Darkwah v Kpenetey (matrimonial cause) [2025] GHADC 215 (20 November 2025)

_**09:08 A.M.**_ _**IN THE DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN REGION HELD AT**_ _**EFFIAKWESIMINTSIM, THIS THURSDAY THE 20**_ _**TH**_ _**DAY OF NOVEMBER,**_ _**2025, BEFORE HER WORSHIP BERNICE ODURO**_ _**KWARTENG (ESQ.) (MS.).**_ _**THE MAGISTRATE**_ _**.**_ _**SUIT NO. A4/24/24.**_ **CHRISTIAN DARKWAH, : PETITIONER** **H/NO. 42,** **EFFIAKUMA.** **VS.** **BEATRICE KPENETEY, : RESPONDENT** **PIPE ANO NEAR CHURCH OF** **PENTECOST, TAKORADI.** _______________________________________________________________________ **JUDGMENT** **_____________________________________________________________________** **INTRODUCTION** The Petitioner initiated this action by filing a petition for divorce on 27th September 2024. In response, the Respondent filed an answer and a cross-petition on 15th November 2024. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion on notice seeking to amend the original petition, and upon the grant of leave by the Court, the Petitioner filed an amended petition on 10th January 2025, wherein he prayed the court for the following reliefs; 1\. The dissolution of the marriage celebrated on 12th March 2006. 2\. The Petitioner to be granted custody of all the children of the marriage, namely Georgina Acheampomaa Darkwah, Gloria Kesewaa Darkwah, and Promise Dodua Darkwah. Upon being served with the amended petition, the Respondent duly filed her amended answer and cross-petition on 20th February 2025, praying for the following reliefs: 1\. The marriage celebrated between the parties on 12th March 2006 be dissolved. 2\. Custody of the three children namely Georgina Acheampomaa Darkwah, Gloria Kesewaa Darkwah, and Promise Dodua Darkwah be granted to the Respondent. 3\. Petitioner be ordered to pay for the rent amount of GH₡20,000.00. 4\. Petitioner be ordered to refund an amount of GH₡4,000.00 which the Respondent gave in acquisition of an Urvan vehicle the Petitioner purchased during the subsistence of the marriage to the Respondent. 5\. Petitioner be ordered to refund an amount of GH₡3,500.00 being the cost of provisions the Respondent left in the provision shop when the Petitioner sacked her. 6\. Petitioner be ordered to refund an amount of GH₡6,000.00 the Petitioner took from the Respondent to sponsor his travelling to the UK in the subsistence of the marriage. 7\. Petitioner be ordered to compensate the Respondent with a lump sum of GH₡50,000.00. 8\. Petitioner be ordered to maintain the children at GH₡1,500.00 monthly. 9\. Petitioner be ordered to pay the school fees and medical fees for the children. 10\. Petitioner be ordered to provide accommodation for the children. The Petitioner filed a reply and answer to the cross-petition on 3rd March 2025 and joined issues with the Respondent. After the close of pleadings, the court directed the parties to file their respective witness statements, including those of any witnesses they intended to call. In compliance, the Petitioner filed his own witness statement, as well as witness statement of Douglas Awortwe and Tetteh Adams. The Respondent also filed her witness statement. At the hearing, the parties relied on their statements as their evidence-in-chief. PETITIONER’S CASE The case of the Petitioner is that initially, his marriage to the Respondent was peaceful. The Petitioner operated a shop at the STC Station, Takoradi, which he funded and restocked during weekly treks, while the Respondent managed it in the Petitioner’s absence. Petitioner says he noticed that the Respondent had begun an affair with one Mr. Barnes, who is an STC staff member. Despite denials, the Petitioner on one occasion in the company of Mr. Douglas Awortwe, PW2 and one Mr. Amoah, a staff member of STC caught the Respondent with Mr. Barnes in the latter’s house with both naked which led to his collapse. Following this, the Respondent rented a separate apartment in Lagos Town without the Petitioner’s knowledge or consent, to afford her privacy to continue her infidelity with her paramour. Petitioner avers that since 2013, the Respondent has subjected him to verbal and physical abuse, denied him intimacy since 2014, and once injured the Petitioner in his genitalia, which he reported to police and had to incur high medical expenses for treatment. The Respondent later acquired a shop at Effiakuma VIP and abandoned the matrimonial home, and also ceased to cook or care for the Petitioner. She removed household utensils to her shop, where she cooked for herself and the children at the Petitioner’s expense. Petitioner asserts that efforts to reconcile through the church, led by one Pastor Romeo Quainoo, and through family meetings, were unsuccessful. The Respondent refused to attend three family meetings and, through her uncle called Borga, communicated her disinterest in continuing the marriage. In 2018, Respondent