Kazungu v Clerk, County Assembly of Taita Taveta & another (Petition E005 of 2025) [2026] KEELRC 270 (KLR) (29 January 2026) (Judgment)

Kazungu v Clerk, County Assembly of Taita Taveta & another (Petition E005 of 2025) [2026] KEELRC 270 (KLR) (29 January 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELRC 270 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Employment and Labour Relations Court at Mombasa Petition E005 of 2025 K Ocharo, J January 29, 2026 IN THE MATTER OF: ARTICLES 2, 10, 27, 38, 40, 43, 47, 48, 50, 162, 164 and 178 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA (2010) -AND- IN THE MATTER OF: THE FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ACT, 2015 -AND- IN THE MATTER OF: THE EMPLOYMENT ACT, 2012 -AND- IN THE MATTER OF: THE THREAT TO, AND VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS UNDER ARTICLES 10, 40, 47, 48, 50 AND 164 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA (2010) -AND- IN THE MATTER OF: SECTIONS 11 AND 13 OF THE COUNTY GOVERNMENT ACT NO. 17 OF 2012 -AND- IN THE MATTER OF: STANDING ORDER NO. 61 AND 82 OF THE TAITA TAVETA COUNTY ASSEMBLY STANDING ORDERS, 2022 -AND- IN THE MATTER OF: THE OFFICE OF THE SPEAKER OF THE COUNTY ASSEMBLY OF TAITA TAVETA Between Wisdom Mwamburi Kazungu Petitioner and The Clerk, County Assembly of Taita Taveta 1st Respondent County Assembly of TaitaTaveta 2nd Respondent Judgment Introduction 1.In an open and democratic society founded on constitutionalism, it is imperative that all persons, state organs and public state officers conduct themselves in fidelity to the rule of law. [The Constitution](/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution) is the supreme expression of the people’s will, and together with the Bill of Rights, it binds every individual and organ of State without exception. Public power is therefore not exercised at whim or convenience, but within the confines of constitutional authority, legality, and accountability. Any departure from these foundational values not only undermines the constitutional order but also erodes public confidence in governance. Background 2.By a Petition dated 12th February 2025, the Petitioner has approached this Court seeking the following reliefs against the Respondents;a.That it be declared that the removal process of the Petitioner from office as Speaker of the County Assembly of Taita Taveta was unconstitutional and unlawful, and hence it be further declared that the purported removal of the Petitioner from the office of the Speaker on 3rd July, 2024 was unconstitutional for all purposes.b.That it be further declared that Petitioner has been and still is the Speaker of the County Assembly of Taita Taveta, notwithstanding his purported removal from that office by the Respondents on 3rd July, 2024.c.That it be declared that Petitioner is entitled to be paid all the withheld salary from the month of July 2024, until the Petitioner’s employment as the Speaker of the County Assembly of Taita Taveta is lawfully terminatedd.That an injunction be issued restraining the Respondents from interfering with the Petitioner’s quiet and peaceful employment in the office of the Speaker of the County Assembly of Taita Taveta.e.That the costs of the petition be awarded to the Petitioner herein.f.Any other relief that this Honourable Court deems fit and just to grant 3.The Petition is supported by a supporting affidavit sworn by the Petitioner on 12th February 2025. 4.The Respondents opposed the Petition through a Replying affidavit sworn by Gadiel Magaga, the 1st Respondent, on 12th November 2025. 5.this Court directed the Parties to file their respective submissions for and against the Petition, which they did, and gave them an opportunity to highlight them. The Petitioner’s Petition 6.The Petitioner states that following the general election conducted in August 2022, he was elected as the Speaker of the 2nd Respondent. In this capacity, he entered into an employer/employee relationship with the 2nd Respondent, the principal terms of which are as follows:i.That he would earn a gross monthly salary of Kes. 662,503/=. He was also entitled to other fringe benefits arising from his employment with the 2nd Respondent.ii.That he would manage the running of the legislative affairs of the 2nd Respondent.iii.In the event that the 2nd Respondent intended to impeach him, the 2nd Respondent was obliged to comply with Section 11 of the County Government Act, Standing Order No. 61, and 82 of the 2nd Respondent's Standing Orders. Furthermore, the 2nd Respondent would also ensure adherence to the relevant Articles of [the Constitution](/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution) of Kenya, 2010, particularly Articles 10, 27, 40, and 43. 