Case Law[2004] UGSC 44Uganda
Onyango Obbo and Another v Attorney General (Constitutional Appeal 2 of 2002) [2004] UGSC 44 (11 February 2004)
Supreme Court of Uganda
Judgment
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA
IIOLDEN AT MENGO
,l
o
CORAM: Odoki, CJ, Oder, Tsekooko, Karokora, Mulenga,
Ka nyeihamba, JJ.S.C., B.""am u gishn, Ag. .LS.C.
C'ONSTIl-t'TION.{1. APP[.Al- No. 2 of 2002
lletrvecn
I. CHARLES ONYANGO OBI]O
l. A\l)Rl'l\\ !II-UUNI }IWIINDA:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::,,\l'l'l-l-1.,\\'lS
And
A.TTORNBY GENERAL:::::::::::::3::::::::::::::::::::::::::::RESPONDE,NT
\.'lppcal i tnt lecision of the Constittttional Court (llunyintl,t, DCJ. Kato. Barko and
[r:.grtrrir. J.l ..1 . Tvinonttjttni. .1.,1 , di.ssenting). in
('rtnsl
itttt iottu l Pttitittn .\'o ]5it)1 Llated
)i'.lult,)000t
Iirr. ;ip|t'ol i5 :lsai!rsi i] dccision ol the ( rrnstitutiorlrl
(
oun rn .i
l!'tilrr)rl
rLl i\,;r! ;,,
inrolig c61151i1qrtional plotL'ctron tbr thc lrecdonr (rl tirc
nrcs{
Ihc
(-r.rnstitrrt:,\" r,l ih.
Iicpr:hlic ol [.luanda ]995, "the C'onstittrtion". in ,,\rticl.' 19. guar;rntce s
nrlrtccli(\r'
{)l rlr.
r,rlir rrlurrl i-ight ol lieetlorrt ol e xprc-ssirrrr. r,',lrieh irrclrrdcs lrtctJtrrr ol thc
l-'1. '-.
i i e
icntral issLrc in this appgal is rr'hcther sc'ctiorr 50 ol'tllc Penal C'oclc ..\ct. '.qr-'ctirrn 50".
u lrich makes publication of false news a crirninal oilcncc, contravencs that protection.
Charles On1'ango Obbo and Andrew Mujuni Mu'enda. the appellants in this appeal, are
practising journalists- At all the rnaterial times, they were, respectively, an Editor and a
O
I
n.
.I I'D(] NT EN'T OII NI T]I-I',NGA. .I.S.C.
I
o
a
"co!'er
of constirur ionality" ro any law derogating from that right, if the law was
reasonably required in the inrerests of ...public safety, public order.....,,. It is arguable
that section 50 enjoyed that "cover of constitutionality,,, as a law reasonably required in
the interests ofpublic safety and public order. However, neither that
particular clause, nor
the 1967 Constitution as a whole, was the source ol its existence. Section 50 existed long
before Uganda acquired a constitution entrenching a bil of rights. It has neve" been
repealed, notwithstanding the loss of the "cover of constitutionality,' in 1995. It remains a
law that existed "immediately before the coming
into lorce', ol the Constirution. * hich
Lr.der Article 27l.like all other exisring law, has lo be construed. in a manner thar hr.inss
t it'tttr c.nlirrrnitr rrith the C.nstirution. \\,hcther it calr be so c()n\tr.rcd! to c.1rli,1 ;11 11 11i,
Arrrcie "ll is the underlying question in ground I.
Ihe sLtbstance ol'ground 3 is criticisrn of the conslnrction ol secrion 50. The srsr () j
rl.rc
eriticisnr is that the section is too imprecise for a penal legislation. I must say that much
of the criticism is quite valid. Precision and clarity in the definition of a criminal ollence
is essential, if a person accused of the offence is to have a t'air trial. This court has held
that to be the import of clause
(leneral
vs. Silva tori Abuk
l2 of Article 28 ol the Constirution. See Attorney
Constitutional Appeal No. I of l99g
ISCD
(Const.
)
1999/2000 p.2451. ln their perition, however, the appeilants did not ailege that section 50
contravened the right to a fair hearing guaranteed under Article 2g; nor did thev seek a
tlcclirrati.n t. that efl'ect. In their written subrnissions to the ('..nsrirutionar
cr-rurr. rhcr
'litl
tt.l e lltlYiiss the point. antl in this appeal. the thrust ol'their conlenliorr re n,,rirrc.tl 1lr.rl
--cliorl j1)
rtas inconsistent rrith rhe ficedont of erpr.,-.ssion. rritlt crriJ.,h.rsis (,r) lt!.L,rl(,It (,1
tilr:1''1t'" Ill lhat c()ntr\t. Ihe critieisnr rn tlrt,rrnd l;:r i.rcs..r)tr.ri.
,,r.t:lrl
l.e r:,.1r.,..r:: r(r
' ! r.iil(' ii) li)t-' ,lI\peJj. Ihi.s .r;.,J,g,1] )s n()l L(tnCerner.j rvith f.rirncss or ()tll!.r\\tSe (,:
l,t(.
.rnpcllilnts'trial in tht- cr.inrinal court. I hast,.,n to acknorvledge. houq.191, lhat in clc_lining
atll dcrogatiotl ol'a right guarantecd
by the Consritution. precision ancl claritv are ol-rht:
o
,1
o
essence. To thal extent, the content of section 50 is relevant in considering if it is within
the parameters of permissible limitation, That aspect of the criticism in ground 3 is an
integral part ofground L
Mr. Nangwala, learned lead counsel for the appellants, submitted that the source of the
error in the court decision was the failure, on the part of the majority of the leamed
Justices of Appeal, to address the impon of the provision in paragraph (c) of Article 43
(2). Under that provision, a limitation on the enjoyment of a constitutional right, on the
ground of public interest, is valid only il it is "acceptable and clemonstrably justifiable in
a
lree
and democralic society". Counse.l observed that although in the majority judgnrcnt
the Constitutional Court con'eclly lbund section -i0
to be a linritation on thc righl ()l'
freedom ofexpression; it failed to consider rvhether the section rvas rvithin thc paratneters
of that provision. He subrnirted that section 50. as such limitation. is not acceptable and
demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society. He criticised lhe learned
Justices of Appeal for failure to consider, and take leaf from, judicial precedents on the
subject from other jurisdictions, which were referred to the court. He contended that
Ljganda as a democratic society, must apply the universal Standards of a democratic
sociery; and that under those standards, it is not justifiable to criminalize publication of
false news. Mr. Rezida, the learned second counsel for the appellants locussed on what
he called the vagueness of section 50, and highlighted its very rvide applicability, which
makes it difficult to determine its scope.
In re.sponse, Mr. Cheborion Barishaki, Commissioner for Civil Litigation, submitted that
it was necessary to use criminal law' for excluding from the range of frec'choice. thosc
acts that are incompatible with maintenance of public peace and order. Scction 50 is such
nccc-ssary criminal law. It prohibits excesses in the exercise ol thc' lieedom of expression.
It prohibits publication of statements, which are false and are likely to cause public t'ear
a
a
5
o
a
or alarm or to disturb pubric peace.
He submitted that
the prohibition
was proportionar
to
the danger it is intended
to prevent.
The leamed
Commissioner
,r',,rn";
;"; ;
determining
if that prohibition
is "acceptabre
and demonstrabry justified,,
,, ,r: J;,",.:
of Article 4) this Court should apply a subjective inrerpretation,
because it is local
circumstances
that dictate what is acceptable
and justified.
A law may be acceptable
and
jusrifiabre
in the circumstances
of Uganda, whire it is unacceprabre
and unjustifiabre
in
circurnstances
or another country,
even though borh counlries are democratic
socr(,rius
I-le invited this court to uphord the majority decision of the constiturionar
coun.
In his
.iudgment, rvith which rhe majority
or the constitutionai
court concurred.
L'--rkcr
'l A considered
the merits of thc apperanrs'
petirion
under two broad hcacrs. (,ncie'
rhe
llrst. he considered the
complaint
against the Dl)p,s
dr icrston to prosecute the
appellants.
llis conclusion
on that complaint
is not subject of this appear. The second was the
complaint
that section 50 is inconsistent
with the constitution.
