Shose Sinare vs Stanbic Bank Tanzania Limited & Another (Civil Appeal No. 205 of 2023) [2026] TZCA 409 (14 April 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT PAR ES SALAAM (CORAM: SEHEL. 3.A., MGONYA. J.A. And FELESHI, J.A.) CIVIL APPEAL NO. 205 OF 2023 SHOSE SINARE...,.......................................................................... . APPELLANT VERSUS STANBIC BANK TANZANIA LIMITED ....... .................. ......... 1st RESPONDENT ICBC STANDARD BANK PLC (Formerly STANDARD BANK PLC) .......................................... 2n d RESPONDENT (Appeal from the drawn order of the High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam District Registry, at Dar es Salaam) (Kakolaki. J.1 ) dated 8th day of December, 2022 in Civil Case No. 34 of 2016 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 27th June 2025 & 14th April, 2026 SEHEL, J.A.: This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam (the trial court) in Civil Case No. 34 of 2016 that struck out the appellant's suit for want of pecuniary jurisdiction. We find it apt to point out here that the matter was once dealt by the Court after the trial court had struck it out upon sustaining the second respondent's preliminary objection that there was no cause of action against the second respondent on account that, under the English Law, the second respondent who was immune from any legal proceedings. However, on appeal it was restored and returned to the trial court for continuation of hearing. Briefly, the facts leading to the present appeal are such that: in the year 2011/2012, the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania (the Government) invited proposals from reputable banks to assist her in raising funds through private placement in order to support and meet her key infrastructure requirements. The first and second respondents who were sister companies offered and were mandated to raise a loan note of USD 550 million at a transaction fee of 2.4% of the principal amount. Later, in March, 2013, the Government increased the mandate to USD 600 million. At that time, the appellant was working with the first respondent as a Head of Corporate and Investment Banking but resigned in June, 2013. According to the amended plaint, the appellant was shocked to learn that, in December, 2015, the second respondent made a self- report to the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) admitting that she failed to prevent the first respondent and/or the appellant from committing bribery in the private placement by introducing a third party, to wit, Enterprise Growth Market Advisors Limited (EGMA), a local entity, which increased the placement fee from 1.4% to 2.4% whereby 1% of the said 2.4% of the gross proceeds was paid to the third party. Following the admission, the second respondent avoided prosecution by paying financial penalty and other consequences as per Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) which was approved by the Crown Court at Southwark, UK in the same year in 2015. It is in that respect the appellant filed a suit against the respondents claiming that the self-report was based on misrepresentation and suppression of material facts which tarnished her image and reputation. She further alleged that the respondents illegally and unlawfully condemned her of a serious criminal offence in the self- report without being given a chance to be heard, thus, violating her fundamental right to be heard and caused her to be adversely mentioned in the DPA. As a result, the appellant sought for the following reliefs: a) A declaratory order that a self-report made by the respondents and presented to SFO that the appellant com m itted bribery in the transaction was based on m aterial m isrepresentation. b) A declaratory order that the second respondent procured DPA through m isrepresentation and/or 3 withholding inform ation and/or suppressing m aterial facts. c) A declaratory order that the respondents condemned the appellant o f serious crim inal offence in the self- report ille g a lly and unlaw fully in total breach o f her natural right ■ the rig h t to be heard. d) In the alternative, an order that the respondents caused the appellant to be condemned ille g ally and unlaw fully by being m entioned adversely in the DP A. e) Paym ent o f the sum o f USD 30 m illion as com pensation fo r ruining her banking carrier. f) Costs o f the suit. g) And any re lie f deemed fit to grant. After the first respondent was served with the amended plaint, she filed her amended written statement of defence but retained her previous raised preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court asserting that the matter was a labour dispute. On the part of the second respondent, she also filed her amended written statement of defence and raised three points of law. The first point of law that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear, try