Matovu & Matovu Advocates v Attorney General and Others (Miscellaneous Application No. 15 of 2025) [2025] UGSC 44 (26 September 2025)

ar/ ,*/- THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OO15 OF 2025 & ctvtL APPLtcATt0N N0. 0015 0F 2025 (AR|STNG FRoM CoURT 0F APPEAL C|VIL APPL|CAT|oN N0. 0399 0F 2024) ARtSTNG FRoM CoURT 0F APPEAL CrVrL APPLTCATToN N0. 0s60 0F 2025) (ARTSTNG FRoM SUPREME CoURT CrVrL APPEAL N0. 12 0F 2025) MAToVU & MAToVU ADVoCATES) APPLICANT VERSUS 10 20 25 30 r. ATToRNEYGENERAL) 2. BERNARD MWETEISE} 3. CHR|S ABEL NKUNZTGoMA) RESPONDENTS RULING OF CHRISTOPHER MADRAMA IZAMA, JSC The Appticant fited this application seeking an order of stay of execution pending the determination of the substantive apptication. The Appticant prays for a stay of the interim orders and rulings of the Court of Appeat in Civit Apptication No. 0399 of 2024. Secondty, the Appticants seek an interim order of stay of proceedings in Civit Apptication No. 562 of 2022 untit the hearing and disposat of the substantive apptication in this court. Finalty, the Appticant prays for the costs of the apptication to be provided for. The grounds of the apptication are that the Appticant fited a "substantive apptication" for a stay of proceedings in the Court of Appeat pending the hearing and determination of the appeat. Secondty, the 2"d and 3'd Respondents have filed affidavits in repty to the main application in Civit Apptication No. 562 of 2022 in comptiance with the Court of Appeat Orders in Civit Apptication No. 560 ot 2022. Thirdty, the act of fiting the affidavits amounts to a serious threat to the execution of the orders of the Court of 1 5 Appeat by the Respondents in Civil Apptication No 0399 ot 2024 before the hearing of the pending substantive application. Finatty, the Appticants averred that it is just equitabte that an interim order of stay of proceedings is granted, pending the hearing and determination of the 'substantive apptication'. The apptication is supported by the affidavit of Birungi Rosemary, an advocate practicing with Messrs. Matovu & Matovu Advocates. She states in the affidavit that the Appticant filed Civit Apptication Nos 562 and 560 of 2022in this court (meaning in the Court of Appeat). Civit Apptication No. 560 of 2022 was heard and determined by a Singte Justice, Muzamiru Kibeedi Mutangula, JA (when he was stit[ a Justice of the Court of Appeat), granting specific orders for execution of the Court's decree in consotidated Appeats Nos 230 of 2013 & Civit Appeal No. 10 ol 2014, al[ arising from HCCS No. 135 of 2003. Rosemary Birungi further deposed that during the execution of the orders of the Court of Appeal in Civit Apptication No. 560 ot 2022 by the Applicant, the 2"d and 3'd Respondents filed Civit Application No. 399 of 2024 and Civil Apptication No 400 ot 2024, praying inler alia for review of the decision of the singte justice which was issued in Civit Apptication No. 560 of 2024. The apptication was determined in favour of the 2"d and 3'd Respondents, and the Appticant was dissatisfied with the review decision and fited an appeal in the Supreme Court. After fiting a Notice of Appeat, the Appticant apptied by tetter requesting a record of proceedings of the Court of Appeat, whereupon the Appticant fited in this Court a substantive apptication for stay of proceedings, pending the hearing and determination of the appeal. The 2"d and 3'd Respondents fited affidavits in reply to Civit Apptication No. 562 of 2022, in the Court of Appeat, and the Appticant contends that this act constitutes a serious threat of the execution of the orders of the Court of Appeat in Civit Apptication No. 0399 of 2024 before the hearing of the substantive apptication that is pending in this Court. The Appticant contends that it is just and equitabte that the apptication is granted by this Court. 10 15 20 30 2 5 ln repty, Chris Abel Nkunzingoma of C\o Centre for Legat Aid deposed on behatf of the 2"d and 3'd Respondents in his capacity as the 3'd Respondent and on behalf of the 2"d Respondent with his written authority as foltows: He read and understood the contents of the affidavit of Rosemary Birungi and asserts that it contains fatsehoods and material distortion of facts. Based on information from his lawyers, Messrs. Center for Legat Aid, he asserts that the apptication is incompetent because it ought to have been fited first in the Court of Appeat. Moreover, no exceptionaI circumstances were p[eaded or demonstrated by the appettant to warrant the fiting of the apptication directty in the Supreme Court. Further, the second Respondent and he were ptaintiffs in Civit Suit No. 135 of 2003, a representative suit filed for and on behalf of 824 other plaintiffs in the name of the second Respondent and another. The High Court entered judgment for the ptaintiffs and made a declaration that the ptaintiffs were entitted to a pension catculated in accordance with the originat contracts of service, general damages, and interest thereon. UTL and UPL appeated against the decision of the High Court to the Court of Appeat in Civit Appeat No. 230 of 2013 and Civit Appeat No. l0 of 2014. These appeats were consotidated, and judgment was entered against the appettants, uphotding the decision of the High Court. 