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Case LawGhana

CUDJOE VRS. PEASAH AND ANOTHER (A9/227/19) [2024] GHADC 493 (24 October 2024)

District Court of Ghana
24 October 2024

Judgment

CORAM: HER WORSHIP MRS. ANNETTE SOPHIA ESSEL, SITTING AS DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, AMASAMAN DISTRICT COURT “B” ON THE 24th DAY OF OCTOBER, 2024 SUIT NUMBER: A9/227/19 DAVID CUDJOE PLAINTIFF VRS 1. ESTHER PEASAH DEFENDANTS 2. VIVIAN TIWAH JUDGMENT In the wise words of Apaloo JA. (as he then was) in the case of Mahama v Soli and Another [1977] 1 GLR 215@ 237: “A Court of conscience will never allow a man to profit by his own default or fraud” FACTS OF THE CASE: The facts of this case admit of no controversy whatsoever. The Plaintiff in the instant suit hauled the Defendants before the Honourable Court seeking a refund of Eighteen Thousand, One Hundred and Nighty Six Ghana Cedis (GH¢18,196) only with interest being amount of expenses incurred in the construction of a single room self-contained residential facility on Defendants’ land. Parties in the instant suit are tenants and landladies respectively. The Defendants are mother and child. Subject matter is single room at Amamorley in the Ga-West District of the Greater Accra Region of the Republic of Ghana. The Defendants upon service of the Writ of Summons entered appearance on 21st May 2019. The 1st Defendant is a pensioner. The 1st Defendant contended that somewhere in March 2016, the Plaintiff negotiated with her for a portion of land to be leased to him for the building of a single room self- contained residence facility to which she obliged him. It was agreed between parties herein that 1 Plaintiff would bear the entire of cost of construction works and subsequently use same to defray cost of rent. This initial agreement between parties was not documented. Defendant avers that upon completion of the premises, they invited Plaintiff on countless occasions to a meeting to reconcile his bill for the construction works and also mutually execute a tenancy agreement but Plaintiff never obliged them with an opportunity for this meeting to take place. After two years of the Plaintiff’s stay in the premises without any agreement in place, the Defendants reported this situation at the Rent Control Office, Amasaman seeking a resolution. At the Rent Control Office Defendants were informed that Plaintiff no longer intended to occupy the premises and was demanding a refund of Eighteen Thousand, One Hundred and Nighty Six Ghana Cedis (GH¢18,196) only. The Defendants stated that they have no money to refund to the Plaintiff as they cannot afford same thus Plaintiff must be compelled to comply by their initial terms of agreement which was build, occupy and transfer. JURISDICTION: The court ensured that it had jurisdiction for the determination of this action i.e. that same was not statute-barred. The law is lucid and clear that where a party omits to bring an action within the time frame specified in the Limitation Act, 1972 (NRCD 54), that person is barred from bringing any civil proceedings in respect of that action. The Limitation Act, 1972 (NRCD 54) provides that actions founded on simple contract (as is the case) in the suit, must be brought within a period of six years after the cause of action accrues. Section 4(1)(b) of the Limitation Act, 1972 (NRCD 54) provides: “Section 4 – Actions barred after six years (1) The following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued: - (b) actions founded on simple contract.” 2 In cases for an action founded on simple contract; The policy consideration for precluding litigants from instituting suits based on simple contracts after the lapse of six years was succinctly elucidated in the case of Alex Yaw Nsiah & 88 Ors. v Ghana Commercial Bank C.A · Civil Appeal: Suit No: H1/154/2014 · 3 Dec., 2015 where Kusi-Appiah JA. relied on the pronouncements of Lord Edmund Davies in the case of Birkett v James (1977) 2 All ER 801, where he opined: “Statutory provisions imposing periods of limitation within which actions must be instituted seek to serve several aims. In the first place, they protect defendants from being vexed by stale claims relating to long-past incidents about which their records may no longer be in existence and as to which their witnesses, even if they are still available, may well have no accurate recollection. Secondly, the law of limitation is designed to encourage plaintiffs to institute proceedings as soon as it is reasonably possible for them to do so... Thirdly, the law is intended to ensure that a person may with confidence feel that after a given time he may regard as finally closed an incident which might have led to a claim against him …” Based on the above, this action is not statute barred as it is evident that the Plaintiff’s cause of action arose sometime around mid-September, 2016 and he therefore has a right to institute civil proceedings in respect of the matter. PROCEDURE OF TRIAL: Parties were both legally represented. Attempts at settlement at Court-connected Alternative Dispute Resolution (CCADR) was not successful. The court consequently set the matter down for Hearing. During trial, Plaintiff testified by himself and also the 1st Defendant testified for herself and on behalf of the 2nd defendant. Parties called no witnesses. The court ordered for a valuation of the subject matter of this suit to assist the court in determining this matter. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION: 3 In view of the pleadings, evidence and cross examination of parties, the court set down the following issues for determination: 1. Whether or not the plaintiff expended Eighteen Thousand One Hundred and Ninety-Six Cedis in the construction of the residential facility: the subject matter of this suit. 2. Whether or not the Plaintiff is entitled to a refund of GH¢18,196 with interest. BURDEN OF PROOF: In civil trials, the standard of proof is on the preponderance of the probabilities. Section 12(1) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) provides that: “Proof by a Preponderance of Probabilities (1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of persuasion requires proof by a preponderance of the probabilities. “Preponderance of the probabilities” is defined under Section 12(2) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) as (2) “Preponderance of the probabilities” means that degree of certainty of belief in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the Court by which it is convinced that the existence of a fact is more probable than its non-existence. Furthermore, the principles on which our civil jurisprudence is hinged on require that a party who asserts a fact leads credible evidence to prove same. This is codified under Sections 10, 11(1) and (4), 14 and 17 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), which provides that: “10. Burden of Persuasion Defined (1) For the purposes of this Act, the burden of persuasion means the obligation of a party to establish a requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the Court. (2) The burden of persuasion may require a party (a) To raise a reasonable doubt concerning the existence or non-existence of a fact, or 4 (b) To establish the existence or non-existence of a fact by a preponderance of the probabilities or by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 11. Burden of Producing Evidence Defined. (1) For the purposes of this Decree, the burden of producing evidence means the obligation of a party to introduce sufficient evidence to avoid a ruling against him on the issue. (4) In other circumstances the burden of producing evidence requires a party to produce sufficient evidence so that on all the evidence a reasonable mind could conclude that the existence of the fact was more probable than its non-existence. 14 Allocation of burden of persuasion Except as otherwise provided by law, unless it is shifted a party has the burden of persuasion as to each fact the existence or non-existence of which is essential to the claim or defense that party is asserting. 17. Allocation of burden of producing evidence (1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of producing evidence of a particular fact is on the party against whom a finding on that fact would be required in the absence of further proof (2) The burden of producing evidence of a particular fact is initially on the party with the burden of persuasion as to that fact. This principle received judicial mention in the case of Lydia Akwandua Quarcoo Ahele (Suing as Administratix of The Estate of Jama Ahele Zinabu) and Abiba Awudu Adjonako v Alhaji Baba Salifu and Solomon Kwabena Tetteh Suit No FAL/191/14, decided on 20th June, 2019 where Barbara Tetteh-Charway J. (Mrs.) cited with approval, the following proposition from the case of Zabrama v. Segbedzi (1991) 2 GLR 221: “The correct proposition is that a person who makes an averment or assertion, which is denied by his opponent has the burden to establish that his averment or assertion is true. And he does not discharge 5 this burden unless he leads admissible and credible evidence from which the fact or facts he asserts can properly and safely be inferred. The nature of each averment or assertion determines the degree and nature of that burden.” EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY PLAINTIFF: The Plaintiff herein is a resident of West Ridge, Takoradi. He testified on oath that in March 2016 through neighbour-friend he met the 1st Defendant and negotiated for the construction of a one- bedroom self-contained residential facility on a portion of land on which Defendants resided. Plaintiff testified that the 1st Defendant obliged him. With