I wirr review in some
detair how he handled it. First he deart with a coupre of, preliminary
points, which he
concluded by
holding _
'
thar in order ror section 50 to conrorm to
Anicre 43(r), ithas to be construed as if
the offence is constituted when
the
/arse srakment
-.. is tikery to prejudice
the
rights andfreedoms
of others or the pubiic
intere.tr. awr
.
that sub-section (2)
of section 50. which requires the accLrse<J to pro\e thar hr rn,.,tJ
to verir'l the truth ol the statenrenl,
is in acc.rd *ith crirninur
nrocedure antr is n.t
unconst jtut
ionaL
o
I lr.., lL.
',t
iris j
llItlcd.lLtsticc
cr1',.\pIcll
tltcrr tlcalt u,irh tlrc
i,rine il.,rrl issuc r, thc t.llorr,ing
I)irr:i:r,.
rrrl!ttturtl.
-
"l do agree thar
arricle 29 , ) of the Constitutio, guarantees
free speech and
expression and also secures
.taicltha!oleratingoffenr,"r::::::r':::rr'::;:::ff
;;:::r::::"';::;;:
6
I
I
)
o
o
I h t'rc.
tlow.s,
7
I
a reasonably
free and open
and part icular
ly cri m inal
choice those
acr that
are
law, should
(be
to)
society.
Therefore
in m! view,
the
funuions of the law,
exclude
from the range
of individual
incompafible
wih the tnaintenance
of public
peace
and
safery and
rights
of individuals.
Freedom
of speech
and expression
cannot
be
invoked
b protect
a pers<;n
"who
falsely shou$
panic,,.
-ln
my opinion
fire, fire, in a theate
and caus
ins
lt is therefore
important
b regulate
or lintir
tifitcttit>n
/or t,t?ttt I t)t.q
rhe exrcn!
o v,hich
this c.an hctppen
That is reason
for rhe article
43 of the
Consrirurion.
.l ctttzen
is entitled
b express
h u,here
the
expression
u,ould
prejudice
the
funtlomenrol
or
/reedon.s of olher.s
or the public
inlerest.
I lincl that.t.5t)
ofthe penal
Code is
Ido
of the arricle
is not the
of the ingrediews
of
,,,'.,',''1,..,
tt1.lulure
That i,, th"
I /('rr r -j// ()/
/ht pL,tltt/
(,rxl;,
lr / l:
inttl ft 11.r,, /r .,1...717
olltcr
hunton
riglt t.t unl
not-subscribe
to rhe argurhenl
..... that the truth
orfalsehood
rhe
ofence
the shrc
has lo
issue.
In my view the
rruth orfalsehood
of the anicle
is one
prove.
public
interesr
resulted
in the
It
)
tiit/ ,/1t ( ) t?.\ i.\. I L, I I I t\ i//t ll?t, (,()t]t
litution
( L,ln phasi s
ts atldcd
1. at'c a number
of flaws
in this
ch closely
touch
on the
that the leamed
Justice
of
Passage. lb stan wirh
I will
highlight
two
major
scope
of the right to freedom
of expression.
The first is Appeal
omitted
to consi der
if section
50 was
wirhin
the
Y
O
parametersofArticlea3(2)(c).HeonlyfocussedonrationaliSingtheneedforlimitatton
on the freedom of expression by law' and was content
to hold that section 50 was a
necessarylegallimitation'However'theappellants'caseintheConstitutionalCourt'asin
this Court, was not that the freedom
ofexpression
is absolute They acknowledge that
the
enjoyment of the freedom of expression
is subject to Article 43' which provides for
general limitation on the enjoyment
of human rights and freedoms prescribed
in the
Constitution.Theircontentionisthatsection50isinconsistentwiththeConstitution
because the limitation
it imposes on the enjoyment
of the right to freedom of expression'
is beyond what is permitted under Anicle 43 There is no finding on that contention in
the
nrajority-judgrnent.ItisthereforeimperativeforthisCourttoconsiderthecontentionand
rnake a frnding on it'
a
a
l alsitl and Freedont oJ expression
on the
I he second flaiv is implicit in the observation
that in absence of constrarnts
I
freedom of expression,
the objective
of upholding
truth would be
def'eared
lhis
presupposes that to extend the constitutional
protection of freedom
of expression
to false
starements is incompatible
with
,upholding
truth'. In my view, there is no such
incompatibility.
Extending protection
of the freedom of expression
to false statements
does not necessarily defeat the
objective of upholding
the truth' because
while tnrth and
falsity are mutually
exclusive' the purposes for protecting both are not l will retum to
thatlaterinthisjudgment.Iwiltfirstconsiderwhethertheconstitutionalprovisions
perraining to the protection ol the right to freedom
of expression' and to the limitation of
its enjo.vrnent.
lend any creclence to the supposition
thar thc protcction
does not extcnd to
lalse expresstons
.r
hc L.onstiturion,
decrares the right to fieeclom of expression
in Anicle 29 thus -
" J9
( t) l',vert'persott
shttll have tha right ttt -
8
a
I)"
v'
o
a
o
" :9 l1) Every person shall have the right to -
(a)
freedom
of speech and expression, \^)hich shall include
freedom
of
the
Press
and other media;"
That declaration does not stipulate or specif, what a person is free to say or express. The
Constitution, unlike its 1967 predecessor, does not provide a definition of the freedom of
expression or of the press. Nor does it describe the scope of that freedom. Even the Press
and Joumalist Act (cap. I 05), which was enacted in 1995 "to ensure the lreedom of the
[)rcss,,. does not deljne that lreedom. Nevertheless, there is no dispr.rte as to what that
licerionr encompasses. In the I967 Constitution, and before that, in the Indepcndencc'
('onsritution ol 1962. the freedonr of expression was defined
'r'r)!-'l,l
(,/lJ
'rlr
/(itl\!' ut-ttl t'ttj"ul ljLitr
'ttt'l
tttjrtt trtttlial vtllt"ttl ittl''t.ttt
't:' '
I
'i"
;t()t tilink that thc orttiSsittn l() lnc:udc that tlcllnrlrrrlt in tllc
('(r:l:lillltl(\!1
'lli(1t(:
ill('
ir!irninu. ()r (ititrrictcl ttl the tiectklnl as prc\ iousll tlctilletl' Ihc r'iclirl:tiorl :;li r"
'l
-looci.
It is aIso instructivc to look at dellnitions of the sanle fiecdtrnl irt ittlcrtt;rliotlrtl
instruments, to rvhich Uganda is party. The African Charter on Human and Peoplcs'
Righrs simply stales in Article 9 that
-
I l;t'er) irulit'itlual shali haye the right to t"ceiv! inlbrmcttion'
) Evett irtdividtral shall huye the tight lt) a\)ress and disseminate his opinions
v,ithin the loY'.
IJori.e-r'er, in or<ler "to elahorrtl( antl cxprnutl on tlk' ttoture conlenl dnLl
('rlctlt ttl tlk'
,i,qht prrn iilt',1 litr unrler ,lrtrtlt'
t)",
the Atiican
('omrnission on Iluman attrl l)cof l'J.'
Ilruiits rn tts -11"r
t )rclinarl Sessron in Oct()hcr l(101, adoptcci [lle [)c'-l'rl'rtt"tr
"l
lrrine rfrlcs a)n Ftdcdont rtt [..x]rression in Atlica. lln(l lecotlllllell(icd t() lh('.'\lilelttt
\t r"
'
t('
-u..r.::l:ce
'LIle Iicr(l(rll1 lllrt\ -
'l
l:rL, rl,'rtt /)/ ('\.4)/ ('.(\/{')/i itttLl !t!lt)r ttlLtllt)t'1 ittt'!tttiit
"'
llt' t.:!itt t" t''':
r.((('ir'('(lll(/ lttll)(.rl i l()ttttdlt()t1
'ItlLl
..lLLt\
(tl11':r ()t'Ltiiv itl \ttilttt'{
(t'
Js "/r .'.',i11t11 1,' i:' . :
9
Y
/
print, itt the
form
of art, or through any other
form
of communication'
including across frontiers,
is a
fundamental
and inalienable human
right and an indispensable component
of democracy'
2. Everyone shall have an equal opportunity to exercise the right to
freedom
of expression and to access information without discrimination "
InthelntemationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,Articlel0provides-
"l.Everyoneshallhavetherighttoholdopinionswithoutinterference.