10 15 20 3 25 The Appticant was the [awyer for the ptaintiffs in Civit Suit No. 135 of 2003. Thereafter, the Appticants sought to recover 20% of the decretal sums as '[egaI fees' without a valid remuneration agreement with the beneficiaries of the Civit Suit. This was opposed by many beneficiaries, inctuding the deponent and the second Respondent. Further, the Appticant instead 30 communicated to the Ministry of ICT and Nationat Guidance demanding that the decreed sum in Civit Suit No. 135 of 2003 be deposited into its account where 20% only woutd be retained by the Appticant and 80% would be paid to each individuat beneficiary account. The first Respondent advised that it would not be involved in the enforcement of private agreements between 3s the beneficiaries and the Appticant. The Appticant, as a firm of advocates, fited Civit Apptication No. 562 ol 2022 to prevent the first Respondent from paying the court awards directty to the !udgment creditors in Civit Suit No. 135 of 2003/Respondents in the Consotidated Appeats in the Court of Appeat, and sought the payment to be made to it for onward transmission to the beneficiaries. The Appticant atteged that it was entitted lo 20% of each benef iciary's decretaI entitlement. These consisted of pension arrears, gratuity, and general damages. The Applicant fited Civit Apptication No. 560 ol 2022 seeking a temporary injunction to restrain the first Respondent's agents from depositing the beneficiaries' monies on their personaI accounts pending the determination of Civit Apptication No.562 ot2022. None of the beneficiaries was a partyto that apptication. A single justice of the Court of Appeat heard the temporary injunction apptication, granting the finat retiefs in Civit Apptication No. 562 ol 2022 and ordering 20% lo be remitted to the Applicant and 80% to the beneficiaries. The second Respondent and the deponent fited Civit Apptication No. 399 ot 2024 for setting aside the ruling in Civil Apptication No. 560 ol 2022, and also to be added as parties to Civit Apptication No. 560 of 2022, and it was granted. 0n l9th August 2025, the Appticant filed the current application and Civit Apptication No. 15 of 2025 after the third Respondent and the deponent had fited an affidavit in repty to Civit Apptication No. 562 ot 2025. 0n the basis of the information of his [awyers, Messrs. Center for Legat Aid, the deponent believes that there is no competent Notice of Appeal and that the Appticant has no right of appeal to be protected by the orders sought. Further the orders sought wi[[ have the effect of affecting other simitarty situated pensioners. 0n the basis of information of his tawyers, Mr. Nkunzingoma asserts that the Appticant's substantive apptication is incompetent and invatid. This is because no mode of execution of the 0rder in Civit Apptication No. 399 of 2025 has commenced. Further, it is not true that there is an imminent threat of execution or any of the actions comptained about that woutd render the substantive application nugatory. 10 15 20 30 4 5 The parties fi[ed written submissions for and against the apptication. The Appticants'submissrons are filed by Messrs. Matovu and Matovu Advocates, white the 2nd and 3'd Respondents (Mr. Bernard Mweteise and Mr. Chris Abet Nkunzingoma, respectivety) f ited submissions through their Iawyers, Messrs. Centre for LegaI Aid. When the apptication came for hearing on 25th September, 2025, Mr. John Matovu, SC and learned counsel for the AppLicant appeared jointty with learned counsel Mr. JoeL Kidandaire. The learned Senior State Attorney Mr. HiLary Nathan EbiLa, appeared for the ]'t Respondent white, the learned counseI Stanl.ey 0kecho appeared for the 2"d and 3'd Respondents. The Court was addressed in written submissions. The [earned Senior State Attorney was granted leave to submit on whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeat and rntertocutory apptrcations and ruting was reserved for the 26th of September 2025 at 9.30 am. Appticants Submissions The Appticant's written submissions are that the apptication is brought under Rutes l+2 and 43 of the Judicature (Supreme Court) Rutes and is supported by an aff idavit sworn by Birungi Rosemary, an advocate practicing with the Appticant law firm. The issue for determination is whether the apptication merits an rnterim stay of execution and stay of proceedings. The Appticant's arguments in support are that its apptication meets the three conditions set out by this Court in Patrick Kaumba v lsmail Dabule No. 3 of 2018 SCCA.lhe