Simbanet Tanzania Limited vs Commissioner General Tanzania Revenue Authority (Civil Appeal No. 196 of 2025) [2026] TZCA 372 (27 March 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT MWANZA fCORAM: SEHEL J.A., ISSA. 3.A. And ISMAIL J.A.^ CIVIL APPEAL NO. 196 OF 2025 SIMBANET TANZANIA LIMITED ............... .............................APPELLANT VERSUS THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL TANZANIA REVENUE AUTHORITY ............................ ..........RESPONDENT (Appeal from the judgment of the Tax revenue Appeals Tribunal at Dar es Salaam) (Naimilanaa, Vice Chairperson^ dated the 15th day of April, 2024 in Tax Appeal No. 123 of 2024 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 5th December, 2025 & 2?h March, 2026 ISMAIL. 3.A.: This appeal traces its origin from the 2020's decision by the Commissioner Genera!, the respondent, to carry out a tax audit of the appellant's affairs for the years of income of 2016 and 2017. The appellant's line of business entails provision of data communication and internet services in Tanzania. The audit findings came out on 30th January, 2020, and the conclusion drawn by the respondent was that the appellant had underpaid Withholding Tax (WHT) levied on services rendered to both residents and i non-residents. Believing that the findings were erroneous, the appellant provided clarifications which were backed by documentary evidence to support her case. These clarifications did little or nothing to convince the respondent who went ahead and issued two tax assessments that required the appellant to make good the underpaid tax. This decision did not sit well with the appellant and, as a result, she filed notices of objection. Her contention was that the imposition of WHT was erroneous and incorrect. Her areas of concern were: commission payments; maintenance costs; and incorrect application of 15% WHT rate on equipment and installation costs. The appellant's submission did not find any purchase as the respondent went ahead and issued a final determination of the objection. Irked by the respondent's decision, the appellant filed an appeal to the Tax Revenue Appeals Board (TRAB) where she registered a partial success as some of her claims were rejected. This triggered yet another appeal to the Tax Revenue Appeal Tribunal (TRAT) the latter of which upheld the findings of the TRAB. A culmination of all this was the institution of the instant appeal. Five grounds of appeal have been raised by the appellant. Their substance is as reproduced hereunder: 1. That, the Tax Revenue Appeal Tribunal erred in law by finding that the respondent was correct for charging Withholding tax on local equipment and installation costs at the rate o f 15%. 2. That, the Tax Revenue Appeal Tribunal erred in law by misapplying the provision o f law under section 18 (2) o f the Tax Revenue Appeals Act, Cap. 408. i 3. That, the Tax Revenue Appeal Tribunal erred in law by finding that the respondent was correct in imposing Withholding tax on the maintenance costs incurred by the appellant for the years o f income 2016 and 2017. 4. That, the Tax Revenue Appeal Tribunal erred in iaw by finding that the respondent was correct in iaw to demand payment o f Withholding tax and interest for the years 2016 - 2017. 5. That, the Tax Revenue Appeal Tribunal erred in iaw by failing to consider the appellant's evidence before the Tax Revenue Appeals Board in arriving [at] its judgment Hearing of the appeal pitted Mr. Nasri Hassan and Ms. Lucy Kiangi, both learned advocates, against Messrs. Yohana Ndila, Taragwa Nyang'anyi and Eiinihaki Kabura, all learned State Attorneys. Before hearing of the appeal got underway, we called upon the counsel to address us on the compliance of the appeal with the provisions of section 26 (2) of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act (TRAA). Mr. Hassan, who addressed us first, was emphatically of the contention that the grounds of appeal are all, save for ground four which he abandoned, in conformity with the requirements of section 26 (2) of the TRAA and as were expounded in the case of Serengeti Breweries Limited v. The Commissioner General Tanzania Revenue Authority [2025] TZCA 685. Revisiting each and every ground of appeal, Mr. Hassan argued that, in ground one the appellant's contention is that TRAB and TRAT failed to hold that section 83 of the TRAA (now section 84) had been complied with. Instead, it upheld the imposition of 15% that is applicable to non-residents while the appropriate rate for residents was 5%. Regarding grounds two and three, the argument by Mr. Hassan is that, the appellant provided a clear justification through adduction of evidence. In his view, the conditions set out in Insignia Limited v. Commissioner General Tanzania Revenue Authority [2011] TZCA 246 had been met. In so doing, the appellant complied with section 18 (2) (now section 19 (2) of the TRAA and that, these grounds of appeal 4 are intended to take an exception to TRAT's misapplication of the said provisions. With respect to ground five, the argument by Mr. Hassan is that, that too, was a point of law that fell within the powers of the Court in terms of section 26 (2) of the TRAA. He contended that the point of law that it carries is in the mould of the points of law stated in the case of Serengeti Breweries Limited(supra). Mr. Hassan beseeched us to consider these grounds as complaints on pure points of law against which an appeal to this Court may lie. He urged us to spare them from possible crossing-off. Mr. Ndila's reply submission was diametrically opposed to his counterpart's contention. He was of the contention that, none of the grounds raise a pure question of law to qualify for consideration by this Court. Addressing us on ground one of the appeal, Mr. Ndiia referred us to pages 940 and 941 of the record of appeal which constitutes the respondent's determination of the dispute. He also referred us to page 961. The learned counsel argued that the culmination of all this was the TRAT's finding at page 1102. In his contention, this finding rested the matter and it could not be open to any appeal to this Court. He fortified his contention by referring us to two decisions of the Court. These are: Atlas Copco Tanzania Limited v. Commissioner General, Tanzania Revenue Authority [2020] TZCA 317 and Serengeti Breweries Limited (supra) in which it was held that complaints to this Court must be on questions of law only. In his contention, determination of this ground of appeal cannot be done without reviewing facts adduced by the parties. Mr. Ndila distinguished