Case LawGhana
Annan & Anor V Oforiwaa (A1/06/2024) [2024] GHADC 522 (24 October 2024)
District Court of Ghana
24 October 2024
Judgment
INTHEDISTRICT COURT HELDAT ADANSI ASOKWA ON
THURSDAY THE24TH DAY OF OCTOBER2024BEFORE HER
WORSHIP MRS. LINDA FREMAHBOAMAH-OKYERE, ESQ.
SUITNO. A1/06/2024
1. DANIELKWASI ANNANPERHIS LAWFUL ATTORNEY
JOSEPHINE ANNAN
2. KWAKU MINTAH
V
AFUAOFORIWAA
JUDGMENT
BACKGROUND:
1. The Plaintiffs filed the instant Writ of Summons on the 24th day
ofJanuary, 2024and claimed thefollowing reliefs:
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“a. A declaration of title, ownership and recovery of possession of all
that entire land, with a building thereon situate at Adansi-Asokwa
and bounded by the properties of Maame Kesewaa, a multi TV store,
Obuasi-Asokwalorry road and agutter
b. An order for perpetual injunction to restrain the Defendant, his
agents, assigns, workmen, etc. from constructing any structure, edifice
or obstruction whatsoever which interfere with 1st Plaintiff’s quiet
enjoymentof the building
c.General damages
d.Costincluding solicitor’s fees”
2. Defendant denied liability of the claims and orders were made
for written statements and subsequently witness statements to
be filed which said orders were complied with. Defendant filed
a counterclaim wherein she claimed for “a declaration that the
purported outright sale of the disputed property by the 2nd Plaintiff to
the 1st Plaintiff be declared null and void as same was done
fraudulently”.
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3. Plaintiffs were represented by Counsel therefore after close of
trial, he was given opportunity to file a written address on
behalf of the Plaintiffs; which Counsel did and same was filed
on 19/09/2024. The address has been duly considered in the
writing of this judgment. Defendant was unrepresented
throughoutthe trial.
THE RESPECTIVECASES OF THE PARTIES:
4. The 1st Plaintiff gave evidence through his lawful attorney who
had been empowered by Power of Attorney dated 4th October,
2023 and which had been duly stamped in accordance with the
Stamp Duty Act, 2005 (Act 689). According to the 1st Plaintiff,
the 2nd Plaintiff approached him and his wife sometime in 2017
for financial assistance of GHC. 10,000.00. In return, they agreed
with the 2nd Plaintiff to operate his family’s building for a
number of years. Subsequently, in 2020, the 1st Plaintiff says that
the 2nd Plaintiff again approached him and his wife and
intimated to them that he had been authorized by his family to
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dispose of the disputed property. 1st Plaintiff says that they did
their due diligence and came to the realization that the disputed
property indeed belonged to the 2nd Plaintiff’s family. This, the
1st Plaintiff states, was confirmed by the stool under which the
property is located. They then went ahead and advanced an
amount of Thirty-Five Thousand Ghana Cedis (GHC.35,000.00)
in two tranches for the purchase of the property. 1st Plaintiff
tendered into evidence a payment receipt and same was
admitted and marked as Exhibit D. After the payment, 1st
Plaintiff states that they caused a site plan to be prepared in his
name and same was tendered into evidence, admitted and
markedExhibit E.
5. 2nd Plaintiff says that he is the one who sold the disputed
property to 1st Plaintiff onbehalf of his family. His case is that in
and around 1988, his family, represented by one Kofi Akowuah
purchased an unnumbered plot of land measuring about 18.00
square meters which is the disputed property from the Adansi
Asokwa Stool. After purchasing the land, 2ndPlaintiff says that
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the family started developing the disputed land. Sometime in
2017, 2nd Plaintiff asserts that the Adansi Asokwa Stool invited
all plot owners to present their land documents to a
representative of the stool land committee for regularization of
their title. According to the 2nd Plaintiff, Kofi Akowuah
submitted a site plan to the stool representative and he was
issued with a new receipt which said receipt was tendered into
evidence, admitted and marked as Exhibit A. 2nd Plaintiff also
tendered the said site plan into evidence and same was
admittedand marked as Exhibit B.
6. 2ndPlaintiff claims that sometime in 2017, his family tasked him
to seek financial assistance from 1st Plaintiff to support the
construction of the building. He says that the family
subsequently decided to sell the disputed property outrightly to
the 1st Plaintiff and his wife. According to 2nd Plaintiff, Kofi
Akowuah had travelled and he (2nd Plaintiff) was asked to
represent the family in the sale transaction. He tendered into
evidence a transfer document dated 2nd April, 2019 and same
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was admitted and marked Exhibit C. 2nd Plaintiff states that he
was married to the Defendant from 1995 to 2019 and she knew
that the propertywas not his personalone but same belonged to
his family. 2nd Plaintiff states also that the disputed property
was not jointly acquired during the subsistence of the marriage
betweenhimself and the Defendant.