2. Everyone shall have the right ro
freedom
ofexpression: this right
shall include
freedom
to seek' receive and impart information and
icleas ttf all kinds' regardless of
fronriers'
either orally' in writing or
in print' in the
form
ofart' or through any other media
of his choice'"
Fronltheforegoingdifferentdefinitions,itisevidentthattherighttofr.eedomof
expression extends to holding, receiving and imparting all forms of opinions' ideas and
information. It is not confined to categories, such as conect opinions, sound ideas or
rruthful information. subject to the limitation under Anicle 43, a person's expression or
statementisnotprecludedfrorntheconstitutionalprotectionsimplybecauseitisthought
by another or others to be false, erroneous, conrroversial or unpleasant' Everyone is free
to express his or her views. lndeed, the protection is most relevant and required where
a
person,sviewsareopposedorobjectedtobysocietyoranypartthereof,as''false.'or
"wrong". I think, with due respect, to the leamed Berko J A
'
he misconstrued
what \\as
in issue when he said -
" the clemocralic interest cannot
be seen to require (sic)
citrzens lo make
demonstrably untue and alarming slatements under the guise oJ
.fi'eedom
of speeclt and expression The section prohibits iltegal and crintinal concluct
under the cover offreedom of speech and expression."
IO
a
o
o
I
Y
Firsr, it is inaccurate
to assert that section 50 prohibits
" iltegal anld criminal
conduct"
Rather, the section criminalizes
conduct
that is otherw ise legitimate
"'is1si5g
sf the
constitutionally
protected
right t o freedom of expression'
lt is for that reason that the
I
appellants came
to court to challeng e the section as inconsistent
with the Constitution'
Secondly,
the issue is not whether under democracy
citizens
are required or
permitted to
make demonstrably
untrue and alarm ing statements
under anY gutse' A democrattc
society respects and promotes the citi zens' individual
right to freedom
of expresston'
because
it derives benefit frorn the exe rcise of that freedom
by its citizens'
In order to
maintain that benefit,
a democratic
society chooses to tolerate the exercise
of the freedom
even in resPect of "demonstrablY
untr ue and alarming
statements"
'
father than
ttr
suppress
it. I think the point is well a rticulated in the following
excerpt from an arlicle b)-
Archibalcl Cox in Society
Vol 24 p 8 No.l Nov.i Dec' 1986 -
a
"
Some PrttPositions
seem lr ue or
J'alse
bevontl rctlionol
clebote Some lalst'
ttn.l
harmful Political
and rclig iotr.s drLt lrint's gain rtttlt' pttbI it tt'' ceplurtc't
1'lr t!|
Hirler's brttal theory of a "master race" is sufficient
exumPle
We kierale suclt
e but
oo lish and
so ,netl mes datt erous
eals n ec attse th t|l a ro ve lru
I
because freedom of speech
is indivisible'
plain enough; no man' no commiltee'
and surely no
Sovernment'
has the infinit e wisdom and disinterestedness
accurately
and unselfshly
to separate
wh al is truefromwhat
is debatable'
and
-t
both from
rthar is
false
" (emphasis is
There is supporl for this view in
judicial preced
and enforce the right to freedom of expresSton
view in R vs. Zundel
( 1992) l0 C C'R
(2rd)
rhe rnajority
judgment, had this to say -
"Tests o.f
Jree
expression frequentlv
itlvo
of vshat is trtte or right and an unpopul
added)
ents flom diverse
jurisdictions that uphold
-['he
Strprerne Court of Canada
upheld the
l9l. Nlcl.achlirl
J'' as:he then u'as' rt'rilitr!:
/1 (,(l c,rr?lr'.\l
heltr','cll llk'
('tltti'tt'1t\ t \';t \r
ar ntitl()t'tly
viev' As Holmes J' sldltd L\'r't'
ll
The liberty cannot be denied to some
ideas and saved for
others'
The reason is
Y
t
60 years ago, the
fact
that the
Particular
conrent ofa person's speech might
"excite popular prejudice" is no reason to deny it protectionfor
" if there is any
principle of the Constitution lhat more imperatively call
for
attachment than any
other it is the principle offree thought -
not
free
thought for
those who agree with
us but
freedom for
the thought that we hate""'Thus the guarantee offreedom of
expression serves ... to preclude rhe maiority's perception of truth or public
interest
from
smothering the minority's perception'"
Rejectinganargumenlraisedinthatcase,thatadeliberatelieisnotprotectedbecauseit
isanillegitimateformofexpression,whichdoesnotserveanyofthevaluesforw'hich
thc freedom ofexpression is guaranteed' she said in conclusion' al p'209 '
"Be/ore v'e clenv a person the ptotection which the most
-/
ndanrctltdl la.r. ol this
lartcl on its
face
accords to the person' we shoulcl' in m1' belieJ' be cntireh' cerraitt
that there can be no justiJication
for
oJJbring protection The t 'rtlerton o lit l.s lll
have valuc
a
lls short o
and iven the di tc 11 o conclus ivel deterrn ln ln total o lsi Applying the
protect fundanrental human rights and lieedorns'
in line with J.J Rousseau's
version of the Social
I his certaitt iven that lse state ments can so nte I lnles
ll
broad, pttrposive interpretation of the
freedom
of expression
guaranteed by s'2(b)
hitherto adhered to by this court, I cannot accede lo the argument that those who
deliberatelv publish
fatsehoods
are
for
that reason alone precluded fiom
claiming
the beneft of the constitutional guarantees offree speech
" (emphasis is added)'
I respectfully agree with that view' I should stress that applying the constitutional
the maioritY
to f'alse expressions is not to 'uphold falsity' as implied in
o
protectton
judgment. I'he purpose is to avoid the greater danger of 'smothering altcmative
vieus' ol
I:rctdont of Expression in Democracy
Democralic societies uPhold
and
essentially on principles that are
I2
lhct r-rr oPinion.
t
Contract theory. In brief, the theory is to the effect that the pre-social humans agreed to
surrender their respective individual freedom of action' in order to secure mutual
protection, and that consequently, lhe raison d'erre of lhe State is to provide protection to
the individual citizens. In that regard, the state has the duty to facilitate and enhance the
individual,s self-fulfilmenr and advancement, recognising the individual's rights and
lreedoms as inherent in humanity. Uganda acknowledges this in Article 20 of the
Constitution, which reads -
"(t) Fundamental rights and
freedoms
of the individual are inherent and not
granted by the State.
(2) The rights and
freedoms
of the individual and groups enshrined in this
Chaprer shall be respected, upheld and promoted by alt organs and agencies of
Government and bY all
Persons."
protection
of the fundamental human rights rheretbre, is a primary ob.iective of cr etr
democratic constitution, and as such is an essential characteristic of democracy ln
particular, proteclion ol the right to fieedom of expression is of great significance to
democracy. lt is the bedrock ol democratic govemance. Meaningftrl participation
ot'the
govemed in their govemance' which is the hallmark of democracy, is only assured
through optimal exercise of the freedom of expression' This is as true in the new
democracies as it is in the old ones. In R' vs' Zundel (supra) at p'205' the following
excerpr from an earlier
judgment in Edmonton Journal vs. Alberta
(A.G.) ( 1989) 2
SCR 1326, was cited with aPProval -
,,It
is dif|iculr b imaSine a guaranteed righl more imporlant to democratic sociell,
rhanfreedomofexpression.Indeedaclemocracycannotexistwithoullhatfreeclom
to express new ideas and to put forwart) ttpinkttts ahout the funtttttttirtv
'tl
ltuhlit
inslitulions. The cot'tcepr offi"ec and wtinhihitecl speec'h pcrneate't ull truly
democratic societies antl in,clitutions. The viral intportance o/ the cont'ept t'ctnnol he
a
o
over-emphos i,ted ll st'.'nts lltol tlrc righls ctt.s hr
li
in.s.ltbt
, ,'j, ,' ,
I
TheEuropeanColrventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamental
Freedoms, protects the right to freedom of expression under Anicle 10. ln its judgment in
the Ling ens Case, (No.l21198a/84/l3l), the European Court of Human Rights said -
"freedom of expression, as secured in paragraph I of Article l0 constitules
one of the essential foundations
of a democratic society and one of the basic
conditions
for
its progress andfor each individual's self-
fulfilment'
Subject to
parttgraph 2, it is applicahle nol onll' lo "rnfitrmatitttt" ttr "itlcus" llul ut e'
/itr'rturabl),reL.eire(l Or regardecl as inrsl/tnsit'r' ()t
d! u tlt,tllL't
'tl
ttulilt't
'
t:"
:'ttl
also lt.r llrc.se that <tlenLt. .shoc'k or tlisttrrh Str< h Qt i' lht' lL'ntdn(lt
'i
Jtlttru!rrnt
t0lt'tttnt'a ttnJ b rt tLtclnt indelnt \'\ \ illl()ltl tthi' h rltcrt' l\ ttt | "Ll' ttii)L't.tt 1r( \"( ir /i
The.:e ptinciples are r-;-f-parlicttlLtr intpt)t'tLtttcc sL) fttr
d\ lht'ltrcst is cttttctttt"l
ll'hil.st rhe press Dlust t10t overslep rhe bituncls sel it cr uliu, lttt'llta
"yrrrtt'tltrttt 'tl
lhe re;tttttttion oJ others". it is nevertheless ittcuntbenl ott it to imparl tttlormotitttt
anci icleas on political issttes just as lhose in other areas of public interest
'\tot
utlv
cloes tlre pres.t ltave the task of imparting such informalktn ancl ideas.. the puhlic
also has a righr m receive them. " (see p' 12 Para 4l )'
|
,,,,rrrcia.