7.The Petitioner states that the effect of the aforesaid legal provisions is that, even in an impeachment process, the law requires that due process and fairness be upheld at all times. 8.The Petitioner further states that on 2nd July, 2024, at about 3.59 p.m., the 1st Respondent served him with a letter dated 2nd July, 2024, which annexed a notice of motion for his impeachment as the Speaker of the Taita Taveta County Assembly. The notice was signed by Rose Shingira and enclosed a list of 27 members of the County Assembly who allegedly supported the motion. 9.On July 2nd, 2024, the 1st Respondent issued an invitation to him to attend the County Assembly and respond to the allegations outlined in the notice of motion. He was required to appear before the 2nd Respondent on July 3rd, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. The said invitation was received by the Petitioner on 2nd July, 2024, at about 3.59 p.m. 10.He further states that upon receiving the invitation, he immediately composed a letter addressed to the 1st Respondent, acknowledging receipt of the correspondence; after referencing Section 11(4) of the [County Governments Act](/akn/ke/act/2012/17), 2012, he requested that the meeting be adjourned for a minimum of seven days to afford him adequate time to prepare his defence and arrange his representation. The Respondents did not respond to the request. 11.Additionally, due to the pressure exerted on him, particularly by the 1st Respondent and the movers of the process, he developed serious hypertension and severe acute gastritis, which necessitated his admission to River Jordan Medical Centre in Voi. The facility granted him a 72-hour rest period (off duty). As a result, he could not attend the sitting scheduled to be held by the 2nd Respondent on 3rd July, 2024, at 8.30 a.m. 12.Accordingly, he requested his then advocate to attend the said session and inform the 2nd Respondent of his inability to attend. However, the 2nd Respondent dismissed the said request and proceeded with the aforesaid Notice of Motion that had been filed for the impeachment of the Petitioner. The said Motion succeeded, and he was therefore impeached from the office of the Speaker of the Taita Taveta County Assembly on 3rd July, 2024. 13.He further states that, in accordance with Standing Order 5(3) of the County Assembly of Taita Taveta, one Honourable Anselim Mwadime was elected as the acting Speaker pending the election of the substantive Speaker following the purported impeachment. 14.The 4th Respondent presented himself for election as the acting speaker following the impugned Notice of Motion. However, as a substantive Deputy Speaker, the 4th Respondent was aware that the said motion did not meet the legal threshold to be heard on 3rd July, 2024. 15.Following the striking out on 17th January, 2025, of Voi Constitutional and Human Rights Petition No. E008 of 2024, Wisdom Mwamburi Kazungu v. The Clerk County Assembly of Taita Taveta & 2 Others, the Acting Speaker promptly published in the Kenya Gazette Notice No. 387 on the same day the ruling was delivered, which informed that the election for the office of the Speaker of the County Assembly of Taita Taveta would be conducted on 28th January, 2025. 16.The Acting Speaker's actions were unlawful. He lacked the authority to issue the Notice, which was the responsibility of the 1st Respondent, the Clerk of the County Assembly. 17.The Petitioner asserts that, as a result of the aforementioned matter, his employment with the 2nd Respondent was unlawfully terminated. Consequently, since July 2024, he has not received any salary or other employment benefits to which the 2nd Respondent is obligated to provide. 18.The Petitioner states that had the Respondents not acted in violation of [the Constitution](/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution) and other applicable laws, he would still be working as a Speaker of the 2nd Respondent, and thereby still earning his monthly salary together with other benefits as had been the case since he became the Speaker of the said Assembly. In the circumstances, he is entitled to all his withheld salary and other benefits. 19.The Petitioner asserts that Standing Order No. 61 of the Taita Taveta County Assembly Standing Order and Section 11(1)(d) of the [County Governments Act](/akn/ke/act/2012/17), expressly provides the procedure applicable for the removal from office of the Speaker namely: a resolution to that effect must be supported by not less than 75% of the members and that the resolution to remove the Speaker should be given in writing to the Clerk of the County Assembly. With regard to his case, the resolution served on the 1st Respondent is signed by the Honourable Rose Shingira alone. 