7. It is the Plaintiffs’ case that the Defendant is not entitled to her
counterclaim since she has no interest in the disputed property.
Plaintiffscalled one witnessto corroboratetheir claim.
8. The Defendant’s case is that she has been married to the 2nd
Plaintiff for about thirty (30) years now. She said that she and
the 2nd Plaintiff used proceeds from the cocoa farm they had
cultivated on her father’s land which was gifted to her at the
time she was getting married to the Plaintiff, to purchase the
disputed property. According to the Defendant, they erected a
temporary wooden structure on the land where 2nd Plaintiff
started his radio repairs work. She, on the other hand, was
hawking by then. Defendant says that 2nd Plaintiff pleaded with
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her to allow him use all the proceeds from the cocoa farm to
develop the land so that they could do their work there and the
Defendant would be relieved of the stress of the hawking
business. She says that she agreed to the suggestion and the
building project commenced. At some point, the Defendant says
that she had to secure a loan and pay an amount of
GHC.1,500.00 to the Adansi Asokwa Stool before the
constructioncould continue.
9. The Defendant avers that she later got hint that the 2nd Plaintiff
was attempting to sell the property to 1st Plaintiff’s attorney. She
said that she tried to call her husband to confirm the truth or
otherwise of the news but she tried to no avail because he had
changed his mobile number. The following day, Defendant says
that she went in the company of a friend to 1st Plaintiff
attorney’s house to confirm the truth or otherwise of the
intended sale transaction between her and her husband.
According to the Defendant, 1st Plaintiff attorney neither
admitted nor denied the information. Defendant says that she
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advised 1st Plaintiff’s attorney not to indulge in any transaction
concerning the disputed property with her husband because the
property is their jointly acquired one and she was opposed to
theintended sale.
10.The Defendant avers that attempts at amicable settlement have
been made but they have all proven futile. Defendant states also
that sometime in 2023, she decided to complete one of the stores
for her business and in the cause of the work, she was served
with the instant Writ. Defendant called three (3) witnesses in
herdefence and inproof ofher counterclaim.
ISSUESFORDETERMINATION:
1. Whether or not the subject property belonged to the 2nd
Plaintiff’s family before the sale ofsame tothe 1stPlaintiff
2. Whether or not the marriage between 2nd Plaintiff and
Defendant had been dissolved at the time of the sale of the
disputed propertyto the1stPlaintiff
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3. Whether or not the sale of the disputed property by the 2nd
Plaintiff tothe 1stPlaintiff is valid
BURDENOF PROOF:
4. In civil cases, the general rule is that the party who in his
pleadings or his writ raises issues essential to the success of
his case assumes the onus of proof on the balance of
probabilities. See the cases of Faibi v State Hotels
Corporation [1968] GLR 471 and In re Ashalley Botwe
Lands; Adjetey Agbosu & Others. [2003-2004] SCGLR 420.
This is codified in sections 11 (4) and 12(1)(2) of the
Evidence Act, 1975 (Act 323).The Plaintiff is required by law
to prove his case on the balance or preponderance of
probabilities however, Section 14 of the Act 323 provides
that a party has the burden of persuasion as to each fact the
existence or non-existence of which is essential to the claim
or defence that party is asserting. This burden may shift
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from the Plaintiff to the Defendant and vice versa depending
onwhich partyis making the allegationsoffacts
5. In land cases specifically, the Plaintiff must succeed on the
strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the
defendant’s case. The onus lies with the Plaintiff to prove his
case before he can rely on any weaknesses in the
Defendant’s case. See the case of Dokutso Tei Kwabla v
Lands Commission and Another [2017-2018] 1 SCGLR 497
at 509. The Supreme Court has held in the case of George
Kwadwo Asante & Another v Madam Abena Amponsah &
Another (Civil Appeal No. J4/64/2021) dated 20th January,
2022, that if the plaintiff failed to discharge the onus on him
and also failed to make a case for the reliefs sought, then he
could not rely on theweakness ofthedefendant’scase to ask
for relief. However, if the plaintiff made a case which would
entitle himto relief if thedefendant offered no evidence, then
if the case offered by the defendant disclosed any weakness
which supported the plaintiff’s claim, then the plaintiff was
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entitled to rely on the weakness of the defendant’s case to
strengthen his case. This position of the law is amply supported
by sections 11 and 12 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (Act 323). See
also Odametey v Clouch [1989-90] 1 GLR 14, SC. Also, in
thecase ofOkudzeto Ablakwa (No.2) vAttorney General&
Obetsebi-Lamptey (No.2) [2012] 2 SCGLR 845 at 867, the
court held that, ‘…what this rule literally means is that if a
person goes to court to make an allegation, the onus is on him to
lead evidence to prove that allegation, unless the allegation is
admitted. If he fails to do that, the ruling on that allegation will go
against him. Stated more explicitly, a party cannot win a
case in court if the case is based on allegation which he fails
toprove orestablish.’
