff’s. Itis apublic access route used by
thecommunity.”
[40]. The Court-appointed Surveyor’s composite plan and testimony are unequivocal
that the Defendant’s actual building straddles the stream (the drainage) and intrudes
upon the Plaintiff’s documentary boundaries. Although the Defendant contends that
the area is a public route, the Surveyor’s evidence indicates that the Defendant’s
house physically sits “across the drainage.” Even if part of the land is a route or
drainage, that does not negate the Surveyor’s conclusion that it is within the
Plaintiff’s site plan boundary. Hence, the Court finds that the Defendant did
develop his two-bedroom building in a manner that encroaches onto Plaintiff’s land.
Simply put, in assessing the totality of the Surveyor’s report and testimony, the
Court accepts that, on the ground, the Defendant’s building or boundary wall
intrudesontothe Plaintiff’s plot.
[41]. I must stress that no complaint of bias or lack of neutrality whatsoever was
made by the parties or their lawyers during cross examination against the court
appointed surveyor. See: Great Commission Church International Vs. Acolatse &
Anor(2014) 75GMJ 39AT PAGE45.)
It is well known proposition of adjectival law that expert witnesses, such as
surveyors, provide opinions and reports to assist the court in determining the
identity, location, and boundaries of disputed land. However, the court is notbound
by expertevidence but mayuse it asguidance toarrive atitsownconclusion.
Thus, in the case of Fenuku V. John Teye [2001-2002] SCGLR 985 Ampiah JSC
speaking onbehalfofthe courtheld that:-
“The principle of law regarding expert evidence was that the judge need not accept any of the
evidence offered. The Judge was only to be assisted by such expert evidence to arrive at a
conclusion of his own after examining the whole of the evidence before him. The expert
evidencewas only aguideto arrive at the conclusions.”
19
Moreover, in the case of Tetteh V. Hayford (2012) 44 GMJ 11, Dotse JSC held at page 17
thus:
It is generally understood that a court is not bound by the evidence given by
an expert such as the surveyor in this case. But the law is equally clear that a
trial courtmustgive good reasons whyexpertevidence is tobe rejected”.
[42]. My findings premised upon report and testimony of the court appointed
surveyor is fortified by the weight of these foregoing teaching by the supreme court
particularly the dictum of Dotse JSC just quoted above. This court does not have any
cogent basis to disregard or accord little orno probative value to the court appointed
surveyor’s report and his testimony. It would therefore be preposterous for court to
disregard a scientific report which has not been challenged as lacking in credibility
orauthenticity.
Issue (1): Whether the plaintiff built anuncompleted one storey building onher
land and constructed afence wall around the land.
[43]. The Plaintiff in her evidence in chief testified that she “took immediate
possessionofthe land acquired and proceededto build aone-storey building onpart
of the land, which house is yet to be completed.” The Defendant neither seriously
refuted that the Plaintiff had commenced building nor did he deny the existence of
the Plaintiff’s fence wall. Cross examination of Plaintiff by Defendant did not
impeach this aspect of her testimony in any way. It is therefore established and I so
hold that the Plaintiff indeed erected a fence wall and began construction of an
uncompleted one-storey building ontheland she claims as hers.
Issue (2) Whether the defendant caused the fence wall constructed by the plaintiff to
bedemolished.
20
[44]. The Plaintiff testified that the Defendant threatened to demolish the wall “100
times” if she rebuilt it. Asked by Defendant’s Counsel whether she had provided
any evidence showing he demolished the wall, she replied, “That is true,” meaning
she had not produced direct proof such as pictures or witnesses. However, she
insisted that the Defendant was responsible, alleging he had even boasted openly
aboutdoing so.WhenCounsel forDefendant cross-examined Plaintiff onthis;
Q: Did you provide any evidence to show clearly that the Defendant broke any so-called wall
of yours?