like anv other dernocratic societr,. is committ,-'d to upholding tl-re t itlltl lt'
.:t',\ll)1,]].]1.c\}rrtsSjo].l.flrateollltttilnl!.I]t.il]l(litlclr..t'rl.'Lii'.tLlllet..ttc*tr,'l.lr,.ll.
"'
f. i (a\ lIll\ ll(\l l',c;ls ltrttL'. slllntlttlq il\ lll 1li(''rltit'l tltt'lrr' t r1 r''
r-
11 rt 1\ l :r'
"l
:
i,.ltirl Ttitsotl lh.ll ll ls ttttrcttcherl itt lllc tlttt' t h tr'lirltl I I
'
i *
I i i 1 I ( ' I
.l
I ()l- lll"
l.
I
rl
,,r -lrlllll()ll {tlill.tlltr'c' l(r (\cl\r'r:lL l:l l tl;tll'lt tlrL' t
'll'-
r'l il
"":
r 1
''
r
'r
"
;":cceive lrtttl inrl-ra11 rd"as trntl intirrttlation u ilhotli ittlcrlercrL'r I
'ltrrLlltl 'rrlrl
tl '
!()ltlrttittlletll is rlot eVident rrl rhc C<lnstltutional pror'lsiorls otll) '
-l
hc etl3cll'll('ll1 i 'r'
,)l rhe
prr,ss
lnd.lorrrnalist Si!'iut.. to ensure prL-ss lrecdonr. is additional L'\'i(lencc ol'tllt
l.+
o
o
I
only be restricted in the clearest of circumstances "
I
7
Lintitolion o
freedom
of expression
Itiscommongroundthattheprotectionoftherighttofreedomofexpressionissubjectto
Article 43, which provides for permissible restriction as follows -
"( I ) Itt the enioyment of the rights and
'freedoms
prescribed in this Chapter' rto
person shall oreiudice the
fundamental
or other human rights and ft'eecloms
cti
others or the
Public
interest
(2) Public interest under this article shall nol permil '
a\
Political Persecut
ion
b) derention v'ithout trial:
c) any limitation of the enioyment of the rights and
freedoms
prescribed b1' tltis
Chaptt!r
antl dent ocrattc s ocierv, or what is provided in this Constitution
"
(emphasis is added)
The provision in clause (l) is couched as a prohibition of expressions that "prejudice"
rightsandfreedomsofothersandpublicinterest.Thistranslatesintoarestrictiononthe
enjoymentofone,srightsandfreedomsinordertoprotecttheenjoymentby',others,..of
theirownrightsandfreedoms.aswellastoprotectthepublicinreresl.Inotherworcls.|.}
virtue of the provision in clause ( l), the constitutional protection
ol one's en.itly,lrrcrtt ot
l5
t
a
o
comrnitment,
That statute, inter alia,repealed
the
press
censorship and correction
Act of
lgl5,andintroducedagoodmeasureofself-regulatorymechanismforthepromotionof
prolessionalandresponsibleexerciseofpressfreedom'However'thestrongestevidence'
which is without doubt common knowledge' is the outpouring
vigour and enthusiasm
with which not only the media, but also the public at large' exercise the freedom of
expression in practice. ln my view, it is because of that commitment' and the importance
ofthefreedomofexpressiontodemocracy,thatrestrictionontheexerciseofthefreedom
is permitted only in special circumstances'
a
I
o
rights and freedoms does not extend to two scenarios, namely: (a) where the exercise of
one,s right or freedom "prejudices" the human right ofanother person; and (b) where such
exercise "prejudices" the public interest. It foltows therefore, that subject to clause (2)'
any law that derogates from any human right in order to prevent prejudice to the rights or
freedoms of others or the public interest, is not inconsistent with the Constitution'
However, the timitation provided for in clause ( I
)
is qualified by clause (2), which in
effect introduces
,,a
limitation upon the limitation". It is apparent from the wording of
clause (2) that the framers of the constitution were concemed about a probable danger of
rnisusc. or abuse of the provision in clause ( l) under the guise ol defcncc' ol ptrblic
inrcr.,st. For ar,oidance of thar danger, they enacted clause
(l), r'"hich expresslv prohihrts
the use of pttlitical persecution and detention u'ithout trial, as means of prerentine. or
lt)casLrres t() remoVe. pre.iudice to the public interest. In atldition. lhcr provitletl i:r tlt'rt
clausc a
lardstick,
by which to gauge any'limitation irnposctl ort the rillhls in tlelencc
'.'1
public interest. The yardstick is that the limitation must be acceptable and demonstrahlr
justitiable in a free and democratic society. This is what I have ret-erred to as "a Iimitation
upon rhe limitation". The limitation on the enjoyment of a protected right in defence of
public interesr is in tum lirritcd to the measure of tliat yardstick. In othe:" words. sr.tch
ljrnitation, however otherwise rationalised, is not
valid unless its restriclion on a prolected
right is acceptable and demonstrably
justifiable in a ttee and democratic society.
ir., i ,,-.\is1.nrc in the sanle conslittltilln.
qrf p1'otr.ciion :ttltl lirrillrtion r\l''l'r
.i,,lrr.
.,..\1|l\ {cn('r,rl!'\ t\\(t Conlpr'ling llllcrc<1s
()tt llle
r'llt l'rllrl
1l'l('l('
i' 'll
lrni ..itl irn.l
l]rortet
thc t.iglrts gulrratlteed hl,rhe
(.trt]:lilttlirrti ( );l illL. rllllt'1, ll.rtl.] tlli'1. l.
rlr, r'rt('iL'\l l(' xec Iltt' clllil\ Ir(lli rrt' tll,-' irt,lir r<lrt'ri rilllt'
i'r
'
llt'.'l
r\r' '
\' 1 |
',r'r!r(ir.ii)il()IS. ,.r'ltiClt
;ri"e ill:,)
.iCt ()tll ill thc
( ol1\lltLlit..-'tt \\ !telt
:i:1'1' 1
'-"r
l
'
i -
'\
"'r
lltL. lr.,o intct.L'Sts. lhe CoUrt resolves it havinC icg:ttcl to thc'drtf'erent
rrl.rlt'ctives rrl tltt
(
onstitution.
lri
t
t
that il cannot be st/ ressed unless the situations created b u llou'irt the reedom
ndanPered The antici
pate d dansct
drc ress lnq and lhe cct mmunii' tnleresl ts e
. coniectural ot far ferchcd. lr should ha l)t'()r ltnd lc and
( have )
should not be re tnole
The ex Dressloll 0 { thou sht should bei ntrinsicallt'
o
direct nexus v,ith the expression
dan erous lo the
public interests. In other words the expression should be
inseparabllt locked up with the action contemplated tike rhe equivalent of a 'spark
in a powder keg'.