20.Standing Order No. 82(6) of the County Assembly of Taita Taveta expressly requires that the 1st Respondent shall notify the Speaker of the said motion within 5 days and that the Speaker would have a period of 7 days to respond to the said motion. Consequently, it is not possible in law for the motion to remove the Speaker to be validly heard by the County Assembly before the expiry of a period of 7 days from the date of service of the motion to the date of the hearing of the same. 21.Furthermore, the said Standing Order expressly required that he, as the Speaker, be accorded an opportunity to respond to the said allegations on the floor of the 2nd Respondent. Considering that he was served with the said motion on 2nd July, 2024, at 3.59 p.m., and considering the sudden illness he suffered (which is quite normal), he could not possibly attend the said session at 8.30 a.m. on 3rd July, 2024. 22.He further states that Section 57(a) of the [Interpretation and General Provisions Act](/akn/ke/act/1956/39) expressly requires that the date of the event and the date of the happening of the event are not reckonable for the purpose of computing time. Consequently, in this case, both the 2nd of July, 2024 and the 3rd of July, 2024, were not reckonable for purposes of computing time. This means that he was not given any notice for the purpose of compliance with both Section 11(1)(d) of the [County Governments Act](/akn/ke/act/2012/17) and Section 57(a) of the [Interpretation and General Provisions Act](/akn/ke/act/1956/39). 23.The Respondents are state organs and state officers and are therefore required to comply with Articles 10, 27, 47 and 50 of [the Constitution](/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution) of Kenya, 2010, the effect of which is that, as state organs and officers, the Respondents are required to act in a credible, accountable and transparent manner, always upholding the Rule of Law and Good Governance in their actions. In this case, their actions fell short of the said legal requirements in that:i.The initiator of the motion served the 1st Respondent with a notice of motion for his removal dated 2nd July, 2024. The said motion was signed only by her. The 1st Respondent served him with the said motion on 2nd July, 2024, at 3.59 p.m.ii.That, considering all the circumstances, including his ill health at the material time, the Respondents' insistence on proceeding with the hearing of the said motion in violation of Standing Order No. 82(6) of the County Assembly of Taita Taveta and Articles 10, 27, 47 and 50 of [the Constitution](/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution) of Kenya, 2010. 24.Article 50 of [the Constitution](/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution) of Kenya, 2010, obligated the Respondents to respect his right to a fair hearing. However, the Respondents failed to do so, effectively rendering his right to a fair hearing meaningless. 25.Additionally, the Respondents breached the stipulations of the [Fair Administrative Action Act](/akn/ke/act/2015/4). There was absolutely no justification for creating a sense of urgency and emergency in his removal as the Speaker of the 2nd Respondent on 3rd July, 2024, and in the process of such unwarranted urgency and emergency, the Respondents failed to act in a fair and reasonable manner. 26.As a consequence of the Respondents’ action complained of, his right to earn a living, which also enables him to enjoy social and economic stability, was destroyed. As such, his fundamental rights under Articles 40 and 43 of [the Constitution](/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution) of Kenya, 2010, were violated. The Respondents’ Response. 27.The Respondents state that on 2nd July 2024, the Petitioner was personally served with the Notice of removal from office. The service was effected by the 2nd Respondent’s secretary. He read it, took photos, posted them on a social media platform, and returned the Motion to the secretary. 28.Contrary to the Petitioner’s assertion, a valid notice was issued to the Petitioner, accompanied by the signatures of 26 out of 31 members of the 1st Respondent. 29.The Respondents contend that the Petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard and that they notified the Petitioner of this opportunity. Further, the process for removing the Petitioner from office conformed to the relevant legal provisions. 