6. It is trite learning that a defendant who counter-claims
assumes the same burdenas the plaintiff in respect ofhis/her
counterclaim. See the cases of Gregory v Tandoh IV &
Hanson [2010] SCGLR 971 and Nortey (No.2) v African
Institute of Journalism and Communication & Others
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(No.2) [2013-2014]1 SCGLR 703. The Plaintiffs therefore
have the duty to prove their title to the property whilst the
Defendant carries the burden of proving her joint title with
the2nd Plaintiff.
7. In this judgment the Plaintiff’s evidence will first be
analysed independent of the Defendant’s defence to
determine whether the Plaintiffs have successfully proved
the allegation they make. If Plaintiffs prove their allegations,
then any weaknesses in the case of the Defendant, if any is
found, will inure to the benefit of the Plaintiffs. Same applies
tothe Defendant’scounterclaim.
ANALYSIS/EVALUATIONOF EVIDENCE & THELAW:
ISSUE 1- WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT LAND BELONGED TO
THE 2ND PLAINTIFF’S FAMILY BEFORE THE SALE OF SAME TO THE
1ST PLAINTIFF
8. The 1st Plaintiff asserts through his lawful attorney that he
bought the property after satisfying himself that the
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property belongs to the family of the 2nd Defendant. His
lawful attorney states in paragraph 7 of her witness
statement that ‘after careful due diligence we realised that the
disputed property is indeed a family property’. The evidence she
led showed that the extent of her due diligence was that she
went to the stool on whose land the disputed property is
located, and the stool confirmed that the property was the
bonafide property of the 2nd Plaintiff’s family. It is my
humble opinion that it would have served the interest of
justice for the 1st Plaintiff to have called a representative of
the stool to corroborate this piece of evidence especially
since he did not present any form of documentary evidence
as to what he saw or was presented to him by the stool that
caused him to believe that the property belonged to the 2nd
Plaintiff’s family.
9. It is a trite principle of law that a party does not satisfy the
burden of producing evidence by merely repeating on oath
the allegations contained in his pleadings. In the case of
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Klah v Phoenix Insurance Co. Ltd. [2012] 2 SCGLR 1139,
the court averred that “where a party makes an averment
capable of proof in some positive way e.g. by producing documents,
description of things, reference to other facts, instances and his
averment is denied, he does not prove it by merely going into the
witness box and repeating that averment on oath or having it
repeated on oath by his witness. He proves it by producing other
evidence of facts and circumstances from which the court can be
satisfiedthat whathe avers is true”.
10.The 1st Plaintiff did not lead any such evidence either
through the tendering of documents or the calling of
witnesses to corroborate his assertion. Assuming that 1st
Plaintiff indeed found that the land was a family property,
due diligence would have required him to approach the said
family to confirm whether the seller has the authorization of
the family to dispose of same, but the 1st Plaintiff did not
lead any evidence to cause the court to believe that, any such
stepwas taken.
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11. 1st Plaintiff tendered into evidence Exhibit D which is a
receipt showing that he had advanced an amount of Thirty-
Five Thousand Ghana Cedis to the 2nd Plaintiff in respect of
the sale of the disputed property to him by the 2nd Plaintiff.
The contentsofExhibit Dread asfollows:
“THIS IS TO CERTIFY that I the undersigned/Marked KWAKU
MINTAH of Adansi Brofoyedru in the Ashanti Region of Ghana on
the 3rd day of August, 2020 out-rightly sold my storey building store
being and situate at Adansi Asokwa to DANIEL KWESI ANNAN of
H/No. A2-0342-5334 with an agreed price of Thirty Five Thousand
GhanaCedis (GHC.35,000.00)of which fullpaymenthas been made.
CONFIRMATION
This is to confirm that the said STORE being and situate at Adansi
Asokwa in the Ashanti Region of Ghana is my Bona fide property
therefore freefrom all encumbrances”.
12.1st and 2nd Plaintiffs have signed the above Exhibit D
whereon they describe themselves as buyer and seller
respectively, as well as two witnesses for each party. It is my
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view that the oral evidence led by 1st Plaintiff is inconsistent
with the documentary evidence he presented to the court.
