Namyalo Kevina and Another v John Baptist Kawanga (Civil Appeal No. 16 of 2020) [2023] UGSC 78 (29 November 2023)

5 THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA (C0RAM:TIBATEMWA - EKtRtKUBtNZA, CHtBtTA, MUSOKE, MUSOTA & MADRAMA, JJSC) CIVIL APPEAL NO 16 OF 2O2O 10 15 20 30 1. NAMYALo KEVTNA) 2. SSEMAKULA LAWRENCE} VERSUS JOHN BAPTIST KAWANGA} RESPONDENT (Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal before Alfonse Owiny - Dollo, DCJ, Kakuru and ruhaise JJA in civil Appeat No. 130 of 20tz arising from High Court Civil Suit No. 5t of 20t4 JUDGMENT OF CHRISTOPHER MADRAMA IZAMA, JSC This rs a second appeat arising from the decision of the court of Appeat as a first appeLtate court having decided an appeal. from the decision of the High court in which the appettants suit was granted. The court of Appeat reversed the decision of the High court and the appettants being aggrieved appeated to this court. The background to the appear. is that the ptaintiffs, who are now the appetLants, had fited an action in the High court joinil.y and severatty against the respondent and the commissioner for Land Registration for inter atia a declaration that both defendants knowingl.y connived and fraudutentl.y transferred land comprised in Buddu BLock 333 ptots 7 and 26 situated at Kigo in Masaka district (hereinafter referred to as the suit property). They sought for an order of canceU.ation of the titl.es, eviction orders, generaI damages for the continuous trespass on the suit Land, special. damages for inconveniences, exemp[ary damages, aggravated damages, interests and costs of the suit arising from the trespass. lt was asserted that the first 1 APPELLANTS 2 s ptaintiff, who is the first appeU.ant in this court sued in her capacity as a trustee for the benef iciaries of the estate of the Late Geratdo Lute (hereinafter referred to as the deceased). She is atso a beneficiary. The second ptaintiff is a beneficiary and represents at[ surviving beneficiaries. The respondent denied the cLaim and asserted that he was a bona fide 10 purchaser for vatue having bought the suit property from an administrator of the estate of the deceased, one Mr. Adrian Mukasa sekyajja who had been granted letters of administration in .1974 and was registered on the titte deeds to the suit property in his capacity as an administrator of the estate on the l7th of December ,l974. 1s The facts were that the deceased (Mr. Geratdo Lute) died in 1970 survived by three chitdren namel.y Adrian Mukasa Sekyajja (a son and heir), Kevina Namyato, a daughter (the first appettant) and Nseratudde Nassi, a daughter. Adrian Sekyajja was granted letters of administration to the estate of the deceased in197 l+ but later died in 1983 and Kevina Namyal.o apptied for and 20 was granted letters of administration to the estate of the deceased. Kevina approached the first respondent to hand over the certificates of titte for Land of the estate of the deceased and he handed over some titLes. 0n carrying out a search the first appettant discovered that the suit land had been transferred to the first respondent hence she took the action of fiting High 2s court civiL Suit No. 51of 20iz for inter atia cancettation of titte. The High court attowed the suit and issued the fottowing dectarations: '1. lt is hereby dectared that the pl.aintiffs are the tawful. registered owners of the land comprised in Buddu Btock 333 ptots T, 26, and 37 situated at Kigo Masaka district. 30 2. lt is hereby dectared that both the first and second defendants knowingty connived and fraudutentty transferred r.and comprised in Buddu Bl.ock 333 ptots T, 26, and 3? situated at Kigo Masaka district to the I't defendant and the 2"d defendant shoutd therefore cancel the aforesaid tittes and register the same in the names of the second ptaintiff. 3. An order of eviction is hereby issued ordering the first defendant to vacate the above [and. The ptaintiffs are hereby awarded generaI damages for the inconvenience suffered and the physical. and mental suffering infticted on them to the tune of 20,000,000/= (twenty miU.ion) shittings. PLaintiffs are hereby awarded 10,000,000/= (ten mittion) shittings as exemptary damages to (against) the defendants. The ptaintiffs are a[so awarded 20,000,000/= (twenty mil.tion) shitl.ings as aggravated damages. The ptaintiffs are awarded interest on d, e and f above at 30% per annum from the date of this Judgment untit payment in fuLt. B. The defendants to pay the costs of the suit. The first respondent was aggrieved and appeal.ed to the court of Appeat on 10 grounds of appeal that need not be set out for purposes of this background. The respondent's appeal. was attowed upon the court accepting his defence as a bona fide purchaser for vatue. The court of Appeal. hetd inter atia as hereunder. a. The respondents who are now the appettants to this court faiLed to adduce evidence that coutd prove their case to the standard required by taw. b. The appetlant was neither a lawyer for Geratdo Lule, nor was he lawyer for Adriene Ssekyajja; so, he had no fiduciary duty to the two, or to the beneficiaries of the estate of Geral.do Lul.e. 10 15 20 25 30 4 6 7 3 5 tr 5 c. The appettant acquired the suit land from, and with the consent and participation of Adrienne Ssekyajja; upon meeting a purchase consideration therefore. d. The sate of the suit [ands to the appettant by Adrienne Ssekyajja was not in breach of his position as a trustee of the beneficiaries of the estate of Geratdo Lute, since it was to enabte Adrienne Ssekyajja be registered on the certificates of titte to the estate [ands, and thereby protect them from waste, or adverse atienation. e. The appettant was therefore a bona fide purchaser for vatue. f. The suit was instituted in court after expiry of the period of timitation of suits for the recovery of [and. g. The second respondent was wrongful.ty joined as a party to the suit; and is accordingty expunged from the record as a party. The Court of Appeal. attowed the appeal and set aside the Judgment and orders of the trial court as wetl as any execution thereof and substituted it with the Judgment and orders of the Court of Appeal.. They ordered that the appetlant is the lawfuI proprietor of the suit [ands and according[y his name must remain, or be restored on the register of the suit tands. Lastty the appettant was awarded the costs of the appeal and of the High Court. The appel.l.ants being aggrieved appeated to this court on seven grounds of appeaI that: 10 15 20 25 30 '1. The learned Justices of AppeaI erred in law when they faited to futl.y evaluate the evidence on record as a first appettate court thus Leading to a miscarriage of justice. 