and determine the suit was premised on three issues: one, the trial court has no territorial jurisdiction in relation to the suit as the suit is against the provisions of sections 20 and 21 of the Civil Procedure Code (the CPC) because: i) the second respondent does not reside, carry on business, or work for gain in Tanzania and that, the cause of action arose in UK; ii) the appellant failed to obtain leave to sue a non-resident person prior to the institution of the suit; iii) the amended plaint failed to disclose any justifiable cause of action against the second respondent. Two, the plaint contravened the provisions of Order VII rule 1 (i) of the CPC as the subject matter is unascertained and/or unascertainable to enable the trial court to determine the pecuniary jurisdiction. In the alternative, three, the subject matter arose out of or in connection to the appellant's employment thus the suit ought to be instituted before the Labour Court. The second preliminary point was to the effect that the appellant failed to disclose any cause of action against the second respondent. The last point of law was that the claims in the amended plaint are subject to absolute privilege under the English Law as they relate on criminal investigation in the English Crown Court. 5 As intimated earlier, the last objection relating to absolute immunity was the subject of the Civil Appeal No. 89 of 2020 that allowed the appeal and remitted the record to the High Court for continuation of the matter. The trial court continued with the proceedings of the case by considering the remaining preliminary objections. In determining the preliminary objection concerning the subject matter of the suit, the High Court observed from paragraphs 4, 24 and 25 of the amended plaint that the appellant's cause of action originated from the report made to the SFO by the second respondent who had never been an employer of the appellant and none of the reliefs sought fell under the employment remedies. Accordingly, it overruled the objection by holding that, the dispute did not fall under the jurisdiction of a Labour Court. On the objection that the trial court had no territorial jurisdiction, the trial court appreciated the position of the law stated under sections 20 and 21 of the CPC that the suit has to be instituted within the local limits where the wrong was done or where the defendant resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain. Persuaded by the decision of the Indian case in the State Maharshtra v. Sarvodaya Industries [1975] AIR Bom 19, the trial court held that the term 6 'wrong done' should not be given a narrow interpretation but rather it should extend to cover and include not only the place where the wrong was done but also the place where its consequences occurred or felt. It therefore saw nothing wrong for the appellant to sue the respondents in Tanzania where damage of the wrong was felt. Accordingly, the preliminary objection was overruled by the trial court. Nonetheless, the trial court sustained the objection in respect of pecuniary jurisdiction. It observed that, under Order VII rule 1 (f) and (i) of the CPC, the plaintiff was mandatorily required to state facts showing court's jurisdiction and to include particulars of value of the subject matter of the suit for the purposes of determining court's jurisdiction and fees. It took the view that, in determining the court's jurisdiction and fees, the trial court has to consider only the jurisdictional paragraph and that, the appellant's jurisdictional paragraph 27 of the amended plaint did conspicuously show whether the amount claimed of USD 30 million was specific or general damages. It held that failure to specify the exact amount claimed was taken to be general damages which the trial court had no jurisdiction to try it as, in terms of section 40 (2) (b) of the Magistrates Courts' Act, the suit ought to have been filed in the subordinate court. Having found so, as intimated earlier, the trial court struck out the suit with an order of a right to refile, subject to the law of limitation. Dissatisfied with the decision, the appellant filed the present appeal fronting the following three grounds: "1. That, having regard to the appellant's am ended p la in t on record, the learned tria l Judge grossly m isdirected him self in law and fact in holding that to establish pecuniary jurisdiction ; the tria l court needs to consider only paragraph 27 o f the appellant's am ended plaint. 