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Case Law[2026] TZCA 635Tanzania

Patrick Mrimi vs Agness Chacha (Civil Appeal No. 594 of 2025) [2026] TZCA 635 (8 June 2026)

Court of Appeal of Tanzania

Judgment

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT MWANZA rCQRAM: MWANDAMBO, J.A.. KENTE, J.A, And MGONYA, J.A.T CIVIL APPEAL NO. 594 OF 2025 PATRICK M R IM I ............ .......................................... ................ APPELLANT VERSUS AGNESS CHACH A ........... .............. ....................................... RESPONDENT (Appeal from the decision of the High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza) fNdvekobora, PRM Ext. Juris.) dated the 16th day of February, 2022 in RM. PC Civil Appeal No. 01 of 2022 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 29th April & 8th June, 2026 KENTE, J.A.: This appeal is against a judgment of the Resident Magistrate's Court of Mwanza (Ndyekobora-PRM, with Extended Jurisdiction), in RM. PC Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2022, rendered on 16th February 2023. The parties who were respectively, a husband and wife, were married under customary law in 2008 and subsequently blessed with four children who were aged below eighteen at the time which is material to the occurrence of this dispute. During the subsistence of the marriage, some problems started to surface which put a strain on the parties' marital relationship. Before the Primary Court of Bukumbi in Misungwi District, Mwanza Region (the trial court), in Matrimonial Case No.6 of 2019, the present respondent Agness Chacha as the petitioner, petitioned the court for a decree of divorce, division of the jointly acquired matrimonial properties and the right to visit the children who were at the time, under the appellant's custody. While the appellant who was the respondent did not contest the dissolution of the marriage and the subsequent issuance of a divorce decree, he strongly maintained that, the properties jointly acquired by the parties during the duration of their marriage should be retained for the benefit and interests of the children rather than being distributed to the estranged spouses. After receiving and going through the evidence of both parties, on 27th May 2019, the trial magistrate granted the prayers for dissolution of the marriage and made a final order for the issuing of a divorce decree. As for the matrimonial properties, the trial court declined to order for their immediate division instead it entrusted them to the appellant in trust for the children apparently to cater for their welfare, upbringing and shelter until they attain the age of the majority. Quite evidently, going by the records of appeal, both the appellant and respondent had no qualms about the decision of the trial court. As such, there was no immediate appeal by any of the parties to the District Court seeking to challenge it. However, on 1s t March 2021, notwithstanding the earlier-mentioned conclusive determination which was essentially consented to by both parties, the respondent moved the trial court vide a letter alleging the children were not benefiting from the jointly acquired matrimonial properties. This resulted in the trial court's opening of Civil Application No.2 of 2021 in which another magistrate invoked the provisions of section 114(2)(b) of the Law of Marriage Act and distributed the properties at the ratio of 70% to the appellant and 30% to the respondent. Following a successful revision application to the District Court which declared the subsequent application before the trial court incompetent for being barred by the doctrine of res judicata, the respondent appealed to the High Court of Tanzania (at Mwanza) from where the appeal was transferred to the Resident Magistrate's Court of Mwanza to be heard by Hon. Ndyekobora who was at the time, a Principal Resident Magistrate with Extended Jurisdiction. After hearing the parties, the learned Principal Resident Magistrate went on quashing the decision of the District Court holding that, a mere agreement between the spouse not to share the jointly acquired properties at the time of dissolution of their marriage and the court's directing the appellant to hold them in trust for the benefit of the children, could not override the express provisions of section 114(1) of the Law of Marriage Act. The learned Principal Resident Magistrate also held that, the doctrine of estoppel could not apply against the mandatory requirements of the law. The present appeal challenges these findings and holdings by the second appellate court. On 28th April, 2026 when the appeal was called on for hearing, each party appeared in person without any legal representation. Being lay, the parties submitted in support of their respective positions and grievances largely focussing on the division of the jointly acquired matrimonial properties as ordered by the lower courts. After hearing them in their arguments, as a norm, we deferred the judgment to a future date. However, during our deliberations and upon going through the record of appeal, a glaring procedural anomaly caught our attention. For, it appeared to us that, instead of leading the respondent who was the petitioner in the trial court and the appellant who was the respondent, to adduce evidence regarding their conducts and circumstances with a view to determining if indeed the marriage had reached a point where it could not be salvaged, the trial court appears to have simply endorsed the parties' prayers which were essentially impulsive and emotionally driven. It should be mentioned here that the appellant had