conditions are that an Appticant for an interim order must satisfy the court of the fotLowlng: (a), tnat a competent notice of appeal. has been fiLed on record, (b) that a substantive apptication has been fited and ts pending before the Court, and (c) tnat there is a threat of execution of the orders sought to be stayed. These conditions are atso found in the hotding of G.M. Oketto, JSC in Hwang Sung lndustries Limited v Tajdin Hussein and Others SCCA No. 19 of 2008, where it was hetd that it is sufficient for the Appticant for an interim 10 15 20 25 30 5 order, to show that a substantive apptication is pending and there is a serious threat of execution before the substantive apptication can be heard. ln conctusion, the Appticant prays that the court grants the apptication for an interim stay of execution of the orders from Civit Apptication No. 0399 of 6 The Appticant's counseIsubmitted that att three requirements for an interim stay have been met: These are that (a) there is a competent Notice of Appeat on record. The Appticant provided evidence of a notice of appeat dated 4'h 10 August 2025, and a letter requesting for a copy of the record of proceedings of the Court of Appeat dated 5th August 2025. The Appticant fited a competent appeat with the Supreme Court, referenced as Sup-00-CV-CL-01?-2025, because it was aggrieved by the decision of the Court of Appeat in the apptication for review. (b) There is a substantial application for a stay of 1s execution and proceedings fited on the court record. Counset submitted that the Appticant fited the interim application (Miscellaneous Apptication No. 15 ol 2025), which arises from the substantive apptication (Civit Apptication No. 15 of 2025), which was todged on the 20'h of August, 2025. (c), There is a threat of execution. CounseI for the Appticant asserts that a threat of 20 execution exists because the 2nd and 3'd Respondents fited affidavits in reply to Civit Apptication No. 562 ot 2022, which is pending before the Court of Appeat. The Applicant argues that this act constitutes a threat of the execution of the orders from Civit Apptication No. 0399 ol 2024 before the substantive apptication for stay can be heard. Counset retied on Osman 2s Kassim Ramathan v Century Bottling Company Limited SCCA No. 35 of 2019, where 0pio Aweri, JSC, hetd that "execution in its widest sense signifies the enforcement of or the giving effect to the judgment or the order of the Courts of Justice". The Appticant contends that the Respondents' action of filing affidavits in reply is a process of enforcing the orders and therefore 30 constitutes an imminent threat. Additionatty, the Appticant notes that the first Respondent, the Attorney Generat, is required to deposit money due to the Appticant into a court of Appeal account in enforcement of orders issued in Civit Apptication No. 0399 of 2025, which is also a threat of execution. 10 15 20 25 30 2024 and a stay of proceedings from Civil Application No. 562 ot 2022, pending the hearing and determination of the substantive apptication. ln repty, Counsel for the 2'd and 3'd Respondents object to the apptication on the ground that it is incompetent on several grounds. Firstty, the Applicant improperty "leapfrogged" to the highest court without first seeking retief from the Court of Appeat. This ground of objection is based on the provisions of rule 41(1) of the Judicature (Supreme Court) Rules, which provides lhal'. "Where an application may be made either to the court or to the Court of Appeal, it shall be made to the Court of Appeal firsl'. Counset submitted that Rule 41 (l) is mandatory as determined by the Supreme Court in Attorney Generat and Another Versus Eddie Kwizera, Supreme Court Civil Applications No. I and 3 of 2020, and cited as good authority in Osman Kassim Ramathan Versus Century Bottling Company, Supreme Courl Civil Application No. 34 of 2019. The apptication's breach of the mandatory terms of rute 4l (l) of the Judicature (Supreme Court) Rutes by fiting the application directty in the Supreme Court without first fiting it in the [ower court is exacerbated by the Appticant's fai[ure to ptead any exceptional circumstances that woutd have justified it being fited first in the Supreme Court. ln the absence of a ptea and evidence of exceptional circumstances, the Applicant's apptication is barred for being incurabty incompetent and improperty before the court. The Respondents pray that the apptication be dismissed on this so[e ground. Concerning the Appticant's grounds for the interim retief, the Respondents' counseI submitted in the alternative, and without prejudice to the preliminary point of taw that the application has no merit. Firstty, the Respondents contend that the Applicant's case rests on the existence of a competent notice of appeat, a substantive application, and ttre atteged imminent threat of execution. These grounds are not available to