2. That, the learned tria l Judge grossly m isdirected him self in fact and law in naming and treating paragraph 27 o f the appellant's amended p la in t as ju risd iction al paragraph in exclusion o f the other paragraphs in the appellant's am ended p la in t 3. That, having regard to the appellant's am ended plain t in its totality, the learned tria l Judge grossly m isdirected him self in fact and law in holding that the tria l court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the su it 4. That, the learned tria l Judge grossly m isdirected him self in fact and law in striking out the s u it" The second respondent cross appealed and raised the following three grounds of appeal: "1, The learned tria l Judge erred in law and fact in h is holding that the determ ination o f the question o f territorialjurisdiction raises m atters o f fact which requires calling o f evidence while, the second respondent contended that this question is and has to be determ ined as a dear point o f law without looking a t any facts calling fo r evidence. 2. The learned tria l Judge erred in law and fact by wrongly interpreting the term "wrong done" as used in section 17 o f the C ivil Procedure Code (now section 20 o f the CPC). 3. The learned tria l Judge erred in law and fact in refusing to entertain a ll other points o f objection raised by the second respondent when it rightly found that it lacks pecuniary jurisdiction to hear and determ ine the appellant's claim s in the suit . " At the hearing of the appeal, Mr. Sinare Zahran, learned advocate appeared for the appellant, whereas, Captain Audax Kijana Kameja and Mr. Waziri Mchome, both learned advocates, appeared for the first respondent. The second respondent had the legal services of Messrs. Deusdedith Mayomba Duncan and Emanuel Daniel Saghan, also learned advocates. 9 When Mr. Zahran was given a chance to address us on the appeal, he first adopted the written submissions filed to this Court on 23rd June, 2023 whereby the first and second grounds of appeal were conjunctly argued as they centred on the issue as to whether the trial court had pecuniary jurisdiction and the third and fourth grounds of appeal were also argued together, but in the alternative, whether the trial court was correct in striking out the suit. Highlighting on the issue of pecuniary jurisdiction, Mr. Zahran faulted the trial court in holding that it did not have pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the matter before it on account that the sum of money pleaded was not specific but general damages. Referring us to paragraphs 25, 26 and 27 of the amended plaint, he submitted that the appellant specifically pleaded the sum of USD 30 million as compensation for losses suffered, that is, loss of employment earnings and loss of business opportunity. He contended that the claimed amount was so specific and within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the High Court. He further faulted the trial court by considering only one paragraph of the amended plaint in ascertaining the jurisdiction of the court instead of looking at the plaint as a whole. Relying on a passage from Sarkar's Law of Civil Procedure, 8th Edition, Vol. 1 at page 607, 10 he asserted that pleadings were to be read as a whole to ascertain the true import. It was his view that had the trial court considered the plaint as a whole it would have observed that the appellant complied with the provisions of Order VII rule 1 (f) of the CPC. Mr. Zahran went on to submit on the cherished principle of law regarding pecuniary jurisdiction of the court that general damages do not form the basis of determination of the court's pecuniary jurisdiction; only substantive, specific or liquated damages do. Nonetheless, he contended that section 13 of the CPC (now section 16 of the CPC) has been amended through Miscellaneous Amendment Act No. 4 of 2016 by adding a proviso which made the point of law raised by the second respondent redundant. On this, he referred us to the cases of Benitho Thadei Chengula v. Abdulahi Mohamed Ismail [2023] TZCA 17519 and General Manager, African Barrick Gold Mine Limited v. Chacha Kiguha & 5 Others [2024] TZCA 469. Furthermore, Mr. Zahran responded to the first and second respondents' submissions on the need for the appellant to specify each and every claim. Fie argued that if the respondents were in need of such specificity, they were required to request for further and better particulars of the claim in terms of Order VI rule 5 of the CPC but not to raise a preliminary point of law. In the alternative, highlighting on the third and fourth grounds of appeal, Mr. Zahran contended that even if, the trial court was correct in holding that it had no pecuniary jurisdiction, it was not supposed to strike out the case. He contended that it was supposed to transfer the case to the competent court which has jurisdiction to try it but not to strike it out. He referred us to the case of Qamara Kwaslema Gwareh v. Anwary Hassan & 2 Others [2016] TZCA 593 where the Court held that, if the court finds that it lacked pecuniary jurisdiction, the proper course was to return the plaint to be presented to a competent court, as per the provisions of Order VII rule 10 (1) and (2) of the CPC but not to dismiss the suit. In the end, he prayed that the appeal be allowed, and parties be returned to the High Court to continue with the trial with an order for costs as parties had been litigating on the preliminary objections raised by the respondents for the past nine years. In reply, Mr. Duncan adopted the written arguments which the second respondent filed to this Court on 25th July 2023 in opposing the appellant's appeal. 