and her mother presented Petitioner with the traditional drinks and encouraged the Petitioner to dissolve the ordinance marriage in court and parties have lived apart since then. Petitioner claims no joint property was acquired during the marriage. He further asserts that he owned an Urvan vehicle prior to marriage, which was later sold as scrap in 2017 for GH₡900.00. Petitioner says he never attempted to travel abroad and did not collect any funds for such purposes from the Respondent. Petitioner avers that throughout the marriage, he has borne the sole responsibility for the children’s welfare, including school fees, feeding, and medical expenses till date and still cater for the children who currently reside with the Petitioner in her rented home at Effiakuma. According to Petitioner, Respondent frequently travels without informing the children and neglects her maternal duties and therefore contends that apart from the dissolution of the marriage, Respondent is not entitled to any of her reliefs. TESTIMONY OF PW1 TETTEH ADAMS PW1, Tetteh Adams, claims he knows of the prevailing marital issues between the Petitioner and the Respondent. In his capacity as the then Presiding Elder and Chairman of the Marriage Committee of the Church of Pentecost, Police Assembly, Effiakuma District, PW1 avers that the church, through various leadership members including himself, the late Pastor Baiden, Elder Gyimah, and later Pastor Romeo Asante, made several conscious efforts to counsel and mediate between the parties to sustain their marriage. The efforts were ultimately unsuccessful due to the Respondent’s uncooperative and adamant stance, evidenced by her failure to attend meetings. Furthermore, PW1 states that it came to the attention of church leadership, via the Petitioner and Deacon Awortwe, PW2, that the Respondent was engaged in an amorous relationship with one Mr. Barnes of the State Transport Corporation (STC). Deacon Awortwe reported witnessing an incident where he and the Petitioner barged into Mr. Barnes’ room and found the Respondent and Mr. Barnes naked, causing the Petitioner to collapse. Following this, the Petitioner was hosted by District Pastor Don Diego. The next day, the Petitioner, accompanied by the Pastor and Deacon Awortwe, met with STC authorities and Mr. Barnes, where Mr. Barnes apologized and claimed the Respondent had informed him, she was unmarried. Despite the revelation, the Petitioner expressed his willingness to reconcile with Respondent, and asked Mr. Barnes to cease contact with his wife. PW1 also asserts that at a later date, the Respondent and her mother came to the Petitioner’s house to return the wedding ring and the traditional “tsir nsa” drinks, and refused any attempt at dialogue. PW1 says he advised the Petitioner to keep the items and inform his own parents, and he subsequently reported the entire matter to the church’s executive body. TESTIMONY OF PW2 DOUGLAS AWORTWE PW2, Douglas Awortwe, states that sometime in the year 2013 or 2014, the Petitioner confided in him, complaining about the Respondent’s attitude and infidelity. On one occasion in 2014, after the Petitioner informed him that the Respondent had not slept at their matrimonial home the previous night, the Petitioner requested PW2 to escort him to the Respondent’s paramour’s residence to confront them. Upon arrival, the Petitioner and PW2 knocked repeatedly on the door, but the Respondent and her paramour delayed in opening it. PW2 says he then forcibly attempted to open the door, after which the paramour finally opened it, allowing the PW2 and the Petitioner to rush into the room. Upon entering the room, PW2 says he saw the Respondent naked, covered with a black material, while the paramour was wearing a white singlet and green boxer shorts. The Respondent hurriedly attempted to dress up. Upon witnessing the Respondent’s state, the Petitioner suddenly collapsed, and the Respondent and PW2 had to carry him outside until he regained consciousness. Subsequently, PW2 accompanied the Petitioner and led by the Petitioner’s District Pastor, Pastor Amos Don Diego, proceeded to the State Transport Corporation (STC) to meet with the Branch Manager to discuss the events of the previous night and determine the way forward. PW2 contends that the meeting, which was attended by the Respondent and her paramour, concluded with the paramour admitting his relationship with the Respondent and he apologized to the Petitioner. RESPONDENT’S CASE The Respondent asserts that the marriage between the parties broke down due to the Petitioner’s persistent and baseless accusations of adultery, which caused her emotional distress. The Respondent states that in 2018, the Petitioner informed Respondent’s family of his desire to end the marriage and subsequently forced her out of their matrimonial home. The Respondent denies all allegations of infidelity, particularly with the said