Innocent Tigano Masinde vs Assemble Insurance Tanzania Limited (Civil Appeal No. 642 of 2023) [2026] TZCA 524 (12 May 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT PAR ES SALAAM fCORAM: NDIKA. J.A.. MURUKE. J.A. And MGEYEKWA. J J U CIVIL APPEAL NO. 642 OF 2023 INNOCENT TIGANO MASINDE....................................................APPELLANT VERSUS ASSEMBLE INSURANCE TANZANIA LIMITED ........................... RESPONDENT (Arising from the Judgment and Decree of the High Court of Tanzania, Labour Division at Dar-es-Salaam) (Rwizile, J.1 dated the 22 day of February, 2023 in Revision No. 317 of 2022 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 22n dApril & 1 2 th May, 2026 MURUKE. J.A.: The Appellant, Innocent Tigano Masinde, was employed by the Respondent on a permanent contract as a Senior Underwriter and Reinsurance - General Business Manager, on 1s t March, 2021, with a monthly salary of TZS 4,218,720.00. However, the appellant's employment was brought to an end following holding of guilt, in respect breach of company policy, gross negligence and gross misconduct, on 17th May, 2021. Following the finding of guilt, the disciplinary hearing committee recommended that the appellant be issued with a warning as a sanction. The appellant was dissatisfied with the finding of guilt and the proposed 1

sanction, thus, preferred an appeal to the management. The appeal was determined and its results were the confirmation of the finding of guilt on the two charges. However, the proposed sanctions were not taken up, instead the appellant was terminated, on the reasons that the offences he committed, warranted termination. The appellant was dissatisfied with the termination, therefore he filed a labour dispute before the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration (CMA). The dispute was heard and an award was issued. The award essentially was to the effect that the termination was unfair on both reasons and procedures. The CMA, awarded the appellant 24 months' salaries as compensation for unfair termination. The respondent was aggrieved, thus, it filed at the High Court a revision No.31 of 2022. The High Court, partly allowed the revision by holding that the termination was with valid reason but with procedural faults. Consequently, the compensation was reduced from 24 months to 14 months' salaries. Being dissatisfied, with the decision of the High Court, the appellant has raised five grounds of appeal namely;

1. That, the learned Judge erred in law and in fact in holding that the appellant breached the Company's underwriting policy while the same was non-existent
2. That, the learned Judge erred in law and fact by failure to comprehend the difference between the insurance policy and

underwriting policy, hence interchangeably applying them thus reached into a wrong conclusion that the Appellant breached the underwriting policy. 3. That, the learned Judge erred in law and in fact in holding that, the Respondent's oral evidence was enough to prove documentary evidence without tendering the respective documents for cross examination. 4. That, the learned Judge erred in law and in fact by failing to note that the investigation was not done in respect o fbreach o f company policy (underwriting policy o f the company). 5. That, the learnedJudge erred in law and fact in reducing the amount o f award from 24 months' remuneration to 14 months' remuneration. On the hearing date before us, Mr. Hamisi Kitundu, learned counsel represented the appellant, whereas Mr. Daniel Welwel, together with Ms. Blandina Harieth Kihampa, both learned counsel, represented the respondent. Before hearing, and upon brief discussion with the Court, the appellant's counsel, decided to abandon ground four, and thereafter, he fused grounds two and three into ground one, and finally, argued grounds one and five of the appeal separately. On the first ground of appeal, the appellant's counsel submitted that: the applicant had no underwriting policy therefore, there was no policy tendered. The respondent as an Insurance Company should have underwriting policy in place as required under rule 12(1) (a) (b) the 3

Employment and Labour Relations (Code of Good Practice), Rules of 2007 (G. N. 42 of 2007). There was no any policy tendered to have been breached in terms of to rule 13(5) of G.N. 42 of 2007. In relation to the allegation of car subject for underwriting process to have two owners, the respondent did not prove that fact by documentary evidence at the CMA. Despite there having no proof of the policy contravened, yet, the respondent did not follow the recommendation of the displinary hearing committee that the appellant was to be warned and not to be terminated. On the 5th ground the appellant's counsel submitted that it was wrong for the High Court to reduce the amount of 24 months' salary compensation awarded by the CMA. The arbitrator exercised the discretion properly as the offences were not proved. In totality, the appellant's counsel beseeched us to quash the High Court's Judgment and restore the holding and the award of the CMA. In response Ms. Kihampa submitted that, the respondent proved the offences charged at the CMA. In the testimonies of DW1 and DW3 they proved that the appellant was both the customer and the underwriter on behalf of the respondent in insuring the motor vehicle with registration number T.307 DKB. Furthermore, the testimony reveals that the underwriting was done while the appellant as a customer failed to disclose crucial information and did not provide the motor vehicle registration card. 4

