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Case LawGhana

LAWERTEH VRS. BAIDOO (C11/3/22) [2025] GHACC 14 (27 February 2025)

Circuit Court of Ghana
27 February 2025

Judgment

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT “A”, TEMA, HELD ON THURSDAY, THE 27TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025, BEFORE HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE AGNES OPOKU-BARNIEH, SITTING AS ADDITIONAL CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE SUIT NO. C11/3/22 HENRY NARSH LAWERTEH ---- PLAINTIFF VRS. PAUL KOJO BAIDOO ---- DEFENDANT PARTIES PRESENT PATRICK LARWEH KPALM, ESQ. FOR THE PLAINTIFF PRESENT RAYMOND AFAWUBO, ESQ. FOR THE DEFENDANT ABSENT JUDGMENT FACTS: The plaintiff caused a writ of summons with an accompanying statement of claim to be issued against the defendant on 7th September, 2021, for the following reliefs; (a)An order directing the defendant to immediately pay an amount of GH₵80,000 to the plaintiff, being the principal amount due and owing. (b)Interest on the amount stated supra from October 2018 to the date of final payment at the rate of interest (4%) as agreed by the parties. (c)Costs, including legal fees. The defendant caused his lawyer to file an appearance, a statement of defence and counterclaimed against the plaintiff as follows; (a)An order to the plaintiff to refund to the defendant all illegal interests paid to the plaintiff less the principal amount. (b)Interest on the said amount from November 2018 to the date of final payment. 1 (c)Costs including solicitor’s fees. THE PLAINTIFF’S CASE The plaintiff’s case is that he is a businessman and that on 26th July 2018, he gave the defendant financial assistance of One Hundred Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵100,000) with interest at a rate of 10% on the principal amount to be paid in three months. The plaintiff further avers that the defendant paid the 10% interest without the principal amount after the expiration of the initially agreed three months. The plaintiff further says that he magnanimously extended the repayment dates severally as the defendant gave assurances that he would repay the debt owed. The plaintiff says that in good faith, the parties further agreed to reduce the interest accumulated on the principal amount to a rate of 4%. The plaintiff says that the defendant paid Twenty Thousand Ghana Cedis of the principal amount owed him in early 2020, and this was after several reminders. The plaintiff avers that the outstanding amount, together with interest to be paid by the defendant to him as of September 2021, stood at One Hundred and Twenty-Nine Thousand, One Hundred Ghana Cedis (GH₵129,100). The plaintiff says that the defendant has made no effort to pay him the outstanding amount despite several reminders and follow-ups which has resulted in him incurring additional costs in the pursuit of same. The plaintiff says that he caused his lawyers to write a demand letter to the defendant for the debt owed him but the defendant has failed, refused or neglected to pay him his money. The plaintiff says that the defendant has on numerous occasions given him deadlines within which to make payments to him but failed to meet those deadlines on all those occasions. The plaintiff says the defendant will not pay the debt unless he is compelled by this Honourable Court to do so. 2 THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANT The defendant, in his defence, admits taking the money from the plaintiff but states that the plaintiff calculated an exorbitant amount of Ten Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵10,000) as interest per month on the One Hundred Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵100,000) for him to pay and a total of Thirty Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵30,000) was paid to the plaintiff as interest for the first three months. The defendant says further that the said interest of GH₵10,000 is way too high and above the prevailing bank rate, unconscionable and difficult to raise from the business every month. Consequently, the defendant requested to pay the plaintiff the principal of One Hundred Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵100,000) by instalments in addition to the GH₵30,000 already paid to the plaintiff as interest, but same fell on deaf ears as the plaintiff insisted on the exorbitant and unconscionable interest. The defendant avers that he fell into the trap of the plaintiff, a professional banker who knew that the interest charged on the loan was above the prevailing interest rate. The defendant avers that he later discovered that the plaintiff is not a licensed money lender and must not engage in the money lending business, contrary to the laws of Ghana, and take interest from members of the public. The defendant states that he has paid a total amount of Two Hundred and Thirty Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵230,000) to the plaintiff, who is still insisting on further interest on the said amount. The defendant avers that he had to fall on his belongings, which he sold to pay the plaintiff. As a result, the defendant is left with nothing and he is currently on medication because of the constant harassment and intimidation from the plaintiff. The defendant states that the plaintiff has breached the Non-Bank Financial Institutions Act, 2008 (Act 774) since he is not licensed to give loans contrary to Section 2(1) of (Act 774) as stated in the First Schedule. 