Sunflag (T) Ltd vs Nicas Bazil and Others (Civil Appeal No. 1581 of 2025) [2026] TZCA 449 (29 April 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT ARUSHA (CORAM: FIKIRINI, J.A, RUMANYIKA, J.A, And ISSA, J.A.) CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1581 OF 2025 SUNFLAG (T) LTD .................................................................. APPELLANT VERSUS

1. NICASBAZIL

2. LUCY KUNDAKIRA NDOSS

3. SIKUDHAN MAYANGE

4. MARIAW. MWENDI

5. AGRIPINA MWINJO

6. REHEMAALLY

7. ROSEGOMBANIA

8. RAHELMCHARO

9. DOROTH N. MASAWE

10. MWANAHAMIS MSUMI

11. REBEKA ALIAKIM

12. FELISTA SHAYO

13. SAPHINA MUSSA

14. VICKY RITE

15. HORTHENSIA STANLEY

16. JAMILA DALALA

17. HIRIMINA STANLEY

18. AGATHA VICENT

19. AMINA DAUDI

20. OLIVER JAMES

21. JULIANA NDOSS

22. AISHA RAJABU

23. LUCYKESSY

24. DAINESS MWANGA

25. MATILDA MKUMBI

26. AMANI M. KILANGO

27. HALIMA ABDURAHAMAN

28. BEATRICE KITUNGA

29. AMROSIA DIWANI

30. LEAH ANDREA MHAGAMA {Administratrix o f the late Andrea Lukuwi)

31. SALVATOR A. SWAI

32. FRANCIS MOREL RESPONDENTS 1

33. DIDAS A. TESHA

34. HAMISI YUSUPH

35. AGNESS MUSHI

36. MESHAK1 MUSHI

37. GAUSENS BAZIL

38. LOBULU RAKAITA

39. AGNESS ABDALLAH

40. ANTONIGADI

41. ISSA HAMADI

42. GEORGIA AUGUSTINO

43. HAMIS MOHAMED

44. RAJABU SAIDI

45. VALENS ANSELIM KESSY

46. ABASI OMARY

47. NIENDIWE KAZOKA

48. ANGELINA KITOJO

49. WELU MKUMBU

50. RAMADHANI HAMADI

51. MWASHABANI HAMADI

52. ROSE PIUS

53. EVARIST KONSTANTINO

54. SABATO MTAKI

55. MARY ALEX

56. ABUU SENZOTA

57. ALLY SALIM

58. ANDREA TINGATINGA

59. JOSELIN MOSHI

60. ESTEROSE ELIAS

61. JUMA ABDALA

62. MZAMILO MOHAMED

63. MARTHA SUNGI

64. HALIMA MZIRAI

65. FLORA MOSHI

66. AGATHA FAUSTIN

67. MINICA MATHIAS

68. KISAKENI MUSHI

69. RUTHI MAFIE

70. BAHATI RAMADHANI

71. LOTHI KIWAN DAI

72. JACOB MEENA

73. LEONAD JOHN

74. GODFREY SUMARY RESPONDENTS 2

RESPONDENTS 75. PIUSTAIS 76. JOHN SEBASTIAN 77. MARY PALANGYO 78. THERESIA THOMAS 79. SENGASU MPOKERA 80. ISSAJUMA 81. HADIJA MOHAMED 82. ATHUMANI RAJABU 83. MIRAJIMBWANA 84. AGNES FERDINANDI 85. DANIEL TANGO 86. BERTHA TUNGARAZA 87. LUCAS AMINIEL 88. SAMWELMARGWE 89. RASHIDI RAMADHANI 90. ELINAJA EZEKIEL 91. NOELAHAMIS 92. NEEMA JAMES 93. ADELA KIMARO 94. FATUMA IDDI 95. JULIAS MAKAO 96. ULIMBOKA MWAKASOLE 97. SOFIA SHABANI 98. CHRISTOPHER BOBEWE 99. FRANIS SAMWEL 100.AMBROSE MARTIN 101.NELSON STEPHIN 102.SWALEH ISSA 103.STANLEY WILSON 104.ANNA PETER MAFIE 105.MONICA SHANGALI 106.BERTHA DANIEL 107.SOFIA NJAU 108.DATIVA MATUNDA 109.HILDA JOHN (Appeal from the Ruling and Order of the High Court of Tanzania (Labour Division) (Mwaseba, J^ dated the 27th day of September, 2023 in Miscellaneous Labour Application No. 14 of 2023 3