As an underwriter, the appellant proceeded to underwrite in the absence of such crucial information and the motor vehicle registration card as confirmed by Exhibit D7 (Disciplinary Hearing Minutes) available in the record. Non-disclosure is a breach of the principle of utmost good faith, which the appellant was supposed to observe. Failure to observe it is a seriously anomaly to the respondent as an Insurance Company. Therefore, the High Court was right in holding that the appellant committed wrong in terms of an investigation report. In totality, the respondent complied with the rule 13 (5) of G.N.42 of 2007, thus the complaint on ground one is without merit, insisted the respondent's counsel. Having heard both sides on ground one, we wish to note at the outset that, the respondent is an insurance company, dealing with insurance businesses. The respondent's counsel submitted correct in our view that, the Insurance Industry is an ancient old industry which is governed by well-known principles applicable to date. These are the principles of insurable interest, utmost good faith, indemnity, proximate cause, subrogation etc. It is an industry which is regulated and in Tanzania it is regulated by the Tanzania Insurance Regulatory Authority, (TIRA). Any underwriting policy of an insurance company registered and operating in Tanzania, must be based on the ancient long insurance principles and it must conform to the law in place. In actual fact, each insurance company 5

in Tanzania has a predetermined underwriting policy based on the principles of insurance. Underwriters and all insurance professionals are trained on the insurance principles and are expected to operate in compliance with the insurance principles. The insurance principles are the standard operating guidelines and principles for insurance professionals. We have noted from the record of appeal, that the appellant was a seasoned underwriter whom by virtue of his position with the respondent, was bound by law and industry practice to uphold the insurance principles in carrying out underwriting process. Both DW1 and DW3 testified that after the accident of the motor vehicle and the investigation, it was revealed that the name of the insured (ABET Co. Ltd) in the cover note issued during the underwriting process was not similar to the name of the owner of the motor vehicle (Innocent Massinde and Jubilee Insurance as title owner) on the motor vehicle registration card. This variance was not disclosed by the appellant during the underwriting process. This amounts to non-disclosure. It is clear that an insurance company is always bound by a predetermined underwriting policy based on insurance principles, industry practice and the law. Throughout the disciplinary hearing and at the CMA, the respondent presented facts which established the breach of the principles of utmost good faith and insurable interest by the appellant. The 6

appellant being at management level was reasonably expected to have been aware of the rules or standards of underwriting. The appellant contravened basic and main principles that regulate his profession as an underwriter. The rules and standards have been in existence since the emergence of the insurance industry. The employee of any insurance company, and other stakeholders are presumed to know the principles underlying their business in the Insurance Industry. To us, Rule 12(1) (a) (t> ) (i) (i) (iii) (iv) and (v) of (the Employment and Labour Relations (Code of Good Practice) Rules 2007) G.N. 42 of 2007 was fully complied with by the respondent. In the circumstance the appellant cannot claim non existence of the policy. Thus, ground one lacks merit and is dismissed. On the issue of the relief, the appellant's counsel lamented that, the amount ought not to have been reduced by the High Court, because there was no justification of doing so. On the other hand, the respondent's counsel submitted that the High Court having concluded that the respondent had a valid reason to terminate the appellant, the gravity of unfairness of the termination reduced. Indeed, the respondent's counsel submitted rightly in our view that, the amount of 10 months' compensation ordered by the High Court, after the findings that there was valid reason to terminate the appellant, the gravity of unfainess was reduced. The finding of unfairness of termination on the ground, carries more weight 7

and consequently, and more serious punishment because the law abhors substantive unfairness more than procedural unfairness. In our view, we have no reason to interfere, with the High Court decision. This ground also lack merits. In totality, the appeal is unmerited, therefore it is dismissed. Being an employment dispute, each party to bear own costs. DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 11th day of May, 2026. G. A. M. NDIKA JUSTICE OF APPEAL Z. G. MURUKE JUSTICE OF APPEAL A. Z. MGEYEKWA JUSTICE OF APPEAL Judgment delivered this 12th day of May, 2026 in the presence of Mr. Hamis Katundu, learned counsel for the appellant, Ms. Blandina Kihampa, learned counsel for the respondent, who appeared virtually and Ms. Janekissa Bukuku, Court clerk; is hereby certified as a true copy of the original