2. The learned Justices of Appeat erred in law and fact when they hel.d that the second respondent had locus standi to bring up the suit. 3. The learned Justices of Appeal. erred in [aw and fact when they hel.d that the trial. judge ptaced much reliance on the evidence of the first respondent. 4. The learned Justices of Appeat erred in law and fact when they hetd that the appettant was not a lawyer of Adrienne Ssekyajja before he demised. 3s 4 5 5. The learned Justices of Appeat erred in law when they hel.d that the appettant was not a bona fide purchaser for vatue. 6. The learned Justices of Appeal. erred in law and fact when they hetd that the first respondent, Kevina Namyal.o and Adrienne Ssekyajja assented to the appettant's acquisition of the suit [and. 7. The Justices of Appeat erred in law and fact when they hel.d that the suit was barred by timitation. Appearances. At the hearing of the appea[ [earned counsel Mr. Kituuma Magata appeared for the second appeltant and informed court that the first appettant was deceased. Learned CounseI Mr. Enos Tumusiime appeared for the respondent. The appettants counsel prayed that the memorandum of appeal. be amended so that he can argue a point of law that the Court of Appeat Lacked jurisdiction because it was not duty constituted as the third Justice did not participate in the judgement. The respondents counsel objected to raising of a point of [aw on the issue of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal. in detivery of the judgment appeated from. Both counsel addressed the court on this issue which ought to be considered first. The appetLant's counseI submitted that he had appl.ied in the written submissions for leave to amend one of the grounds of appeat and correct grammaticaI mistakes. ln repLy the respondent's counsel submitted that the parties appeared for prehearing conference twice and the appetl.ant's counsel onty raised the issue of substitution of the first appettant who was deceased. The parties were required to submit on this issue but the appetlant's counsel did not compty with the court directions to fite written submissions. Further counsel opposed the oral apptication to amend the grounds and submitted that it ought to be made formatly and by notice of motion. He prayed that the apptication for amendment be rejected. Further he submitted that under rute 98 of the Judicature (Supreme Court Rutes) Directions, the judgment of the Court of Appeat cannot be set aside except on grounds averred in the 10 15 20 25 30 35 5 memorandum of appeat, Further the appel.tants counsel never sought leave under rute 17 of the Rul.es of Court. The court ruted that it woutd deal. with the apptication in the appeat and I now deal with it. 10 The amendment that the appticant seeks is to incl.ude a ground that the court of Appeat [acked the requisite jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction touches on the vatidity of the judgment appeal.ed from and is a point of Law that ought to be resotved first since the outcome of the court of Appeat judgment was to set aside the High court judgment. The decision of a court made without jurisdiction is a nuLtity. The statement of Law by Hamtyn J of the High court of ranzania in Desai v warsama [1967] t EA 351 to this effect is a correct statement of [aw when he stated that: It is wetl-established law that a judgment of a court without jurisdiction is a nuttity and 9 Halsbury 351 sets out the proposition briefLy thus: "where a court takes it upon itsetf to exercise a jurisdiction which it does not possess, its decision amounts to nothing., The issue of jurisdiction touches on the power of the court to carry out its judiciat function of adjudication and corottary powers in respect thereof. An issue of [ack of jurisdiction of the [ower court can be raised at any stage of the appeal proceedings because it is an assertion that the decision is a nuttity. This ftows from the proposition that jurisdiction is a creature of statute. Jurisdiction is conferred by Law and where purported jurisdiction is not exercised by the envisaged court in terms of its minimum requirement as to number of members of the court for due constitution of the court as stiputated in the [aw, any decision arrived at without the statutory minimum constitution of the court woutd be without any jurisdiction. I woutd therefore determine the preliminary issue first before handLing any other issue if the issue has no merit. lf it has merit the appeat witt be determined on this point atone. ln the premises, I wil.t consider the point of law which even arises from the judgment of the court of Appeat that is on record and both counsel have addressed the court on it. I woutd overrute the objection against 15 20 25 30 6 35 5 admitting an additional. ground of appeat to argue the issue arising out of the composition of the court at the stage of deLivery of judgment. Submissions of counsel on the point of Law The issue is whether the learned Justices of the court of Appeal. tacked the requisite coram to render Judgment in civit Appeat No 130 of 2017, and in the atternative, whether or not there was a proper court of Appeal. judgment rn Civit Appeat No 130 of 2017. The appel.tant's counseI submitted that the Lead judgment was del.ivered by the Hon Atfonse Owiny - DoU.o, DCJ (as he then was) wherein he stated inter aLia that since Kakuru, JA agrees with his Judgment and orders proposed therein, orders are hereby given in those terms. He contended that Hon Lady Justice Percy Night Tuhaise was part of the coram and futty participated at the hearing and subsequent discussion of the appeal. by the pane[ and was in agreement that the appeal. shoul.d succeed. She was however etevated and took her seat in the supreme court hence she did not participate in the finat stages of the Judgment. The appeLtant's counsel submitted that articl.e 135 (1) of the constitution of the Repubtic of Uganda categorical.l.y states that "the court of Appeal shalt be constituted at any sitting if it consists of an uneven number not being less than three members of the court."He contended that whereas section 12 of the Judicature Act cap 13 permits a singLe justice to hear intertocutory matters, for the court to hear appeal.s, there shouLd be a minimum of three Justices. Neither the constitution nor the Judicature Act atlows two Justices to hear a case inctuding an appLication. He contended that it is evident that the Judgment of ALfonse Owiny - DoLto, DCJ (as he then was) where he stated that Kakuru, JA agreed with the orders proposed therein and signed