Lonie Lionel Rayford vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 501 of 2023) [2026] TZCA 277 (10 March 2026)

ZN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT PAR ES SALAAM ( CORAM: MWARI3A, 3.A.. KENTE, 3.A. And MURUKE, 3.A.) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 501 OF 2023 LONIE LIONEL RAYFORD................................................................. APPELLANT VERSUS THE REPUBLIC ......... ............................ .......................................RESPONDENT (Appeal from the 3udgment of the High Court of Tanzania, Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Division at Dar es Salaam) (Isava, 3/) Dated the 26thday of May, 2023 in Economic Case No. 17 of 2021 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 12th February & 10th March, 2026 KENTE, J.A.: The appellant appeared before the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Division of the High Court of Tanzania (the trial court), where he was charged and convicted of one count of unlawful trafficking in narcotic drugs, contrary to section 15 (1) (a) of the Drugs Control and Enforcement Act, Chapter 95 of the Revised Laws (the DCEA), read together with paragraph 23 of the First Schedule to, and sections 57 (1) and 60 (2) of the Economic and Organised Crimes Control Act, Chapter 200 of the Revised Laws (the EOCCA). It was alleged that, on 4th July 2018 at Julius Nyerere International Airport in the Ilala District of Dar es i Salaam Region of the United Republic of Tanzania, the appellant was found while trafficking in narcotic drugs namely, Heroin Hydrochloride weighing 2.188 kilograms. After hearing ten prosecution witnesses and the appellant who was a sole witness to his case, the learned trial Judge in a judgment delivered on 26th May 2023, was satisfied that going by the totality of the evidence before him, the prosecution had proved the case against the appellant to the required standard. He thus proceeded to convict him and subsequently sentenced him to the mandatory twenty years imprisonment. Discomposed by the decision of the trial court, the appellant has now taken up the cudgels seeking to assail the said decision on several grounds both procedural and substantive. However, in view of what will soon become apparent in this judgment, we will neither reproduce nor paraphrase all the grounds impugning the decision of the trial court. Suffice it to say that as we see it, the most dispositive issue of this appeal gyrates around the general complaint by the appellant that, because of the defects in the consent issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions pursuant to section 26 (1) of the EOCCA authorising and initiating his prosecution which was a prerequisite before the trial could proceed, the trial court acted without jurisdiction as to render the proceedings and subsequent judgment a nullity. The above is in essence what we raised suo motu and asked the learned counsel appearing for the parties in this matter to address us, bearing in mind that, in any court proceedings, jurisdiction is a fundamental legal principle that dictates a court's power to hear and determine cases. Briefly stated, the evidence before the trial court was that, on 4th July 2018, officers from the Tanzania Police Force and the Drugs Enforcement Commission, received information that the appellant was dealing in drugs and that, as part of a broader pattern, he was intending to travel from Tanzania to the USA via Julius Nyerere International Airport. Relying on that information, the said officers set out for the appellant's intended point of exit at Julius Nyerere International Airport where they managed to arrest him and impound his two bags. A search conducted in one of the said bags is said to have revealed prepacks of the drugs that are subject of the present appeal. Moreover, it was the prosecution case that, during interrogation, the appellant confessed trafficking in drugs and the allegation that the seized items were his. 3 Forensic analysis of the said items confirmed that they were Heroin Hydrochloride weighing 2.188 kilograms. However, in his defence, the appellant denied the evidence ied in support of the prosecution case. Specifically, he denied admitting that the drugs found by the Police Officers were his and being found with any drugs in his luggage or on his person. After hearing the parties, the trial Judge considered the rival evidence regarding the general question as to whether or not on the material day, the appellant was found trafficking in narcotic drugs. He accepted the evidence of the prosecution witnesses who said that, after the appellant's two bags were impounded and a search conducted, one of the said bags revealed the presence of the drugs subject of this appeal. The trial Judge also found that, the appellant had signed a certificate of seizure acknowledging not only that the items seized from him were drugs but also that they were his and that, he was in the course of trafficking them from Dar es Salaam Tanzania to Bologna, Italy. To that end, the trial court went on convicting and sentencing him accordingly. As stated earlier, in the appeal before us, the appellant who was represented by Mr. Josephat Mabula learned Advocate, has canvassed several grounds of appeal save for one ground which faults the trial court for trying and convicting the appellant of an economic offence without the requisite jurisdiction a ground which the learned counsel curiously decided to abandon before presentation of substantive arguments. However, from the very beginning, we drew the attention of Ms. Edith Mauya learned Senior State Attorney who was assisted by Ms. Eva Kassa and Mr. Erick Kamala, both learned State Attorneys representing the respondent, to the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (the DPP) appearing on page five of the record of appeal. What we sought to drive home, is the fact that the consent shows that the DPP had consented to the prosecution of the appellant for contravention of the provisions of Paragraph 23 of the First Schedule to the EOCCA as amended without specifically making reference to section 15 (1) (a) which is the specific law allegedly violated by the appellant. When it truly dawned on the learned Senior State Attorney who had initially intimated to us that she was supporting the appellant's conviction and sentence and therefore, vociferously opposed to the appeal, she reneged on her position and subsequently submitted that, indeed the trial court had acted without the requisite jurisdiction. Perhaps inadvertently, she went on entreating us to order for retrial without addressing us on the fate of the proceedings and decision made by the trial court in the first place. 