the Appticant on the fotlowing grounds: 7 Respondents' Submissions 5 Firstty, counseI submitted that there was no competent Notice of Appeat. This is because no right of appeal exists. CounseI contends that the right of appeal to the Supreme Court is a creature of statute under Section 5(l) of the Judicature Act, which provides that an appeaI may tie to the Supreme Court where the Court of Appeat "confirms, varies, or reverses a judgment or order inctuding an interlocutory order, given by the High Court in exercise of its originat jurisdiction and either confirmed, varied or reversed by the Court of Appeal". ln Zubeda Mohamed and Anor versus Laila Kaka Wallia and Anor Supreme Court Civil Reference No. 07 of 20ld the Supreme Court stated that "in order to base an apptication for an interim stay, it is needless to say that the undertying Notice of Appeat must be a valid one; otherwise the substantive application on which the interim order is based would have no [eg to stand on". Secondty, there is no right of appeaI to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory order of the Court of Appeat. Counsel submitted that the decision sought to be appeated ls an intertocutory order of the Court of Appeat (Civit Apptication No. 399 ot 20241, which merely set aside orders made in another temporary injunction application (Civit Apptication No. 560 ot 2022) of the same Court. The order sought to be appeated does not meet the criteria in section 6(1) of the Judicature Act. Consequenlty, the notice of appeal is invalid and cannot form the basis for either a substantive application or an interim order. Secondty, the Respondents' counseI submitted that there is no substantive apptication pending in this court from which the instant application arises. That the substantive apptication is a nultity because it is based on an incompetent Notice of Appeat. lt is an assertion that, if the underlying appeat is invatid, the substantive application has no tegalfoundation and is "invatid, nu[[ and void". CounseI reiterated submissions that the substantive apptication is incompetent for being in breach of rute 4l(l) of the Judicature (Supreme Court) Rules, as it was fited first in the Supreme Court and not in the Court of Appeat. 10 15 20 25 30 8 The 2"d and 3'd Respondents respectfulty pray that this Honourabte Court be pteased to dismiss the instant apptication with costs. Submissions of the'l"t Respondent The learned Senior State Attorney Hitary Nathan Ebita did not oppose the apptication and submitted inter alialhat the matter is a dispute between the Applicant and his clients and so the Attorney Generat witt abide by any decision of the court. 0n the issue of whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction in the matter, he agreed with the Applicants and submitted that the Supreme Court is seized with jurisdiction and the appeal before court did not require leave to be fited. Counsel relied on Katayira Francis vs Rogers Bosco Bugembe, Supreme Court Civit Reference No. 9 of 2017,' arising from Civil Application No. 23 of 2016 [2020J UGSC l0 (lfh June, 2020). Submissions of the Appticant in Rejoinder The Appticant's counsel, submitted that the apptication is properly before the Supreme Court, as it is the appellate court where the Notice of Appeat has been filed. Counset submitted that Respondents'retiance on Rute 4l('l) of the Judicature (Supreme Court) Rutes, is erroneous. This is because the rule applies onty to stays emanating from High Court decisions. With regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in Uganda National Examination Board vs Mparo General Contractors Ltd [2004J UGSC 5l (30h Nov 2004), the Appticant's counsel hightighted the hotding in that decision that there is an automatic right of appeal from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court in civit matters originating from the High Court, and therefore, the application is vatid under Section 6(l) of the Judicature Act. Regarding the Respondent's submission that there is no competent Notice of Appeat, the Appticant's counset submitted that it is valid and does not intend to appeal against an intertocutory order incidental to an appeat. The Appticant's counset ctarified that the apptication decision they are appeating against was that of three justices of the Court of Appeat after a judgment and decree had been passed. This means that the matter before the Court of Appeat arose after the appeal had been disposed of. 10 15 20 25 30 35 9 5 Furthermore, in repty to the objection on the ground that there is no substantive apptication before court and the Appticant argued that Rute 41(2) of the Judicature (Supreme Court) Rules provides for exceptions where the Supreme Court can hear an application fited directly in the Supreme Court without having been first fited in the Lower Court. Counsel retied on Uganda Peoples'Congress & Anor vs Professor Edward