was without the participation of Hon. Lady Justice percy Night Tuhaise who was atso part of coram and participated in the hearings. lt is stated that she had participated in the subsequent discussions of the appeat but neither took part in the finat stages of the Judgment nor signed the same. He contended that, it fol.l.owed that, the court of AppeaL was not dul.y 10 15 20 25 30 7 35 5 constituted during the finaL stages of the Judgment in contravention of articte 135 (1) of the Constitution. The appetLant's counsel submitted that Rur.e 33 (5) of the court of Appeat Rutes Directions requires the Justices of Appeat to write separate judgments in civiL matters and untess the decision being unanimous, the presiding judge otherwise directs. He contended that despite the remarks of Atfonse Owiny - Dotto, DCJ, the judgment was not signed by Tuhaise, JA. counsel contended that the two Justices without the participation of the Lady Justice Percy Night Tuhaise, coutd not form a majority and they woul.d have been a majority if the three Justices had att decided and onl.y one of them dissented from the other two who agreed. ln the al.ternative, he contended that Hon Lady Justice Percy Tuhaise ought to have signed the Judgment to signify her agreement to the success of the appeat which she apparentty did not do. The appettant's counsel submitted that as a resutt, the Judgment of the two Justices without the decision of a third member of the quorum is a nuttity. ln conctusion, he submitted that the court of Appeat tacked coram when it decided the appeaI and the Judgment is a nuU.ity for contravention of Articl.e 135 (1) of the constitution and section l2 of the Judicature Act, cap 13 read together with the rute 35 (5) of the Judicature (court of Appeal. Rutes) Directions. The appettant's counseI further submitted that the decision infringed on the appettant's right to a fair hearing enshrined in articte 2g (l) of the constitution. ln support of that submission, the appettant's counsel relied on John Lubega vs John ssinabuLya and two others; SCCA No 04 of 2019. Further counsel retied on David chandi Jamwa vs Uganda; supreme court criminat Appeat No 02 of 2018 and the joint dissenting judgments of Dr Esther Kisakye, JSC and Jotham Tumwesigye, JSC which hold inter atia that denying the appettant a right to be heard in a situation akin to the present case was a fundamental error on the part of the learned Justices of Appeat and it vitiated their judgment. Further, counsel submitted that their Lordships hetd that the right to be heard is a constitutionat right under articte 28 of the constitution which 10 15 20 25 30 f( 5 right cannot be derogated from as provided by Articte 44 of the constitution. They further heLd that the right to be heard runs through al.l. stages of the judicrat process from the time of hearing the matter to the time of detivering judgment. ln the premises, the appettant's counse[ submitted that the Judgment of two Justices out of three with one not having participated in the appeal prejudiced the appeltants of their right to be heard and as such is a nuttity. counse[ invited this court to remit the matter to the court of Appeal. so that it is heard and determined by a properl.y constituted Coram. ln repl.y the respondents counsel retied on the wording in the judgment appeaLed against thal, " Lady Justice Percy Night Tuhaise, who was part of this coram participated fully in the hearing and the subsequent discussion of the appeal and was ln agreement that this appeal should succeed. She was however elevated and took her seat at the Supreme Court hence has not participated in the final stages of the Judgmenl. "Further, the learned Justice Kakuru, JA signed the Judgment. The respondent,s counsel disagreed that the third Justice did not participate in the finaL stages of the Judgment on the fottowing grounds. Firstty, articte 135 (1) of the Constitution provides that the court of Appeat shatt be dul.y constituted at any sitting if it consists of an uneven number not being less than three members. ln the circumstances of the case, the court sat and was duty constituted with three Justices when the appetl.ants and the respondent appeared before the court. Secondty under articte 135 (2), the Deputy Chief Justice presided over the court and even wrote the tead judgment. Further and in terms of articte 28 (1) of the Constitution, the respondent's counse[ submitted that it provides for fair hearing and the wording under the article is of "farr and speedy and public hearing before an independent and impartial court established by law". That the appel.tants and respondents had a fair hearing before the court in conformity with articl.e 28 (1) of the Constitution. 10 15 20 25 30 9 Thirdty, counsel submitted that in terms of rute 33 (5) of the Judicature (court of Appeat Rutes) directions, it is provided that "rn civit Appeats, separate judgment should be given by members of the court unless the decision being unanimous, the presiding judge otherwise directs". He contended that in the instant appeaL, the decision was unanimous and the presiding judge Hon. Alfonse Owiny - Dotto DCJ, as he then was, stated that the Hon, Lady Justice Percy Night Tuhaise did not participate in the finat stages of the Judgment, but she was in agreement that the appeat shouLd succeed. That this showed that the presiding judge was aLive to the provisions of Rute 33 of the Judicature (court of Appeat Rutes) directions and so directed. Therefore, the Judgment of the court of Appeat conforms to the provisions of rute 33 of the Ru[es of the Court. ln repty to the contention that the two Justices who endorsed the judgment did not form a majority, the respondent's counsel submitted that the two out of the three justice no doubt were the majority. Further the appeLl.ants retied on the dissenting judgment in David chandi Jamwa vs Uganda (supra) instead of rel.ying on the majority judgment. The majority reLied on Orient Bank Ltd vs Frederick Zaabwe and Mars trading Ltd, Supreme court civit Apptication No 17 of 2007 where Judgment was detivered at the time when one of the Justices of the panel. had retired. He invited the court to fol.l.ow the majority decision in the David chandiJamwa vs Uganda (supra). Further in the David Jamwa case (supra) the supreme court invoked the provisions of articte 126 (2) (e) of the constitution, "to adminlster substantive justice without undue regard to technicalities'l Further in sarah Kul.ata Bisangwa v Uganda; criminal Appeat No. 03 of 20]8 it was hetd that the absence of a third Justice or his signature does not invaLidate the decision of the court which was taken after hearing of the case in accordance with the constitution. The respondent's counsel. submitted in the al.ternative to the eartier prayer that we reject the ground on the merits. The appetl.ants counsel fil.ed submissions in rejoinder which do not add any further points or repty to the above submissions. consideration of the point of law on Jurisdiction of the court of Appeat. 