12 Responding to the first and second ground, Mr. Duncan submitted that Order VII rule 1 (f) and (i) of the CPC requires the plaint to provide facts showing the court's jurisdiction and to contain a statement of the value of the subject matter of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction and of court fees. He contended that the amended plaint did not provide the required particulars as the statement of value of the subject matter was stated in general terms without stating as to what does the loss of business entails. He asserted that the appellant had an obligation to provide material facts establishing specific damages but failed to do so. He stressed that the mere claim of USD 30 million without establishing whether it was general or specific damages did not confer the trial court's jurisdiction. To buttress his submission that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try claims for general damages, he referred to the cases of Tanzania Saruji Corporation v. African Marble Company Limited [2004] T.L.R. 155 and Tanzania-China Friendship Textiles Co. Ltd v. Our Lady of the Usambara Sisters [2006] T.L.R. 70 and Mwananchi Communications Limited & 2 Others v. Joshua K. Kajula & 2 Others [2020] TZCA 1961. In that respect, Mr. Duncan supported the findings of the trial court that the claim was general damages. Responding to paragraphs 25, 26 and 27 of the amended plaint and whether the plaint should be read as whole, Mr. Duncan asserted that Order VII rule (1) (f) of the CPC did not impose a duty to the court to travel through the pleadings to see whether it has jurisdiction or not. Such duty is on the plaintiff. He asserted that the reason behind such requirement is to ensure that the court is conferred with the pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit since, pursuant to section 16 of the CPC, a suit is to be instituted at the court of lowest grade competent to try it. He added that even if the trial court would have looked at the entire plaint it would have arrived at the same findings because paragraph 27 of the amended plaint was meant to assert that the court had jurisdiction to try the suit. In other words, he argued it was a jurisdictional paragraph with no more details while paragraph 26 of the amended plaint failed to provide a clear statement on the claimed employment earnings and loss of business. He stressed that the respondents were not seeking for further and better particulars rather for a clear statement in the pleadings as the law requires. Responding to the amendment effected on section 16 of the CPC, he argued that the amendment does not apply retrospectively as the suit was filed prior to the amendment. He added that the said section 14 could have been relevant if the amount claimed was lower than the peculiar jurisdiction which was not the case in the present appeal. In that respect, he asserted that the cited cases of Benitho Thadei Chengula v. Abdulahi Mohamed (supra) and General Manager, African Barrick Gold Mine Limited v. Chacha Kiguha & 5 Others (supra) were referred out of context. On the third and fourth grounds of appeal, relying on the authority in the case of Commissioner General, Tanzania Revenue Authority & Another v. Milambo Limited [2022] TZCA 348 that jurisdiction of a court is a creature of statute and that no court should try a matter without satisfying itself with its jurisdiction, Mr. Duncan submitted that the trial court was correct in striking out the appellant's suit for the appellant to file it in a competent court, subject to the law of limitation. On his part, Mr. Kameja adopted the written submission filed on 24th July, 2023 and joined hands with the submission of the learned counsel for the second respondent that the appellant failed to comply with Order VII rule (1) (f) and (i) of the CPC. He asserted that paragraph 27 of the amended plaint was meant to show that the trial court had jurisdiction to try the suit while there was no statement 15 showing the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction and for assessment of the filing fees. He stressed that, in the entire amended plaint only paragraphs 25 and 26 attempted to show pecuniary jurisdiction but in general terms without providing details as what constitutes loss of employment and loss of business opportunity. He stressed that the fact that the total amount was stated did not make the claim special damages as it has to be specifically claimed and proved in terms of the amount of lost salaries allowances and/or