3 The plaintiff, in reply to the defendant’s statement of defence and Counterclaim, stated that he did not unilaterally impose the interest of 10% on the defendant rather, the parties entered into a mutual agreement with respect to the transaction, including the interest to be paid since the defendant was going to invest the money in a highly lucrative business. The plaintiff, in further reply and defence to counterclaim, states that the defendant agreed to pay both the agreed principal and interest within three months of the original agreement. The interest of 10% was mutually agreed on because the money given to the defendant was unsecured, in that there was no security or collateral. The plaintiff says that the prevailing bank interest rate in 2018 when he gave out the money to the defendant was 17% and this was far above the 10% the parties agreed was to be paid on the borrowed amount within the agreed three months period. The plaintiff says further that the defendant, being a cunning character, never responded to any of the plaintiff’s reminders to agree on alternative payment plans to settle the debts. Rather, the defendant became evasive anytime the plaintiff demanded the money he gave to him. The plaintiff further says that he is not a money lender and the transaction did not arise from a money lending business activity. The plaintiff in further denial, says that the amount of Two Hundred and Thirty Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵230,000) the defendant claims he has paid to the plaintiff is false and a figment of his imagination, which is well calculated not only to cast a slur on the image of the plaintiff but also to mislead this Honourable Court. The plaintiff says that the defendant has only paid Twenty-Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵20,000) of the total principal amount and Thirty-Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵30,000), which is the total interest agreed on the principal amount. The plaintiff says that the Non-Bank Financial Institutions Act, 2008 (Act 774) is alien to this agreement, and same does not apply to the plaintiff and the transaction between the parties and that he only lent money to a distressed friend and thus could not be properly described as a money lender in the sense of the law. 4 At the application for directions stage, the court set down the following issues for trial. LEGAL ISSUES 1. Whether or not the plaintiff lent the defendant an amount of One Hundred Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵100,000) to be repaid within three months. 2. Whether or not the parties agreed that the defendant would pay interest at 10% on the GH₵100,000 lent to the defendant by the plaintiff to do his business. 3. Whether or not the contractual agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant is regulated by the Non-Bank Financial Institutions Act, 2008 (Act 774). At the end of the trial, Learned Counsel for the plaintiff filed his written address on 10th February 2025 and Learned Counsel for the defendant filed his written address on 7th October, 2024. The court has considered the addresses filed. BURDEN OF PROOF It is trite learning that in civil cases, the party who bears the burden of proof is required to prove his case on a balance of probabilities. The Supreme Court in the case of Jass Co. Ltd & Anor v. Apau & Anor [2009] SCGLR 265 held in holding 1 as follows; “The burden of proof is always put on the plaintiff to satisfy the court on a balance of probabilities in an action for a declaration of title to land. Where the defendant has not counterclaimed, and the Plaintiff has not been able to make out a sufficient case against the defendant, then the Plaintiff’s claims would be dismissed. Whenever a defendant also files a counterclaim, then the same standard or burden of proof would be used in evaluating and assessing the case of the defendant, just as it was used to evaluate the case of the plaintiff against the defendant.” Thus, the plaintiff who brought the defendant to court bears the burden to prove his claim on a balance of probabilities. Where as in the instant case, the defendant has also 5 counterclaimed, he bears the onus to prove the counterclaim on a preponderance of probabilities. In effect, a counterclaim is a cross-action and the same burden is cast on a defendant who counterclaims to prove his counterclaim on a balance of probabilities and will not win merely because the action of the plaintiff has been struck out as discontinued. Also, in the case of Aryeh & Akakpo v. Ayaa Iddrisu [2010] SCGLR 891 @901, the Supreme Court per Brobbey JSC (as he then was) held as follows: “A party who counterclaims bears the burden of proving his counterclaim on the preponderance of the probabilities and would not win on that issue only because the original claim has failed. The party wins on the counterclaim on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of his opponent’s case.” The phrase “preponderance of probabilities” is defined under Section 12(2) of the