"
I agree with the proposition that the freedom of expression ought not to be suppressed
except where allowing its exercise endangers community interest' It is in that context
that I have to consider whether section 50 is a valid limitation under the Constitution'
t7
|.-
As I said earlier in this judgment,
protection of the guaranteed rights is a primary'
objective of the constitution. Limiting rheir enjoyment is an exception to their protection'
and is therefore a secondary objective. Although the constitution Provides
for both, it is
obvious that the primary objective must be dominant. It can be overridden only in the
exceptional circumstances that give rise to that secondary objective ln that eventuality'
only minimal impairment ol enjoyment of the right, strictly warranted by the exeptional
circumstance is permissible. The exceptional circumstances set out in clause ( I
)
of
Article 43 are the prejudice or violation of protected rights of others and prejudice or
breach of social values categorised as public interest. In Rangaraian vs. Jasiivan Ram
and othersl union of India and others vs, Jasvan Ram and others (1990) LRC
(Const.) 412, the Supreme Court of India put the point this way, ar' p'427 -
,,There
cloes incleed have to be a compromise between the interest of
freedom
oJ
expressionandsocialinleresl.Butwecannolsimpll'balanc'alheivoinlereslsasi/
I
V
I
Section 50
As I have already indicated, the validity of section 50 now depends on whether its
provisions fit within the parameters set down in Article 43. Section 50 reads thus -
"50
(l) Any person who publishes any
false
statement, rumour or report which is
likely to cause
fear
and alarm to the public or to disturb the public peace
is guilty of a misdemeanour.
(2)lt :;hall be a defenc'c to a charge unc]er sub-section (l) if the accused
prot'es that prior lo publication, he took such ntcosures to
yeril.t
tlv
accurltc)'oJ the slatemetll, runto r and or report as to lead hint l,t hclt'.'tt
that it was true "
ln order to establish the oftcnce undcr sc'ction 50. the prosccrrtion has t() pr,)\ c tltc
loliou'ing ingrt-d ie nts -
r
-l'hat
thr' accused published the statement, rumour or rcport;
. That the statement, nrmour or report is false;
. That the published statement, rumour or report is likely to cause fear and alarm to
the public or to disturb the public peace.
Signiticantly, to establish the guilt of the person accused of the offence, the prosecution
rioes not have to prove that the accused knew the statement to be false. lnstead, in order
to cstablish his innoccnce thc accused has the onus to prove that he tried to vc'rifj' the
iLccLrracy ol'the statenlent. ln this regard, I do not share the r,iew exprcsscd in the
r:raioritr.judgrnent ol'thc Constitutional Court. rvhere it rvas said
'I
Jo nol lind an.t,thin,q o/./ensive ahoul lhe reqtrirr'mc'ttl ltt) tltL' rrt't tt\t'tI l, ) t'\ttthii' 11
lti.s cle/cntt rv o/far un erplottotirnt oftcr a pritnt lhtit ttt.rt' Itttt htert t'tari',1r,/r,.,'
,qdinsl
luDt llt, r.s rrit.tl ohlaitts in drt dJ\'.'r\drtdl trtD tlttl,,il\1/!. \r.\/( /ri l,,l
.rcrrsed pc ]()tt is rtnh recluiracl lo anlar tnto hts clc/incc a/tet tha t'rttrrl ltu.s ltttrttil
aprimaJacie case...against him. This procedure is provided
lbr bl s.7l tt/ tlrc
t
t
t8
/
I
t
Trial on lndictmenl Decree... That requiremenl cannot therefore muke lhe section
unconstitt tlionnl "
With due respect, the suggestion that the provision in section 50(2) is merely procedural,
regulating the time for presentation of the defence case is erroneous. The provision places
on a person on trial for that offence the onus of proving lack of guilty knowledge. Far
frorn being 'what obtains in adversarial crininal justice system', it is an exception to the
general rule that in a criminal trial, the onus of proof remains on the
Prosecution
throughout, and does not shift to the defence. Furthermore, I should point out and stress
that by the definition of the offence, liability for conviction, let alone for prosecution,
does not depend on any actual occurrence of pub)ic fear or alarnr or disturbance of public
peace. l.iability for prosecution depends on the state prosecutor's perception ol tht'
inrpact the expression is likely to have on the public: and Iiability tbr conviction dcpr'ntls
on rvhether the court is persuaded to share the same perception
In nry, view, although those two characteristics of the offence per se do not make the
provision unconstitutional, they must be considered in determining if the limitation
section 50 irnposes on the constitutionally guaranteed right, is acceptable and
demonstrablv justifiable in a free and democratic society.
a
l9
Objective of Section 50
It is important to identi$ the objective and effect of section 50, to the extent they are
discernable. ivluch as counsel on both sides exhibited commendable effort in presentation
of argument, neither addi'essed us on that aspect. I also have not been able to access thr
contemporary legis)ative materials that would have helped me to identifl, the 'nrischicl
that the legislalure sought to remedy in enacting section 50. tn his minorirv judgment
in
the Constitutional Court, the Icarned Twinomujuni J.A., rraced the origin of the fzrlsr,
statemetlt offences to a | 3'r' century English statute that created the ofl'errce of St'oncl,tlis
Magnatum. The offence was to tell or publish false news or tales that could cause
"discord or slander between the King and his People or the Great Men of the Realm" He
also referred to rhe judgmenr in
@!
(supra), in which it was said that the
primary aim of Scandalis Magnatum had been "the
prevention of false
statements, which
in a society dominated by extremely powerful landowners could lhreaten the security of
the state".It rvas also observed therein that: "This was no vain
fear
at a time when the
offended great one was only too ready to resorl to arms to redress a
fancied
injury".
Engtand abolished the offence in 1887. Going by the timing and definition ofthe offence
under section 50, however, I think its objective cannot have been the same as that of
,scandalis Magnatum. The aim of the colonial legislature, in enacting section 50, is more
likeli, to have been akin to that of the legislature in the former colony ol Southern
Rhodesia. tbr enactirrg a similar law, of which Cubbay C J., in NI ark
(Jor':r
& Another
r s. \l inistcr of Ilom e Affairs & A nother ,
(supra) had this to sa\'-
" It was, however justified by the Government...on the basis that it would
provide a safeguard against the attempts ofirresponsible iournalists
and
ntmourmongers
'to create chaos ottt oforder', no inslance ofany such
occurrence was mentioned
-
only a rumour circulating in the then Northern
Rhodesia that cigarettes had been poisoned".
I think it is reasonable to infer lrom the wording of section 50, that at the time, when
political agitation for setf governance was in early stages, the colonial legislature in
Uganda would have wante+ to provide a legal safeguard against the spreading ofnews,
rumours or reports that could destabilise the populace, with probable elfect of
undermining the authority ol the colonial regime. As lor the retention of that Ia$'
suhsequent to the colonial admrnistration, the probable reason is that the process of larl'
refbrm has not been vigorOus or extensive enough to review the relcvance of larvs. suclt
as section 50, in the changed circrtnrstances since their enactmcnt. In the circumslanccs.
I
I
a
l0
t
ir
one cannot with certainty, point to the purpose for which section 50 is retained in the
Penal Code to day. The effect of section 50, however, is evident. It makes any person
who publishes a statement, rumour or report, which the prosecution holds out to be
"false" and to be "likety" to cause public fear or alarm, or a disturbance of public peace,
liable to criminal prosecution. and to imprisonment if convicted. What can be said rvith
cet"tainty therefore, is thar section 50 is supposed to protect the public against ialse
statements, rumours and reports that are likely to cause any of the stated mischief.
It is not in dispute that the impugned section 50 is a limitation on the enjoyment of the
right to the freedom ofexpression; and that it is concerned with public interest rather than
the rights of others. What is in contention is whether, as such a limitation, it fits within
thc parameters of Article 43. To fit within those parameters, it must satisry two
crrnditions; narnely -
. it must be directed to prevent or remove "prejudice to public interesl" (clause
l);
and in addition,
. it must be a:neasure that is acceptable and demonstrably
justifiable in a lree and
democratic society (clause 2).
These conditions, which are interrelated, in effect constitute the sub-issues in this appeal.