the decision in Insignia Limited (supra) from the instant case, arguing that, in that case, the Commissioner General seized the evidence and that the same was in his hands at the time the matter was being litigated upon. With regard to grounds two and three of the appeal, the argument by Mr. Ndila is that, at page 959, the TRAB reasoned that no evidence was adduced to disprove the findings made by the respondent. He argued that this point was taken on an appeal to the TRAT and the latter's determination was to uphold the TRAB's findings. These findings, he contended, are reflected at page 1098 and that, the stance taken by the TRAT was that not enough evidence was adduced to be able to discharge the burden of proof under section 18 (2) (now section 19 (2) of the TRAA. 6 With respect to ground five, the respondent's argument is that this, as well, is a matter of fact. It decries the TRAT's failure to consider evidence. In Mr, Ndila's contention, this is purely a point of fact over which the Court has no powers to determine. He urged us to strike out the appeal with costs. Having carefully heard the parties' rival submissions, our duty is to assess the arguments, the law and the record of appeal, and resolve if the instant appeal is tenable. None of the counsel has any qualms about what this Court can do and what it cannot do when it comes to appeals that arise from decisions of the TRAT. They both appreciate that only appeals whose complaint fits in the description of the law are permissible for appeal to this Court. The law in reference here is section 26 (2) of the TRAA. For ease of reference, we feel apt to reproduce the substance of section 26 (2), as follows: "Appeal to the Court o fAppeal shall He on matters Involving questions o f law only, and the provisions o f the Appellate Jurisdiction Act and the rules made thereunder, shall apply mutatis mutandis to appeals from the decision o f the Tribunal." We need to point, outrightly, that, the dear import of section 26 (2) is that, if the impugned finding is on a matter of fact, then its final port of call is the TRAT, and that this Court flouts its jurisdictional bounds if it entertains grounds of appeal that raise factual complaints. Only questions of law are in the remit of the Court and numerous decisions of this Court have accentuated this settled principle. As to what constitutes matters of law, Black's Law Dictionary, 8th edition, 2008, has given the following description at page 1000: "A matter involving a judicial inquiry into the applicable iaw." A more elaborate interpretation of what matters of law are was restated in Serengeti Breweries Limited (supra) in which we held as follows: "Presently, this Court has interpreted matters o f law referred to at the above section as; one, issues o f interpretation of the Constitution o f the United Republic o f Tanzania (the Constitution), the laws o f Tanzania or relevant legal doctrines, two, the manner the Tribunal applies a relevant provision o f the Constitution, or of the statute or relevant legal doctrine, and; three, a question on a decision reached consequent to a complete failure to consider evidence, or its complete misconception culminating into a plain and dear failure o fjustice." 8 Crucially, therefore, if the ground under consideration raises a question which does not touch on construction or application of a constitutional or statutory provision, or misapprehension of evidence, such as failure to consider the evidence or if the Tribunal considered extraneous matters which are not supported by evidence, then such ground is not a point of law. In such a case, the Court must consider that as a 'no-go territory' -see: Atlas Copco Tanzania Limited (supra). Looking at the grounds of appeal, we cannot help but subscribe to the contention raised by Mr. Ndila that these are all complaints on factual determination made by the TRAT. They question TRATs decision to attach little or no weight to the many pieces of evidence that were adduced in order to prove that the burden of proof under section 19 (2) of the TRAA was discharged. Mr. Ndila pointed out, painstakingly, areas where issues raised by the appellant were attended to and the responses that the TRAB and TRAT gave. In our considered view, they all pointed to the fact that the respondent's factual analysis that concluded that 15% was chargeable as WHT for services rendered was correct and that the evidence submitted was not sufficient to tilt the decision in the appellant's favour. Thus, while it is within the appellant's right to hold a disgruntlement against what he considers to be an erroneous treatment of the evidence that he tendered in the course of prosecuting his complaint, we are constrained to hold that such finding of fact is a determination that binds this Court and any attempt to appeal against is nothing but a futile exercise that offends section 26 (2) of the TRAA. On this, we wish to reiterate our position we stated in Bulyanhulu Gold Mine Limited v. Commissioner General, Tanzania Revenue Authority, Consolidated Civil Appeals No. 89 and 90 of 2015 [2016] TZCA 571, quoted in Atlas Copco Tanzania Limited (supra) that: 'We agree with the Tribunal that this was a question o f fact in terms o f section [18] (2) (b) o f the Tax Revenue Appeals Act, the burden o fproof was on the appellant to prove that the said equipment was used wholly and exclusively for purposes o f mining operations. In the finding of the Tribunal, the appellant had failed to discharge the burden. This being a question of fact it ends there. This is so, because under section 25 (2) o f the Tax Revenue Appeals Act (CAP 408 RE 2002) appeals to this Court lie only on matters involving questions of law. So, we find that the fifth ground is devoid o f substance and we dismiss i t " [Emphasis is added] 10 We entertain no doubt that, the entirety of what constitutes grounds of appeal which we have held as mere factual complaints have failed the test of admissible grounds under section 26 (2) of the TRAA in respect of which this Court can lay its hands on. In consequence, we find the appeal incompetent and proceed to strike out the appeal with costs. DATED at DODOMA this 2n d day of February, 2026. B. M. A. SEHEL JUSTICE OF APPEAL A. A. ISSA JUSTICE OF APPEAL M. K. ISMAIL JUSTICE OF APPEAL Judgment delivered this 27th day of March, 2026 in the presence of Ms. Lucy Kiangi, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Yohana Ndila, learned State Attorney for the respondent via virtual Court, and Mr. Nelson Novati, Court Clerk, is hereby certified as a true copy of the original. li