A: Yes, because he spoke through his own mouth… He broke it and now he has used my
broken wall to make bigpillars…
Q: I put it to you that you have not provided any evidence to show that the Defendant broke
your wall.
A: That istrue.
[45]. While the Plaintiff credibly asserted that her wall was indeed broken, there was
no contemporaneous photographic or witness evidence tying the Defendant directly
to its demolition. The Plaintiff relied on her recollection of threats. Accordingly, the
Court finds that while the fence wall was indeed demolished, the available
evidence does not conclusively identify the Defendant himself (or his agents) as
the demolisher. The Plaintiff’s assertion stands primarily on her testimony and
caretaker’s claims, which the Defendant refutes. This is a contested factual point,
partially unresolved by direct evidence, but strongly alleged by the Plaintiff. Indeed,
the Court agrees with Counsel for Defendant that Plaintiff failed to discharged the
evidential burden on these issues as required by Section 11 (1) of NRCD 323 and
plethora of decisional law including Ababio v Mensah [ 1989-90] 1GLR 27; Adjei v
Adjei [2021]GHASC5
Issue (4): Whether the Defendant deposited quantities of sand and stones on the
Plaintiff’sland
21
[46]. The Plaintiff had evidential burden with respect to this issue. No cogent
evidence whatsoever was adduced by Plaintiff to establish this averment in
paragraph 12of the statement ofclaim that “… the defendant deposited quantities of
sand and stones on plaintiff’s land asserting a kind of possessory rights over some
portions ofplaintiff’s land.”
[47]. Also, inhis writtenaddress Counselfor Plaintiff submittedinter alia that;
My Lord, additionally, the Plaintiff testifiedthat the Defendanton several occasions
demolishedher fence wall. This matter was severally reported to the Ghana Policeand
apolice extractwas attached tothe WitnessStatementof the Plaintiff.This
incontrovertibleevidence was notimpeachedin any way by the Defendant.This shall
remainan admitted fact
Fortherecords, in paragraph18ofherWitness Statement Plaintiff testified that
Defendant has threatened herand hercaretaker withharmand death.She
proceededtotender Exhibit Dwhichis Extract fromStation Diary ofGhana Police.
WhenExhibit Dis examined, it essentially indicates thaton14thNovember, 2019
Plaintiff lodgedcomplaint thatDefendant had destroyedportion ofher wall and
constructed hisdefence wall inside her plot. Itis truethat Counsel forDefendant did
notchallenge this ExhibitD.Nevertheless, it cannot be takenfor granted that
Defendant has by hisfailure toimpeach Exhibit Dhasadmitted itscontent. Even,if
suchadmissionis upheld by Court, it is not dispositive oftheissues ofdepositing
sand onPlaintiff’s landand also demolition ofthe wall. The Courtnotesthatno
arrest orinvitationofDefendant or his agentswhatsoeverwas made consequent
uponthe complaint made by Plaintiff. Exhibit D is self-serving particularly so when
thePolice investigatorwas notinvited totestify regarding any investigation made
intothe one-sided storycontained in Plaintiff’scomplaint.
22
[48]. The only remotely related evidence that emerged in the trial as far as the issue
of dumping sand and stone on Plaintiff’s land was tangential unsolicited statement
whenDefendant was answering aquestionposed by Counsel forPlaintiff asfollows;
Q: What was the size of the land granted you by the Owoo Family?
A: Ican’ttellnow unlessthe site plan. The landwas givento me as agift. When itwas
givento me, there was abig gutter in frontof the land, theyhad notconstructed it, justbare
gutter. When my familywas selling the land,they werewinning smooth sand from the land
for various construction purposes. So, whenthey gave acontract toa contractor to builda
gutter around the area. The contactor came tosee all the tenants, those who hadthe land so
that theycan usewhere theydig the sand…
Fromthe foregoing, therewas obviously no specific question-and-answer sequence
establishing thatthe Defendant placed sand and stonesonthe Plaintiff’sland
withoutpermission. I accordinglyhold that Plaintiff has failed toprove this assertion
and issue (4) isresolved against Plaintiff.