Prcjudice to public i letest
I will consider the first sub-issue from two complimentary perspectives, namely the form
and the substance of section 50. Clause (l) of Article 43 allows for derogation of rights,
or limitation of their enjoyment, in respect of two exceptional circumstances or scenarios,
narnely, where the enjoyment of one's right "prejudices" either the personal rights of
orhers or the public interest. Those are grave circumstances presenting actual mischref or
danger ro "the rights of others" or to "the public interest". In those exceptional
circumstances, the Constitution allows for derogation or lirnitation in order to aven or
t
I
o
ll
t
remove real mischief or danger. The clause does not expressly or implicitly extend to a
third scenario, where the enjoyment of one's right is "likely to cause prejudice"' I do not
understand the clause to permit derogation of guaranteed rights or limitation of their
enjoyment, in order to ave|1 speculative or conjectural mischief or danger to public
interest. Section 50, however, relates precisely to that third scenario. It is directed to a
clangcr, if it is a danger at all, which is remote. and even uncertain. At nrost. section 5
(')
aims at pre-ernpting danger to the public interest. It is in that regard distinguishab[" irom
a la$ tlirected to prevent. tbr exampJe, expressions tllat alllount to threatetritrg Lrr inciting
Violcnce. 1'hc danger to the public itrterest in such circttmstances is proxirnalc t() thc act
of the expression, and therefore the expression
"prejudices" the public interest' A tragic
example in recent history is the use of the mass media to ignite genocide in Rwanda. on
the lace of it theretbre, section 5O in its current form does not fall within the description
of t[.re purposes for which lirnitation on enjoyment of rights is permissible under Article
4l( I
). Is
it plausible then, pursuant to Article 273, to construe the section in a manner that
would make it conform to Article 43( I
)?
The ma.iority I iew in the Constitutional court was that section 50 would confirrlr to
..\rticle 4-l by transplanting into it, $,ords lrom clause (1 ), to rephrasc thr' dcllrrition ol the
ot'lence.'[he learne'cl Berko ].A, plrt it thus -
" l t,tt,tt ttJ'tlt tthr,r,e pr.Ot ition t,'lrt 131 1 t)r(!eI lu t,hlL.ttt tt)t1\'ttIit]tt tttl\tLt
.\ct.tio 50( l) <.tl lht, Petrul cttdt: ,lt'l llrc sldlL' ltd.\ l()
Pt
o\'(: lltttl ' llr lrtlt,.'
\ltttt'ttlttll
rumour or report is likel) t0 Dre iutlica thc lunlunrcnlul or otlt er htttt turt t i!hl.\
ond freedons o f olhers o rlheD ublic interest'."
With due respect, that definition would not produce the desired conformity, as it still
would not fit within the two scenarios envisaged in clause (1) of Article 43. It would
remain in the third scenario. What I have said about the offence in its current definition
would apply with equal force to it as so redefined. I have instead considered an option,
a
a
22
/
'
t
a
a
23
which neither party canvassed in the lower court or in this court' namely to remove the
conjectural element and constnre the offence as confined to publishing an expression,
which
,,causes,'
public fear or alarm or disturbance of public peace. After all, the
prohibition in section 50 applies to a publication that "causes" as much as to that which is
,'likety
ro cause" any of the stated mischief. However, I have concluded that such
construction is not plausible for two reasons. First, it is tantamount to restructuring the
legislation in a manner that goes beyond modification, adaptation, qualification and
exception envisaged in Article 273. Given the uncertainty about the objective olenacting
and./or retaining section 50. the coun is ill suited to redefine it. The task is best lefi in the
hands of Parliament, which is more suited:
(a) to determine if in that arr'a there is
substantial concem, which
.iustifies
a limiting legislation; (b) to idcntit,r the' strict
objective of that legislationl and (c) to design the minimum rncasure and treans tbr
achieving that objective. Secondly, it appears to me that therc is ample law, both cri:ninal
and civil, rvhich covers the special circumstances envisaged under clause ( I ) of Article
43, e.g. law of defamation, criminal libel and inciting violence. Parliament may discover
on inquiry, that there is no pressing or substantial concern to warrant any more restriction
on the enjoyment of the freedom than is already in place. Altematively, it may recognise
on such inquiry, that the concern such as there may be, would best be dealt with under
provisions of the Press and Joumalist Act, rather than under the Penal Code. In the
circumstances, I have to consider the impugned section as il is.
In regard to competing interests that I alluded to earlier, the cornpetition in the inslarrt
case is betq,een the interest of upholding the right to the fieedonr of expr,-'ssit,n. on thc'
one hand. and the interest of protecting the puhiic agarnst such excrcis,-' ol lltr-' Irr'ctlottt lt.
is "likely to cause public tear or alarm, or disttrrhancc of puhlic peace". otr the othcr'
Ultimately, in the context of clause ( I
)
of Article 43. the question to answcr is rvhethcr
the danger, against which section 50 protects the public is so substanlial, as to prejudice
public interest and warrant limitation of enjoyment of the guaranteed right to freedom ol'
t
expression. In his judgment, Berko J.A. rationalised the limitation imposed by section 50
as an end in itself. He did not contemplate the notion of balancing the limitation against
the protection ofthe right. That is evident inter alia, from the following assertions in the
judgment
-
" the
function
of the law, and particularly criminal law, should (be to) exclude
from
the range of individual choice those acts that are tncompatible with the
maintenance of public peace and the safety and rights of individuals. Freedom of
speech and expression cannot be invoked to prolect a person 'who falsely
shouts
lire,fire,
in a lheatre and causins oanic'. " (emphasis is added)
In principle, I accept that the larv should be utilised 'lo exclude lrom the range of
individual choice' (i.e. prohibit) acts incompatible with maintenance ol'public peace and
the safety and rights of individuals. I-lowever. Iam constrained to say, with due rcspect,
that in his illustration, the leamed Justice misconstrued or overlooked pertinent issucs. In
the first place, the issue in this case is not whether law should be utilised to prohibit those
acs. That is a given. The issue is whether the prohibition imposed by section 50 is valid
under the Constitution. Where a law prohibits an act, which is otherwise an exercise of a
protected right, that prohibition is valid only if it fits within the parameters of Article 43.
In that regard, a law prohibiting the 'false fire alarm', would fit within the parameters of
clause (l) of Article 43 only on the premise, and to the extent, that the alarm 'causes
panic', and the 'panic' so caused, prejudices public interest. Secondly, the illustration falls
short of applying the full scope of section 50.
A court applying section 50 to the false fire alarrn would convict and sentence to
imprisonment. the person who shouted the false alarrn, il it is satisfied that at the tirnc thc
alarm was expressetl. it was "likely" to cause panic, notwithstanding thal no p'ranic ri rs
actually caused. That would mean overriding the right to the freedom of expression,
when the public interest is not prejudiced at all. In those circumstances can it be said that
I
I
24
t
o
a
thedanger,againstwhichsection50Protectsthepublicissubstantialandprejudicesthe
public interest? ln my view, the answer must be in the negative' My conclusion
is that
bothinformandinsubstance,section50doesnotfitwithintheparametersofclause(I)
of Article 43' It goes beyond
what is permissible under' and
is therefore
not saved by'
tlratclause.ThatissufficientgroundformetoholdthatSection50doesnotpassthefirst
test of validity' Nevertheless,
because of the importance
of this case' I will also test the
impugned legistation
against what I have called the constitutional
yardstick'
Slandatd of fimitalion
In clause
(2) (c) of Article 43' lhe Constitution
sets out an objective
standard against
which every lirnitation
on the enjoyment of rights is measured for validity' Counsel
lor
therespondenturgedtheCourttoconslruethatstandardsubjectively,onthepremisethat
rvhatis',acceptablcandjustrfiable',variesiiomonedetnocraticsocietytoanothcr'Ir.lrl
not agree. That approach
wotrld distorr lhe standard set out by the Constitution'
lhe
provision in clatrse
(2) (c) clearly presupposes the existence
of universal
delnocratic
values and principles, to which every clemocraric
society adheres lt also underscores
the
tacrtlratbyherConstitution,Ugandaisademocraticstatecommittedtoadheretotlrtlse
valuesandprinciples,andtherefore,tolhatsetstandard.Whiletheremaybevariationsiir
application,thedemocraticvaluesandprinciplesremainthesame'LegislationinUganda
that seeks to limit
the enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression is
not valid under
the Constitution,
unless it is in accord with the universal democratic
values and principles
that every free and democratic society adheres to' The court must construe the standard
objectively.
In R vs' Oakes ?6 D'L'R'
(4rh) 200' the Supreme Court of Canada elaborated
onthatStandaldinrelationtos.loftheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms.rvhich
insimilarternrsaSArticle43.setsoutthestandardoIjustiticationofltnlitaticrnonthe
errjoymcnt of rights guaranteed by the said Clanadian Charter' ln his juclgrnent' uitlr
rvhich all other members of the court concurcd' Dickson C J C said -
25
o
"lnclusion of these words ('free and democratic society,) as the
final
standard of
justilication
for
limits on rights and
freedoms refers
the court to the very purpose
for
which the Charter was originally entrenched in the Consritufion; Canadian
society is to be
free
and democratic. The court must be guided by the values and
principles essential to a
free
and democratic sociery, which I believe embody, to
name but a.few, respecr.for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment
to socialjustice and equality.......The underlying values and principles of a
free
and democratic society are the genesis of the rights and
freedoms guaranteed
by
the charter and the ultimare standard against which a limit on a righr or
freedom
must be shown... .... to be reasonable and demonslrably justified... .....s. I provides
criteria ofjustifcation
for
limits on the rights and
fr.eedoms
guaranteecl ht, thc
('harter.