Mr. Barnes, and says that Mr. Barnes on the fateful day merely gave her a lift and that the Petitioner misinterpreted the situation, and caused a public scene. The Respondent recounts that she took over the management of the STC provision shop after the Petitioner’s fallout with the original owner, Aunty Mercy, with whom he had a failed romantic relationship. The Respondent claims she restocked the shop at her own expense and later gave the Petitioner GH₡4,000.00 to help purchase an Urvan vehicle. She also lent Petitioner GH₡6,000.00 to assist him travel to UK but the plan never materialized and Petitioner refused to pay back the money. The Respondent claims the Petitioner was abusive physically, emotionally, and sexually including forcing sexual intercourse during Respondent’s menstrual period, which led to medical complications. The Respondent also recounts an incident where the Petitioner tore her clothes in public out of jealousy because she was being escorted home at night by a young man, leaving her naked and humiliated. The Respondent maintains that she consistently fulfilled her marital duties, including cooking and caring for the children, even after separation. However, the Petitioner refused her food and later instructed their children to tell Respondent to stop cooking meals for him. The Respondent states that all attempts at reconciliation failed due to the Petitioner’s uncooperative and abusive behavior. She alleges that Petitioner physically assaulted her, insulted her, and allowed his family to do the same. The Respondent also claims Petitioner failed to provide food for her when she was nursing their second child which situation forced her to take her neighbor’s food without permission. Respondent says the children have been with her since 2018. Respondent says she has borne the financial burden of their care, including school fees, rent cost of about GH₡20,000.00 and their daily expenses. The Respondent further asserts that the Petitioner has a history of mental illness which caused him violent behavior. This caused Respondent to have fear and anxiety. She concludes that the Petitioner’s conduct made it impossible to continue the marriage hence prays for the reliefs indorsed on her answer and cross-petition. From the case presented by both parties, the court shall determine the following issues; 1. Whether or not the marriage celebrated between the parties on the 12th March 2006 has broken down beyond reconciliation. 2. Whether or not the Petitioner is entitled to be granted custody of the issues of the marriage. 3. Whether or not the Respondent is entitled to her financial claims. It is not disputed that the parties married under the ordinance on 12th March 2006 and are blessed with three children aged 17,16 and 14 at the time of instituting this action. Both parties are traders. After the celebration of the marriage, they cohabited in a single room rented apartment at Accra Station, Takoradi. Petitioner currently lives at Effiekuma and the Respondent at Pipe Ano. Respondent left the matrimonial home in 2013 and the customary drinks were returned to the Petitioner in the year 2018 signifying the dissolution of the customary marriage. Both parties pray the court for the dissolution of the marriage amongst other reliefs. **EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW** It is a fundamental principle of the law of evidence that the party who makes an assertion bears the burden of proving it. In civil proceedings, this burden rests on the Petitioner, who must establish the claims in his plaint on a balance of probabilities. The same standard applies to the Respondent in respect of any cross-petition filed. This legal position is clearly articulated in **Sections 10, 11(1)** and **(4), 12** , and **14** of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323). The Supreme Court, in _**Serwah v. Kesse**_**[1960] GLR 227** , affirmed this principle, stating: “the general rule, of course, is that the onus probandi lies on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue.” The authority to grant a decree of divorce of an ordinance marriage lies exclusively with the court, which must first take evidence from the parties and evaluate same to determine whether the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation. This determination is made by establishing one or more of the facts enumerated under **Section 2(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367). See the case of****Kotei v. Kotei [1974] 2 GLR 172, per Sarkodee J**. **Section 2(1) of Act 367** stipulates that to satisfy the court that the marriage has indeed broken down beyond reconciliation, one or more of the following facts ought to be established: 1. that the Respondent has committed adultery and that by reason of such adultery the Petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the Respondent; or (b) that the Respondent