bonuses. In that respect, he supported the decision of the High Court and prayed for the appeal to be dismissed with costs for failure to lay down enough foundation for specific damages. Re-joining to the submissions by the learned counsel of the respondents, Mr. Zahran reiterated his earlier submission that the amount claimed was specific claim and that, section 16 of the CPC applies retrospectively as it was in the cases of Benitho Thadei Chengula v. Abdulahi Mohamed (supra) and General Manager, African Barrick Gold Mine Limited v. Chacha Kiguha & 5 Others (supra) which fall in all fours on the facts in the present appeal. Having heard the parties' submission, we have duly examined the record and the grounds of appeal and noted that two issues stem for 16 our determination. One, whether the amended plaint of the appellant established the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial court and two, whether the trial court was correct in striking out the appellant's suit. We shall start with the first issue. Section 25 of the CPC provides that: "Every su it sh all be instituted by the presentation o f a p lain t or in such other m anner as may be prescribed." Further, Order VII rule 1 of the CPC detailed the contents of the plaint that it shall contain: "a) the name o f the court in which the su it is brought; b) the name , description and place o f residence o f the p la in tiff including em ail address, fax number, telephone number and post code, if available; c) the name, description and place o f residence o f the defendant including em ail address, fax number, telephone num ber and post code, if available, so far as they can be ascertained; 17 d) where the p la in tiff or the defendant is a m inor or a person o f unsound mind, a statem ent to that effect; e) the facts constituting the cause o f action and when it arose; f) the facts showing that the court has jurisdiction; g) the re lie f which the p la in tiff claim s; h) where the p la in tiff has allow ed a se t-o ff or relinquished a portion o f his claim , the am ount so allow ed or relinquished; and i) a statem ent o f the value o f the subject m atter o f the su it for the purpose o f jurisdiction and o f court fees." The above rule has to be read in conjunction with Order VI rule 3 of the CPC which sets out the basic and cardinal rule of pleadings and declares that the pleading has to state material facts and not the evidence. It mandates that every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved. 18 In the appeal before us, the respondents contended that the appellant failed to show and state in paragraph 27 of the amended plaint the trial court's jurisdiction. The said paragraph was couched as follows: "The cause o f action arose in Dar es Salaam City in the year 2013. A s to jurisdiction, the first defendant is registered and carries on business within the United Republic o f Tanzania; its head office is situated in Dar es Salaam City, while the second defendant is registered in the United Kingdom , but carries out business a ll over the world. The p la in tiff resides in Dar es Salaam City and is a citizen o f Tanzania and during her em ploym ent with the first defendant worked in D ar es Salaam City. The cla im so u g h t is fo r d e cla ra to ry o rd e rs an d fo r p aym e n t o f USD 3 0 m illio n , w e ll o v e r TZS. 1 0 0 m illio n a n d th e re fo re w e ll w ith in th e ju ris d ic tio n o f th is H o n o u rab le Coi/rf. "[Emphasis added] Having noticed that paragraph 27 of the amended plaint only mentioned USD 30 million with no specificity, the trial court considered the claimed amount was general damages, thus proceeded to strike out the appellant's suit on account that it had no jurisdiction to try it. For 19 ease of reference, we reproduce part of the trial court's judgment as hereunder: "In the present m atter as alluded to above, the [appellant] who was duty bound to provide and specify the pecuniary damages or value fo r the purpose o f jurisdiction o f the court, in p arag rap h 2 7 d id n o t so sta te w h eth er the cia im e d USD 3 0 m iiiio n is s p e c ific dam ages o r com pen sation to en ab le th is co u rt to ap p reciate , co n sid e r a n d d eterm in e its p e cu n ia ry ju ris d ic tio n a n d fe e s as per the m andatory provisions o f Order VII rule 1 (f) and (i) o f the CPC..., Since the [appellant] herein failed to discharge his noble duty o f highlighting the specific claim for the purposes o f determ ination o f jurisdiction fo r sta tin g u n sp e cifie d n a tu re o f cla im s co n stru e d to b e g e n e ra l dam ages > th is co u rt fin d s a n d an sw e rs in a ffirm a tiv e the raised issue in the second lim b to the first p oint o f objection by the second [respondent] in th at, th is co u rt h as no ju ris d ic tio n to e n te rta in th is s u it a s u n d e r th e circu m sta n ce s th e s u it o u g h t to