These criteria irrpose a srringenr standard o.f
.lusti/icat ion ... .The ontts o{
proving that a limit on a right or
freedom
guaranteed b1, the Charter ts rea.sonttble
and demonstrablv justiJied in a
-free
and democratic sociei, re\t.t upon thc parl
seekins ttt uphold the limikztion. lt is clear
fr.ont
the te.rr oJ s. I thur rhe /imir.t on tlrc
rights and
freedoms enunterated in the Charrer are exceprions to their guaranree.
The presumption is that the rights and
freedoms are guaranteed unless the party
invoking s. I can bring itself within the exceptional criteria which justifl their being
limited."
similarly, under Article 43(2) democratic values and principles are the criteria on which
any limitation on the enjoymenr of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constirution
has to be.iusrified. In determining the validity olthe limiration imposed by section su on
the tieedom of expression, the courr must be guided by the values and principies essenrial
to a tree and democratic societl, . In IIark florl & .,\notlr er vs. i\l in i.ste r rrf llrrrne
.\ffairs & Anot her , JS.C. 36/2000: Civil Applicarion No. 156/991, the Suprenre Courr o1'
O
a
26
;
Zimbabwe formulared rhe following summary of criteria, with which I agree, for
j9*'i!9E,.9torhl..lr-rposinglirpitationonguaranteQdrtg}l.!t-.-rar-Li
o the legislative objective which the limitation is designed to
Promote
must be
sufficiently important to warrant overriding a
fundamental
right;
. the measures designed to meet the objective must be rationally connecled to il and
not arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational consideraliow;
. the means used to impair the right or
freedom
must be no more than necessary to
accompl is h the obi ect ive.
I have already indicated my view that the apparent objective, which section 50 promotes
is not sufficiently important to warrant overriding the right to freedom ofexpression. In
order to illustrate the reason for that view, horvever, let me revert to balancing the
competing interests in the instant case. ln the one balancing scale, are two bencllts in rcel
terms that are derived from upholding the right to freedom ol expression. First, the
individual derives self-fulfilment from the exercise of the tieedom, or from receiving
rntbrrnation or ideas from those who impart it. l'his is panicularly true of the right to
freedom ofthe press, because the essence olthe media's existence is to impart knowledge
to the public. Secondly, the country as a democratic society derives the benefit of
promoting and maintaining democratic govemance. In the second scale to balance against
all that, is the non-quantifiable benelit derived from protecting the public, not against real
or actual danger, but in effect against the speculative or conjectural danger of "likely
public fear, alarm or disturbance of public peace". Clearly, the benefit in the second scale
is so obviouslv outr.veighed that I have to conclude that it cannot
justify
oveniding the
l.cnellt in the llrst scale.
Other considerations support the same conclusion that the lirnitation imposed b1' sr'ction
50 on the right to freedom of expression is not.iustified. Thc lirst is that thc' el'ltct ol'of
sr'ctron 50 is not proportional to the apparent objective it is supposed to achicve. Given
t
I
27
o
thar the objective of section 50 is to prevent publication of expressions likely to cause
public fear alarm or disturbance of peace even if it does not cause any such mischief, to
criminalize the publication
and make it punishable with imprisonment, is akin to the
proverbial killing of a mosquito with a sledgehammer. This is exacerbated by the special
characteristics of the offence whereby the prosecution does not have to prove guilty
knowledge but instead, to avoid liability, one has to take'provable measures to verifo'the
otcuru.y of every statement' rumour or report before publishing it' Without in any way
condoning reckless or even negligent publications, I think the provision therehy intposcs
e gla\,er impediment on the lieedom of expression than is necessarl,, fhe tlrc;tsttre is
clearly. not proporlional to thc mischiel and that makes it that much less acceptable
irncl orjusrifiable in a free and democratic socien '
o
a
1a
A related difficulty inherenr in section 50, is that its very wide applicability makes it
extremely difficult to determine ahead of publication, what exPression will be perceived
as likely to cause the mischief guarded against. I have already alluded to the difficulties
in determining falsity. similar, if not worse, difficulties confront those who have to guess
before deciding to publish, what perception a publication might evoke. In @.lf,..Govg
Chavunduka case, Chief Justice Gubby put the point graphically thus -
"The expressiort 'fear. alarnr or despondency' is over'broad Almost anything
newsworthy is likeh'lo cause, to some degree at leasl' in a section of the puhlit
or in a single person. o,E or olher of these ;uhieclit'e entoliotzt '1
report of a
btts accident whic,h mtstokenly in/brms that fllh, insteud o/
.|ilr^'-ntne
pas\engers
were killed. mighr be consitlered to
fall foul
o.7 s'50(2 ttat
"
ln practical terms, the broadness can lead to grave consequenccs especially aflccting thc
media. Because the section is capable of very wide application, it is bound to frequentll'
place news publishers in doubt as to what is safe to publish and what is not' some
joumalists will boldly take the plunge and publish,
as the appellants did, at the risk of
.-1
o
o
a
suffering prosecution, and possible imprisonment. Inevitably, however, there will be the
more cautious who, in order to avoid possible prosecution and imprisonment, will abstain
lrom publishing. Needless to say, both the prosecution of those who dare. and the
abstaining by those rvho are cautious, are gravely in.jurious 1o thc freedom of L-xpression
and consequently to democracy. Additionally, thc *,ide applicabilit-v o1'section 50 has tlrr'
adverse eflect of placing in the state prosecutor corrcspondingly rast discrc'tiort itt
t
J'. tcrnrining lor uhat publication to rnstitutc a prusce ution. Thc fornt and degrec ,'t lcrir.
aI rrl or disturbance of peace; the fi'action of the public perceived to be likely to incur
any of the mischief guarded against; are all aspects ofl the offence Ieft to the unfettered
I
discretion of the state to determine on individual case basis. This unfettered discretion
opens the way for those in power to perceive criticism and all expressions that put them
in bad light, to be likely to cause mischief to the public. In that regard, I find the
following observation of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Hector vs.
Attornel General of .4ntisua and Ba rbuda ( I990) 2 AC 3 12, at p. 3 I8 pertinent. [-ord
Bridge of Harwich said -
"ln a.fi'ee dentocratic societ\t it is almost loo obvious to need stating thot Ihose v lrt
hold olJice in governnten! and who are responsihle
fitr
publit atlminislrutiott trtust
alv,6ys 6s open lo criticism. Any attempl to stifle or
fetter
such criticism anounts
to polirical censorship o/ the most insidious and objectionable kind. At the sante
time it is no less obvious that the very purpose ofcriticism levelled ar those who
have the conduct of public affairs by their political opponents is to undermine
public confidence in their stewardship and to persuade the electorate that the
opponents would make a better job of it than those presently holding ofiice. In the
light of these considerations their Lordships cannot help viewing a statutory
provision which criminalizes statements likely to undermine public confidence in
the conduct of public a.ffitirs with the utmost suspicion."
:9
o
Thechargesheerallegedthattheappellantspublishedfalsenews.citingtheexcorpts
reproducedearlierinthisjudgment,butwithoutparricularisingthemischiefthatthe
publicationwaslikelytocause.That,ofcourse,wasadefectbecausepublishingfalse
nervs per se is not an offence even under section 50 l-lowever' no one addresscd that
defect'Atthetrial,theprosecutioncalledfourwitnesses,whohadreadtheoffending
article, to testi$ on their respective perceptions' In her ruling, the leamed trial magistrate
observedthattherewasconsiderablediversityintheevidenceofthosewitnesses.only
one,theSeniorPresidentialAdvisorontheMedia,testifiedthatuponreadingthestoryhe
was extremely alarmed because he thought there was going to develop tension between
Ugandaandaneighbouringcountry.Twoofthewitnessesfearedforpersonalreasons.