30.The Petitioner was removed from office on grounds inter alia, lack of confidence in him, gross misconduct and incompetence. The motion for his removal was supported by more than one-third of all the Members of the 1st Respondent and passed by a resolution of more than two-thirds of all the Members of the 1st Respondent. 31.It is further asserted that the Notice contained detailed information, sufficient to enable the Petitioner duly understand the accusations against him. 32.The Petitioner has not been fully honest with this Court. While he falsely claims to have been hospitalised in Voi for acute hypertension, he was actually in Mombasa, where he appeared before a Commissioner for oaths and signed affidavits supporting an application for conservatory orders. 33.On 3rd July 2024, they received a letter from Counsel for the Petitioner informing them that he had appointed Counsel to represent him before the County Assembly on the day of impeachment. 34.The Respondents further state that upon being impeached, the Petitioner ceased to be an employee of the 1st Respondent and was therefore not entitled to continue earning a salary and related benefits as a Speaker of the County Assembly of Taita Taveta. Further, after the impeachment, the Petitioner never reported for work nor was engaged by the 1st Respondent to perform any of the functions of the office of the Speaker. He is therefore not entitled to any pay. 35.The reliefs sought by the Petitioner cannot be availed for the following reasons;a.The Petitioner was ousted from office by the County Assembly via a resolution backed by at least seventy-five percent of its members.b.A notice of the intention to propose a motion for a resolution to remove the Petitioner was submitted in writing to the County Assembly, signed by no fewer than one third of all the members of the County Assembly, explicitly outlining in detail the grounds for removal.c.A motion for a resolution to remove the Petitioner was presided over by a duly elected member of the County Assembly.d.Before the debate and voting on the motion, the Petitioner was accorded an opportunity to respond to the allegations on the floor of the County Assembly. 36.Furthermore, the reliefs sought are akin to specific performance orders which issue sparingly in unique & very exceptional circumstances. Analysis and Determination 37.I have carefully considered the petitioner’s petition herein, the affidavit in support thereof, the replying affidavit by the Respondents, and the elaborate submissions by Mr Gikandi, Counsel for the Petitioner, and Mr Nyange, Counsel for the Respondents, and distil the following issues for determination. Thus;a.Whether the removal of the Petitioner from office as Speaker of the 1st Respondent was unconstitutional and unlawful;b.Whether the Petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought in his petition. 38.There is no contest that the dispute before this Court is anchored on the constitutionality, legality, and procedural fairness of the process leading to the removal of the Petitioner from his office as the Speaker of the 1st Respondent by way of impeachment. While impeachment is undoubtedly a function reposed in a political organ, [the Constitution](/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution) does not immunise the process from judicial scrutiny where allegations of constitutional violation, illegality, or procedural unfairness are raised. This Court is therefore properly seized of jurisdiction, not to interrogate the political merits of the decision, but to determine whether the impugned process met the constitutional and statutory thresholds of legality, rationality, and fairness. 39.The Respondents contended, and their Counsel, Mr Nyange, submitted that the process leading to the removal of the Petitioner from office was in conformity with the legal requirements applicable to such a process. Counsel submitted that Section 11 of the County Government Act 2012 provides for the threshold for the removal of a Speaker of a County Assembly from office. The Section provides;i.A Speaker of a County Assembly may be removed from office by the County Assembly through a resolution supported by not less than seventy five percent of all the members of the County Assembly.ii.A notice of the intention to move a motion for a resolution to remove the Speaker shall be given in writing to the clerk of the County Assembly, signed by at least one third of all the members of the County Assembly, stating the grounds for removal.iii.A motion for a resolution to remove the Speaker shall be presided over by a member of the County Assembly elected under Section 9[4].iv.Before the debate and voting on a Motion under Subsection [3], the Speaker shall be accorded an opportunity to respond to the allegations on the floor of the County Assembly. 