22n d & 29th April, 2026. FIKIRINI, 3.A.: The appellant, Sunflag (T) Ltd, was aggrieved by the ruling and drawn order of the High Court of Tanzania, Labour Division at Arusha, delivered on 27th September, 2023 in Miscellaneous Labour Application No. 14 of 2023, hence preferred the present appeal. The genesis of the dispute traces back to a labour complaint lodged before the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration (the CMA), registered as CMA/ARS/MED/38/2008. Following the determination of that complaint, the respondents, initially 409 in number, later reduced to 109, became dissatisfied with the outcome and consequently filed Revision No. 51 of 2009 before the High Court. That revision was struck out on the ground that it had been improperly instituted as a representative suit. Undeterred, the respondents embarked on successive applications seeking an extension of time within which to file a revision against the CMA decision. These applications were struck out on account of JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

incompetence, culminating in Miscellaneous Application No. 25 of 2021, which was dismissed on 10th August, 2022. Subsequently, the respondents addressed a letter to the Minister for Constitutional and Legal Affairs seeking an extension of time to initiate execution of the CMA award. They were advised that such relief could only be granted by a court of law. Acting on that advice, the respondents filed Miscellaneous Labour Application No. 14 of 2023 before the High Court (Labour Division) at Arusha, seeking orders for extension of time within which to file an application for execution of the award in CMA/ARS/MED/38/2008. After hearing the application, the learned High Court Judge was persuaded to grant it. In doing so, the court acknowledged that although the respondents had not accounted for the entire period of delay, it was undisputed that they had been engaged in litigation since 2009 in an attempt to challenge the CMA decision. On that basis, and in the interest of justice, the court granted the respondents leave and afforded them 30 days within which to file an application for execution. As alluded to above, upset by the ruling and drawn order, the appellant, preferred the present appeal before this Court on the following five grounds of appeal which are:- 5

1. That, the High Court Judge erred in law and fact in granting the application which was pursued and granted substantially under Rule 56 (1) of the Labour Court Rules as promulgated in Government Notice Number 106/2007 which Rule was wholly inapplicable.
2. That, the High Court Judge who entertained and granted Labour Application No. 14 o f 2023 omitted to consider and harmonize and/or take onote of her previous decisions on the same facts in Labour Application No. 25 o f2021.
3. That, the learned Judge failed to appreciate the fact that the respondents were at all times pursuing wrong remedy or incompetent ones in all ten instances that the respondents had attempted to approach the court with intention to revise the Award in Labour Complaint with reference CMA/ARS/MED/3/2008.
4. That, the High Court Judge having found that, the respondents had failed to account for the delay, stumbled and granted the application.
5. That, the High Court erred in failing to take note o f the fact that there was no valid authority for filing Labour Application No. 14 o f2023. At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant and respondents were represented by Mr. Elvaison Maro and Mr. Harun Msangi, respectively, both learned advocates. Counsel for the parties had earlier filed their written submissions as required under Rule 106(1) and (7) of the Court 6