Kakonge S.C.C.A No. 19 of 2020, [2020J UGSC 46 (3Oh September, 2020), noting that the Supreme Court can entertain such apptications to safeguard the right of appeat. The counseI further contended that it woutd be futite to fite the apptication in the Court of Appeat first, given the manner in which their previous pretiminary objections were disregarded by that court. The Applicant's counse[ prayed for the Court to grant the apptication for an interim stay of execution and a stay of proceedings. Consideration of the Application The background to this apptication is that the Appticants represented over '1600 former employees of Uganda Telecom Ltd, Uganda Posts Ltd, Uganda Communications Commission, and Post Bank Ltd, as ptaintiffs, and their suit in the High Court was successful, cutminating in Civit Appeat No. l0 of 2014 in the Court of Appeat fited by the defendants to that suit. Consotidated Civit Appeat No 230 of 2013 and Civit Appeat No. 10 of 2014 conclusivety determined the dispute between the parties and resulted in an award in favour of the former employees for payment of pension arrears, general damages, and interest accrued thereon to be paid through the Appticant law firm for onward transmission to the beneficiaries. There is no appeal from consotidated Civit Appeal No. 230 of 2013 and Civit Appeat No. l0 of 2014 to the Supreme Court. Pursuant to the conclusion of the appeal by the Court of Appeat, the Applicants apptied to the Court of Appeat for orders that the Attorney General and or any other agency of Government or Ministry of the l'r and 2nd Respondents cannol pay off the Court awards to the Appticant's clients 10 10 15 20 30 35 directty when they were represented by Counset. The grounds of the application were that: L The Appticants have specific agreements with their ctients regarding administration costs and expenses. 2. The Appticants have advanced monies to their clients which must be deducted from their pension packages i.e., the Appticants distributed to their clients hundreds of mi[[ions of shiltings which was a resutt of execution proceedings in the Court of Appeat against the first and second Respondents. 3. Thirdly that it was in the interest of justice that their apptication be granted. The matter was heard by a single justice of the Court of Appeat who disposed of the apptication as fo[[ows: a. An injunction is issued against the Attorney General and the agencies of Government from paying the decreed sums awarded in High Court Civit Suit No. 135 of 2003 and the interest thereon directty to the Appticant's ctients. b. lnstead, the Attorney General shatt pay 80% directty to the bank accounts of the beneficiaries under the decretaI award in accordance with the assessment made by the Auditor General, and 20% shalt be paid to the Appticant's bank account. c. Upon payment as aforesaid, the Attorney Generat shatI stand discharged from a[t claims and tiabitities arising from att claims and tiabitities associated with the satisfaction of the decretat sum in High Court Civit Suit No. 135 of 2003. d. The order shat[ stay in ptace untit the end of the next financiaI year (2021+ / 2025) or untit this court has resolved Civil Apptication No. 562 of 2022, which is pending before this court, whichever of the two happens first. e. For the avoidance of doubt, the payment terms above cover onty the pension arrears, general damages, and accrued interest due to the Appticant's ctients under HCCS No. 135 of 2003; Bernard Mweteise, 11 10 15 20 25 30 35 Asaph Ndawula, and others versus, UTL, UPL, UCC, PBL, and others, as computed by the Auditor Generat. The subsequent monthty pension payments which the Appticant's ctients are entitted to receive are not subject to this order and are, accordingty, payabte directty to the Appticant's ctients. f. Cost of the apptication was to abide the outcome of Civit Apptication No. 562 ot 2002. This decision was delivered on the 15th of November,2023. ln the course of execution proceedings pursuant to the orders of the Singte Justice of the Court of Appeat, the 2"d and 3'd Respondents f ited Civit Apptication Nos 399 and 400 ol 2024 seeking review of the decision in Civit Apptication No. 560 ol 2024. The apptication for review was heard and determined in Civit Application No. 399 ot 2024 in favor of the 2'd and 3'd Respondents to this application. The Court of Appeat, consisting of a panel of three justices of appeal, disposed of the review application in Bernard Mweteise and Another vs Matovu & Matovu Advocates (Civil Application No. 399 of 2024) 2025 UGCA 249 (30h July, 2025) as follows: 15 20 25 30 1. The apptication to review to set aside the ruting and orders of Hon. Justice Muzamiru Mutangula Kibeedi dated 15th November 2023 in Civit Apptication No. 560 ol 2022 is hereby a[towed and the ruting and orders are accordingty set aside. 