Odei v Quartey and Another (C8/25/2025) [2025] GHACC 41 (22 May 2025)

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GHANA HELD IN ACCRA AT CIRCUIT COURT ‘2’ ON THURSDAY, 22ND MAY, 2025 BEFORE HIS HONOUR ISAAC ADDO SUIT NO. C8/25/2025 VIVIENNE ODEI PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT H/NO.12 ZOTI-KORLEBU ACCRA VRS 1. SUSAN K. QUARTEY 2. WILLIAM GEORGE NII ADOTEI MINGLE DEFENDANT/APPLICANT ALLOFH/NO.12 ZOTI-KORLEBU ACCRA PLAINTIFF PRESENT DEFENDANTS ABSENT OPOKU AMPONSAH, ESQ. FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT PRESENT EWURABENA NTIAMOAH TAKYI, ESQ. HOLDING THE BRIEF OF JULIUS NKETSIAH, ESQ. FOR DEFENDANT/APPLICANT PRESENT RULING ON APPLICATION TO STRIKE OUT PLAINTIFF’S PLEADINGS FOR DISCLOSING NO REASONALBE CAUSE OF ACTION AND DISMISS THE INSTANT SUIT PURSUANT TO ORDER 11 RULE 18(a) of CI 47 1 On the 10th February, 2025, the Plaintiff/Applicant (hereinafter called ‘the Respondent’) issued a Writ of Summons at the Registry of this Court against the Defendants/Applicants (hereinafter called ‘the Applicants’) seeking the following reliefs: 1. A declaration that as beneficiaries, the Plaintiff, Grace Hall, the Defendants and Samuel Mingle are entitled to the estate of Augustina Quarcoopome in equal proportion. 2. An order directing the Defendants to return forthwith all Household Chattels they have taken away from House No. 12, Zoti, Korle Bu-Accra to the said House for equal distribution of the entire Household Chattels for the five beneficiaries of the estate. 3. An order directing the Plaintiff and the Defendants to cause their respective Solicitors and/or authorized representatives to engage a valuer to value House No. 12, Zoti Korle Bu-Accra for the sale of the said House and distribution of the proceeds in equal proportion less any legitimate expenses approved by their respective Solicitors or authorized representatives. 4. An Order restraining the Defendants from engaging the services of a Realtor for the sale of the House. 5. An order directing the Defendants to seize forthwith acts of intermeddling of the estate of Augustina Quarcoopome, and 6. Any further reliefs the Honourable Court may deem fit. The 1st Defendant entered Appearance on the 5th March, 2025 through her lawyers. This court has been invited by the Applicant to strike out Respondent’s pleadings for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, and to 2 dismiss the instant suit. The lawyers for both sides were ordered to file their written submissions on this issue. Order 11 rule 18(1)(a) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (CI 47) provides that the Court may at any stage of the proceedings order any pleading or anything in any pleading to be struck out on the grounds that it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence. In his book titled “A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CIVIL PROCEDURE IN GHANA”, this is what the venerable Justice Marful-Sau of the Supreme Court of blessed memory wrote: “When a party applies to strike out a pleading because it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence under Order 11 Rule 18 (1)(a), no evidence is admissible. In other words, the court will consider the issue on the face of the pleading and determine whether it discloses a reasonable cause of action or defence or not. No evidence in the form of an affidavit is required.” A general principle is that a party, before suing, must satisfy himself or herself that he or she has a cause of action at the time of the institution of the suit. See Republic vrs High Court, Sunyani, Ex parte Collins Dauda (Boakye-Boateng Interested Party) [2009] SCGLR 447 per Date-Bah JSC In the case of Mensah vrs Intercontinental Bank [2010] 28 MLRG 180 SC @ 201 per Adinyira JSC, the Supreme Court defined cause of action as follows: ‘Cause of Action’ has been defined as: “... a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person. The phrase has been held from earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and 3 every fact which the defendant would have a right to traverse. Cause of action has also been taken to mean that particular act of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or subject matter or grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action.” (e.s) See Halsbury’s Laws of England (Fourth edition) Volume 37, paragraph 20 at page 27. I have carefully read the 10-page written submission filed by the Applicant’s counsel on the 16th April, 2025. Counsel submits that nowhere in the pleadings has the Plaintiff stated that her interest as a beneficiary of the estate has been neglected or not catered for. After citing a number of authorities on the law on intermeddling, the Applicant’s counsel submitted at page 9, paragraph 3 as follows: “The authority in Ex parte Yvonne Amponsah Brobbey (supra) is abundantly clear such that it requires no further clarification. In effect, by the Applicant issuing a writ of summons and statement of claim purportedly claiming that the Defendants are guilty of intermeddling, the instant action is incompetent and the appropriate action assuming there is even intermeddling by the Defendants ought to have been prosecuted by the Attorney General as a criminal offence.” With all due deference to learned counsel for the Applicant, that is an erroneous understanding of the law. If that was the case, then what would be essence of section 13(1) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323)? The said section reads: “In a civil or criminal action, the burden of persuasion as to the commission by a party of a crime which is directly in issue requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” See also Fenuku & Another vrs John Teye and Another (2001-02) SCGLR 985. 4 Will the Attorney General be called upon to prove this assertion of intermeddling in a civil suit? I think not. What this provision means is that the moment an issue of crime emerges in a civil trial, the one who introduced it has the burden to prove that assertion beyond reasonable doubt. The Respondent is not inviting this court to punish the Applicants for intermeddling. Areasonable cause of action is one with some chance of success when only the allegations in the pleading are considered. Once the pleadings disclose some cause of action or raise some questions fit to be decided by the courts, it should not be struck out even if it is weak and not likely to succeed. See Appiah II vrs Boakye [1993-94] 1 GLR 417. In the case of Ghana Muslim Representative Council & Others vrs Salifu & Others [1975] 2 GLR 246, CA,Azu Crabbe JSC stated: “Apleading will only be struck out under the rule in a plain and obvious case, where it is apparent that even if the facts are proved, the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief he seeks”. I have carefully read the pleadings filed by the Respondent as well as the reliefs sought. At this stage, the Applicant has not filed a Statement of Defence. Paragraph 16 of the Statement of Claim reads: “The Plaintiff adds that the 1st Defendant returned to Ghana recently and together with the 2nd Defendant labelled the household chattels in the house owned by the estate, loaded them in a truck and conveyed same to an unknown location in batches and insisting on emptying the house to compel the Plaintiff to vacate same. They insisted on taking away even the fridge, cooker and chairs been used by the Plaintiff in the house. They commenced 5 this exercise at night on Thursday, 6th February, 2025 and continued on Friday, 7th February, 2025. ……………………………” Assuming the above paragraph 16 is admitted by the Applicant, would the Respondent not be entitled to relief 2 supra? Also, if it is denied by the Applicant by way of a Statement of Defence, would this court not determine it as an issue? Even if the pleadings are weak and not likely to succeed, the Respondent must still be heard on the merits of the case. As rightly pointed out by the Respondent’s counsel at page 8 of his written submission, as a beneficiary of the estate, the Defendants cannot exercise sole ownership right over the household chattels and transport them from the property. Indeed, if that is what was done without the consent of the Plaintiff, then it means that the Plaintiff’s right as a beneficiary and a co-administratrix has been trampled upon by the Defendants. On the face of the pleadings, the court finds that the suit of the Respondent discloses a reasonable cause of action. The application has no merit and same is hereby dismissed. I will make no order as to costs. (SGD) ……………………………….. HIS HONOUR ISAAC ADDO CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 22ND MAY, 2025 6