of Appeal Rules and sought to adopt them to form part of their oral submissions. Arguing the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Maro, submitted that the first to fifth grounds be determined on the basis of the written submissions, while placing particular emphasis on the fifth ground. On that issue, he contended that the respondents7application for extension of time was procedurally defective for non-compliance with section 56 of the Labour Institutions Act, now section 57 R.E. 2023, read together with Rule 43 of the Labour Court Rules. He argued that these provisions prescribe the manner in which a party may appear or be represented before the Labour Court and impose a mandatory requirement for filing and serving a notice of representation. It was his submission that no such notice was filed or served to indicate that Mr. Msangi, learned counsel, would act for the respondents. Consequently, he maintained that the proceedings were vitiated by that omission. In support of this proposition, he relied on the decision in Edward James Ng'wenge & Others v. Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Minerals & Others, [2023] TZCA 17347, which, according to him, underscores the legal consequences attendant 7

upon failure to serve a notice of representation. He accordingly urged the Court to allow the appeal. In response, learned counsel for the respondents, Mr. Msangi, opposed the appeal. He submitted that notice of representation is provided for under section 56, with Rule 43 elaborating the procedure. However, he argued that the requirement to file and serve a notice of representation applies only to representatives such as trade unions, employers' organizations, or other authorized persons, and does not extend to advocates. He therefore prayed for dismissal of the appeal. Having considered the grounds of appeal, the record, and the submissions of both parties plus the list of authorities, we proceed to determine the grounds of appeal as presented. On the first ground, the appellant contends that Rule 56(1) of the Labour Court Rules, Government Notice No. 106 of 2007 (the Labour Court Rules) was inapplicable to the application before the High Court. Notably, the ruling of the learned trial Judge expressly stated that the application before the Labour Division of the High Court had been brought under, inter alia, Rules 24, Rule 55(1), and 56(1) and (2) of the Labour Court Rules. This citation formed the legal foundation upon

which the application for extension of time to file an execution application was premised. Upon close scrutiny of the relevant provisions, however, we find that reliance on those Rules was fundamentally misplaced. Rule 55(1) of the Labour Court Rules provides that where a situation arises in proceedings for which the Rules do not provide, the Court may adopt any procedure it deems appropriate in the circumstances. Its invocation is conditional upon the absence of a specific provision governing the situation in question. As such, it cannot be stretched beyond its intended scope. In particular, Rule 55(1) cannot be invoked to create jurisdiction to extend time where the Rules do not prescribe any time limit capable of extension; it only fills procedural gaps, not substantive legal lacunae. In the present case, the application before the High Court sought an extension of time. The Labour Court Rules do contain a specific provision dealing with extension of time, namely Rule 56(1), which empowers the Court to extend or abridge any period prescribed by the Rules. In view of the existence of Rule 56, it is evident that the Rules do provide for the procedural question of extension of time, albeit with limitation. Even so, Rule 56(1) was inapplicable in this situation because it is expressly confined to periods prescribed by the Labour Court Rules. 9

Consequently, Rule 55(1) could not properly be invoked. In short, the Labour Court Rules are silent as to the prescribed time limit for filing an application for execution of a decision or award of the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration (the CMA). The filing of an execution application was therefore not an act required or regulated by any specific timeframe under the Rules. The inevitable conclusion is that the Labour Court Rules neither provide for nor contemplate any application for extension of time in relation to the filing of execution proceedings arising from CMA awards. In other words, there exists no legal foundation within the Rules upon which such an application could properly be anchored. In the circumstances, the Labour Division of the High Court lacked a legal basis upon which to entertain, let alone grant, the application for extension of time. The first ground of appeal is thus merited. On the second ground, the appellant contends that the learned Judge failed to reconcile the impugned ruling with her earlier dismissal of Miscellaneous Application No. 25 of 2021. Notably, on page 2 of the impugned ruling, the learned Judge observed that the respondents had filed multiple applications for extension of time which were struck out for 10

incompetence, culminating in the dismissal of Miscellaneous Application No. 25 of 2021. It is a settled principle that when a court decides a matter, it does so based on the pleadings and evidence before it at that time. This applies equally to applications for extension of time. Thus, if the pleadings in the previous application Miscellaneous Application No. 25 of 2021, were unpersuasive, as held, the court was entitled to dismiss that application. The dismissal reflected the court's assessment of the evidence, explanations, and arguments presented at that point in time. Weak pleadings in a prior application do not compel denial of a subsequent application. The learned Judge was entitled to grant the subsequent application if she found that the respondents had sufficiently explained the delay, even if earlier attempts were unconvincing. Importantly, dismissal of a prior application does not automatically preclude a future application for different relief, unless the facts and relief sought are identical and the doctrines of res judicata or doctrine of estoppel apply. On the third and fourth grounds, the central question for determination is whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in granting the extension of time. ii