be e n te rta in e d b y th e su b o rd in a te co u rt..." [Emphasis added] 20 It would appear from the above extract, the trial court looked at paragraph 27 of the amended plaint to see whether it had jurisdiction or not. It did not consider other paragraphs of the amended plaint, such as paragraphs 25 and 26, where the appellant provided in a concise form on the claimed amount that, it is comprised of a loss of business opportunity at the tune of USD 24 million and a loss of employment earnings at the tune of USD 6 million. It is settled law that, in construing a plaint or a pleading, the court must have regard to all relevant allegations in it to ascertain its true import and purpose. We believe that had the trial court looked into all the relevant allegations in the amended plaint, it would have noticed that the claim of USD 30 million was comprised of loss of business and loss of earnings. Given the circumstances of the present appeal where the appellant pleaded the type of loss suffered, we are of the strong view that the cases of Tanzania Saruji Corporation v. African Marble Company Limited (supra), Tanzania-China Friendship Textiles Co. Ltd v. Our Lady of the Usambara Sisters (supra) and Mwananchi Communications Limited & 2 Others v. Joshua K. Kajula & 2 Others (supra), were cited to us out of context. 21 Besides, even if the amount claimed was general damages, with the coming into force of the Miscellaneous Amendment Act No. 4 of 2016 that amended section 16 of the CPC, the mischief by the appellant of filing the suit before the High Court instead of the lowest court no longer vitiates the proceedings. We stated this position of the law in the case of Benitho Thadei Chengula v. Abdulahi Mohamed Ismail (supra), which is similar to the circumstances of the appeal at hand, that: "...it is our considered view that the error o f instituting it in the High Court instead o f the D istrict Court did not occasion a m iscarriage o f ju stice as it did not prejudice any o f the parties. Besides, since section 13 o f the CPC was am ended two years iater by A ct No. 4 o f 2016 by adding a proviso whose effect is to render the present objection regarding jurisdiction to be redundant, we sh all not uphold the [objection]". In the same vein, we find that the objection raised by the respondents is overtaken by events. Accordingly, we allow the first and second grounds of appeal. 22 Since the first and second grounds of appeal are meritorious, the third and fourth grounds which were argued in the alternative died natural death. We shall therefore not deliberate on them. We now turn to the cross appeal. Mr Duncan fully adopted the second respondent's notice of cross appeal as well as the written submissions in support of the cross appeal. He combined the first and second grounds of appeal and submitted that sections 20 & 21 of the CPC dictate that suits must be filed in a court where, within the local geographical limits, the wrong was done or where the defendant resides, carries on business, or personally works for gain. He argued that, in the present appeal, the trial court extraneously extended the meaning of wrong done to the felt principle instead of looking at where the wrong took place. Elaborating, he argued that the second defendant neither reside, nor carried on business nor personally worked for gain in Tanzania despite the allegation by the appellant that she carried out her business all over the world. He further argued that, if there was any cause of action, the same arose in the United Kingdom where the initiation of wrong came from DPA which was negotiated, signed and executed in London; there was no term under DPA that it was to be performed in Tanzania. The 23 deal was done in the UK and concluded there. As such, he argued, its performance cannot be felt in Tanzania for the trial court to have territorial jurisdiction. Mr. Duncan faulted the trial court in adopting the Indian case which, he argued, was not applicable in the facts surrounding the appeal at hand. He argued that, in the case of State Maharshtra v. Sarvodaya Industries (supra) the plaintiff's business in Akola was affected by an action of the second defendant in Bhandara while, in the appeal at hand, all actions and transactions were done and concluded in the United Kingdom. He asserted that the prevailing law required the appellant to seek leave to sue the second respondent who was non resident and that the second respondent did not acquiesce in the institution of the suit. Submitting on the third ground of appeal, Mr. Duncan was very brief that since the trial court failed to determine the remaining preliminary points of law, he invited the Court to invoke its power conferred under section 6 (2) of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act (the AJA) and proceed to determine the 3rd and 4th preliminary points of law. In the end, Mr. Duncan implored us to allow the cross appeal and dismiss the appellant's appeal with costs. 