Evidence Act, 1975(NRCD 323) as “that degree of certainty of belief in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the Court by which it is convinced that the existence of a fact is more probable than its non-existence." In the case of Takoradi Flour Mills v Samir Faris [2005-2006] SCGLR 882 holding (5), the Supreme Court held that: “... In assessing the balance of probabilities, all the evidence, be it that of the plaintiff or the defendant, must be considered and the party in whose favour the balance tilts is the person whose case is the more probable of the rival versions and is deserving of favourable verdict.” ANALYSIS ISSUE 1: Whether or not the plaintiff lent the defendant an amount of One Hundred Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵100,000) to be repaid within three months. It is trite that admitted facts require no proof and this finds expression in the Latin Maxim, de minimis non lex curat which means that the law does not concern itself with 6 matters which are not controverted. In the case of Kusi v. Kusi [2010] SCGLR 60 at page 78, the court held that: “It is an elementary principle of law that in civil litigation, where no issue was joined as between parties on a specific question, issue or fact, no duty was cast on the party asserting it to lead evidence in proof of that fact or issue. Indeed, most of the delays associated with civil trials would be avoided, if this simple evidentiary rule were strictly adhered to.” On the state of the pleadings and the evidence led by the parties, the fact that the plaintiff lent the defendant an amount of One Hundred Thousand Ghana Cedis at an interest rate of 10% to be repaid within three months on 26th July 2018 is not controverted. The defendant, in his Statement of defence and counterclaim, admitted the agreement, the principal amount lent to him by the plaintiff and the period within which to repay the principal amount with interest. The plaintiff in his evidence-in-chief, testified to this fact and tendered in evidence Exhibit “A”, a copy of the Loan Repayment Schedule agreed between the parties, which shows that 26th July, 2018 to 26th October 2018, the defendant should have paid both the principal and the interest on the amount totalling One Hundred and Thirty Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵130,000). The defendant confirmed the agreement in his evidence-in-chief save that he claims that the interest charged on the amount was exorbitant. ISSUE 2: Whether or not the parties agreed that the defendant would pay interest at 10% on the GH₵100,000 lent to the defendant by the plaintiff to do his business. The plaintiff testified that the parties mutually agreed on an interest of 10% since the money given to the defendant was unsecured and same was to be invested in the defendant’s business, purported to be a lucrative business. He stated that it was after the three months and the defendant had not paid the principal amount that they mutually agreed that the money would now attract an interest rate of 4% after the initially agreed 7 three months. The defendant agrees to the interest charged on the amount but states that the interest charged was exorbitant and that he fell into the trap of the plaintiff, a professional banker who knew that the interest charged on the loan was above the prevailing interest rate and without authority to lend money and charge interests. Thus, the rate of interest charged on the loan amount was not disputed. ISSUE 3: Whether or not the contractual agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant is regulated by the Non-Bank Financial Institution Act, 2008 (Act 774) Under Section 2(1) and the First Schedule of the Non-Bank Financial Institutions Act, 2008 (Act 774), a person without a license shall not engage in money lending business. Further to that under Section 3 of Act 774, a person shall not be licensed to provide a non-bank financial service unless that person is a body incorporated in Ghana. It is noteworthy that both Counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for the defendant addressed the Court on the Money Lenders Act, 1941 (Cap 176). However, the Non-Banking and Financial Institutions 2014(Act 774) in Section 47 has repealed the Money Lenders Ordinance (Cap 176) as variously amended. The Court will therefore not discuss the repealed enactment since the transaction between the parties was entered into in July 2018, long after the repeal of Cap 176 and the law prohibiting money lending transactions without a valid license is Act 774. The court will therefore proceed to determine the nature of the transaction entered between the plaintiff and defendant to determine if it was a friendly financial assistance as the plaintiff would want the court to believe or that he was engaged in money lending. The plaintiff testified that the defendant contacted him with his colleague at work and requested him to lend money to the defendant to invest in his business. They mutually agreed on the loan amount, the interest and the term, but the defendant breached the repayment schedule when at the end of the three months, he had only paid the interest component of the loan leading to the principal sum of One Hundred Thousand Ghana 8 Cedis unpaid. According