10 15 20 25 30 35 10 5 I have carefutty considered the point of law raised by the appettant's counse[. lt is based on the fact that one of the Justices of Appeal. who heard the appeal did not participate in the finat stages of the Judgment. There was a tead Judgment that was detivered with the concurrence of the one justice and the Judgment acknowl.edged the fact that the third Justice had been etevated to the supreme court and did not sign the finat judgment or even write a separate concurring judgment. The tead judgment was written and signed by the Hon. Al.fonse Owiny - DoU.o, DCJ who at pages 55 and 56 of the Judgment of Court wrote that: 'Since Kakuru JA (is) in agreement with the Judgment and orders proposed therein, orders are hereby given in those terms. N.B. (Lady Justice Percy Night Tuhaise, who was part of this Coram particrpated fully in the hearing and subsequent discussion over the appeal; and was in agreement that this appeat should succeed. She was however elevated and took her seat at the Supreme Court,.hence she has not participated in the final stages of the Judgment).,, It is very ctear from the above passage that one of the members of the court, Tuhaise, JA, did not participate in the finaI stages of the Judgment. lt is al.so ctear that the Hon. Deputy chief Justice indicated that she was in agreement with the proposed order that the appeal. shoul.d succeed. The crux of the appettant's objection is that Tuhaise, JA never futty participated in the finat stages of the judgment and did not sign the Judgment. lt was atso submitted for the appel.tant that each member of the paneL is required under the Rutes of court to write a separate judgment expressing how the appeal. shoul.d be determined. The composition of the court of Appeat is prescribed by articte ,l35 (1) of the Constitution which provides that: 135.Composition of the Court of Appeat. 10 15 20 30 11 (1) The court of AppeaL shaLt be duty constituted at any sitting if it consists of an uneven number not being Less than three members of the court. There is no equrvatent provision of the Judicature Act on the due constitution of the court of Appeal. other than provisions on powers of a singte Justices to exercise powers of the court in any intertocutory cause or matter under section 12 (1) thereof which provides that: 12. Powers of a singte justice of the Court of Appeat. (1) A singte justice of the court of AppeaL may exercise any power vested in the court of AppeaI in any interlocutory cause or matter before the court of Appeat. A titerat transtation of articte 135 (1) of the constitution provides that the Court of Appeat shatl. be dul.y constituted "at any sitting,, if it consists of an uneven number of not less than three members of the court. ln other words, the court of AppeaI is on[y dul.y constituted if there are not less than three members and secondty, it shoutd be uneven number of members of the court. This means that the number of members can either be a minimum of 3 or more comprising of uneven numbers of 5, 7, 9, ll, 13 members etc. ln the circumstances of this appeat it is a fact which is not in dispute that there were three Justices of the court of Appeal. who heard the appeal.. Further, the phrase "at any sitting" means at the hearing when counse[ is expected to address the court on the grounds of appeal. and any corottary issues. After the sitting, the court adjourns the hearing or hearings and indicates to the parties when the decision on the matter wil.L be communicated either on a particu[ar day or with notice. ln that sense the words "at any sitting,, means, in many respects, at the sitting of the court when it is hearing the parties and sitting at the adjourned judgment. Further, the parties can be heard by way of "written submissions" as stipuLated in rute 9g of the Judicature (Court of AppeaL Rutes) Directions which provides that: 98. Presentatron of arguments in writing. (1) Any party to an appea[ does not intend to appear in person or by advocate at the hearing of the appeal may Lodge in the registry statement in writing of his or her arguments in support of or in opposition to the appeal or the cross appeaL, if 10 15 20 30 t< t2 25 any, as the case may be, and shatl, before or withrn seven days after Lodging it, serve a copy of it on the other party or each party in person or separatety represented. The ru[e then further provides for the timel.ines for the fiting and service of written statements. Rute 98 (4) provides that: (4) No party who has todged a statement under this rur.e shau., except with the leave of the court, address the court at the hearing of the appeat. Further rute 100 of the RuLes of the court of AppeaL provides for appearances at hearing and procedure on nonappearance. lt provides in rute'100 (6) as fottows: (6) For the purposes of this rute, a party who has Lodged a statement under rule 98 of these Rutes sha[l. be taken to have appeared. ln that context therefore the word "sitting of the court,,presupposes a hearing in open court though it atso inctudes opportunity avaited to the parties for the hearing of the appeal when the court is open to the parties and the publ.ic and duly constituted by an uneven number not being Less than three members to hear the appeat or accept the written submissions and grve notice of when judgment wiil. be detivered. The sitting of the court can a[so be taken to be "opportunity to hear the parties". where the court has heard the parties and the sitting of the court or even in the written submissions where a party is taken to have appeared before the court, then the court adjourns the hearing and may fix the matter for judgment at a later stage. ln the circumstances of this appeaL therefore, Hon Lady Justice Percy Night Tuhaise was present at the sitting of the court but not at the sitting for del.ivery of judgment. As stated in the tead Judgment of the Hon. Deputy chief Justice, thereafter she was elevated to the supreme court and did not participate at the finaL stages of the Judgment. The phrase,,final stages of the judgmenl' leaves a lot to be desired because it is not definitive of what those finaL stages are. Do they inctude deliberations on the finaI outcome or is it about presentation? Does it inctude sitting when detivering judgment? what is reported in the judgment is that Tuhaise, JA, as she then was, had agreed at an eartier stage just before she was etevated to the 10 20 ,q 30 13 5 15 5 Supreme Court, that the appeal shoutd succeed. lt is ctear that she did not write any concurring judgment or write a dissenting judgment so her opinion remains that which is reported in the tead judgment. lt is not signified in her own writing as a member of the Court. She never sat at the detivery of judgment in the appeat. 