respect to rent, Plaintiff claimed that parties agreed that same would be computed upon completion of the premises. With respect to the construction works also, it was agreed that Plaintiff would pay for the cost of materials and labour, whilst 1st Defendant provided the labourers and also supervised works. Plaintiff testified that six months into the construction works, he observed that the 1st Defendant was in the habit of inflating the cost of building materials and labour whilst her son: Addo also pilfered the purchased building materials and resold same to him. According to the Plaintiff his complaint in respect of this turn of events were met with threats of abrogation of contract by the 1st Defendant. Plaintiff stated that subsequently, in November 2016, he moved into the premises. As at this date aforementioned, only the front door of the premises had been fixed. The ceiling had not been done, no electrical wiring or meter had been installed. Toilets, manhole, kitchen, water supply, tiling, painting and mortaring of the interior and exterior of the building remained as outstanding works. Plaintiff averred that he had to do all he could to complete the works and adjust to living in the incomplete structure. Plaintiff asserts that whilst at the completion stage of works, the defendants invited him for a meeting to discuss the issue of rent rate for the premises. He responded to them to hold on till works on the premises were completed. This response however did not sit well with the defendants who 6 descended into a practice of several acts of harassment such as raining insults, threats of refund of construction money, and in summary, the plaintiff did not have any peaceful enjoyment whilst occupying the premises. Consequently, the plaintiff vacated the premises unilaterally in December, 2017 after thirteen (13) months of continued stay in same. Plaintiff averred that the defendants subsequently sued him at the Rent Control Office at Accra and also Amasaman. This office concluded that for the resolution of this matter, the defendants refund to him the expenses incurred in putting up this structure. The defendants however have not complied with this directive on grounds that they cannot afford same. Plaintiff therefore prayed for the recovery of this money. EVIDENCE ADDUCE BY DEFENDANTS: It is the testimony of the Defendants per the 1st Defendant that she owns one plot of land at Amamorley, Accra. In March 2016 she did negotiate with the Plaintiff for the building of the subject matter of this suit on a portion of this plot of land which had other structures built o same. It was agreed between parties that upon completion of the subject matter same would be occupied by Plaintiff or let out to defray rent. 1st Defendant admits that although she leased the land for the construction of the residential facility thereon to the Plaintiff no fixed terms were made nor the duration of the lease. According to the 1st Defendant, construction works commenced in March, 2016, Plaintiff moved into the subject matter in June, 2016. According to the 1st defendant, upon completion of the construction works and the plaintiff’s occupation of the premises, she invited Plaintiff to a meeting to discuss the tenancy, however Plaintiff failed to honour any of the invitations. Defendant testified that for this reason, she reported the Plaintiff to the Rent Control Office in Accra and Amasaman. At these offices, Plaintiff demanded an amount of Eighteen Thousand One Hundred and Ninety-Eight Cedis (GH¢18,198.00) only being cost of construction works on the subject matter of this suit. 7 Subsequently the plaintiff vacated the premises without leaving the keys since September, 2018. This was after the plaintiff had engaged with 2nd defendant in several bouts of quarrels. The Defendant concluded that she did not have the money to pay off the plaintiff as at the time of his demand, so she therefore requested of the Plaintiff to return the keys to the premises to enable he to let out same for the recovery of his money through rent paid by any third person who would express an interest in renting the facility. According to the Defendant, as at the year 2020, rent for the subject matter of this suit was assessed by officers of the Rent Control Department at Four Hundred Cedis (GH¢400.00) only per month. To this arrangement also, the plaintiff refused to oblige the defendants and has held unto the keys to the subject matter to date. As at today it has been ninety-four months with the facility at the exclusive possession of the plaintiff. ANALYSIS: This matter commenced before the court differently constituted. Thus, the determination of this case will be based on the record of proceedings as adopted and the trial conducted before me. It is the claim of Plaintiff, that he expended Eighteen Thousand One Hundred and Ninety-Eight Cedis (GH¢18,198.00) only