has behaved in such a way that the Petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the Respondent; or (c) that the Respondent has deserted the Petitioner for a continuous period of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or (d) that the parties to the marriage have not lived as man and wife for a continuous period of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition and the Respondent consents to the grant of a decree of divorce; provided that such consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, and where the court is satisfied that it has been so withheld, the court may grant a petition for divorce under this paragraph notwithstanding the refusal; or (e) that the parties to the marriage have not lived as man and wife for a continuous period of at least five years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or (f) that the parties to the marriage have, after diligent effort, been unable to reconcile their differences. **Section 2 (3)** stipulates further that even where the court is satisfied that one or more of the facts enumerated in subsection (1) exist, it shall not grant a decree of divorce unless it is further satisfied, upon consideration of all the evidence, that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation. **Unreasonable Behaviour** To establish the fact of unreasonable behaviour, the case of **Mensah v Mensah [1972] 2 GLR 198** held that “in determining whether a husband has behaved in such a way as to make it unreasonable to expect a wife to live with him, the court must consider all circumstances constituting such behavior including the history of the marriage. It is always a question of fact. The conduct complained of must be grave and weighty and mere trivialities will not suffice for Act 367 is not a Cassanova’s Charter.” The test to determine whether an act constitutes unreasonable behaviour is an objective test by considering both parties’ behaviour, character and disposition. The conduct in question may be a single grave act or a cumulative series of lesser acts which, taken together, render cohabitation unbearable. See the cases of **Knudsen v Knudsen [1976] 1 GLR 204; Ansah v. Ansah [1982-83] GLR 1127.** With respect to the allegation of unreasonable behaviour, the Petitioner avers that the Respondent subjected him to persistent verbal and physical abuse, culminating in an incident in which he sustained a serious injury to his genitalia, for which he sought medical attention and incurred substantial expenses. The Petitioner further contends that, since the year 2014, the Respondent has willfully denied him conjugal relations, thereby depriving him of the companionship and intimacy ordinarily expected within the marital relationship. The Respondent although sought to challenge the case of the Petitioner, she failed to rebut or challenge these claims during cross-examination of the Petitioner. In line with the principle established in _**Takoradi Flour Mills v. Samir Faris**_**[2005-2006] SCGLR 882** , the failure to contest material allegations is deemed an admission of those facts. The court therefore finds and accepts these claims as having been established. Similarly, the Respondent alleges that the Petitioner subjected her to physical, emotional, and sexual abuse, including instances of forced sexual intercourse and a public assault. Respondent also claims Petitioner neglected his responsibilities by not providing food for her when she was nursing their second child. She further claims that the Petitioner has a history of mental illness and violent tendencies, which rendered cohabitation unsafe and intolerable. These allegations were equally not denied or challenged by the Petitioner, and in accordance with the same legal principle in the Takoradi Flour Mills case (supra), the court considers them admitted. Evaluated objectively, these conducts constitute unreasonable behaviour within the meaning of the authorities above-cited. **Adultery** On what constitutes adultery, **Section 43** **of Act 367** , defines it as voluntary sexual intercourse between a married person and someone of the opposite sex who is not their spouse. As direct evidence is rare, adultery can be proven through circumstantial evidence, as established in **Adjetey v Adjetey [1973] 1 GLR 216**. Additionally, the Petitioner must show that the adultery has made it intolerable to continue living with the Respondent. The decision in **Goodrich v Goodrich [1971] 2 All ER 1340** clarified that proving adultery and demonstrating that continued cohabitation is intolerable are separate legal requirements. It emphasized that the question of intolerability is a personal and subjective judgment, unique to the Petitioner’s circumstances. The allegation of adultery on the part of the Respondent has been a central and contentious issue between the parties, significantly contributing to the breakdown of