His oral evidence is that the disputed property belongs to
the 2nd Plaintiff’s family whereas the documentary evidence
he presented shows that it belongs to the 2nd Plaintiff; 2nd
Plaintiff having stated therein that the property is his
bonafide property.
13.In the case of Aboa v Keelson; Yima v Doku; Suit No.20/92,
16th March, 2011 the court referring to the decision in Fosua
& Adu Poku v Dufie (Deceased) & Adu-Poku Mensah
[2009] SCGLR 310 held that “it was settled law that
documentary evidence should prevail over oral evidence. Thus,
where documents supported one party’s case as against the other
the court should consider whether the latter party was truthful but
with faulty collection.” In the Fosua & Adu Poku case (supra),
the court stated that whenever there was in existence a
written agreement and conflicting oral evidence over a
transaction, the practice in the Court was to lean
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favourably towards the documentary evidence, especially if
it wasauthenticand theoralevidence conflicting.
14. The 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs own up to the fact that Exhibit D is
their deed and I hold the view therefore that they should be
bound by same in accordance with section 25(1) of the
Evidence Act, 1975 (Act 323) which states that “except as
otherwise provided by law including a rule of equity, the facts
recited in a written document are conclusively presumed to be true
as between the parties to the instrument, or their successors
in interest” (emphasis mine). See also the case of Kwantreng
II and Others v Klu [1991] 2 GLR 93. Having admitted per
his conduct i.e., the execution of Exhibit D, 1st Plaintiff is
estopped from asserting that he purchased the property
from 2nd Plaintiff with the knowledge that same belonged to
his family and that he intended to deal with him on that
understanding.
15.On the part of the 2nd Plaintiff, he asserts per paragraph 5 of
his witness statement that the disputed property belongs to
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his family on the basis that same was purchased by his
family in 1988 for the construction of a house. The family
then bought the disputed property from the Adansi Asokwa
Stoolthrough his brother KofiAkowuah. 2nd Plaintiff did not
tender into evidence any document corroborating this
assertion neither did he call the stool or a representative
thereof to corroborate this assertion. He rather tendered into
evidence Exhibit A which is a receipt emanating from the
Adansi Asokwa Stool Lands Committee. 2nd Plaintiff averred
that they got Exhibit A from the stool after Kofi Akowuah
heeded to the call by the stoolfor landowners to submit their
documents to the stool for the regularization of their titles.
According to 2nd Plaintiff, Kofi Akowuah submitted the site
plan which bore his name to the stool and he was issued
with the receipt, Exhibit A. My view on Exhibits A and B is
that they do not assist the court in any way to come to a
determinationthat the land was originally purchased in 1988
by the family of the 2nd Plaintiff. No proof, neither oral nor
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documentary, of the family’s authorization to the said Kofi
Akowuah to purchase the land in his name was presented to
the court save the bare allegation that Akowuah had such
authorization from the family. Perhaps, had Kofi Akowuah
been called as a witness to corroborate this assertion, it
would have lent some credibility to the case of the 2nd
Plaintiff- Kofi Akowuah was not called, no family member
wasalso called tocorroborate this assertion.
16.In addition to this, Plaintiff’s Counsel during his cross
examination of Defendant suggested that the property was
the self - acquired property of Kofi Akowuah which said
statement is entirely different from the claim Plaintiffs have
put up in their evidence-in-chief, specifically paragraph 5 of
the 2nd Plaintiff’s witness statement. This is what ensued in
crossexamination;
Q. I am suggesting it to you that the disputed property is the self-
acquiredproperty of KofiAkowuah
A. It isnot true
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17.The inconsistencies in 2nd Plaintiff’s case that in one breadth
the disputed property belongs to his family, in another
breadth, it is the self-acquired property of Kofi Akowuah
and in another breadth this same property is his bonafide
property cannot be overlooked. Based on the oral evidence
led by the Plaintiffs and especially the documentary
evidence placed before the court by Plaintiffs themselves, I
find that the 1st Plaintiff at all material times dealt with the
2nd Plaintiff personally and not as a representative of his
family.
18. Having found that 2nd Plaintiff was on the frolic of his own
when he sold the subject property to the 1st Plaintiff, it
would be unjust to make a pronouncement of ownership for
or against an entity which was not before the court and has
therefore not been heard. It appears to me that the averment
made by 2nd Plaintiff that the property belongs to his family,
is only a self-help tactic which was framed to justify the
propriety ofthesale ofthepropertyto the1stPlaintiff.