Issue (6). Whether the Defendantis liable
[50]. A preliminary issue which is a predicate for determining Defendant’s liability is
whether Plaintiff had title to the land she claims. The court has no difficult at all in
holding without elaborate analysis that Plaintiff has land title to all that parcel of
land as per the corrected Land Certificate with Certificate No. GA.51728, Volume 69,
Folio 386. Throughout the trial and in Defendant’s written address there has been
no challenge toPlaintiff’s land as per thecorrected land title certificate issued in 2022
to replace the earlier issued on 26th day of May, 2017. It is well known proposition of
law of evidence that facts admitted need no further proof. In Kusi Vrs Bonsu (2010)
SCGLR 60 page 101-102 the Supreme Court opined that: “It is a basic principle in
evidence that no evidence is necessary to prove an admitted fact. This is so basic as to admit
of nodispute”.
23
[51]. In the final analysis, the question of liability rested on whether the Defendant
interfered with the Plaintiff’s possessory rights. Since the Surveyor’s uncontested
testimony was that the Defendant’s physical structures encroach onto the Plaintiff’s
land and sit over the major drainage that ought to demarcate the boundary, the
Courtfinds thatthe Defendant did interfere withthe Plaintiff’s lawfulpossession.
When cross-examined by Plaintiff’s Counsel, the Defendant denied wrongdoing but
acknowledged having no final building permit and conceded that part of his wall
had been “broken” to allow the authorities to complete the gutter. The Plaintiff also
insisted the Defendant’s frontage was on her land, especially where the big pillars
and gatewere placed.
[52]. The evidence from the Surveyor and from the Defendant’s own admissions
about building on the gutter support a conclusion that the Defendant is liable for
trespass on the Plaintiff’s land. Even if the Municipal Assembly had designated a
portion as a “future” or “emergency” route, there is no conclusive proof that it
formally overrides the Plaintiff’s existing title as per Land Title Certificate. The
question of demolition liability is more ambiguous due to conflicting evidence and
already resolved in Defendant’s favour. However, as to building encroachment on
Plaintiff’s land as encompassed in his land title certificate, the Defendant’s liability
isestablished by the cumulativeeffect oftheevidence onrecord.
Defendant’s Counsel insisted the disputed land as shown on Exhibit CW1 (survey
report) is a “public access route,” and also cited a local authority plan. The Plaintiff
rightly acknowledged that the Ga East Municipal Assembly demarcated some
emergencyroadin2018after her2017land title registration.
[53]. If the Defendant wanted to use that as a stronger claim, he should have
formally challenged or sought to revoke part of the Plaintiff’s registered title, but he
did not. In my view Counsel for Defendant in his address both written and orally
highlighted before the court respectfully conflates two distinct matters namely
whether Defendant has wrongfully extended his building onto portion of Plaintiff’s
24
land with the issue of whether the portion of the Plaintiff’s land which Defendant
might trespassed has been taken over for development as public access route under
statutorylawor byreasonofemergenceofeasement.
[54]. In the instant case, the court has not been invited to cancel the Plaintiff’s land
title certificate and the court has made a finding that Defendant has extended his
developmentintoPlaintiff’s portionofland.
Plaintiff did not have any evidential burden regarding his parcel of land as covered
by land title certificate originally issued in 2017 had been taken over for
development as road or public access route. It is rather the Defendant who set that
assertion up as theory of his defence and had evidential burden. Having considered
the entire evidence I am not satisfied that Defendant made any convincing defence
regarding parcel of land embodied in the land title certificate or portion thereof had
lawfully been taken over for public access route since the land title certificate was
issued in2017and correctedin 2022.