to the plaintiff, they agreed on an interest rate of 10% because the loan was unsecured and the same was to be invested in the defendant’s business, purported to be lucrative. Also after three months, when the defendant defaulted, they agreed on an interest rate of 4% on the principal amount. After further demand notices, the defendant later paid Twenty Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵20,000). The outstanding amount and accrued interest payable by the defendant as of September 2021, when the plaintiff initiated the instant action now stood at One Hundred and Twenty-Nine Thousand, One Hundred Ghana Cedis (GH₵129,100). According to the plaintiff, he caused his lawyers to write to the defendant to demand for the debt owed to him but the defendant failed, refused or neglected to pay the money. In support he tendered in evidence a copy of the demand letter admitted and marked as Exhibit “B”. The defendant responded to the demand letter proposing payment terms. In support, he tendered in evidence, Exhibit “C”, a copy of the defendant’s letter. He rejected the woefully unacceptable terms of payment proposed by the defendant and in support, he tendered in evidence, Exhibit “D”. The plaintiff says that the defendant has on numerous occasions suggested deadlines within which he will make payments to him but failed to do so. The defendant on his part admits the agreement between himself and the plaintiff but contends that the plaintiff was engaged in money lending and taking interest on the amount without license contrary to the statute. The defendant therefore, testified that the plaintiff had breached the Non-Bank Financial Institutions Act, 2008, (Act 774) and his actions were illegal. The defendant under cross-examination by Counsel for the plaintiff on whether the plaintiff was a money lender testified as follows; Q: And that it was because you will be depriving the plaintiff of his money and investing it in your business that is why you agreed on interest. Is that not so? 9 A: Yes, My Lord. Q: And at the time, the plaintiff mentioned to you that based on the principle of time value of money, you have to pay an interest. Is that not so? A: No, My Lord. I did not know the plaintiff myself. It was through my brother who told me that the plaintiff said he will grant me the money but at the end of the three months I should bring him the principal and interest of 10% for the 3 months. Q: You will further agree with me that during the execution of the agreement, you paid no collateral or security? A: Yes, My Lord. Q: And that you did not also sign any document or pay a facility fee, processing fee or any other charges before accessing the funds? A: My Lord, I agree I did not pay that but it happened so because I already told this court that I did not know the plaintiff before this transaction. The whole transaction was done through my brother so it was through my brother that the 3 of us signed the document. Q: Were you given an offer letter before you accessed the funds? A: No My Lord. It happened so because my younger brother works in the same office with the plaintiff and because my brother trusted me and knew I was not going to run away with the money, he did a lot of things on my behalf with the plaintiff. Q: You allege that the plaintiff is into the business of money lending. Do you have any evidence to show? A: I already told this court that I dealt with the plaintiff through my brother so it was my brother who dealt with him. 10 Q: So you have no evidence to show that he is into the business of lending money? A: No, My Lord. Q: Can you point to any individual or institution that the plaintiff has granted a loan? A: No, My Lord. From the cross-examination conducted by Counsel for the plaintiff, the defendant states that he did not personally deal with the plaintiff and that his brother who is a colleague of the plaintiff at work dealt with the plaintiff and that he was not given any offer letter, no charges, and that he has no evidence to show that the plaintiff was into money lending and could not also show any other person that the plaintiff had lent money to at an interest. Thus, the defendant failed to show that the plaintiff’s business is money lending or carries on or advertises or holds himself out as carrying on the business of money lending. The defendant having testified that he has no evidence that the plaintiff is into money lending, I find that he failed to raise a presumption of money lending contrary to Section 2 of Act 774. The evidence of the plaintiff is that he gave out friendly financial assistance to the defendant. The defendant contends that it was a loan that he had paid interest of GH₵30,000 for the first three months and had made various payments amounting to Two Hundred and Thirty Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵230,000) and disputes the plaintiff’s assertion that there is an outstanding amount of One Hundred and Twenty- Nine Thousand, One Hundred Ghana Cedis (GH₵129,100) as of September 2021. From the evidence led by the plaintiff and the defence put up by the defendant, it is not in dispute that the plaintiff lent money at an interest rate of 10% per month. The 11 plaintiff states that he is not a money lender and that the money he lent