being cost of construction works on the subject matter of this suit. This amount he claimed proceeded from the receipts he tendered without objection during trial. With respect to the items purchased the Plaintiff tendered a list of materials purchased totaling Thirteen Thousand Three Hundred and One Cedis (GH¢13,301.00) only which same is not disputed by the defendants. However, with the difference in amount that made the total bill amount increase to Eighteen Thousand One Hundred and Ninety-Eight Cedis (GH¢18,198.00) only, not a single receipt was attached to support his averments. At cross-examination he stated that: - Q. So, it is your case that the total sum of GH¢13,301 is a list of items purchased and labour is that the case. 8 A. They were the cost of items purchased and labour when 1st Defendant was overseeing the construction of the building. Q. You agree with me that you did not attach a single receipt to the estimate that you gave to the Rent Control Office that was brought to this Honourable Court on which you are making your claim. A. Yes, that is correct. Q. You also agree with me that this estimate you made had a list of things you had just typed with no date of purchase. A. Yes, that is correct. It was just typed. Q. Kindly take a look at your Exhibit A. Exhibit A is a list that you prepared listing the items you claim you purchased in the construction of the property in dispute right. A. Yes, my Lord. Q. This list as you can see has no receipts attached to show the payment you made in respect of this list, right. A. Yes, that is true. Q. There are also no dates to show when these items were purchased, right. A. Yes. Q. I am putting it to you that your Exhibit A is a self-serving document prepared by you to give you undue advantage over the Defendants in this case. A. That is not true because this list of items were building materials I recorded as the monies were given to 1st Defendant to purchase them, until I took over the purchase of material due to her delays. 9 Q. It is your case that the total sum of these items is GH¢13, 301 right. A. That is true. If that is so, no evidence was led on how Plaintiff generated the additional Four Thousand Eight Hundred and Ninety-Five Cedis (GH¢4,895.00) only. There is no receipt before the court nor did any workman testify to receipt of same for works done. It is Plaintiff who states that it was the cost of labour. He therefore reserved the option to lead cogent evidence on how this amount was generated and in this he woefully failed. During trial it was not missing on the plaintiff that the defendants challenged the bill he provided yet he took no steps to defend same. In the case of Ackah v Pergah Limited & Others [2010] SCGLR 728 the Supreme Court per Sophia Adinyira (Mrs.) JSC.: “It is a basic principle of the law on evidence that a party who bears the burden of proof is to produce the required evidence of the facts in issue that has the quality of credibility short of which his claim may fail. The method of producing evidence is varied and it includes the testimonies of the party and material witnesses, admissible hearsay, documentary and things (often described as real evidence), without which the party might not succeed to establish the requisite degree of credibility concerning a fact in the mind of the court or tribunal of fact such as a jury. It is trite law that matters that are capable of proof must be proved by producing sufficient evidence so that on all the evidence a reasonable mind could conclude that the existence of the fact is more reasonable than its non-existence.” Consequently, the court holds that the plaintiff expended Thirteen Thousand Three Hundred and One Cedis (GH¢13,301.00) only and no more on the subject matter of this suit. In the instant case parties admit that no valid lease existed although a valid oral contract which is enforceable existed. A contract, in essence, refers to an agreement, between two or more parties which is legally enforceable and for which consideration is provided, barring any issues of capacity or illegality. As a matter of principle, the terms and obligations must be clear between the parties, and a mere proposition of entering into a contract would not suffice. In the case of Baher Fattal v Emmanuel Oko Tei (Jnr.) Civil Suit No: H1/15/2016 delivered on 2 Feb 2017, the Court of Appeal relying on the locus classicus case of IBM World Trade Corporation Ltd V. Hansem Enterprise Ltd 10 [2001-2002] SC GLR 393 held that an agreement was to be certain as to its essential terms to be construed as enforceable as a contract in law. Furthermore, a contract need not be in writing and the mere fact that a contract is oral does not detract from its validity. This proposition of law received judicial pronouncement in the recent case of Daniel Addo v PSC Tema Shipyard Limited Suit No. BDC47/2014, delivered