40.Counsel proceeded and cited the case of Nairobi Appeal No. 18 of 2016, Nick Githinji Ndichu vs County Assembly of the County of Kiambu and 3 others, in which the Court of Appeal referred to the Court of Appeal decision in County Assembly of Kisumu and 2 others v Kisumu County Assembly Service Board and 6 others, where the Court stated;“Standing order 58 of the 1st Respondent’s Standing Orders, which mirrors word for word Section 11 of the County Government Act, requires four conditions to be met before impeaching a County Speaker. First, there must be a formal notice to the Clerk of the Assembly stating the grounds of removal and signed by at least a third of the members of that County Assembly. Secondly, the Speaker must be accorded an opportunity to respond; thirdly, the proceedings must be presided over by a member elected under Section 9[4] of the Act and fourthly, the resolution to remove the Speaker must be passed by at least seventy five percent [75%] of the members.” 41.In my view, where constitutional violations, illegality, and procedural unfairness are alleged, as in the present case, it is insufficient for the Respondent to merely assert that the four conditions under Section 11 of the County Government Act were satisfied, and on that basis alone, conclude that the petition is unfounded. It bears emphasis that Section 11 cannot be read in isolation. It must be interpreted in light of [the Constitution](/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution) and other relevant legislative frameworks, which together establish mandatory safeguards to ensure fairness in administrative action. 42.Section 82 of the 1st Respondent’s Standing Order provides the procedure for the removal of the speaker, thus;(1)The speaker may be removed from office by the Assembly through a resolution supported by not less than two-thirds of all the Members of the County Assembly.2.The Speaker may be removed pursuant to subsection [1] on any of the following grounds-a.gross violation of [the Constitution](/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution) of Kenya, 2010 or any other law;b.incompetence;c.if convicted of an offence punishable by imprisonment for at least six months; ord.inability to perform the functions of the office of Speaker arising from mental or physical incapacity.(3)A notice of intention to move a motion for a resolution to remove the Speaker under subsection [2] shall-a.be given in writing to the Clerk of the County Assembly;b.be signed by at least one third of all the Members of the County Assembly; andc.state grounds for removal as specified in subsection [2].4.......................5.......................6.Upon notice of the motion being given under subsection [4]a.the Clerk of the County Assembly shall, within five days-b.notify the speaker; andc.invite the Speaker to respond, within seven days, in writing, setting out the grounds of opposition;(8)The Speaker shall have the right to appear and be represented before the County Assembly during its investigations. 43.My understanding of the provision, particularly subsection 5, is that it does not contemplate -let alone permit -a scenario in which a notice of intention is issued to the Clerk, the Clerk notifies the Speaker and invites a response, investigations are concluded, the motion considered and a resolution is reached, all within an implausibly short period of two days. Such a compressed sequence of events would be inherently inconsistent with the procedural safeguards envisaged by the Standing Order and fundamentally undermine the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and due process. 44.Certainly, this Provision of the Standing Order of the 2nd Respondent does not sanction a rushed or perfunctory process. On the contrary, it envisages a patient, deliberate, and methodological process-one that affords adequate time for notice, response, investigation, and reasoned consideration before any resolution is reached. Any process conducted in haste runs afoul of both the letter and spirit of the provision and cannot meet the procedural fairness. 45.At this point, it becomes imperative to note that it is not in dispute that the notice of intention to move a motion for the resolution to remove the Speaker was served on the Clerk on 2nd July 2024. On the same day, the Clerk asked the Speaker to respond. It isn’t disputed that the Clerk’s communication was received by the petitioner at 3:59 pm on 3rd July 2024. In the Petitioner's absence, the motion was considered, and a resolution to remove him was passed. No doubt, the Petitioner wasn’t given seven days to respond in writing to the notice, contrary to the stipulations of subsection 6. He was not given adequate time to appear before the County Assembly during the investigations. Investigations leading to his removal were carried out well before the seven days, and before he would respond to the notice. If an analogy were to be drawn, it would be like a court deciding to proceed to hear a civil suit before the period for filing a statement of response had lapsed, and then hearing the matter in the respondent's absence. 