initially expressed his willingness to marriage preservation, and his hesitation to part company with the respondent but only to have a change of heart later. Consequently, on 29th April 2026, we recalled the parties and asked them if they had led any evidence establishing the commission of any matrimonial offence and if such an offence, if any, had made their matrimonial life really intolerable. Both the appellant and respondent unequivocally answered in the negative. They confirmed that, the trial magistrate had simply recorded their respective grievances noting that, they both seemed tired of each other and consented to parting ways whereupon the magistrate went on dissolving the marriage without conducting any inquiry as to whether the breakdown was irreparable. This procedural anomaly brings to the fore a critical point of law regarding the procedure to be followed by the courts in conducting the proceedings related to the dissolution of marriages in Tanzania. Obviously, the law governing the dissolution of marriage is the Law of Marriage Act, Cap. 29 of the Revised Laws (the LMA). Section 99 of the LMA clearly provides that, any married person may petition the court for a decree of separation or divorce on the sole ground that his or her marriage has broken down, but no decree o f divorce shall be granted unless the court is satisfied that the breakdown is irreparable. [Emphasis added]. To that end, section 107(1) of the LMA imposes a mandatory, inquisitorial duty upon the trial court and thus, states: " 107:-(1) In hearing a petition for a decree o f divorce, the court shall have regard to a // relevant evidence regarding the conduct and circumstances o f the parties and shall, unless the court is satisfied that the marriage has irreparably broken down, refuse to grant a decree o f divorce." Since, in matrimonial proceedings the courts handle litigants who are more often than not, emotionally driven, it becomes both incumbent and dispensable upon the presiding magistrate to balance empathy for the trauma of the relationship dissolution with strict procedural enforcement to ensure fair, efficient and in some cases, a child-focused outcome. As such, even in the circumstances where both spouses appear before a magistrate and express a mutual desire and consent to divorce, a magistrate is not absolved of his or her statutory duty. The court must actively conduct a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of the union, the attempts at reconciliation (as mandated by section 104 of the Law Marriage Act through the Marriage Conciliation Boards), and if it is satisfied, it may proceed to make a definite and reasoned finding that the marriage has indeed broken down irreparably. In view of the above statutory obligation, a magistrate cannot simply act as a mere rubber stamp to automatically approve the decision and wishes of the spouses. In this regard, the magistracy is reminded that, in marital proceedings, when a decree for divorce or separation is sought, the requirement to establish an "irreparable breakdown" of the marriage, is not a mere procedural formality, but a substantive bedrock upon which any decree of divorce or order for separation must rest. In the present case, it goes without saying that, the trial magistrate abdicated this fundamental statutory duty. By failing to inquire into the irreparable breakdown of the marriage, the primary court lacked the legal mandate to dissolve the union. Consequently, the resulting order dissolving the marriage together with the decree of divorce granted were null and void. It follows logically that, if the divorce order itself was a nullity as the matters currently stand, all subsequent proceedings anchored upon it, including the protracted litigation over the division of matrimonial property in Matrimonial Cause No. 02 of 2021, the revisions at the District Court 7 and the appeal to the Resident Magistrate's Court, were exercises in fruitless endeavors. While we feel for the parties who have unremittingly spent years litigating this matter without legal representation, this Court cannot blindly condone a procedural illegality that strikes at the root of the court's jurisdiction to sever a matrimonia! bond which is generally hallowed both in religious and legal perspectives. In the event, and for the reasons stated above, pursuant to the revisional powers vested in this Court under section 6(2) of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, Chapter 141 of the Revised Laws, we nullify the entire proceedings of the Bukumbi Primary Court in respect of the petition for divorce, and quash and set aside the subsequent judgments and orders of the District Court of Misungwi and the Resident Magistrate's Court at Mwanza. We order the record to be remitted to the Bukumbi Primary Court where the matter shall be heard de nove before a different magistrate, who shall not only expedite the hearing process but also strictly adhere to the provisions of the law so as to determine whether the marriage between the parties has indeed broken down irreparably before 8 embarking on the distribution of the jointly acquired properties and the custody and maintenance of the children. We make no order as to costs. DATED at DODOMA this 3r d day of June, 2026. L. S. MWANDAMBO JUSTICE OF APPEAL P. M. KENTE JUSTICE OF APPEAL L. E. MGONYA JUSTICE OF APPEAL Judgment delivered this 8th day of June, 2026 via Teleconference, in the presence of Appellant, Respondent in person/unrepresented and Ms. Harida Hamisi, Court Clerk present in Court; is hereby certified as a 9

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