2. No further payments shatt be made to the 1'r Respondent untit the issues raised in Civil Apptication No. 562 ol 2022 are resolved. 3. Any monies that have already been processed for payment to the l't Respondent, but which have not yet been remitted to their account as at the date of detivering this ruling, shatt be deposited in this Court pending determination of the issues raised in the main apptication. 4. The Appticants sha[[ be joined as the 2nd and 3'd Respondents in Civit Apptication No. 562 ot 2022, and accordingty, they shatt f ite and 12 10 serve their respective replies to the affidavit in support of the apptication within two weeks from the date this ruting is detivered. 5. The Appticant shall then fite and serve its rejoinder to the affidavits in repty, if any, and its written submission in Civit Apptication No. 562 ol 2022 within two weeks from the date they are served with the affidavits in repty. 6. The Respondent sha[[ fite and serve their respective submissions within two weeks from the date they are served with the Appticant's written submissions. 7. The rejoinder, if any, shalt be fited and served within five days from the date of service of Respondents written submissions. 8. We witl deliver our ruting on notice. 9. Costs of this apptication shalt abide the outcome of Civit Application No. 562 ot 2022." I have carefu[[y considered the Appticant's apptication, the affidavit in support, and the [aw. Pretiminary Point of Law: The 2"d and 3'd Respondents'counseI have raised points of law contending that proceedings in this court are incompetent. The objections include a f undamental point of law that this court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal or apptications arising therefrom. lwill consider and determine the issue of jurisdiction first before determination of any other issue, if need be. The issue of jurisdiction of this court arises from the provisions of section 6 (1) of the Judicature Act Cap 16 Laws of Uganda 2023. As I noted earlier there is no appeal from consotidated Court of Appeat Civil Appeat No 230 of 2013 and Civit Appeat No. 10 of 2022 which resulted in awards that ted to execution proceedings which culminated in the proceedings commenced in this court. lwish to note that where an appeal in a civit matter is conctuded, the decree that is issued by the appettate court is considered a decree of the triat court and ought to be executed by the triat court. This arises from interpretation of Section 30 of the CiviI Procedure Act, Cap 282, Laws of 10 15 20 25 30 ,C 13 5 Uganda 2023 provides for the court by which a decree may be executed. lt states that: A decree may be executed either by the court which passed it or by the court to which it is sent for execution. The expression,'court which passed a decree', or words to that effect, shalt, in retation to the execution of decrees, untess there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, be deemed to inctude- (a) where the decree to be executed has been passed in the exercise of appettate jurisdiction, the court of first instance; and Subsection (b) is not retevant and inctudes a court to which the decree is sent for execution. The above notwithstand in g, the decree resutting from the appeat in the Court of Appeat was sought to be executed, and proceedings in execution were taken in the Court of Appeat. The originaI execution proceedings in the Court of Appeat gave rise to the intended appeal in the Supreme Court. lt further gave rise to the instant intertocutory apptication for an interim stay of proceedings in the Court of Appeat and an interim stay of execution of the decree. What is material being that this court has jurisdiction only in second appeals originating from the exercise of originat jurisdiction by the High Court except in Constitution Petitions originatty fited in the Court of Appeat where the Supreme Court is a first appeltate court. The appettate jurisdiction of this court is derived from Articte 132 (2) of the Constitution and section 6 of the Judicature Act Cap 16 Laws of Uganda 2023. Article 132 (2) ol the Constitution states that: 132. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. (2) An appeat sha[[ lie to the Supreme Court from such decisions of the Court of Appeat as may be prescribed by taw. 74 15 20 25 30 The Court of Appeat was neither a court that passed the decree nor one to 10 which it was sent for execution. The decree of the Court of Appeat is deemed a decree of the triat court (High Court). This arises from interpretation of Section 29 of the Civil Procedure Act which defines "court which passed a decree" as f oltows: 5 The law prescribing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in civil matters is inter a[ia section 5 (1) of the Judicature Act Cap 16. The section in effect states that there is a right of appeat to the Supreme Court onty where the High Court exercised originat jurisdiction in the matter and the Court of Appeal