Page20of42
ISSUE2–WHETHEROR NOT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
2NDPLAINTIFFANDDEFENDANTHADBEEN
DISSOLVEDATTHE TIMEOF THE SALEOF THE
DISPUTEDPROPERTY TOTHE 1ST PLAINTIFF
19.It is the Plaintiffs’ case that the disputed property was sold
in 2020 whilst the marriage between the 2nd Plaintiff and
Defendant was dissolved in 2019. The Defendant denies this
averment and insists that the marriage was never dissolved.
During cross examination of 2nd Plaintiff by Defendant, this
iswhat ensued:
Q.Did you informme of your intentionto sell the building
A. You had left the marriage at that time so there was no need for
me toinformyou
Q. I am putting it to you that I had not left the marriage. We are
stillmarried
A. It is not true. The marriage was dissolved in 2019 and we sold
the building in2020
Page21of42
20.The 2nd Plaintiff per paragraph 17 of his witness statement
suggested that there had been a formal dissolution of the
marriage sometime in 2019. He however did not lead
evidence as to what went into the said formal dissolution. In
the face of the Defendant’s insistence that the marriage was
still subsisting, Plaintiff ought to have led sufficient evidence
to show that the marriage had indeed been properly
dissolved. The Defendant does not carry any burden in
respect of this issue for he who makes a negative averment
need notprove thataverment.
21. According to PW1 who is the mother of the 2nd Plaintiff, per
paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of her witness statement, she
claimed that sometime in 2019, the Defendant visited her at
her residence and exclaimed an end to the marriage with the
2nd Plaintiff. She stated that the Defendant brought out the
customary drink and asked her to return same to her son.
PW1 states that due to her old age and ailing health, she
quickly called her son, and he together with other family
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members went to Defendant’s family for a formal
dissolution of the marriage. This means that PW1was absent
from this ‘formal ceremony’ therefore she was not in the
position to give details about what transpired there.
Nonetheless, some of the family members who were
allegedly present at the ceremony could have been called to
corroborate the assertion that the formal dissolution of the
marriage had takenplace.
22.It is for good reason that the Akan custom to which the
parties, or at least the Defendant (as borne out by the
evidence of DW2) belong, insists on this formal dissolution.
The formal ceremony is the avenue for both parties to come
into agreement or make concessions as to distribution of
properties, repayment of any indebtedness, payment of
compensation and many more. Had this beendone, the issue
of the ownership of the disputed property would have been
dealt with at the ceremony, in which case the 2nd Plaintiff
would have called witnesses to that ceremony to testify as to
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the status of the marriage and the disputed property.
Defendant having denied that the marriage was dissolved, it
was important for the 2nd Plaintiff to have led sufficient
evidence toprove same but he failed todo so.
23.In the case of Mavis Osei Owusu v Robert Osei Owusu
[2019] DLHC11512, when the court was faced with having to
determine whether the customary marriage between the
parties had been dissolved, it made reference to William E.
Offei’s book, Family Law in Ghana, Fourth Edition, page 172
writing under the topic, ‘Dissolution of Customary
Marriages’,which statesas follows;
“The relatives of the two (2) parties meet and when all efforts at
reconciliation fail, those assembled known as baguafo ask the parties
which of them has lent anything to the other party. Anyborrowed item
must be returned to the partner who lent it, except that the man may
say that even though he lent a particular item or items to his wife, he
does not intend to claim it or them back. The wife may do likewise. The
only item that must be returned to the husband is the Ti Nsa or head
Page24of42
money which he paid, at the time of the marriage, to the wife’s family.
If the dissolution of the marriage was due to the man’s fault, he will be
requested by the baguafo to ‘send off’ (i.e., compensate) the wife. If on
the other hand, the wife’s default e.g., prostitution or adultery
occasioned the dissolution, she will be required to ‘send off’ the
husband. The dissolution is sealed by the ceremony called hyiregwu or
powdering. A member of the baguafo takes white powder in his hand
and puts it on the shoulder of the wife. He says to her:’Nne yeama wo
hyirew. Yenni wo nni asem biara bio’. This may be translated thus
“today we have powdered you. We have no matter with you again”.
The speaker then hands over the woman to her family and that ends
the ceremony. It must be noted that the speaker does not spread the
powder over the whole body of the woman.”