on 24th March, 2016, where Asiedu J. (as he then was) stated: "At common law contracts could be formal or informal, and except a statute specifically says so, contracts entered into by verbal agreements are enforceable." The court is of the view that there was a valid contract between the parties although no rent was fixed between parties. In the circumstances the court will use equitable rules taking into consideration the entire circumstances of this suit to make the requisite orders that justice may be done to all parties. During trial Plaintiff testified that he moved into the property in November, 2016 then during cross-examination he claimed that he moved in on 2nd November, 2023. Below is a snippet of what transpired in court: “Q. You see in your own paragraph 9 of your Witness Statement you do attest that the Defendants came to you to talk about rent but I quote you “told them to wait because just as we agreed from the beginning, the building is incomplete” meanwhile you had moved into the property and they actually held that meeting with you in the house. So when did you consider the building to be complete. A. Yes, my Lady I had moved into the uncompleted building because my monies were locked up in the building and I was then a student, didn’t have any other place to be so I was left with the only option to live under those dire conditions.” Q So tell us when did you come to live in the property? A. I decided to come in and that was around November, 2016 only because I had then exhausted my savings for the project. Meanwhile 1st Defendant wasn’t using the intended funds for the project so. I came to stay there to complete it. Plaintiff further goes on to say that he did not move in to stay but to supervise works. Yet as at fifteen (15) months 11 into his stay of the premises, no fixed rent rate had been settled between parties for which a complaint was made to the Rent Control Office. Clearly this witness was seen to be double tongued with respect to the start date of his occupation of the premises. The conduct of the plaintiff by his blatant refusal without any compelling or reasonable excuse to negotiate rent rate with the defendants to date even long after he had taken over the works and had been put into exclusive possession of same lends credence to defendants’ testimony that he was intentional and had occupied same for fifteen (15) months as a statutory tenant. It is the case of Plaintiff that he was harassed by Defendants to the extent that he felt unsafe to live in the premises hence his unilateral vacation of the premises. He further asserts that his vacation of the premises was in line with a directive of the Rent Control Office. To these assertions the defendants denied in toto. The burden therefore lay on Plaintiff to lead cogent evidence in support of his averments. During cross-examination of the plaintiff on 2nd November, 2023, the following transpired: Q. After the Rent Control proceedings, you made a demand for the 1st Defendant to pay you GH¢18,196 and she told you that she was a pensioner and she had not asked you to leave the property, you were leaving on your own volition is that not the case. A. My Lady that was not the case. Esther Peasah and Tiwah came to me in the building with threats, insults and even told me that no matter the amount of money I have used in putting up that property, they will find the money and make sure I vacate the premises. Q. You see, I am putting it to you that you left the property because you once lived in it with your fiancée called Akos. You had a baby with his Akos, had a fight with Akos, abducted the baby to Takoradi and the Police were on the lookout for you so you couldn’t stay on the premises again. A. My Lady that is not true. I had to vacate the premises because after their threats and several warnings, I felt unsafe because I was living there alone. Moreover, the Rent Control Manager 12 in Accra instructed me to leave the premises and hand over the keys to the premises as the case was being attended to and it has nothing to do with me taking a child to Takoradi. Q. Did you hand over the keys to the institution as you were instructed? A. Yes, on the day, the next adjourned date at the Rent Control, it was on that same day that judgment or recommendation was given to me to come to Amasaman District Court for t to be enforced. Q. So is it your case that if we should invite the Rent Manager to this court, he will confirm having the keys with him right now. A. The Rent Manager does not have the key. No he would not because he told us that he would not because he told us that he is done with us and that the court at Amasaman will take over the case. Q. You see the Rent Manager will not confirm that he has the keys because you have had the keys in your custody and have had possession of the premises as far back as 2017 to date. A. That is not