determined an appeaI arising from the decision of the High Court. Section 6 (1) of the Judicature Act states that: (1) An appeat shatt tie as of right to the Supreme Court where the Court of Appeat confirms, varies or reverses a judgment or order, includtng an interlocutory order, given by the High Court in the exercise of rts origina I jurrsdiction and either confirnted, varied or reversed by the Court ol Appeal (Emphasis added) This section was recently enforced by the Supreme Court in Attorney General v Kikwanzi (Civil Application 13 of 2019; Civil Application 15 ot 2020) [2024J UGSC 14 (13 June 2024), where, after referring to eartier interpretations, Musoke, JSC, stated that: The question for determination is whether an appeaI ties to this Court, whether as of right or with leave, from a decision of the Court of Appeat dismissing an apptication to vatidate a betatedty fited Notice of Appeat. ln Kobusingye vs. Nyakana and Another, Supreme Court Civil Appeat No.5 of 2004 (unreported), it was hetd that appea[s from decisions of the Court of Appeat tie onty from decisions passed by the Court white exercising its appettate jurisdiction. The Court in the Kobusingye case stated as fo[[ows: "As we have recentty stated in the UNEB case of Uganda National Examinations Board vs. Mparo GeneraI Contractors (Civit Apptication No. 19 of 2004), there is no right of appeatto this Court originating from intertocutory orders ol the Court of Appeat which are incidentat to the appeal but not resulting from lhe tinat determination of the appeat itsetf." ln the present case, the Appticant's intended appeal arises from a decision refusing to vatidate his Notice of Appea[, which, in tight of the above hightighted statement from the Kobusingye case (supra), quatifies as an interlocutory decision since it did not involve the finat determination of any appeaI by the Court of Appeat, but concerned an incidentaI matter retating to the competence of a Notice of Appeatfited by the Appticant in the Court of Appeat. lt fottows, therefore, that this Court cannot grant [eave to the Appticant to todge his intended appeaI to this Court because it is not permitted under the [aw 10 15 20 30 35 15 Further, Prof Littian Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza, JSC with regard to section 6 (1) of the Judicature Act cited UNEB vs Mpora General Contractors (supra) for the proposition that: "There is no right ol appeat to this Court originating from interlocutory orders of the Court of Appeat, which orders are incidentaI lo the appeat but not resutting from the final determination of the appeat itself." ln my ruting in Attorney General vs Kikwanzi (supra) I emphasise the wording of section 6 (1) of the Judicature Act, which revea[s jurisdiction of a second appettate court, that: Finatty, in Uganda National Examinations Board v Mparo General Contractors Limited 2004 UGSC 5l (30 November 2004), the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion about the import of section 6 (l) of the Judicature Act, stated that: According to lhis provision there is an automatic right of appeat from the Court of Appeat to this Court in civiI matters decided by the High Court in the exercise of its origina[ jurisdiction, provided the Court of Appeat has considered and decided on merit an appeat to the Court from a decision of the High Court in the exe rcise of its originat.jurisdiction. The Appticant's Counsel quoted this automatic right of appeal out of context without indicating that the originat decision was that of the Court of Appeal and not the High Court. ln the circumstances of this apptication, the Court of Appeal exercised jurisdiction in proceedings to determine questions arising out of lhe execution of a decree, which decree by definition of section 10 15 20 25 30 35 16 Section 6 (1) of the Judicature Act on[y confers jurisdiction on this court in cases where the Court of Appeat exercised appeltate jurisdiction. ln this case, there was no decision of the High Court, be it an order so that the Court of AppeaI either "confirmed, varied or reversed the judgment or order", of the High Court in the exercise of its originaI jurisdiction. The emphasis is on the words that the Court of Appeat either confirmed, varied or reversed a decision of the High Court in the exercise of its origina[ jurisdiction. lt is important to highlight the fact that this Court exercrses the jurisdiction of a second appeltate court and the [aw emphasizes that the High Court must have exercised originat jurisdiction rn the matter. 