46.The subsection is framed in a manner that unmistakably demonstrates that the Speaker’s response is an integral and indispensable component of his defence. To deny him an opportunity to respond is not a mere procedural lapse; it strikes at the very heart of the process and constitutes a clear violation of his right to a fair hearing. 47.In County Assembly of Kisumu &2 others vs Kisumu County Assembly Service Board vs Kisumu County Assembly Service Board & 6 others [2015] eKLR, the Court stated;“As regards sufficient time to respond to the notice, along with Lord Denning’s decision in the case of Kanda v Government of Malaya [Supra], we also concur with the High Court decision in the case of Martin Nyaga Wambora & 6 others, that the right to a hearing “encompasses .... sufficient time to respond” 48.It is interesting to note that the Respondents deliberately failed to address the issue of the failure to give the Petitioner seven days and to allow him to respond to the notice. 49.The Petitioner contended, and his Counsel submitted that, in the circumstances, he was denied a fair hearing in violation of his right under Article 50 of [the Constitution](/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution). Counsel for the Respondents submits that the invocation of Article 50 of [the Constitution](/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution) by the Petitioner is wholly misplaced, as impeachment proceedings were a criminal trial. Counsel relied on the Court of Appeal decision in Judicial Service Commission v Gladys Boss Shollei & another, where the Court held:“The invocation of Article 50[2] [a] [b] & [c] of [the Constitution](/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution) was misplaced. In the context, it did not apply to the 1st Respondent, who faced disciplinary proceedings and removal from office as Chief Registrar of the Judiciary. A careful perusal of [the Constitution](/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution) shows that Article 50[2][a][b] & [c] applies to criminal trials, not to civil litigation or disciplinary proceedings. Thai is the interpretation of the Article; it does not apply to disciplinary proceedings, and the learned trial judge misdirected his mind in reaching the conclusion that it applied to the case before him. So too with regard to Article 25[c] relating to the constitutional right to fair trial, the learned judge failed to appreciate that the disciplinary proceedings were not a trial, and the issue of fairness in the proceedings was addressed by principles of natural justice and Article 47, which enjoined the Appellant in the disciplinary proceedings to ensure that the 1st Respondent’s right to fair administrative action was observed.” 50.Deliberately or otherwise, Counsel for the Respondents advances submissions in apparent disregard of the fact that the decision was to the Supreme Court of Kenya, through Shollei v Judicial Service Commission & another [2022] KESC 5[KLR], the Supreme Court held inter alia that Article 50 was applied to disciplinary proceedings. 51.The Court stated;“68.In Evans Odhiambo Kidero & 4 others v Ferdinand Ngungu Waititu &4 others SC Petition No. 18 of 2014 as consolidated with Petition No. 20 of 2014; [2014] eKLR [Njoki Ndungu, SCJ, concurring], this court made the following finding concerning the right to a fair trial under Article 50[1]and 50[2]:“255.Article 50[1] refers to the right to a fair hearing for all persons, while Article 50[2] accords all accused persons the right to a fair trial. Article 25[c] lists the right to a fair trial as a non-derogable fundamental right and freedom that may not be limited. Often, the terms ‘fair hearing’ and ‘fair trial’ are used interchangeably, sometimes to define the same concept, and other times to connote a minor difference. Although the right to a fair trial is encompassed in the right to a fair hearing in our Constitution, a literal construction of these two provisions may be misconstrued in some quarters to mean that article 50[1]deals with the right to fair hearing in any disputes including those of a civil, criminal or quasi criminal nature whereas article 50[2] is limited to accused persons thereby arguing that the protection of such right only relates to criminal matters. This is not acceptable interpretation or construction within the parameters of articles 19 and 20 of the Bill of Rights, which calls for an expansive and inclusive construction to give a right its full effect.