24 On the part of the first respondent, Captain Kameja took no part in the cross appeal. As such, he had nothing to reply. On his part, Mr. Zahran argued that the issue of territorial jurisdiction need evidence to establish on whether the second respondent do business in Tanzania or not. In that regard, he argued that the objection was not based on a pure point of law, thus, do not qualify to be termed as a preliminary point of law. He added that, according to the appellant's amended plaint, the dispute was not on deferred prosecution rather on the self-made report by the second appellant and sent to SFO which tarnished the appellant's image and reputation. It was Mr. Zahran's assertion that section 20 of the CPC is parim ateria with section 19 of the Indian CPC. Therefore, the case of State Maharshtra v. Sarvodaya Industries (supra) was highly persuasive and correctly applied by the trial court, to fortify his stance, he further referred us to Mulla, Code of Civil Procedure at page 396 where the author discussed section 19 of the Indian CPC and gave the following illustration that: A, residing in Delhi, publishes in Calcuta statements defamatory of B. B may sue A either in Calcuta or Delhi. Mr. Zahran was of the view that such circumstance squarely applies in the present appeal. 25 Responding to the third ground of appeal, Mr. Zahran was brief that the power of the Court is to determine appeals arising from the decision of the High Court or subordinate courts with extended jurisdiction. In that respect, he argued that the Court cannot deliberate on the 3rd and 4th grounds which were not canvassed by the High Court. He added that it was not a novel thing for a trial court to leave some of the issues unattended after being satisfied that the decided ones disposed of the entire case. On the invitation to invoke the revisional powers of the Court, Mr. Zahran argued that the revisional powers of the Court is exercised in an exceptional circumstance whereas, in the present appeal, there was no such exceptional circumstance. Mr. Duncan re-joined that the appellant only alleged that the second respondent was doing business all over the world but did not explicitly state that she has a place of business in Tanzania. He asserted that the second respondent has no place of business in Tanzania therefore she cannot be sued in Tanzania. He stressed that the appellant was suing on the basis of the representation made to the SFO in the UK and that none of the acts took place in Tanzania. Having heard the contending submissions, we wish to start with the argument that the issue of territorial jurisdiction does not qualify to be a point of law. For a start, we wish to dear up as to what constitutes a preliminary objection. In the landmark case of Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co Ltd v. West End Distributors Ltd [1969] E.A. 696, the erstwhile Court of Appeal for East Africa defined a preliminary objection that: "A prelim inary objection is in the nature o f what used to be a demurrer. It raises a pure point o f law which is argued on the assum ption that a ll the facts pleaded by the other side are correct. I t ca n n o t b e ra ise d i f a n y fa c t h a s to b e a sce rta in e d or what is the exercise o f ju d icia l discretion / ' [Emphasis added]. In this appeal, the appellant averred in paragraph 27 of the amended plaint that the second respondent carried on business all over the world while Mr. Duncan asserted that the appellant failed to establish such an assertion and also failed to show that the second respondent carried on business in Tanzania. Since the dispute was on ascertainment of facts, that is, on the where the second respondent carried her business, we find nothing to fault the findings of the trial 27 court that the objection did not qualify to be termed as a preliminary objection in terms of the holding in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co Ltd v. West End Distributors Ltd (supra). Therefore, we do not find merit on the first ground of the cross appeal. On the second ground, the second respondent complained that the trial court wrongly interpreted the term " wrong dond’ as contained in section 20 of the CPC which provides: "Where a su it is for com pensation fo r w rong done to the person or to m ovable property, if the wrong was done within the local lim its o f the jurisdiction o f one court and the defendant resides, or carries on business, or personally works fo r gain, within the local lim its o f the jurisdiction o f another court, the su it m ay be instituted a t the option o f the p la in tiff in either o f the said courts". [Emphasis added] In interpreting the above provision of the law, the trial court was persuaded by the decision of the High Court of Bombay in the case of State Maharshtra v. Sarvodaya Industries (supra) which extended the meaning of the words "wrong dond' to include the place where its consequences were felt. On our part, we entirely concur with the findings of the trial court. Here, we wish to associate ourselves with the 28 reasoning stated by the High Court of Bombay in the case of State Maharshtra v. Sarvodaya Industries (supra) that: "Provisions o f section 19 are specific in subject and dear in its operation. F ir s t ly it governs a su it seeking restitutive reliefs o f com pensation on the basis o f wrong done to the person or to m ovable property. S eco n d ly , it offers and furnishes option or choice if the conditions indicated by the qualifying clause are satisfied in that wrong com plained o f was done within the lo cal lim it o f one Court while the defendant in fact resides or carries on business within the lo cal lim its o fjurisdiction o f another court. Unless both these conditions together are available no question o f option or choice for forum can conceivably, arise. The co n ju n ctio n "a n d " in th e q u a lify in g cla u se is ve ry m uch in d ic a tiv e o f th is re su lt, le a v in g a sid e the ca se s w here th ese co n d itio n s to g e th e r a re n o t a v a ila b le , th e m atters, o f su ch s u it a re s t ill g o ve rn e d b y o th e r p ro v isio n s o f th e Code. It is noticeable that in the body o f Section 19 the phrase "the cause o f action, w holly or in p a rt" has not been used and it only finds place in Section 20 o f the Code. .... In a su it fo r com pensation "wrong done" "or" "com plained o f" is the cause o f action by which Code understands 29 and contem plates a ll the bundle o f necessary facts capable on p ro of o f sustaining the re lie f claim ed. Compensation clearly posits an injury resulting in loss and damage. Mere injury or wrong w ithout anything more would not suffice to sustain the claim fo r compensation. It is dear that the phrase "wrong d o n e"is not used in any narrow sense but has to be understood in a ll its am plitude so as to afford forum and necessary relief. That clearly takes in both cause and effect. Injury or actual wrong m ay occur a t place A but its effect m ay be fe lt a t places other than A 'a n d may effect places 'B ' or 'C ' act or actions taking place a t a given place m ay s till give rise a t places quite different and a t a ll these places and for a ll those effects, cause would arise seeking com pensation. W ith o u t re s u lta n t lo s s o r its p ro o f re s titu tiv e ju s tic e m ay n o t a ffo rd a n y r e lie f n o r th ere co u ld be a n y rem edy in vacuum . Thus, th e p h ra se o lo g y u sed b y S e ctio n 1 9 a b o u t "the w rong d o n e " w o u ld c le a rly ta ke in n o t o n ly th e in itia l a ctio n co m p la in e d on b u t its re s u lt an effect". [Emphasis added] Given the above reasoning, we find nothing to fault the trial court on its holding that the term " wrong dond’ should be given wider 30 interpretation to cover all actions for the purposes of restitutive justice to the injured plaintiff and when it is pleaded, the same can only be disproved by evidence. Accordingly, we dismiss the second grounds of the cross appeal. The third ground should not detain us much because, as rightly submitted by Mr. Zahran, once the court finds that an issue disposes of the entire matter, it has no obligation to determine other issues as they will just be for academic purposes. Besides, in terms of section 6 (1) of the AJA, the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is to hear and determine appeals from the High Court and from subordinate courts with extended jurisdiction. Given the peculiar circumstances of the appeal before us where the trial court found that there was no need to determine the remaining points of law, the Court cannot step into the shoes of the lower court and assume a duty of resolving the controversy between the parties which was found to be of academic purpose. Accordingly, we do not find merit on this ground of appeal. In the event, we find the appeal is meritorious but the cross appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we set aside the ruling of the High Court and remit the record in respect of Civil Appeal No. 34 of 2016 to the High Court for continuation of the case, in accordance to law. However, we dismiss the cross appeal with costs. It is ordered accordingly. DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 10th day of April, 2026. B. M. A. SEHEL JUSTICE OF APPEAL L. E. MGONYA JUSTICE OF APPEAL E. M. FELESHI JUSTICE OF APPEAL Judgment delivered virtually this 14th day of April, 2026 in the presence of Mr. Sinare Zaharan, learned counsel for the Appellant, Mr. Albert Kameja, learned counsel for the 1st Respondent, Mr. Emmanuel Saghan, learned counsel for the 2n d Respondent and Ms. Christina Mwanandenje, Court Clerk is hereby certified as a true copy of the original.