The exercise of discretion to extend time is guided by Rule 56(1) of the Labour Court Rules, which permits the Court to extend any period prescribed by the Rules upon good cause being shown. Rule 56(3) further emphasizes that the applicant must demonstrate good cause for the delay. However, the facts of this case reveal a remarkable and inordinate delay. The CMA award sought to be executed was made in 2008. From that time until the filing of the application subject of this appeal in 2023, the respondents made at least ten attempts to obtain relief from the High Court, including representative suits and multiple revision applications. The first revision, Miscellaneous Application No. 51 of 2009, was struck out as a representative suit, while the last, Miscellaneous Labour Application No. 25 of 2021, was dismissed on 10th August, 2022. The respondents attributed the delay to pursuing wrong remedies, including filing revisions when they could have proceeded directly with execution: Our assessment is that the delay in question is extraordinary and remains largely unexplained. The respondents have not provided any cogent account for the passage of many days during which they repeatedly pursued fruitless procedural avenues. The argument that they were actively engaged in litigation corridors since 2009 does not suffice to demonstrate good cause. Persistence in pursuing applications 12

for extension of time to file a revision may demonstrate diligence, but only within that procedural context. Such efforts were directed towards reviving their right to challenge the CMA award and cannot, by any stretch of legal reasoning, be transposed to justify or excuse delay in pursuing execution of a decree. No evidence has been placed before this Court to demonstrate that the respondents were diligently pursuing execution proceedings during the relevant period. Their engagements were confined to attempts at reopening the merits of the dispute through revision, not enforcing the award. Consequently, it cannot be said that there was continuous or relevant diligence capable of justifying the orders sought in the application under consideration. Furthermore, even if this Court were to adopt a liberal approach and exclude the period during which the respondents were actively pursuing revision-related applications, there still exists a substantial and wholly unexplained period of delay following the dismissal of Miscellaneous Application No. 25 of 2021. In particular, no explanation has been offered for the period between the dismissal of that application and 12th October, 2022, when the respondents opted to apply to the Minister for extension of time. 13

Equally unexplained is the period between 9th February, 2023, when the respondents received the Minister's communication directing them to seek recourse before a court of law, and the eventual filing of the application subject to this appeal. These intervals constitute significant lapses of time for which no justification has been advanced. The law is settled that an applicant must account for each and every segment of delay. See:- Wambele Mtumwa Shahame v. Mohamed Hamis {Administrator o f the estate o f late Asha Juma) [2015] TZCA 922. Moreover, the respondents' invocation of the protection afforded under section 21(1) of the Law of Limitation Act, Cap. 89 (the Law of Limitation Act) is, upon proper construction of that provision, wholly untenable in the circumstances of this case. The provision permits exclusion of time only where a party has been prosecuting, with due diligence and in good faith, another civil proceeding founded on the same cause of action, but which ultimately failed on account of want of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature. In the present matter, those requirements were not met. The proceedings relied upon by the respondents were not rendered incompetent by reason of want of jurisdiction or any related defect. 14