(257)Fair hearing in principle incorporates the rules of natural justice, which include the concept of audi alteram partem [hear the other side or no one is to be condemned unheard] and nemo judex in causa sua [ no man shall judge his own case], otherwise referred to as the rule against bias. Peter Kaluma, Judicial Review: Law, Procedure and Practice 2nd Edition [Nairobi: 2009]at page 195, notes that the rules of natural justice generally refer to procedural fairness in decision making. Further, he analyses the two mentioned concepts of the rules of natural justice and states [at pages 176 and 177] that it is the duty of the courts, when dealing with individual cases, to determine whether indeed the rules of natural justice have been violated and noting that ‘although the necessity of hearing is well established, its scope and contents remain unsettled.(261)It is important to restate that a literal reading of the provisions of [the Constitution](/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution) shows that the right to a fair hearing is broad and includes the concept of the right to fair trial as it deals with any dispute whether they arise in a judicial or an administrative context. Comparative experience shows that the European Court has elaborated on the question regarding the scope of the right to fair trial applying the right to both civil and in criminal matters. The European Court of Human Rights [European Court] has severally explained that: ‘it is central to the concept of a fair trial, in civil as in criminal proceedings, that a litigant is not denied the opportunity to present his or her case effectively before the court” [See Steel and Morris v United Kingdom [2005] ECHR 103, paragraph 59]. 52.In Oloo Onyango v Kisumu County Assembly Service Board & another, O, C.S Kisumu Central Police Station& 2 others [Interested Parties] [2025] KECA 333[KLR], the Court of Appeal stated:“This Court agrees with the holding made in Pinnacle Project Ltd v Presbyterian Church of East Africa, Ngong Parish & another [2018] eKLR where it was held thus:“ While the wording of Article 50 of [the Constitution](/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution) on the right to a fair hearing prima facie seems to focus on criminal trials, it’s not lost that fair trial in civil cases includes, the right of access to a court, the right to be heard by as competent independent and impartial tribunal, the right to equality of arms, the right to adduce and challenge evidence, the right to legal representation, the right to be informed of the claim in advance before the suit is filed, the right to a public hearing, and the right to be heard within a reasonable time” 53.Noting that the principle of a fair hearing is broader than that of a fair trial and that it applies to realms beyond criminal law, it is clear from the facts of this petition that the petitioner’s right to a fair hearing, i.e., the right to challenge the accusations against him by responding to the notice, the right to adduce evidence and challenge the evidence presented by the 1st Respondent in support of the accusations against him, and the right to be heard by an independent body were infringed. 54.This Court notes Counsel for the Respondents’ submissions that the Petitioner was represented by Counsel at the hearing of the impeachment motion. In my view, Counsel’s attendance was for a specific purpose, namely to inform the 1st Respondent of the Petitioner’s situation and reason for non-attendance, and to secure an adjournment of the motion. This cannot be equated with legal representation for the purposes of the hearing. 55.In Judiciary & 2 others v LNM [2025] KESC 53[KLR], Supreme Court of Kenya neatly stated;“We begin this Judgment by declaring that the fairness of any disciplinary process is today a constitutional imperative, irrespective of the status of the officer involved. The process must uphold all tenets of fair administrative action under Article 47 and the right to a fair hearing under Article 50 of [the Constitution](/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution). .....the disciplinary bodies, including the Judicial Service Commission, are bound to ensure that any disciplinary action against a Judge, Judicial officer and staff must strictly comply with both constitutional and statutory requirements.” 