Ezekiel Mubiligi vs Bulyanhulu Gold Mine Ltd (Civil Appeal No. 1622 of 2024) [2026] TZCA 527 (12 May 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT DODOMA (CORAM: WAMBALI. 3.A., MAIGE, 3.A. And MPEMU, 3. A.) CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1622 OF 2024 EZEKIEL MUBILIGI ............. ................................ ............... APPELLANT VERSUS BULYANHULU GOLD MINE LTD ......................... .................. RESPONDENT (Appeal from the Ruling and Order of the High Court of Tanzania at Shinyanga) fKulita, 3.) dated the 21st day of August, 2024 in Misc. Labour Application No. 16 of 2023 RULING OF THE COURT 23rd April & 12th May, 2026 MPEMU. J.A.: The appeal is challenging the ruling of the High Court of Tanzania at Shinyanga, Kulita, J. which declined to extend time for revision of the award of the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration (the CMA) dated 17th December, 2020. In the CMA award, the appellant's claims on unpaid leave and overtime shift allowances amounting to TZS. 49,498,570.27 was dismissed. Following that dismissal, the appellant did not utilize the statutory time for revision to the High Court, hence he lodged an application for extension of time which was dismissed for being unmeritorious, thus resulting into the instant appeal. 1

Earlier to the hearing of the appeal, the respondent, through the services of Mr. Faustin Anton Malongo, learned advocate, lodged a notice of preliminary objection contending that, the appeal is out of time and it be stuck out for contravening rule 90(1) of the Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules, 2009 (the Rules). We thus heard the parties in this legal point on 20th April, 2026. The appellant appeared in person unrepresented through video conference link from Kasulu, Kigoma, whereas the respondent was represented by Mr. Faustin Anton Malongo and Ms. Caroline Lucas Kivuyo, both learned advocates, who also appeared through video conference link from Mwanza. The appellant resisted the preliminary objection. In his brief oral submission, Mr. Malongo argued that, as there is no certificate of delay, the appeal filed on 30th December, 2024 from 2n d September, 2024 when the notice of appeal was lodged, is out of the sixty (60) days prescribed under rule 90(1) of the Rules. He added that, counting it from when the notice of appeal was lodged, the appeal ought to have been filed latest by 2n d November, 2024. He thus urged us to strike out the appeal for being time barred. In reply, as we stated above, the appellant resisted the preliminary objection arguing that, the appeal is not out of time because sixty (60) 2

days lapsed on 2n d December, 2024. His stance stood in the computation that, sixty (60) days starts to run after lapse of thirty (30) days of lodgement of the notice of appeal. Thus, as the notice of appeal was lodged on 2n d September, 2024, thirty (30) days ended on 2n d October, 2024. Therefore, in his submission, counting sixty (60) days from 2n d October, 2024, time to lodge the appeal lapsed on 2n d January, 2025. Thus, he maintained that he lodged the appeal within time. He urged us to find the objection is without substance and proceed to overrule it. Mr. Malongo, re-joined briefly that, the appellant's style of time computation as to when the (60) days starts to run is not backed up by any legal principle. He reiterated that, in the absence of a certificate of delay, time to lodge the appeal starts to run from the lodgement of the notice of appeal and not after lapse of the days within which the appellant lodged the notice of appeal. To him, the appeal is out of time, and the remedy he urged is for us to hold so and strike it out. From what parties' argued, facts are settled that, on 2n d September, 2024, the appellant lodged the notice of appeal and went ahead to request for copies of the proceedings for appeal purposes on 2n d October, 2024 and served the same on the respondent on 5th October, 2024. Nonetheless, both the request letter and its service to the respondent was 3

out of time, taking into account that, the impugned decision was delivered on 21s t August, 2024. Again, it is also settled that, no any certificate of delay was issued to the appellant for him to benefit from the proviso to rule 90(1) of the Rules. However, even if the said certificate of delay was issued, yet, it would have been of no assistance because the appellant did not request to the Deputy Registrar of the High Court to be supplied with the proceedings within thirty (30) days as mandated under rule 90(1) of the Rules and serve upon the respondent in terms of sub-rule (3) of rule 90 of the Rules. As we have demonstrated above, parties differ in one aspect, that is, when the computation of sixty (60) days starts in circumstances where the appellant is not in possession of a certificate of delay for whatever reason in terms of rule 90 (1) of the Rules. Mr. Malongo argued that, the days starts to run from the lodgement of the notice of appeal, an argument which the lay appellant did not buy in as, his view was that, the computation of sixty (60) days should commence upon the lapse of thirty (30) days of the lodgement of the notice of appeal. The rival arguments prompt us to revisit rule 90(1) of the Rules which reads: " 90 ( 1 ) subject to the provisions of ruie 128 , an appeal shaii be instituted by lodging in the 4

appropriate registry, within sixty days of the date when the notice ofappeal was lodged with: (a) a memorandum of appeal in quintuplicate; (b) the record o f appeal in quintuplicate; (c) Security for the costs o f the appeal, save that where an application for a copy of the proceedings in the High Court has been made within thirty days o f the date o f the decision against which it Is desired to appeal, there shall, in computing the time within which the appealis to be institutedbe excluded such time as may be certified by the Registrar o f the High Court as having been required for the preparation and delivery of that copy to the appellant." It is clear from the Rules that, in the absence of the certificate of delay which entitles the appellant to benefit from the proviso to sub-rule (1) of rule 90 of the Rules, computation of sixty (60) days starts to run from the date the notice of appeal was lodged as argued by Mr. Malongo. This is the law and we need not emphasize further. The appellant stance that, time starts to run from the lapse of the period of thirty days when the notice of appeal was lodged, is not backed up by any known legal principle. Probably he came to that stance him being a lay person in legal matters. 5

With the foregoing analysis, the appellant's appeal lodged on 30th December, 2024 was out of time because he did not rely on the certificate of delay and therefore the appeal ought to have been lodged latest by 2n d November, 2024 from 2n d September, 2024 when the appellant lodged the notice of appeal and not otherwise. The preliminary objection is accordingly sustained. The remedy available is to strike out the appeal as we hereby do, with no order as to costs. DATED at DODOMA this 08th day of May, 2026. F. L. K. WAMBALI JUSTICE OF APPEAL I. J. MAIGE JUSTICE OF APPEAL G. J. MDEMU JUSTICE OF APPEAL Ruling delivered virtually this 12th day of May 2026, in presence of Appellant in person and Mr. Faustine Anton Malongo learned counsel for the Respondent, Ms. Hilda Mcharo court clerk, is hereby certified as a true copy of the original. 6