Rather, they were struck out on account of procedural deficiencies and failure to comply with prescribed legal requirements. Such circumstances fall outside the ambit of section 21(1) of the Law of Limitation Act. Additionally, the prior proceedings were not directed at the same relief as that sought in the subsequent application. As already observed, the earlier applications concerned extension of time to institute revision proceedings, whereas Application No. 14 of 2023 relates to a distinct procedural remedy. The statutory requirement that the proceedings be founded on the same cause of action is therefore not satisfied. In the premises, section 21(1) of the Law of Limitation Act does not avail the respondents any chance. It cannot be invoked to exclude the extensive period of delay in this case. Besides being in the court corridors for an extended period of time, the High Court granted the extension of time on the basis of the "interest of justice" a stance we do not support. The interest of justice is not a one-way principle. It demands fairness not only to the applicant but equally to the opposing party and, indeed, to the administration of justice as a whole. It must be underscored that the interest of justice also embraces the public policy principle of finality of litigation, as elucidated in Amina 15

Maulid Ambali & Others v. Ramadhani Juma [2021] TZCA 186, and strict adherence to limitation periods. That position has consistently been affirmed in previous decisions, including in John Cornel v. A. Grevo (T) Limited, Civil Case No. 70 of 1998, cited with approval in Kigoma Ujiji Municipal Council v. Ulimwengu Rashid t/a Ujiji Mark Foundation, [2023] TZCA 131, that the Law of Limitation on actions, offers no sympathy or equity; it is a merciless sword that cuts deeply across all who become ensnared in its web. In the circumstances, reliance on the "interest of justice" to justify an otherwise unexplained and extraordinary delay was in our considered view misplaced. The principle cannot be invoked to override clear statutory requirements or to dilute the settled doctrine of finality in litigation. All circumstances considered we, find that the respondents failed to demonstrate good cause for the grant of an extension of time. In these circumstances, the High Court erred in exercising its discretion to extend time, and its decision cannot be upheld. The fifth ground faults the High Court for allegedly failing to take into account that there was no valid authority for filing Labour Application No. 14 of 2023. We have carefully examined the record of 16

appeal in light of this complaint. It is evident that Labour Application No. 14 of 2023 was lodged by Mr. Haruni Idi Msangi, learned advocate, purportedly on behalf of 109 respondents. The notice of application indicates that the said respondents authorized Mr. Msangi to act as their representative and that his affidavit would be relied upon in support of the application. However, closer scrutiny of the notice reveals that it was signed by an undisclosed applicant without expressly indicating that the signatory was acting on behalf of the named respondents. Moreover, the record lacks the specific notice of representation required under Rule 43(1) of the Labour Court Rules. Compliance with this provision is mandatory, and its omission constitutes a fundamental defect. This failure creates uncertainty as to whether the application was properly instituted by or on behalf of the respondents. The resulting conundrum compels us to adopt, with approval, the reasoning in Hashim Ally Madegello v. Alpha Krust Limited [2023] TZHCLD 1230, where the Court extensively discussed the applicability of section 56(b) of the Labour Institutions Act, Cap. 300, and concluded, rightly, in our view, that a party's representative cannot appoint himself. It is the duty of the party to notify the Court of the representative of his or her choice, and such notice must be signed by the applicant or respondent, 17

not otherwise. We therefore concur with the appellant that the application was filed without valid authority. Echoing the stance, in Edward James Ng'wenge & Others (supra), the Court once again stressed that the provision of Rule 43 (1) of the Labour Court Rules, has been couched in mandatory terms, meaning compliance to it is a must. Mr. Msangi's purported representation was inconsistent with what the provision has provided. On the basis of the foregoing observations, we find the appeal meritorious and allow it to the extent demonstrated above. DATED at ARUSHA this 28th April, 2026. P. S. FIKIRINI JUSTICE OF APPEAL S. M. RUMANYIKA JUSTICE OF APPEAL A. A. ISSA JUSTICE OF APPEAL Judgment delivered this 29th day of April, 2026 in the presence of Mr. Elvaison Maro, learned counsel for the appellant, Ms. Fatuma Amiri via teleconferencing, holding brief for Mr. Haruni Msangi, learned counsel for the respondent and Mr. Nelson Novati, Court Clerk; is hereby certified as a