10 The appetLant's counsel further attacked the Judgment on the ground that Hon. Tuhaise, JA was required under the rutes and as a member of the PaneL which heard the appeat, to write a separate judgment. Rute 33 (5) of the Judicature (Court of Appeat Rul.es) Directions provides for how the decision of the Court of Appeat shatl be embodied that: (5) ln civit appeats, separate judgments shatt be given by the members of the court unless the deciston been unanimous, the presiding judge otherwise directs. ln the circumstances of this appeat, there was no unanimous decision per se and as envisaged by rute 33 (5) of the Rules of the Court of Appeat because separate judgments were given. There was a tead judgment which was fotlowed by the judgment of the second Justice of the Court of Appeat who wrote a concurring judgment to the lead judgment. There was no Judgment from Tuhaise, JA who was no [onger a member of the Court of Appeat. The essence of the submission of the appeLtant's counsel is that each judge is required to write a separate judgment untess the decision is unanimous and the presiding judge directs that one judgment shatt be written. lt can therefore be sard without fear of contradiction that there was no directron that there be a Judgment of the court to be endorsed by every judge on the panel (three Justices) in comptiance with rul.e 33 (5) of the Rules of the Court of Appeal. ln fact, separate judgments were given and the second justice of appeal concurred with the tead judgment. There was no third judgment, whether dissenting or concurring with the tead judgment. I have reviewed previous authorities of this court on the same question of whether a judgment detivered at a time when one or some of the members of the court is or are not avaitabte either for reasons of etevation to a Higher Court, retirement or when deceased, is invatid. 15 2Q 30 35 l4 5 ln 0rient Bank Limited vs Frederick Zaabwe and Mars Trading Limited; supreme court civit Apptication No. 17 of 2007, the issue was whether the court's judgment in a case heard and decided by a quorum of five Justices is rnvatid, rf at the time it is del.ivered, one of the Justices ceased to be a member of the court. The supreme court of Uganda distinguished and did not fotlow the decision of the Supreme court of lndia in surendra singh and Others vs the state of Uttar Pradesh 0954) AIR 194. The decision of the supreme court of lndia was to the effect that an appeal. decision of the High court constituted by two judges was invaLid because, by the date of deLivery of judgment, one of the two judges had died notwithstanding that he had signed the Judgment before he died. They hetd that a judge who ,,detivers,, the judgment or causes it to be del.ivered by a brother judge, must be in existence as a member of the court at the moment of del.ivery so that if necessary, he or she can stop the deLivery after changing his or her mind. ln another case scenario they referred to the Supreme court noted that where ludges had signed separate Judgments which had been handed over to the registrar of the court for subsequent deLivery and two of the three judges had retired and the third judge had died at the time of detivery of judgment, the judgment couLd not be detivered and when so deLivered is inval.id. The Supreme court of Uganda was not persuaded by the decision of the Supreme court of lndia in Surendra singh and others vs the state of Uttar Pradesh (supra) that the death or retirement of a judge necessarily invatidates an undelivered judgment that the judge signed before the death or retirement. The Supreme court of Uganda considered the fact that in hearing appea[s from the court of Appeat, articLe l3l of the constitution of Uganda provides that the court is dul.y constituted when sitting in criminaI or crviI appeats other than appeal.s from the constitutionaI court when it consrsts of an uneven number not being less than five members of the court. Further, the practice and procedure is governed by the Judicature (Supreme court Rul.es) Directions and particuLarty ru[e 32 thereof. The court singted out inter atia rute 32 sub rul.e (8) which envisages deLivery of 10 15 20 )( 30 35 15 5 a reserved judgment by a judge who did not sit at the hearing or by the registrar. lt provides that: "(8) Where judgment, or the reasons for a decision, have been reserved, the judgment of the court, or a Judgment of any judge, or the reasons, as the case may be, being in writing and signed, may be deLivered by any judge, whether or not he or she sat at the hearing, or by the registrar.,, (Emphasis mine) The court noted as fotlows: "the onLy conditionality for the application of the sub ru[e is that the Judgment in question is written and signed by the judge who took part in the hearing and deciding of the case. The reason that prevents the judge who wrote and signed the judgment to detiver it in person is not a factor for sub rute (B) to appLy. For purposes of this appeat. it is immateriat that the judge is prevented by death or retirement provided that at the time of writing and srgning the judgment, the judge was a member of the court." The court further noted that " on the other hand, the requirement for the judgment to be in writing and signed is to ensure tts authenticity and validation as the judgment of the judge/judges making lt ln the case of reserved judgments, the writing and signing are invariabLy done before the judgment is detivered, and its authenticity and val.idity are thus preserved up to its delivery. where at any time before its deLivery, the judgment is attered because there is a change of mind, the attered judgment has to be simi[arty authenticated and vatidated. ln either case, the judgment is detivered as the vatid judgment of the judge who prepared and signed it.,' (emphasis added) The extensive decision of the supreme court in the above excerpts does not deat with a situation where the Judgment is not signed or written by the judge who has retired, is etevated or is for some other reason no longer a member of the court. The decision is therefore distinguishabl.e from the circumstances of the appeltant's appeal. where the judgment was neither written nor signed by the judge who was etevated and is no longer a member of the court. The supreme court judgment in Orient Bank Limited vs Frederick Zaabwe and Mars Trading Limited (supra) is dated 22nd of January 2008 and was a unanimous decision. 