to the defendant was from his own savings for a project and that since the defendant represented to him that it was for a highly lucrative venture and the money was unsecured by collateral, they agreed on an interest rate of 10% per month for three months. He strenuously contended that the money was a friendly financial assistance and not a loan. The defendant deems the interest rate as harsh and unconscionable and that the plaintiff who has been working with a bank for over 17 years is engaged in money lending without a license. The Supreme Court had the occasion to pronounce on the nature of friendly assistance in the case of Mensah v. Ahenfie Cloth Sellers Association [2010] SCGLR 680@ 697, where the court held that: “A person lending money may take his own money to lend out or borrow money from a source like a bank to lend out. Where the money comes from is irrelevant. It is the object of giving out the money which matters. That object determines whether it is money given out as a benevolent gesture, friendly assistance or money lent out to make more money by way of profit from interest earned on money lent…Friendly assistance can take many forms. What cannot be denied is that “friendly assistance” does not attract interest. Where the money given out as “friendly assistance” attracts interest at 52 or 23 percent, that transaction will cease to be “friendly”, let alone “assistance On the evidence, the friendly assistance attracted an interest rate of 10% per month. This means that interest per annum would amount to 120%, which would have been over and above the prevailing bank rate for friendly assistance, as the plaintiff would want the court to believe. The implication is also that interest per annum on the amount of GH₵100,000 lent to the defendant would have amounted to GH₵120,000 which was more than the principal amount lent. The interest charged by the plaintiff was therefore harsh and unconscionable for a benevolent gesture. 12 The defendant testified that the said interest of GH₵10,000 per month is too high and above the prevailing bank rate and unconscionable and difficult to raise from the business every month. Consequently, he requested to pay the plaintiff the principal of One Hundred Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵100,000) in instalments in addition to the GH₵30,000 already paid to the plaintiff but he insisted on the payment of exorbitant interest. The issue for the consideration of the court is whether or not a court of law and equity will allow a person who is not even in the business of lending to charge an interest of 120 % which is more than the prevailing bank rate. In Attitsogbe v. CFC Construction Co. (WA) Ltd & Read [2005-2006] SCGLR 858, the Supreme Court held in its holding 1 that: “Under the equitable doctrine of unconscionable bargain, the courts would set aside as unconscionable any dealing, whether by contract or by gift, where on account of the special disability of one of the parties, he or she is placed at a serious disadvantage in relation to the other. The categories of special disability should not be regarded as closed would include poverty or need of any kind, sickness, age, sex, infirmity of body or mind, drunkenness, illiteracy or lack of education, lack of assistance or explanation where assistance or explanation is necessary. All those circumstances could, in the right context justify the courts' intervention on the basis of the equitable principles embodied in the doctrine of unconscionable bargain. Where a party successfully makes a case that he or she has a special disability, or the facts of a case lend themselves to an application of the doctrine, the onus would devolve on the dominant party to demonstrate that the transaction was fair, just and reasonable. If the dominant party fails to show that the transaction was fair, just and reasonable, the court is entitled to set the transaction aside.” In this case, the plaintiff is a banker with over 17 years of experience dealing with the defendant, who described himself as a businessman who needed financial assistance. Thus, the agreement between the plaintiff, an astute banker and the defendant who seriously needed financial assistance, could not have been at arm's length. The interest 13 charged was therefore harsh and excessive. The plaintiff in this case had no money lender license to be charging an interest of 10% per month for a benevolent gesture. In the case of Mensah v. Ahenfie Cloth Sellers Association, supra, the Supreme Court held in its holding 6 that: “Where money lending transaction was found to be excessive, harsh and unconscionable (as in the instant case), the transaction was to be regulated by the provision in section 1 of the revised Loans Recovery Act, 1918 (Cap 175). The effect of the provision in section 1 of the Act was that where the interest charged on the amount lent was harsh and excessive and therefore unconscionable, the court might order the transaction to be reopened. In reopening the transaction, the court might take into account a statement or settlement of the account or agreement purporting to close previous dealings and open a new obligation between the parties. Other facts which the court should take into account were the necessities of the