the marriage. In support of this claim, the Petitioner called two witnesses to corroborate his account. PW1 testified that he became aware, through PW2, of an incident in which the Petitioner and PW2 allegedly found the Respondent and Mr. Barnes, her purported paramour, naked together in Mr. Barnes’ residence. The entirety of PW1’s testimony was challenged by Respondent’s counsel during cross-examination. PW2, who claimed to have been present during the said incident, also gave evidence corroborating the Petitioner’s story of the incident. However, the specific details of the incident as recounted by PW2 were not thoroughly controverted during cross-examination by Respondent’s counsel. Given the seriousness of the allegation and the centrality of this incident to the Petitioner’s case, it was expected that the Respondent’s version of events would have been clearly put to PW2 during cross-examination, particularly as PW2 was presented as an eyewitness. The Respondent’s case is that she did not enter Mr. Barnes’ room but merely assisted him in carrying water containers to the frontage of his house. She claims when the Petitioner arrived, she was standing outside and not in Mr. Barnes room. However, this version was not adequately put to PW2 during cross-examination. In _**Yaokumah v. The Republic**_ **[1976] 2 GLR 147** , the court emphasized that the purpose of cross-examination is to “put the case” of the opposing party across. Where this is not done, the court is entitled to infer that there is no contrary case to be made against the witness’s testimony. Similarly, in _**Adjei v. McKorley**_**(J4/01/2024)[[2025] GHASC 40](/akn/gh/judgment/ghasc/2025/40)**, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a party, even if designated as a defendant, bears the evidentiary burden to substantiate any factual assertions made in rebuttal. **Sections 14** **and 17 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323)** , reinforce this principle by placing the burden of persuasion and production of evidence on the party asserting a fact essential to their claim or defence. In light of the foregoing, the court finds that the Respondent failed to discharge the evidentiary burden required to rebut the Petitioner’s allegations of adultery, particularly in relation to the incident involving Mr. Barnes. The testimony of PW2, having remained largely unchallenged on material points, is accepted as credible and reliable. Hence the court finds that the issue of adultery is proved against the Respondent. **Desertion** Desertion refers to the unjustified withdrawal from cohabitation without the consent of the other spouse and with the intention or remaining separated permanently. To prove desertion, the Petitioner must prove that the Respondent has deserted him continuously for at least two years immediately preceding the filing of the petition, as required by **Section 2(1)(c)** **of Act 367.** **Section 5(1)** of the Act further clarifies that any brief periods of resumed cohabitation not exceeding six months within that time frame may be disregarded by the court. Desertion is not confined to physical departure of one spouse from the other. It encompasses a complete repudiation of marital obligations. The courts have established that four essential elements must be present to constitute desertion: actual separation, intention to desert (animus deserendi), absence of consent from the other spouse, and lack of reasonable justification. The absence of any one of these elements would render the claim of desertion unsuccessful. Judicial precedent has provided guidance on these elements. In **Hope v. Hope [1948] 2 All ER 920** , the court held that desertion had not occurred where the spouses, though sleeping in separate rooms, continued to share meals and common space in the house, which indicated insufficient separation. Similarly, in **Naylor v. Naylor [1961] 2 All ER 129** , the court emphasized that desertion requires a total withdrawal from the marital relationship. See also **Bull v Bull [1953] 2 All ER 601**. Consent plays a critical role in assessing desertion. Separation that occurs with the express or implied agreement of the other spouse does not amount to desertion. However, once such consent is withdrawn, continued separation may qualify as desertion. This principle was affirmed in **Nutley v. Nutley [1970] 1 All ER 410** , where the court recognized that consent must be voluntary and can be revoked. A spouse is considered to be in desertion when he or she withdraws from cohabitation without just cause or reasonable excuse. The law also recognizes the concept of constructive desertion, which arises when one spouse is compelled to leave the matrimonial home due to the other’s intolerable conduct, such as abuse. In such cases, the departing spouse must prove both the fact of separation and the intention of the other spouse to drive them away. **In