24.The court also referred to the case of Atta v Annan (1975)
1GLR366inwhich the courtheld as follows:
“…the marriage could be terminated only after an arbitration (to
which must be invited members of the family of each spouse and
neutral persons) had been conducted to find out whether any of the
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spouses had committed any marital offence. If an offence was
proved, it was the duty of the arbitrators to try their utmost to
effect a reconciliation between the spouses in a genuine attempt to
salvage the marriage especially where there were issues of the
marriage. After the arbitrators had ruled that the situation called
for divorce, the spouses must then be given an opportunity to show
whether any of them owed any amount or had any property
belonging to the other. After settling all legitimate accounts
between the spouses, the final act of divorce was then performed by
the husband releasing her from conjugal obligation, either by
chalking her or saying so in the presence of the gathering. In his
book Akan Laws and Customs, the author J.B. Danquah
statedas follows:
“Lodging a complaint by the aggrieved spouse to the family of the
other spouse;
An opportunity is given for the formal hearing of the complaint
and or the ground insupportof the dispute;
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The hearing of adjudication of the dispute is conducted in
accordance with the rules of natural justice whereby either party is
given the opportunity of stating his or her case and answer any
counter-chargesthat may be levelled againsthim or her;
After that aserious attempt ismade to reconcile the parties;
If both parties or either party to the marriage insists on
terminatingthe marriage, thenthe nextstep will be;
The pronouncementor declaration that the marriage is dissolved”.
25.It is clear from the authorities above that the formal
dissolution is essential. The procedure may vary but the
constant elements are that at the formal ceremony there is an
attempt at reconciling the parties and when same fails, the
marriage is dissolved after all outstanding issues regarding
money and propertyareresolved.
26.The lack of evidence on the alleged formal dissolution
evinces the fact that it did not happen and I find therefore
that the customary marriage between the 2nd Plaintiff and
Page27of42
Defendant had not been dissolved as at the time of the sale
ofthe disputed propertyto1stPlaintiff.
27.In his written address, Counsel for the Plaintiffs raised the
issue of ‘whether or not the disputed property is a joint property’.
I am of the view that this is not really an issue for
determination in this case. The reason is that, whether or not
a particular property is a spousal property arises only where
there is the need to distribute properties in the event of the
dissolution of the said marriage. Article 22 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992 states as
follows:
“22.Property Rights of Spouses
22(1) A spouse shall not be deprived of a reasonable provision out
of the estate of a spouse whether or not the spouse died having
made awill
(2) Parliament shall, as soon as practicable after the coming into
force of this Constitution, enact legislation regulating the property
rights of spouses
Page28of42
(3) With a view to achieving the full realization of the rights
referredto inclause(2) of this article-
(a) spouses shall have equal access to property jointly acquired
during marriage;
(b) assets which are jointly acquired during marriage shall be
distributed equitably between the spouses upon dissolution of the
marriage.”
28.The Supreme Court has interpreted Article 22(3) of the
Constitution,1992 in the case of Tony Lithur v Nana Oye
Lithur [2021] DLSC10157, where the court stated as follows:
‘This Court should be deemed as having interpreted marital
property in Article 22(3) in Arthur v Arthur [2012-2014]
1SCGLR 543 as follows:, “marital property is thus to be
understood as property acquired by the spouses during the
marriage, irrespective of whether the other spouse has made a
contribution to its acquisition….What this means in substance is
that, the Article 22(3) provisions of the Constitution only become
Page29of42
effective upon dissolution of the marriage when the distribution of
properties are considered.”’
29.This case is not one of dissolution of marriage and therefore
I shall equally refrain from making a pronouncement on
whether or not the subject matter of this suit is a jointly
acquired property. Suffice it to say at this point that at the
time of the sale, the 2nd Plaintiff and the Defendant were still
married.
ISSUE3-WHETHEROR NOT THE SALEOF THE
DISPUTEDPROPERTY BY THE2NDPLAINTIFFTOTHE 1ST
PLAINTIFFIS VALID
30.The Lands Act, 2020 (Act 1036), Section 47 provides as
follows:
“Section47–Restrictionson transfer of land by spouse
Except as provided in subsections (3) and (4) of section 38, in the
absence of a written agreement to the contrary by the spouses in a
Page30of42
marriage, a spouse shall not, in respect of land, right or interest in
landacquired for valuable consideration during marriage,
(a) Sell, exchange, transfer, mortgage or lease the land, right or
interestin the land,
(b) Enter into a contract for the sale, exchange, transfer, mortgage
or lease of the land, rightor interestin the land,
(c) Give away the land, rightor interestinthe land inter vivos,or
(d) Enter into any other transaction in relation to the land, right
or interest in the land without the written consent of the other
spouse, whichconsentshallnot be unreasonably withheld”.
31.The provision above is to the effect that once the property in
question was acquired whilst the parties were married, then
it is imperative that the party who purports to dispose of the
propertymust seek the writtenconsent ofthe otherspouse.