borrower, his or her pecuniary position, the presence or absence of security, the relationship on which he stood to the borrower and the total remuneration derived by the lender from the whole transaction. At the same time, the court should consider the fact that the first defendant had benefited from the transaction. As a court of equity, the first defendant should not be allowed to take the money, make use of it and shirk her responsibility to pay what was due from her, considering, as she knew too well, that the initial loan had been taken from the Ghana Commercial Bank to which refund should be made with interest at 29 per cent.” Thus, the court will reopen the transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant. On the amount of money repaid, the plaintiff states that he only recovered an amount of GH₵50,000 from the defendant, all being interest payments since the defendant failed to pay the principal amount. The defendant also claims to have paid an amount of Two hundred and Thirty Thousand Ghana Cedis to the plaintiff through various means. The 14 evidence before the court regarding monies paid shows that in Exhibit “E”, the plaintiff’s statement from the Republic Bank, the defendant commenced the so called interest payment on 30th August 2018. By 1st November 2018, he had paid an amount of GH₵30,000. The defendant made further payments in December 2018, February 2019 and September 2019 at GH₵8,500 each, with the total amount paid into the Republic Bank Account of the plaintiff amounting to GH₵55,500. Also, in Exhibit “1”, the MTN Momo statement, the defendant paid a total of GH₵10,050, the total amount paid on the evidence being GH₵65,500. The defendant claims to have paid monies through various means, but there is no evidence before the court of any other payment to the plaintiff. The total amount that the defendant paid as interest and the principal does not exceed the principal amount given to the defendant as friendly financial assistance. The defendant is therefore not entitled to his counterclaim since he is still indebted to the plaintiff and having invested the money into his business and reaped the benefits, it will be against good conscience for him not to be ordered to repay the loan. In my considered opinion, and to do substantial justice in the case, the plaintiff has been deprived of his money and is therefore entitled to recover the money with interest at the prevailing commercial Bank rate. In the case of Akoto v. Gyamfi-Addo [2005-2006] SCGLR 1018, the Supreme Court per Atuguba JSC stated at page 1023 that: “the general principle for the award of interest to a party, is that such party, has been by defendant, unjustifiably kept out of money due to him for the relevant period.” Additionally, in the case of Holland West Africa v. Pan African Trading Co [1976] 2 GLR 179, where Edusei J (as he then was), held in holding 3 as follows; “If a breach of contract by a defendant had deprived a plaintiff of the use of a sum of money or other capital asset, the defendant must be presumed to have agreed to pay 15 interest for the period between the date when the cause of action arose and the date of judgment” CONCLUSION On the totality of the evidence led by the plaintiff and the defence put up by the defendant, I hold that the transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant is a friendly financial assistance since the plaintiff, not being a corporate body properly licensed, cannot purport to give out loans with interest. The interest charged is excessive, harsh and unconscionable and the transaction ought to be reopened. I therefore enter judgment for the plaintiff to recover from the defendant as follows; 1. Recovery of an amount of GH₵34,500 being the principal amount outstanding. 2. Interest on GH₵34,500 at the prevailing commercial bank rate from January 2020 till date of final payment. 3. The defendant shall pay interest on the principal amount of One Hundred Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵100,000) at the prevailing bank rate from July 2018 till December 2018. 4. Interest at the prevailing commercial bank rate on an amount of GH₵45,400 from January 2019 to December 2020. COSTS It is trite learning that the award of costs is at the discretion of the court and the court is enjoined to exercise the discretion judiciously. The court has heard the oral submission of Counsel for the plaintiff and the defendant on costs and the prayer of Counsel for the court to award costs of Five Thousand Ghana Cedis. In accordance with Order 74 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C.I. 47) and considering the nature of the case, the length of the trial and the reasonable expenses incurred by the plaintiff in filing processes in court and providing reasonable remuneration for Counsel for the plaintiff, and the fact that the defendant won on some 16 of the issues, I deem the amount requested by Counsel for the plaintiff to be reasonable. I hereby award costs of Five Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵5,000) in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant. SGD. H/L JUSTICE AGNES OPOKU-BARNIEH (ADDITIONAL CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE) 17

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