10 15 20 ,< 30 35 16 5 ln David Chandi Jamwa vs Uganda; Supreme Court Criminat Appeat No. 02 of 2017 , a simrtar issue was raised and it was noted that the supreme court had not approved the decision of the supreme court of lndia in surendra Singh and 0thers Vs the State of Uttar pradesh (1954) AIR 194 and additionatty noted that rute 32 (8) of the Rutes of the supreme court was in pari materia with rute 33 (8) of the Judicature (court of Appeat Rutes) Directions. 0n the same issue the Supreme Court stated that: "in cases where a judgment is reserved, it is not always the case that the day a judgment is srgned is the day it is del.ivered. The import of ascertaining the date on which a judgment is delivered is that, that is the date on which the judgment takes effect. The fact that the date of srgnature on delivery of the Judgment are different does not affect the vatidity of the signed document. what is important is that at the time a ludge srgns the judgment, he,/she is stitt a member of the court." (Emphasis added). Again the above decision is distinguishabLe on the ground that there was not written judgment or a signature of the judge who had teft the court authenticating the judgment in the circumstances of the appetlant's appeal.. The question was whether indeed one of their Lordships signed judgment prior to his etevation since his signature was never dated. There are two factual etements to be pointed out in David chandi Jamwa vs Uganda (supra); one is that one justice had been etevated to the Supreme Court by the time the decision was delivered and he had Left a signed judgment. Secondty, the head of the panel., Kavuma, DCJ had since retired. He had not even signed the judgment of court (one judgment). The judgment was onty signed by Hon. 0pio - Aweri, JA, who had teft the court, and Kakuru, JA by the time the judgment was deLivered. lt was argued that it coutd not be ascertained whether Hon. Justice Kavuma, DCJ had agreed with the Judgment or dissented. The court noted that Rute 33 (3) of the Judicature (court of Appeat Rutes) Directions provides that in criminaI appeats, one judgment shaLL be given as the judgment of the court, that a judge who dissents shatI not be required to sign the judgment. They noted that Kavuma, DCJ, was taken to have dissented from the opinion of the other two Justices who signed. 10 15 20 25 30 35 77 ln the circumstances, I find that the case of David chandi Jamwa vs Uganda (supra) is distinguishabl.e from the appel.tant's appeal. because it was a criminal appeal governed by rul.e 33 (3) which provides that in criminal appeals, "one judgment shall be given as the judgment of the court, but a ludge who dissents shall not be required to sign the judgment."onthe other hand, in civiI appeaLs, other rutes are appl.icabte. Rute 33 (5) of the court of Appeat Rul.es, which appties to civil. appeal.s, provides that: (5) ln civit appeaLs, separate judgments shar.r. be given by the members of the court unLess the decision being unanimous, the presiding judge otherwise directs. Untike in civiI proceedings, criminal. appeaLs have a substantiaU.y different rute as to judgments. ln the circumstances of this case, there is a civil appeat that was governed by rute 33 (5) of the Judicature (court of AppeaL Rutes) Directions which I have reproduced above. This ruLe provides that separate judgments shatL be given by the members of the court untess the decision being unanimous, the presiding judge otherwise directs. ln the circumstances of this appeal., there was no unanimous decision and there was a separate Lead judgment of owiny - Dotto, DCJ (as he then was) wrth the concurrence, in a separate judgment, by Kakuru, JA. The case of the appetl.ant is clearty distinguishabte from David chandi Jamwa vs Uganda (supra) appeaL on this ground. The decision in David chandi Jamwa was detivered in 2019 and there was no unanimous as two out of five Justices of the Supreme Court dissented from the majority decision. Finatty, I have considered the decision of this court in Sarah Kutata Basangwa vs Uganda; supreme court criminat Appeat No. 03 of 20.l9. ln that appeal., it was argued that the judgment of the Court of AppeaL dated 15th of January 2018 was signed by two Justices of Appeat instead of the requisite minimum of three. The court considered the rutes to the effect that a judge who dissents is not required to sign the judgment in criminaL appeats. The Supreme Court hetd that. 10 15 20 30 "there was a malority decision which constituted the judgment of the court. The absence of the justice's signature does not invatidate the decision of the court 35 18 5 which was taken after a hearing of the case in accordance with the Constitution. ln the circumstances we find no merit in ground five which is atso dismissed.,, The above decision is clearty distinguishabte because it retied on a rute which appties exctusivety to criminat appeats and does not appl.y to civit appeats which are governed by rutes prescribing separate judgments to be written by each judge untess the decision, being unanimous, the presiding judgment otherwise directs. ln the premises, I f ind that in civiI appeals, where separate judgments have to be written, it is a requirement for at[ the justices on the pane[ to write a judgment and to give directions that it shoutd be detivered in his or her absence. ln the circumstances of this case, there is no written Judgment of Tuhaise, JA (as she then was) before she was etevated to the Supreme Court. Her decision was not embodied in a written judgment on the court record and the facts are distinguishabte from the previous decisions of this court. ln Orient Bank Ltd vs Zaabwe and Another (supra), the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court settted the law as provided in the rutes that each separate judgment of a member of the panel in a civil appea[ has to be written and signed. For that reason, the judgment was invatid and therefore the pornt of law raised by the appettant's counseI is sustained. I woutd find that there is no need to consider the merits of the Judgment because it did not compty with the rules on judgment writing under rute 33 (5). Rute 33 (10) of the Judicature (Court of Appeat Rutes) Directions. Rute 33 ('10) provides that. (10) Where judgment, or the reasons for a decision, has or have been reserved, the judgment of the court, or a judgment of any judge, or the reasons, as the case may be, being in writing and signed. may be detivered by any judge, whether or not he or she sat at the hearing, or by the registrar. ln conctusion, there was no written and signed judgment of Tuhaise, JA (as she then was) in a civil appeat where separate judgments were to be deLivered as required by rule 33 (5) of the Judicature (Court of Appeat Rutes) 19 10 20 25 30 15 5 Directions. Secondly, there being no written Judgment by Tuhaise, JA (as she then was), she coutd not have directed a brother or sister judge to detiver it on her behatf as required by ruLe 33 (10) of the Judicature (court of Appeat Rutes) Directions. 