CONCLUSION
[55]. Having considered the pleadings and all evidence both oral and documentary
the Court is satisfied that to a large extent Plaintiff has proven its case on
preponderance of probabilities in the following specific terms. In respect of Issue
One—whether the Plaintiff built an uncompleted one-storey building and
constructed a fence wall—the Court found that she had indeed erected both
structures, thereby resolving Issue One in the Plaintiff’s favour. As to Issue Two,
concerning whether the Defendant caused the demolition of the Plaintiff’s fence wall,
the Court holds that the Plaintiff did not adduce sufficient corroborative proof;
accordingly, Issue Two was resolved in favour of the Defendant. Turning to Issue
Three—whether the Defendant developed a two-bedroom single-storey house across
the stream and onto a portion of the Plaintiff’s land—the Court-appointed
Surveyor’s report and the Defendant’s admissions showed that his structure
25
encroached onto the Plaintiff’s registered plot, so Issue Three is resolved in the
Plaintiff’s favour.
Regarding Issue Four, which examined whether the Defendant deposited sand and
stones on the Plaintiff’s land, the Court finds that the Plaintiff failed to present
concrete or contemporaneous evidence and therefore resolves Issue Four in favour
of the Defendant. On Issue Five—whether the Plaintiff’s land is distinct from the
Defendant’s—the Court accepted the composite plan and documentary evidence
showing that, on paper, the two parcels are separate; however, in reality, the
Defendant’s boundary extended into the Plaintiff’s territory. Notwithstanding that
overlap, the central question of distinctness was answered in the Plaintiff’s favour
because she proved her separate registered title. Finally, on Issue Six—whether the
Defendant is liable—the Court hereby concludes that the Defendant’s encroachment
on the Plaintiff’s registered land amounts to trespass, and accordingly Issue Six is
resolved in the Plaintiff’s favour.
FINALORDERS
[56]. Relief (a) is granted and so it is hereby declared that the Plaintiff is the lawful
owner of all that parcel of land situate at Kisseman in Accra and duly covered by
Land Title Certificate No. GA.51728, Volume 69,Folio 386.
Relief (b) is refused.
Reliefs (c) and (d) aregranted in thefollowing terms;
(i) The Defendant, whether by himself, his agents, workmen, or privies, is
hereby ordered to remove at his own expense any portions of his
boundary walls, house extensions, or other structures that lie on or
encroach upon the Plaintiff’s registered parcel of land within six (6)
monthsfromthedate ofthis order.
26
(ii) A perpetual injunction is hereby granted, restraining the Defendant, his
servants, agents, assigns, orany other persons acting onhis authority from:
Demolishing any fence wall, building, or other structure lawfully erected
by the Plaintiff on her land; and entering, using, or passing through the
Plaintiff’s land without her express permission, save if the appropriate
planning authorities duly acquire or designate any portion as a public
right ofway under applicable law.
(iii) The Defendant is further directed to ensure that the drainage channel, partly
covered by his structure, is reinstated or modified, under the supervision of the
relevant municipal authority, so that it aligns withthe rightful boundary between
thetwo parcels.
Cost of Thirty-Five Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH¢35,000.00) awarded in favour of
Plaintiff against Defendant
Soordered.
(SGD)
H/L.JUSTICE DR. ERNESTOWUSU-DAPAA
(JUSTICEOF THE COURT OF APPEAL)
27
Similar Cases
ODOTAH VRS.ABABIO (LD/0375/19) [2024] GHAHC 455 (12 December 2024)
High Court of Ghana86% similar
Odotah v Ababio (LD/0375/19) [2024] GHAHC 534 (12 December 2024)
High Court of Ghana85% similar
Agyeiwaa and Others v Effah (C1/84/2016) [2025] GHAHC 171 (18 February 2025)
High Court of Ghana84% similar
Mireku v Volta Ghana Investment Ltd. and Others (C1/36/2023) [2025] GHAHC 158 (18 July 2025)
High Court of Ghana83% similar
BAFFOUR OSEI ASANTE VRS IBRAHIM DODOO & ANOR [2024] GHAHC 370 (31 October 2024)
High Court of Ghana82% similar