5 In pressing for a retrial order to be made, the learned Senior State Attorney relied on our earlier decision in the case of Silvanus Maneno Mkasanya @ Kelvin and Another v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No 347 of 2023 in which, for the same reason, after nullifying the proceedings and quashing the appellants' conviction and sentence, we went on ordering a retrial as we thought, in that particular case, the interests of justice required a trial. In support of her position, the learned Senior State Attorney argued that this appeal was on all fours with Silvanus Maneno Mkasanga (supra). We were also referred to the principles governing whether or not a retrial should be ordered in line with the decision of the now defunct Court of Appeal of East Africa which is a predecessor of this Court in the cerebrated case of Fatehali Manji v. Republic [1966] E.A. 343. It was the learned Senior State Attorney's position that, since the appellant in the present matter was charged with a serious offence, an order for retrial would be in the interest of justice. For his part, Mr. Mabula submitted on the contrary that, an order for retrial would not be in the interest of justice in this case. The learned counsel took his argument further by contending that, in the most likely event, ordering retrial would, all in all, risk untold injustice on the part of the appellant. Such an order, he argued, was likely to give an opportunity to the prosecution to fill in the gaps in its case. For this reason, the learned counsel implored us to nullify the proceedings of the trial court, quash the appellant's conviction and set aside the custodial sentence meted out on him. We were further urged to order for the appellant's immediate release from jail without conditions. In our determination of this appeal, we have considered the record of appeal together with the arguments from either side. The learned Senior State Attorney has been magnanimous and conceded that, in so far as the consent by the DPP initiating the appellant's prosecution did not make reference to section 15 (1) (a) of the DCEA which creates the offence with which the appellant stood charged, it did not vest any jurisdiction in the trial court to adjudicate the matter. The learned Senior State Attorney went on to confirm that, as such, the trial court had acted without the requisite jurisdiction and that procedural anomally vitiated both the proceedings and the resulting judgment. Without hesitation, we agree with the appellant's complaint and the concession by the learned Senior State Attorney. Indeed, the trial court was not clothed with the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter as the consent issued by the DPP authorising the appellant's prosecution omitted to cite the provisions of the law allegedly violated by the appellant. Dealing with a similar situation in the case of Leonard Malacha Rhobi v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 302 of 2022, in which we had to determine the same issue, we guided that, the consent of the DPP must be given in respect of the provisions in the information and it ought to make reference to the offence charged or else it becomes useless rendering the trial court without jurisdiction to try the offence for want of consent. Similarly, in the case of Silvanus Mkasanga (supra), to which we were ably referred by Ms. Mauya, we observed that, the omission to mention in the consent the specific provisions of section 15 (1) (a), (c) and 3 (1) of the DCEA which created the offence, vitiated the proceedings and the resulting judgment as the case was tried without the requisite consent. Bearing in mind what we have said about what was, at the time, the position of the law on any case of the present nature which we are inclined to follow, our decision on this point is that indeed the lower court went on trying the appellant who was charged with an economic offence without the consent by the DPP. Due to this, the entire proceedings and the resulting judgment were vitiated. In the ultimate event, we allow the appeal, and consequently, pursuant to section 4 (2) of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, Chapter 141 of the Revised Laws, we nullify the proceeding of the trial court in Economic Case No. 17 of 2021, quash the appellant's conviction and set aside the custodial sentence meted out on him. As to the way forward, we desist from making an order for retrial as that remains in the exclusive prerogative of the DPP. What further compounds our position on the course to be taken in this case, is the indubitable finding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. We therefore order for the appellant's release from jail if he is not further detained for some other lawful cause. DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 6th day of March, 2026. A. G. MWARD A JUSTICE OF APPEAL P. M. KENTE JUSTICE OF APPEAL Z. G. MURUKE JUSTICE OF APPEAL The Judgment delivered via virtual link, this 10th day of March, 2026 in the presence of appellant from Ukonga Central Prison and Mr. Josephat Sayi Mabula, learned counsel for the appellant and Ms. Winfrida Ouko, learned State Attorney for the respondent/Republic and Ms. Tabitha Mwita, Court Clerk, is hereby certified as a true copy of the original. E. G. MRANGU SENIOR DEPUTY REGISTRAR COURT OF APPEAL 9