10 ln the premises, I find merit in the appettant's appeal. and I woul.d al.Low the appeal on the point of law raised on the issue of incompetence of the judgment on the ground of absence of one member of the panet. I woutd set aside the judgment of the court of Appeat as being invatid and of no effect for the reasons I have given above. I woul.d make an order remitting the appeal fite to the court of Appeat to be ptaced before another panel. to hear and determine the appeat. The respondent cannot be fautted for the errors of the court and I wouLd make an order that each party bears its own costs of this appeai. 15 20 Christopher Madrama lzama Justice of the Supreme Court i)*-{"^^^" -"2 tu t 20 Dated at Kampata ,n" ZH, or NorJ zozg 4'TtL, yAO 7/,,/z3 THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT I(AMPALA CTVIL APPEAL NO. 16 OF 2O2L [CORAM: TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKI BINZA; CHIBITA, MUSOKE, MUSOTA & MADRAMA; JJSCI 1. NAMYALO KEVINA 2. SSEMAKULA LAWRENCE: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : APPELLANT VERSUS JOHN BAPTIST KAWANGA RESPONDENT JUDGMENT OF STEPHEN MUSOTA JSC I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment by my brother Madrama, JSC. I agree with his analysis, conclusions and the orders he has proposed. Dated this day of a\ I,\-/ Stephen Musota JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT ( <-t-a ^V Y( u f2t 2023 d 'v -\-Q-C L- J @";tw 14 s-/-- THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA CTVIL APPEAL NO. 16 OF 2O2L [CORAM: TIBATEMWA.EKIRIKT,BINZA; CHIBITA, MUSOKE, MUSOTA & MN)RAMA; JJSCI 1. NAMYALO KTVINA 2. SSEMAKULA LAWRENCE: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : APPELLANT VERSUS JOHN BAPI IST KAUIANGA : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : RTSPONDENT JUDGMENT OF STEPHEN MUSOTA. JSC I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment by my brother Madrama, JSC. I agree with his analysis, conclusions and the orders he has proposed. Dated this f. F^, day of At0v 2023 Stephen Musota JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT @D*fU, THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA CryIL APPEAL NO. 16 OF 2O2I [CORAM: TIBATTMtrIA-EKIRIKITBINZA; CHIBITA, MUSOKE, MUSOTA & MADRAMA; JJSCI I. NAMYALO KEVINA 2. SSEMAKULA LAWR.ENCE; : : : : : : ; : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : APPELLANT VERSUS JOHN BAPTIST I{AWANGA :::::::: RESPONDENT JUDGMENT OF STEPHEN MUSOTA, JSC I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment by my brother Madrama, JSC. I agree with his analysis, conclusions and the orders he has proposed. F-. Nuv Dated this day of 2023 7 Stephen Musota JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT o THT REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA CTVIL APPEAL NO. 16 OF 2O2L [CORAM: TIBATTMWA-EKIRIKIIBINZA; CHIBITA, MUSOKE, MUSOTA & MADRAMA; JJSCI 1. NAMYALO KEVINA 2. SSEMAKIILA LAWRENCE: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : APPELLANT VERSUS JOHN BAPTIST KAWANGA : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : RESPONDENT JUDGMENT OF STEPHEN MUSOTA, JSC I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment by my brother Madrama, JSC. I agree with his analysis, conclusions and the orders he has proposed. Dated this day of Nov 2023 Stephen Musota WSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT t{^ LL LJ) THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA CTVIL APPEAL NO. 16 OF 2O2L [CORAM: TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKITBINZA; CHIBITA, MUSOKE, MUSOTA & MN)RAMA; JJSCI 1. NAMYALO KEVINA 2. SSEMAKIILA LAWRTNCE: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : ; : : : : : : : : : : : APPELLANT VERSUS JOHN BAPTIST KAWANGA RESPONDENT JUDGMENT OF STEPHEN MUSOTA, JSC I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment by my brother Madrama, JSC. I agree with his analysis, conclusions and the orders he has proposed. Dated this day of 2023 k. Il^^L, +'tL Stephen Musota .IT'STICE OF THE SUPREME COURT T Na., THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA CIVIL APPEAL NO. 016 OF 2O2O 1. NAMYALO KEVINA 2. SSEMAKULA LAWRENCE : : :::: ::::: : i : :APPELLANTS VERSUS JOH N BAPTIST KAWANGA: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : RESPON DENT (Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal (Owiny-Dollo, DA and Kakuru and Tuhaise, ilA) in Civil Appeal No. 130 of 2017 dated 2Ad June, 2020) CORAM: JUDGMENT OF ELIZABETH MUSOKE, JSC I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment of my learned brother Madrama, ISC and I concur with his analysis, conclusions and orders. i\ lvov Dated at Kampala this day of =) Yl (rz \\9-'^$4 d u (( HON. LADY JUSTICE PROF. LILLIAN TIBATEMWA - EKIRIKUBINZA, JSC HON. MR. JUSTICE MIKE CHIBITA, JSC HON. LADY JUSTICE ELIZABETH MUSOKE, JSC HON. MR. JUSTICE STEPHEN MUSOTA, ]SC HON. MR. JUSTICE CHRISTOPHER MADRAMA IZAMA, JSC 2023. Elizabeth Musoke Justice of the Supreme Coutt % vr^*) THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPAI.A CIVIL APPEAL NO. 016 OF 2O2O 1. NAMYALO KEVINA 2. SSEMAKULA LAWRENCE: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :APPELLANTS VERSUS JOH N BAPTIST KAWANGA: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : RESPON DENT (Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal (Owiny-Dollo, DA and Kakuru and Tuhaise, ilA) in Civil Appeal No. 1 30 of 20 1 7 dated 27d lune, 2020) CORAM: HON. LADYJUSTICE PROF. LILLIAN TIBATEMWA- EKIRIKUBINZA, JSC HON. MR. JUSTICE MIKE CHIBITA, JSC HON. LADY JUSTICE ELIZABETH MUSOKE, JSC HON. MR. JUSTICE STEPHEN MUSOTA" JSC HON. MR. JUSTICE CHRISTOPHER MADRAMA IZAM& JSC JUDGMENT OF ELTZABETH MUSOKE,ISC I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment of my learned brother Madrama, JSC and I concur with his analysis/ conclusions and orders. A day of Na" 2023. Dated