32.The Defendant denied the Plaintiffs’ claim that the disputed
property belongs to the 2nd Plaintiff’s family. In her defence,
she insists that the property was purchased by her and her
husband in the course of their marriage using proceeds from
Page31of42
their cocoa farm. She did not give the exact date or year but
she did state that this happened some thirty (30) years ago
after they got married. The Defendant was unable to
produce any documentary proof in support of her assertion
that she acquired the disputed property with the 2nd Plaintiff.
However, during cross examination by Counsel for Plaintiff,
she was given an opportunity by Counsel to explain the
absence of such document. This was what ensued during
crossexamination;
Q. You will agree with me that there is no document attached to
your witness statement indicating that the disputed property is
jointlyacquired
A. I did not attach any document. We had a receipt but same is
with 2nd Plaintiff
Q. I am putting it to you that your claim that you jointly acquired
the disputed property isan after thought
A. That isnot the case. Iam speaking the truth
Page32of42
Q. I am putting it to you that if the disputed property is jointly
acquired by the two of you, you would have attached a receipt to
confirmsame
A. The receipts are with myhusband, 2nd Plaintiff
33.On two occasions, the Defendant alleged that the receipts
they got from the purchase of the land are with the 2nd
Plaintiff but he did not deny any of those allegations which
amounts to a tacit admission of the allegation that the said
receipts are in the custody of the 2nd Plaintiff. Furthermore, it
appears that the Defendant’s version of the story is
corroborated by the conduct of the 2nd Plaintiff. I say so
because, the 2nd Plaintiff states in paragraph 5 of his witness
statement that his family purchased the disputed property
for residential purpose. He further states in paragraph 7 of
his witness statement that the family started developing the
disputed land. He does not let the court in on what was
being developed on the land. One would think that from the
statement made in paragraph 5, they would have been
Page33of42
constructing a house/residence on the land. However, we
subsequently come to know from Exhibit A that the
disputed property was allegedly purchased for commercial
purpose i.e., stores and which said stores have been sold to
the 1st Plaintiff. No explanation is offered as to what caused
the change in the usage of the land. The Defendant, on the
other hand, asserts from the beginning to the end of her
evidence that they had purchased the land for the
construction of stores which they begun by erecting a
temporary wooden structure which was occupied by 2nd
Plaintiff forhis radio repairs work.
34.The 2nd Plaintiff’s evidence suggests that the property was
uncompleted and unoccupied at the time of the sale to the 1st
Plaintiff, yet, he did not deny Defendant’s assertion in
paragraph 12 of her witness statement that there was a
wooden structure which he occupied and worked in before
thesale ofsame to 1stPlaintiff.
Page34of42
35.It appears to me that the reason for the absence of any
document emanating from the time of the original purchase
of the land is probably because same may support the
Defendant’s allegation ofjoint ownership. This is a civil case;
the evidence is weighed on probabilities and I am convinced
to make a preference of the evidence of the Defendant over
thatofthe Plaintiffs.
36.The rule in civil proceedings is that where the evidence of
the parties boils down to the oaths of one party and his
witnesses against the oaths of the other party and his
witnesses, the decision of the court may safely be based on
the trial court’s impression of the credibility of the parties.
See the case of Praka v Ketewa [1964] GLR 423, SC. My
impression of the evidence is that the Plaintiffs’ case
especially that of the 2nd Plaintiff smacks of dishonesty
considering the inconsistencies and the unanswered
questions in his evidence, specifically, the absence of
documents emanating from the original sale and the lack of
Page35of42
explanation to justify the absence of those documents. 2nd
Plaintiff rather tendered into evidence a site plan which was
no form of evidence for purposes of proving the date of the
purchase of the said land. The site plan was neither dated,
nor was any oral evidence led to indicate when it was
prepared to enable the court to as much as infer that there is
a possibility that the land was purchased prior to the 2nd
Plaintiff’s marriage tothe Defendant.
37.This, coupled with the fact that the 2nd Plaintiff did not deny
having the documents in his possession, causes me to
conclude that the Defendant was unable to provide
documentary proof to support her claim of joint ownership
because she was incapacitated by the Plaintiff’s conduct of
withholding the documentsfromthe court.
38.In any case, the issue of whether or not the disputed
property is a jointly acquired property has been found not to
be crucial in the determination of the validity of the sale of
the disputed property considering section 47 of Act 1036,
Page36of42
therefore, the Defendant’s inability to prove that allegationis
notdetrimental toherdefence.
39.From the above analysis, I make a finding that the disputed
property was purchased in the course of the marriage of the
2ndPlaintiff and the Defendant.