Hughes v. Hughes [1973] 2 G.L.R. 342** , the court held that for the conduct to amount to desertion, it must reflect an unjustifiable withdrawal from cohabitation with the intent to remain permanently separated. Moreover, if the separation was mutually agreed upon, a claim of desertion cannot be sustained. On the issue of desertion, the Petitioner asserts that the Respondent left the matrimonial home in 2013 without his consent and moved into a rented apartment. He further states that in 2018, the Respondent returned the customary marriage drinks, confirming her intention to end the marriage. Since then, the parties have remained apart, with no effort by the Respondent to resume cohabitation. The Respondent does not deny that she moved out of the matrimonial home in 2013 and returned the customary drinks in 2018. During this period, she stopped performing all marital duties, including intimacy and domestic care, without the Petitioner’s consent. Her extramarital affair with Mr. Barnes around the same time she left further raises doubts about her intention to continue the marriage. Respondent claims that the Petitioner was abusive and had a history of mental illness in the early years of the marriage, which Petitioner did not deny. These issues do not adequately resolve the question why Respondent left the matrimonial home around 2013 to live in her rented apartment especially considering the fact of Respondent’s affair with Mr. Barnes around that same time. Hence, the court is not convinced by the claim of the Respondent that she was forced out of the matrimonial home by the Petitioner. Thus, this court finds that the Respondent deserted the Petitioner. Having regard to the totality of the evidence, it is clear that the marriage has irretrievably broken down. The Petitioner has established acts of adultery, desertion, and unreasonable behaviour on the part of the Respondent likewise the Respondent has established acts of unreasonable behaviour on Petitioner’s part. The evidence further shows that the parties have lived apart since 2013. The return of the customary marriage drinks in 2018 is a strong indication that reconciliation efforts have failed and that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation. Accordingly, the court finds that the legal threshold under **Section 2** **of Act 367** has been met, and it is in the interest of both parties that the marriage be dissolved. Hence the court decrees a dissolution of the ordinance marriage celebrated between the parties on the 12th March 2006. **ANCILLARY RELIEFS** **Custody and Maintenance of the Children** In determining custody, the court is guided by the principle of the best interest of the child, as provided under **Section 2(1) of the Children’s Act, 1998 (Act 560)** and affirmed in _**Happee v. Happee**_**[1974] 2 GLR 186.** It is worthy of note that during cross-examination, the Petitioner conceded that he has no objection to the children, all of whom are girls, remaining in the custody of the Respondent. He further indicated his willingness to support them while they live with Respondent. This concession effectively resolves the issue of custody, leaving only the issue of maintenance of the children for determination by the court. Accordingly, the court grants custody of the children to the Respondent, with reasonable access to the Petitioner on weekends and an equal share of the children’s vacation periods. In addressing the issue of maintenance, **Section 22 of Act 367** empowers the court to make orders it deems reasonable and in the best interest of a child, including custody, access, education, and financial support. **Section 47(1) of the Children’s Act, 1998 (Act 560)** further places a legal duty on parents to provide for the child’s health, education, and shelter. The court in making such orders considers the means of both parties. See the case of **Florence Ofosu Addow v Michael Ofosu Addow (2017) JELR 107601.** Accordingly, the court considering the current financial state of the parties and taking cognizance of submissions of counsel for the Petitioner in his address, awards maintenance of GH₡1,500.00 to be paid monthly by the Petitioner to the Respondent through her mobile money account the first day of each month, as well as cater for the educational and the medical bills of the children. In respect of accommodation, the Respondent is to provide accommodation for the children. **Financial Claims of the Respondent** The Respondent prays the court to order the Petitioner to refund an amount of GH₡4,000.00, she contributed toward the purchase of an Urvan vehicle during the marriage. The Petitioner denies this, stating he acquired the vehicle before the marriage. The Respondent failed to provide any evidence beyond her bare assertion of the said contribution, hence, the court is unable to grant this relief. As held in _**Zabrama v. Segbedzi**_**[1991] 2 