at Kampala this Elizabeth Musoke Justice of the Supreme Court THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA CIVIL APPEAL NO. 016 OF 2O2O 1. NAMYALO KEVINA 2. SSEMAKULA LAWRENCE: :::::::::::::: APPELLANTS VERSUS JOHN BAPTIST KAWANGA: RESPONDENT (Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal (Owiny-Dollo, DCI and Kakuru and Tuhaise, JJA) in Ovil Appeal No. 130 of 2017 dated 27d lune, 2020) CORAM: HON. IADY JUSTICE PROF. LILLIAN TIBATEMWA - EKIRIKUBINZA, JSC HON. MR. JUSTICE MIKE CHIBITA, JSC HON. LADY JUSTICE ETIZABETH MUSOKE, JSC HON. MR. JUSTICE STEPHEN MUSOTA, JSC HON. MR. JUSTICE CHRISTOPHER MADRAMA IZAMA, JSC JUDGMENT OF ELIZABETH MUSOKE, JSC I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment of my learned brother Madrama, JSC and I concur with his analysis, conclusions and orders. t"' Dated at Kampala this day of 2023. Elizabeth Musoke Justice of the Supreme Court f..l elv THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPATA CIWL APPEAL NO. 016 OF 2O2O 1. NAMYALO KEVINA 2. SSEMAKULA LAWRENCE :::::APPELLANTS VERSUS JOH N BAPTIST KAWANGA: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : RESPON DENT (Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal (Owiny-Dollo, DCI and Kakuru and Tuhaise, ttA) in Civil Appeal No. 130 of2017 dated 2.Vd lune, 2020) CORAM: HON. LADY JUSTICE PROF. LILLIAN TIBATEMWA - EKIRIKUBINZA, JSC HON. MR. JUSTICE MIKE CHTBTTA, JSC HON. LADY JUSTICE ELIZABETH MUSOKE, JSC HON. MR. JUSTTCE STEPHEN MUSOTA, JSC HON. MR. JUSTICE CHRISTOPHER MADRAMA IZAM& JSC JUDGMENT OF ELIZABETH MUSOKE, JSC I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment of my learned brother Madrama, JSC and I concur with his analysis, conclusions and orders. lL. Dated at Kampala this day of ov Elizabeth Musoke Justice of the Supreme Couft 2023. THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA CIVIL APPEAL NO. 016 OF 2O2O 1. NAMYALO KEVINA 2. SSEMAKULA LAWRENCE :::::::APPELLANTS VERSUS JOHN BAPTIST KAWANGA: : :::::: :: : RESPONDENT (Appeal from the decision of the Coutt of Appeal (Owiny-Dollo, DCI and Kakuru and Tuhaise, JJA) in Civil Appeal No. 130 of2017 dated 23d lune, 2020) CORAM: HON. LADY JUSTICE PROF. LILLIAN TIBATEMWA - EKIRIKUBINZA, JSC HON. MR. JUSTICE MIKE CHIBITA, JSC HON. LADY JUSTICE ELIZABETH MUSOKE, JSC HON. MR. JUSTICE STEPHEN MUSOTA, JSC HON. MR. JUSTICE CHRISTOPHER MADRAMA IZAMA, JSC JUpGMENT OF ELTZABETH MUSOKE, JSC I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment of my learned brother Madrama, ISC and I concur with his analysis, conclusions and orders. +r.. day of tu 2023. Dated at Kampala this Elizabeth Musoke lustice of the Supreme Couft / THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA CIVIL APPEAL NO. 016 OF 2O2O 1. NAMYALO KEVINA 2. SSEMAKULA LAWRENCE: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :APPELLANTS VERSUS JOH N BAPTIST KAWANGA: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : RESPON DENT (Appeal from the decision of the Coutt of Appeal (Owiny-Dollo, DCI and Kakuru and Tuhaise, JJA) in Civil Appeal No. 130 of 2017 dated 23d June, 2020) CORAM: HON. IADY JUSTICE PROF. LILLIAN TIBATEMWA - EKIRIKUBINZA, JSC HON. MR. JUSTICE MIKE CHIBITA, JSC HON. LADY JUSTICE ELIZABETH MUSOKE, JSC HON. MR. JUSTICE STEPHEN MUSOTA, JSC HON. MR. JUSTICE CHRISTOPHER MADRAMA IZAMA, JSC JUDGMENT OF ELIZABETH MUSOKE, JSC I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment of my learned brother Madrama, JSC and I concur with his analysis, conclusions and orders. lt.. Dated at Kampala this day of 2023. Elizabeth Musoke Justice of the Supreme Court THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA CIWL APPEAL NO. 016 OF 2O2O 1. NAMYALO KEVINA 2. SSEMAKU LA LAWRENCE: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :APPELLANTS JOH N BAPTIST KAWANGA: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : RESPON DENT (Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal (Owiny-Dollo, DC) and Kakuru and Tuhaise, IJA) in Civil Appeal No. 130 of 201 7 dated 2id June, 2020) CORAM: HON. LADY JUSTICE PROF. LILLIAN TIBATEMWA - EKIRIKUBINZA, JSC HON. MR. JUSTICE MIKE CHIBIT& JSC HON. LADY JUSTTCE EITZABETH MUSOKE, JSC HON. MR. JUSTICE STEPHEN MUSOTA, JSC HON. MR. JUSTICE CHRISTOPHER MADRAMA IZAMA, JSC JUDGMENT OF ELTZABETH MUSOKE, JSC I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment of my learned brother Madrama, ISC and I concur with his analysis, conclusions and orders. Dated at Kampala this ......1 lt^ day of 2023. Elizabeth Musoke Justice of the Supreme Court VERSUS [.lo^( / THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA [CORAM: TIBATEIIV|A-EKIRIK|LBINZA; CHIBITA; MUSOKE; MUSOTA; IWADRAMA; ,.\ts;c.l CIVIL APPEAL NO.16 OF 2O2O BETWEEN 1. NAMYALO KEVINA 2. SSEMAKULA LAWRENCE APPELLANTS AND JOHN BAPTIST I(AWANGA :::::::::::::::::: : :: : : RESPONDENT lAppeal from the decision of the Courl of Appeal before: Hon. Jusrices: Alfonse Ouiny Dollo, DCJ, Kakuru and Tuhaise, JJA in Ciuil Appeal No. 130 of 2O 17 ansir tg from High Court Ciuil Suil lVo. 51 of 2012.1 JUDGMENT OF TIBATEMWA-EKIRI KUBINZA. JSC. I have had the benefit of reading the judgment of my learned brother, Christopher Madrama, JSC and I agree with him that this appeal succeeds on the grounds he has elaborated in his judgment. I also agree with his orders as to costs. Since Hon. Justices: Chibita; Musoke and Musota; JJSC also agree, orders are hereby issued in the terms proposed by Hon. Justice Christopher Madrama, JSC. Dated at Kampala this ........7..5 ay of ....6)9.\/-........ L '.14 PROF. LILLIAN TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA JUSTICE OF THE SUPRTME COURT. 2023. 1l (vt (( 6t ,-il,-.!-/ ry THE REPUBLIC OF UGAND.E IN TIIE SUPREME COURT OP UGf,IVDA T,T KT,MPAI,E (CORAM: TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA; CHIBITA; MUSOKE; MADRAMA; JJSC') CIVIL APPEAT NO: 16 OF 2020 BETWEEN 1. NAMYALO KEVINA 2. SSEMAKUI.A TAWRENCE APPELLANTS AND tb4eattromthedeclslonoflheCouttofAppealbeforc:[AlfonseowlnyDollo,DCl; Ih*uru and Tuhatse; !!A, tn ctvtt Appeal No, 130 of 2017 attslng lrom lllgh courl cts sutl No. 5l ol20I2l IUDGMENT OF CHIBITA. ISC I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment prepared by my learned brother, Hon. Justice Christopher Madrama, JSC and I agree with his reasoning and his conclusions. I also agree with the orders he has proposed. \4^.l Dated at Kampala this 2023 Mr,"A-r-t= Hon. |ustice Mike f. Chibita JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT a{,L-t) ;IJ.J 1, e ud JOHN BAPTIST KAWANGA l:::::::!l:::::3:l:::::::::l:l::::::::::::::::: RESPONDENT .day of .........N)e. 2.9 t{J*t^" -*.U hA ^ffi"