40.In this case, it is not in dispute that the Defendant’s consent
was not sought before the disputed property was sold to the
1st Plaintiff. 2nd Plaintiff’s excuse for the consent not being
sought was that the marriage had been dissolved. This
shows that 2nd Plaintiff is even aware that whilst the
marriage subsisted, he required the consent of his wife
before dealing with the property in any way as to dispose it
off. It appears to me that the 2nd Plaintiff created the façade
of the dissolution of their marriage, to enable him escape the
consequences of his failure to obtain his wife’s consent in
accordance withAct 1036.
41.The need to obtain the written consent of the other spouse in
such transactions as this one is a statutory command and
Page37of42
same cannot be waived therefore the inevitable consequence
on the sale transaction of the disputed land that happened
between the Plaintiffs is that same is null, void and of no
effect.
THEDEFENDANT’S COUNTERCLAIM
42.The Defendant counterclaims for a declaration that the
purportedsale ofthe disputed propertyby the 2ndPlaintiff to
the 1st Plaintiff is null and void as same was fraudulently
done. She failed to provide particulars of the fraud which
she alleges, however, the court stated in the case Glorylord
International Limited v Ghana Water Company Limited
[2024] DLHC17536 that the law is settled, that if there is any
legal point which is evident from the proceedings, and it involves
substantial pointof law which can dispose of the matter in one way
or the other, then it should be decided. It can even be determined
in some cases where it was not specifically pleaded, but is
evident from the record as in cases like fraud (emphasis mine).
Page38of42
See also the cases of Kwaku v Serwah & Others [1993-1994]
1 GLR 429, SC, Kwantrang v Amassah & Others [1962] 1
GLR 241, SC, Attorney General v Faroe Atlantic Co. Ltd
[2005-2006] SCGLR 271 and Kowus Motors v Check Point
Ghana Ltd [2009] SCGLR230.
43.In the instant case, even though the Defendant pleaded
fraud and failed to particularise same, if it is found from the
evidence before me that there is indeed fraud and same has
been proven to the satisfaction of the high burden of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, the court will not close its eyes to
it. See the case of Benjamin Danquah v Agnes Ahadzi and
Pioneer Malls Limited [2023] DLSC16084.
44.The Defendant’s evidence did not disclose fraud on the part
of the Plaintiffs save the lack of consent which 2nd Plaintiff
ought to have obtained from her before disposing of the
property to the 1st Plaintiff. This has already been amply
dealtwith above.
Page39of42
45. The Plaintiffs by their written address filed on their behalf
by Counsel reiterated that the Defendant failed to produce
cogent evidence/documents to establish her claim of joint
acquisition of the disputed property and relied on this failure as
one of the reasons why Plaintiffs should be entitled to their
claim. As earlier established, the issue of joint ownership is
not necessary for the proper determination of this matter
and therefore this perceived weakness in the Defendant’s
case (evenif real)will not entitle the Plaintiffs to judgment in
their favour because they failed to make a case for
themselves and they are therefore not in the position to rely
on any weaknesses in the case of the Defendant.1st Plaintiff’s
case failsand he is not entitled tothe reliefs sought.
46.On the part of the 2nd Plaintiff, he is not entitled to judgment
in his favour because he did not have capacity to sue as a co-
plaintiff in the first place, having asserted that his family had
relinquished their interest in the land to the 1st Plaintiff.
According to him, neither he nor his family had any right
Page40of42
over the disputed property, having sold same to the 1st
Plaintiff. He is not entitled to a declaration of title,
ownership and recovery of possession as well as any of the
other reliefs which he claimed alongside the 1st Plaintiff. In
my humble opinion, he ought rather to have been a co-
defendant orbetterstill, aplaintiff witness.
47.Defendant is entitled to her counterclaim to the extent that
the purported sale of the disputed land to the 1st Plaintiff is
null and void by reason of the 2nd Plaintiff’s failure to obtain
herwrittenconsent beforeembarking onthe sale.
48.Plaintiffs’ claim fails and judgment is entered in favour of
theDefendant inrespect ofher counterclaim as follows:
a. A declaration that the sale of the disputed property being
a parcel of land with a one storey store building situate
thereon and bounded by the properties of Maame
Kesewaa, a multi-TV store, Obuasi-Asokwa lorry road
and a gutter by the 2nd Plaintiff to the 1st Plaintiff is null
Page41of42
and void and same is accordingly set aside on ground of
illegality.
b. CostsofGHC.3,000.00 against thePlaintiffs.
ALL PARTIESPRESENT
EKOWARHINSAGOE, ESQ.FORPLAINTIFFSPRESENT
SGD
MRS. LINDAFREMAH BOAMAH-OKYERE
MAGISTRATE
24/10/2024
Page42of42
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