5 29 (a) of the Civil. Procedure Act is a decree of the High Court. The decree was extracted from consolidated Civit Appeat No 230 of 2013 and Civit Appeat No. 10 of 2022 pursuant to a f inal determination of the appeat by the Court of Appeat. Execution proceedings are supposed to be taken in the court which frrst exercised originat triat jurisdiction or the court to which the decree is sent for execution. Any issues arising in execution fat[ under 34 of the CiviI Procedure Act wtrere the execution proceedings are considered a suit between the parties for purposes of determination of questions arising between the parties. Section 34 of the CPA states that: 34. Questions to be determined by the court executing the decree. (1) Att questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representat ives, and relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree, shaL[ be determined by the court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. (2) The court may, subject to any objection as to [imitation or junsdiction, treat a proceeding under this section as a suit, or a suit as a proceeding, and may. if necessary, order payment of any additional court fees. The High Court never determined any question retating to the execution of a decree pursuant to the Court of Appeat finaL determinatron of the dispute. What I have on record is a decision of a Singte Justice of the Court of Appeat; Justice Muzamiru Kibeedi Mutanguta, JA, who issued specific orders to execute a decree from Consotidated Appeats Nos 230 of 2013 and 10 of 2014, in Civit Apptication No. 560 of 2022. The orders of the singte Justice were reviewed by a panel of three Justices in Civit Apptication No. 399 of 2021+. The Appticant then Lodged an appeat from the decision in Civit Apptication No. 399 of 2021+ rn this court under reference Sup-00-CV-CL-012-2025. The intertocutory matter before me arises from a purported appeaL which originated from a decision of the Court of Appeat having determined a question reLating to the execution of a decree. There is no decision of the Court of Appeat which either "confirmed, varied, or which reversed the judgment or order" of the High Court in an appeal from determination of any question rel.ating to execution. ln the premises, the proceedings in this court 17 10 15 25 30 35 20 It has [ong been established and we think there is ampte authority for saying that appellate jurisdiction springs onty from statute. There is no such things as inherent appe[[ate ju risd ict io n. ln the premises, the proceedings in this court are incompetent and lstrike out the instant apptication for an interim order. lt is atso inevitabte, in tight of my conctusion that lalso strike out the substantive application from which this application is derived in exercise of my jurisdiction as a single justice under section 8 of the Judicature Act. Both apptications are in a court without jurisdiction. lstrike them out to avoid muttipticity of proceedings. ln tight of my ru[ing on jurisdiction, ldo not have to determine other issues. This being a matter commenced by Counsel of former employees who are pursuing their tegitimate ctaims under a decree and the futfitment of the decree of the judgment creditors is being inordinate[y delayed by a muttiplicity of proceedings. I observe that the muttipticity of proceedings is only concerned with whether payment shoutd be made through counseI or directty to the principalclients who instructed counse[. The dispute is based on the notion that payments may be found owing to the lawyers by their ctients. ln the premises, lfind that it woutd be unjust, at this stage, to award costs against the said counsel, as it may be passed on to the judgment creditors. lncurring more time by detays and further costs shou[d as much as possible be avoided and efforts shoutd be made and expedited to accelerate the realization of the tegitimate claims of the parties. I ought not, at this stage, determine whether the lawyers shoutd be condemned to pay the costs for fiting this apptication in a court without jurisdiction. The issue of costs arising from trying questions relating to the execution of the decree shoutd be determined by the Court with jurisdiction to try such questions. 15 20 30 35 16 s are without jurisdiction, and no order can vatidly be issued as this court lacks the jurisdiction prescribed by section 5 (1) of the Judicature Act. lt is a trite law that appettate jurisdiction is solely created by statute and there is no inherent appeltate jurisdiction. This was held in Attorney-General v Shah (No) fi971J I EA 50, where Spry V - P who read the judgment of Court 10 stated that: 5 ln the premises, costs shatL abide the f inal. resutt of the trial. of any questions relating to the execution of the decree in question. Dated at Kampata the 26th day of September 2025 10 15 Dated at Kampata the 26th day of September 2025 20 Christopher Madrama lzama Justice of the Supreme Court 19 Christopher Madrama lzama Justice of the Supreme Court Delivered in open court at Kampa[a on the 26th of September 2025 in the presence of. Learned Counsel Mr. John Matovu, SC appearing jointLy with learned counsel Mr. JoeL Kidandaire for the Appticant and, Learned Counsel Ms Namanya Etizabeth for the 2nd and 3'd Respondents