true, the Rent Officer did however not tell me to give the key to anyone but rather come to Amasaman court with the recommendation and with the key. A careful read of proceedings reveal that according to Plaintiff only on one occasion did the defendants enter the plaintiff’s premises. No evidence was led on the threat of harm or threat of death levelled by Defendants on Plaintiff to the extent that he had to flee the premises for fear of his lie. If that was so the nagging question begging for an answer by the court is that why didn’t Plaintiff report the conduct of Defendants to the law enforcement agencies or the Rent Control Office? There is no report before the court in respect of his averment of inducement, no neighbour could testify in support of same, not even his liaison and good friend; Wofa Yaw. Consequently the court finds that the Defendants did not harass the Plaintiff to vacate the premises. It was Plaintiff who in his bid to evade the payment of rent unilaterally left the premises without a bye-bye or thank you to Defendants. It is on record that the plaintiff never registered his displeasure at any moment during his occupancy of the premises to any conduct of the defendants, neither did he detail the exact threat 13 levelled against him for which he feared for his life. It is the respectful opinion of the court that a promise of re-imbursement of debt cannot in any way amount to a threat of harm or death. Furthermore, even if he was in fear of his life and was exiting from the premises, he should have notified the defendant of his intentions. What is more, not even the incessant pleas of the defendant for keys to enable her to access the premises to raise funds to pay the Plaintiff off as per his demands were heeded. I therefore find that the Plaintiff is duty bound to pay rent for this period as he solely had exclusive possession of the premises to the exclusion of all other persons including the defendant. From the evidence on record the Plaintiff took possession of the premises on November, 2016. Once he was put into exclusive possession he is duty bound to pay rent in the absence of any expenses covenant to refuse the payment of same and his not rescinding the contract. Notwithstanding the fact that there was no agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendant in respect of the monthly rent rate, the plaintiff cannot elude responsibility as he committed a folly by voluntarily electing to unilaterally rescind the contract after taking exclusive possession of the premises without notice to the defendants. Although no set rent was negotiated and settled between parties, the court is duty bound then to use it discretion justifiably in setting same. The Plaintiff in this case led credible evidence to support that parties entered into a contract for the building of the subject matter of this suit and upon completion, the cost of same to be used to defray rent. The building was completed, Plaintiff was put into exclusive possession, yet he failed to negotiate with the defendants on the monthly rent rate for his tenancy period without any reasonable cause despite several attempts made by the defendants to commit the plaintiff to his bargain. The Defendants corroborated and did not controvert this fact. This amounts to an admission by the plaintiff. The law is clear that where an admission is made concerning the veracity of a fact, no further proof is required. This principle was enunciated in the case of Amofa Kofi Kusi v Unicredit Ghana Limited, delivered on the 29th July, 2019, where Dr. Richmond Osei Hwere J., relying on the case of Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa and Anor v Jake Obetsebi Lamptey and Anor (2013-2014) 1SC GLR 16, where the court stated that: 14 “Where a matter is admitted proof is dispensed with.” In the case of Re Asere Stool; Nikoi Olai Amontia IV (substituted by Tafo Amon II v Akotia Oworsika III substituted by Laryea Ayiku III [2005 -2006] SCGLR 637 the apex court held that: “where an adversary has admitted a fact advantageous to the cause of a party, the party does not need any better evidence to establish that fact than by relying on such admission which is an example of estoppel by conduct.” The proper legal designation for rent (redditus) is the profit issuing from demised land and tenement corporeal, it is payable either in cash or in kind. It is also the tenant’s acknowledgement to the Lord of his tenure of fealty. In the instant case the Plaintiff set out to negotiate a lease with the Defendants. As a lease is a contract, the parties are free to agree to any number or terms in whatever form provided they comply to the law. As contracting parties, the landlord and tenant may agree to any number of express covenants which are then construed by the courts according to their intentions. An express covenant will stand only if it is not