GLR 221** , a party who makes an assertion bears the burden of proving it with credible and admissible evidence. Respondent also seeks a refund of an amount of GH₡6,000.00, said to have been given to the Petitioner to assist him travel to UK but the trip never materialized. Again, the court finds no sufficient evidence on record to support this claim. Regarding the Respondent’s claim for the amount of GH₡3,500.00 being the worth of provisions she left in the shop, the Court finds the claim deserving. Although the Petitioner claims he initially stocked the shop, the Respondent denies this. Even if the Petitioner’s claim were true, Petitioner’s case is that he placed the Respondent in charge of the shop out of affection. It is reasonable for the Respondent to invest her own funds and reinvest profits to keep the business running as a normal business practice. After managing the shop for several years, Respondent left it in the Petitioner’s care when she left. Hence, the Court finds it just and equitable to order the Petitioner to refund the amount of GH₡3,500.00 to the Respondent. Accordingly, Petitioner is ordered to refund the amount of GH₡3,500.00 being cost for provisions Respondent left in the shop by the 20th of December 2025 failing which interest shall be calculated from the year 2018 at the prevailing commercial rate till date of final payment. As regards the claim for the amount of GH₡20,000.00 as rent, the Respondent admitted under cross-examination that the apartment which she moved in after separating from Petitioner, she rented for her siblings, not for herself. She also failed to provide evidence of the amount she has paid for rent. The following exchange is instructive when Respondent was under cross-examination on 10/07/2025: Q: I further suggest to you that the evidence of your gross nonchalance is your act of gladly leaving your matrimonial home to live in a rented apartment without recourse to the Petitioner. A: That is not correct. As I stated earlier, it is not because of the divorce that I rented a room, I rather rented the room for my siblings. Further, it has been established that the Respondent abandoned her matrimonial home to live in the rented apartment without Petitioner’s consent. Hence, the court finds no basis to award the rent claim. On the Respondent’s claim for a lump sum of GH₡50,000.00 as compensation, **Section 20** **of Act 367** empowers the court to make financial provision orders that are just and equitable, considering the circumstances of the parties. As emphasized in _**Kofi Amofa Kusi v Afia Amankwah Adarkwah [2022] DLSC 11720**_ , the court’s discretion in granting financial relief is broad, but must be exercised with fairness, not arbitrariness. The Supreme Court in the **Kusi v Adarkwah case (supra)** stated that “an award of financial provision or property settlement is not intended by either the framers of the Constitution and/or parliament to unjustly, unfairly and/or inequitably enrich a spouse.” In this case, the court has considered the financial obligations on the Petitioner and his current economic situation. The evidence shows that he is a low-income trader residing in a single room. In light of these circumstances, awarding the lump sum as prayed for by the Respondent would not be fair or reasonable. The claim is therefore refused. **FINAL ORDERS** 1. The marriage celebrated between the parties under the Marriages Act 1884-1985 (CAP 127) on 12th March 2006 at the Church of Pentecost, Senchi Assembly, Akrade has broken down beyond reconciliation and is accordingly dissolved. 2. The custody of the children is awarded to the Respondent. The Petitioner shall have reasonable access to the children on weekends. The parties shall also share equally the children’s vacation periods. 3. The Petitioner is ordered to pay monthly maintenance of GH₡1,500.00 for the three children, payable through the Respondent’s mobile money account on the first day of every month. 4. The Petitioner shall bear all the educational expenses of the children. 5. The Respondent shall ensure that the children are registered under the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). Any medical expenses not covered by the NHIS shall be borne by the Petitioner. 6. The Respondent shall be responsible for providing accommodation for the children. 7. Petitioner is ordered to refund the amount of GH₡3,500.00 being cost for provisions Respondent left in the shop by the 20th of December 2025 failing which interest shall be calculated from the year 2018 at the prevailing commercial rate till date of final payment. 8. No order as to cost. **SGD** **H/W. BERNICE ODURO KWARTENG ESQ. (MS).** **DISTRICT MAGISTRATE** **EFFIA KWESIMINTSIM.** _**COUNSELS:**_ PAPA YAW ACKAAH GYASI FOR THE PETITIONER JOYCE BAFFOE HOLDING BRIEF FOR CONSTANTINE KUDZEDZI FOR THE RESPONDENT _**PARTIES:**_ PETITIONER PRESENT RESPONDENT ABSENT 7 | Page