56.The Respondents had no option but to comply with the constitutional and statutory requirements for process fairness. 57.Article 47 of [the Constitution](/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution) guarantees every person the right to administrative action that is expeditious, efficient, lawful, and reasonable, and procedurally fair. In furtherance of the constitutional imperative, and pursuant to Article 47[3], Parliament enacted the Fair Administrative Act to provide the necessary legislative framework for its implementation. 58.Standing Order 82 unequivocally requires the 2nd Respondent to give not less than seven [7] days’ written notice of the intended impeachment proceedings. Non-compliance with this mandatory requirement vitiates the process and renders the removal of the Speaker procedurally unfair. 59.In the Judiciary Case [Supra], the Supreme Court, on the effect of failure adhere to constitutional and or statutory times, aptly stated;“There is a strict obligation on the Commission or Panel to afford a minimum notice period of fourteen days, which must be in writing. It is immaterial that the respondent proceeded without raising an objection. Failure to comply with a mandatory timeframe renders the proceedings procedurally unfair. This is a principle of constitutional due process. The Court of Appeal in Judicial Service Commission & another [2015] KECA 741[KLR] stressed the importance of compliance with due process in disciplinary matters, especially where [the Constitution](/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution) and Statute so demand. The procedure adopted by the appellant violated [the Constitution](/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution) .... We so hold, answering the question under consideration positively, that the disciplinary proceedings violated Articles 47 and 50 of [the Constitution](/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution).” 60.Based on the circumstances discussed above, I confidently conclude that removing the Petitioner from his role as the Speaker of the 2nd Respondent was unconstitutional, unlawful, and lacked proper procedural fairness. 61.Next, I will examine whether the Petitioner is eligible for the reliefs requested. Before exploring this in depth, I find it important to point out that contracts of employment are no longer regarded as purely commercial contracts entered into between free and equal agents. It is generally recognised today that work is one of the defining features of people’s lives; that loss of one’s job is always a traumatic event, and that it can be especially devastating when the dismissal is accompanied by bad faith and a flagrant breach of the constitutional and statutory principle of procedural fairness. See Johnson v Unisys Ltd [ 2003] 1 AC 518. 62.This point gets reinforcement in the statement by the Court of Appeal in the case of County Assembly of Kisumu & 2 others vs Kisumu County Assembly service Board and 6 others [Supra] cited by Counsel Nyange for the Respondents, thus;“Impeachment or removal from office is a drastic step with serious ramifications on the career of an individual. It can easily consign an individual to professional oblivion. That is why Lord Denning cautioned in Selvarajan vs Race Relations Board that:“The fundamental rule is that, if a person may be subjected to pains and penalties, or exposed to prosecution or proceedings or be deprived of remedies or redress, or in some way adversely affected by the investigation and report, then he should be told the case against him and be afforded a fair opportunity of answering it.” 63.Acknowledging the foregoing premises, I state without hesitation that where the removal of a Speaker is carried out hastily and in flagrant violation of constitutional and statutory requirements of procedural fairness, the Court will not hesitate to order restoration to office. To do otherwise, unless there is a good reason, would amount to legitimising and sanctioning the Assembly’s violations. 64.In the upshot, Judgment is hereby entered for the Petitioner in the following terms:a.A declaration that the removal of the Petitioner from office as the Speaker of the County Assembly of Taita Taveta was unconstitutional, unlawful, and procedurally unfair.b.A declaration that the Petitioner is the bona fide Speaker of the 1st Respondent and is restored to office, immediately.c.It is hereby directed that the Petitioner is entitled and should be paid all unpaid salary from the month of July 2024, to date.d.Costs of this Petition shall be in favour of the Petitioner. **READ SIGNED AND DELIVERED THIS 29 TH DAY OF JANUARY 2026.****OCHARO KEBIRA****JUDGE**