inconsistent with the general law and does not offend public policy or morality. In addition to express covenants the law reads into every lease a number of implied covenants several of which are also embodied in Common Law Rules. The obligation to pay rent on the part of the tenant is one of such implied covenants. This obligation is inferred from the landlord and tenant’s relationship. The tenant can only be freed from the obligation to pay rent by an express clause to the contrary. A breach of covenant to pay rent my result in any one of three remedies available to the landlord: (A) Action for rent (B) Forfeiture It ought to be pointed out that being originally an incident of tenure, rent is payable for the land and not for the premises built upon it. Rent is usually reserved in the form of fixed sum of money. It is rent that compensates the lords for the occupation and use of his land. It is therefore an essential quality of rent that same must be fixed and ascertainable, because no valid lease can 15 result in the absence of an ascertainable rent. The law regards arrears of rent as a straightforward contract debt. Thus, under Section 17(1) (a) of the Rent Act, 1963, Act 220, it is provided that: “(a) the lease may only be forfeited if the rent becomes unpaid for a period of at least one month” At Page 235 of N.A Josiah-Ayeh of blessed memory’s book: Law of Landlord and Tenant in Ghana he states that: “Where no fixed sum is agreed up as rent, the landlord may be able to recover damages for use and occupation of the premises. However a tenant is not liable on an implied covenant to pay rent until actually take possession of the premises..... An express covenant to pay rent make the tenant liable to the landlord by privity of contract throughout the term.” In its quest to do the above, the court ordered for a valuation of the subject matter this suit. The record also shows in Exhibit ‘2’ of the Defendant that an Assessment by the Rent Control Office, Amasaman undertaken on 11th January, 2023 fixed the monthly rent rate of at Four Hundred Cedis (GH¢ 400.00) only. This amount was not challenged by the plaintiff. In the interest of fairness and justice, and upon review of both reports, the court is of the respectful opinion that monthly a monthly rent rate of Four Hundred Cedis (GH¢ 400.00) only is condign. This rate is to be calculated from November, 2016 to October, 2024 thus totaling Thirty-Seven Thousand Six Hundred Cedis (GH¢ 37,600.00) only. The court is not unmindful of the period during which the subject matter remained closed to the exclusive use of Plaintiff and will credit same for rent payment because he reserved the option on how to manage this property to the exclusion of all other persons including the defendants during this period. To spare him the payment of rent during this period will amount to a grave injustice to the defendants. Neither will the court sweep under the carpet the Thirteen Thousand Three Hundred and One Cedis GH¢13,301.00) only that the Plaintiff expended on construction works. The plaintiff in the instant suit deserves no refund whatsoever from the defendants. He is rather to pay rent to the defendants to the tune of Twenty-Four Thousand Two Hundred and Ninety-Nine Cedis (GH¢ 24,299.00) only being the period during which he had exclusive possession of the facility. 16 DISPOSITION: Considering, the rival versions of both parties’ testimonies on the record, the scales of justice therefore tilt in favour of the defendants. It is therefore patent on the record that the plaintiff has therefore breached the agreement to occupy the defendants’ space and pay rent for same. It therefore lies ill in the mouth of the plaintiff to demand a refund of his construction money. The Plaintiff is by this action seeking to benefit and or profit from his own wrong and default. The court balancing the scales of justice, is of the fervent view that to grant the relief sought by Plaintiff is to visit the sins of the plaintiff on the defendants. All told, indeed it will be a mockery and a travesty of justice to hold the ddefendantss responsible for the refund of the plaintiff’s money. The court finds it equitable and in good conscience to order the plaintiff to pay rent for the premises occupied from the date he was put into possession to date. The settled principle of law as espoused by Her Ladyship Joyce Bamford Addo JSC. in the Supreme Court case of Wassem Attieh v Koglex (GH) Ltd & Anor. Samir Khoury & Anor. [2001 – 2002] SCGLR 936 @ 944 is that: “No man should be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong.” 1. Judgment is entered in favour of the defendants against the plaintiff. 2. Cost of Ten Thousand Cedis (GH¢ 10,000.00) only is awarded against the plaintiff in favour of the defendants. H/W ANNETTE SOPHIA ESSEL (MRS.) MAGISTRATE 17

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