'l'he
officer who allegedly esconed the gold feared because people would regard him as
verl' rich; and an official of the Bank of Uganda' from whom the second appellant had
soughtinformationbeforepublication,fearedhavingbeenmisquoted..[hefourthrr'itness.
anotherofficialoftheBankofUgandatestifiedthatthenewselatedherbecauseslrc
thought Llganda,s fbreign reserves would increase. The learned trial Magistratc herst'lf'
saidintheruling:/tll,ouldbegoingbeyondt.easoniJ-lweretoholdlhallhemerewritittg
thar ti gandn was paid in gold which gold was transferred to Uganda by Lt Col' Lutaya
could cause
Jbar
or alarm." All this goes to show that a simple story can evoke diverse
emotional reactions from different individuals' Similarly' the perception of the likely
effectofasimplestoryonthepublicwoulddifferfromoneprosecutortoanother.Itis
t
a
I
Thatwassaidinrespectofanexpressstatutoryprovision'whichmadetheprintingor
distributionofanyfalseStatementlikelytounderminepubticconfidenceintheconduct
of pubtic affairs a criminal offence' In my view' it applies to situations where' under the
I
guise of protecting public interest, section 50
is apptied to expressions'
which in essence
I
amount to criticism of covernment conduct. Some particulars of the appellants' criminal
prosecution help to illustrate the problem'
30
;
Y
/
evenconceivablethatanothercourt'sharingthesameperceptionasthestateprosecutor
in the instant case'
could have convicted
on the same facts' The effect
of the offending
StatementsintheinsEntcasecouldhardlybedifferentfromthatinthecaseofHaruna
Kanabi
vs. usanda criminar
Appeal
No.l2l95,
where the High court
upheld
a
convictionundersectionSOin'"'ptoofafalsepublicationthatthePresidentofUganda
had visited Rwanda
attttibtd
as "the 40rh district
of Uganda"'
to solicit
votes
for the
inrpending
presidential
elections
l am constrained
to wonder' whether counlering
such
"l'11\e ne\\s
t'' publishing
"the truth"
would not be a more effective
measure
than
prosecution
under the Penal
Code'
Clearly.
because
ol its broad
applicability'
section
50 lacks
sullicient
guidance
on what
is, and what is not' safe to publish'
*"::::t::::1r1ffi[ix::n:::'Ti"
H:HII'I;.,;li*T:J*.:J-'*;'.n"-;"iy':::"llreavessuch
unfettered
discretion
in the state Prosecutor
to determine'
from time to time'
what
constitutesairiminaloffence'cannotbeacceptabie'andisnotjustifiableinafreeand
democratic
societY'
o
o
a
leg
udicial
precedents
referred
to in this appeal'
I find support
for my conclusions'
in several
j
sidered
legislation
similar
to section
50 lt
in rvhich courts in different iurisdictions
con
f rvhich the courl
declared
the questroned
will suffice
to highlight only
two' in each o
l he imPugncd
legislation
tn It r:. /,n
islation
inconsistent
rvith the constitutlon
Code.
which made
it an indictable
offe
( supra ) was s. I 8 I of the Canadian
Criminal
ntleI
ncc tr)
news or rale,
which
(b) occasions
or ts likelt
b)
wilfu lly and knowinglY Publish
ary false
ittteresl.The
Canadian
Charter
of Rights
and
b occasion
injury or mischief
ro any public
ression under
s'2 (b) in similar
terms as our
Freedoms,
protects the
right to tieedom
of exp
for
justified limitation like our Article
43
Article
29 (l) (a), and under s'l it provides
31
a
t
Mclachlin J., as she then was, writing the majority judgment,
carefully analysed the said
s. I 8l showing its incompatibility with principles governing limitation of rights that is
acceptable under s,l ofthe Charter. In concluding, she said at p'222
-
"Thevalueoflibertyofspeech,oneofthemostfundamentalfreedomsprotectedby
the Charter, needs no elaboration. By contast, the objective ofs lSf in so
far
as
an objective can be ascribed, falls
short ofconstituting a countervailing interest of
the most compelling nature. In
@fup
(supra), Dicl<son C'J'C' made it clear that
the less important the provision's objective, the less tolerable is an adverse ffict
uponthefundamentalft.eetlom,sectionlSlcould.supportcriminalizatiotlof.
expression only on the basis that the sanction v'as closely cr:tnfined to silualiotl
()l
serious concern, ln
fac.t,
s, l8 ] extends the sanclion o/.lhe Criminal law trl virtualll
any statentent actjuctgecl to be
falsety
ntade which might he seen as causing mischiel
orlikell,locausemischieftovirntallyanypttblicinteresl,Icannotconclttdetharit
has been shown to be'demonstrably
justified' in'afree and democratic society' To
strmmarise, the restriction on expression effected by s' t8l of the Criminal Code'
unlike thar imposed by the hate propaganda provision at issue in I(99114 @ase)'
cannot be justified under s. I of the charrer as a 'reasonable limit prescribed by
law as can be demonstably justified in afree and democratic society"'
Accordingly the courr held by majority that s.181 of the canadian criminal Code
infringed the right of free expression guaranteed by s 2 (b) of the Charter, and that the
infringement was not saved by s.l of the Charter.
The Supreme Court of T.irnbabrve in rrrk
(ior lt ('hlr
untlttka 1l nrl Another vs.
NI
\linistcr o f I{ome Affairs an<l Another (s)l pra). considered section 50(2Xa) of tlie l-an
and Order (Maintenance) Act, a piece ol' legislation that is almost identical to out'
impugned section 50. That legislation similarly made it an offence, punishable with
imprisonment for seven years, for a person to make, publish or reproduce any false
o
a
):
o
sutement, rumour or reporl "(a) likely to cause fear'
alarm or despondency among the
public or any part of the public; or (b) likely to dkturb the public peace " ln his
judgment, with which all the other members of the court concurred, Chief Justice Gubbay
said -
"...it has been emphasised that even stricter standards of permissible statutory
vagueness must be applied where
freedom
of expression is at issue;
fuLg!
ust llte rig hts of thos e who mav wish to communicate and im?art
o
o
eo, rd are nol i
ideas and information bul also those who mav wish to receive them
Does s.50(2)(a) of the Act overcome this threshold test? It is obvious that
the provision cloes not just criminalize false
s@tements,. ttor /alse slatements :|,lliL'11
actuallv cattse
Jbar'
alarm or desponclency There is no requirement of prool tt'l
ony cofisequences - of damage to the State or impact upon the public ll/hat the
lawmaker has provided
lbr
ts a speculative oJfence An offence has been created
outofaconjecturallikelihoodoffear,alarmordespondencywhichmayariseoul
of the publtcation of any statement, rumour or report, even to a single person lt
matters nQt that no
ibar,
alarm or despondency actually eventuates Because
5.50(2)(a)isconcernedwithtiketihoodratherthanrealityandsincethepassageof
time between the dates of publication and trial is irrelevant, it is, to my mind,
vague, being susceprible of toowide interpretation lt place'r persons in doubt as to
what can tawfully be done and what cannot. As a resul!, it exerls an unacceptable
"chilling fficr" ctn
freedom
of expression. since people will rend to steer clear ol
lhe potenlial zone of application ro avoid censure, and liabilin to serve d nta'\tnluttl
period of seven vears' imprisonment "
The courr declared that s.50 (2xa) of the Law and order (Maintenance) Act of Zimbabue
infringed the right to freedom oiexpression, and so contravened the constitution'
33
a
o
o
The respondenr in the instant case had the onus to show that the limitation imposed by
section 50 on the right to the freedom of expression, is necessary to prevent prejudice to
the public interest, and that the limitation is "acceptable and demonstrably
justifiabte in a
free and democratic society". In my view, he did not discharge that onus'
In the result, I would allow this appeal and set aside the majority decision and orders of
the Constitutional Court. I would grant the declaration that section 50 of the Penal Code
Acr (Cap. 120) is inconsistent with Article 29 (lXa) of the Constitution and is
consequenlly void. I would order that the appellants have the costs of the appeal in this
Court and of the proceedings in the Constitutional Court'
y'
u'o ul ) a.'t'L'- a te' /' y'c r'
.l-- t-,, c.,11*.;ct y*
tlt ,'lS.etio*tt
Belore taking leave of the case, I should. for guidance. comment on the preliminar;' order
medLbEthecoEorilBti{mB}€ti0if
thtastay hearing of the petition pending disposal of thtr
,c.rq4ipals.a9e
a1{el6trtlt€ ibpetlaiitSfn
1hd mlgistrate's court. The c6urt'ddddthC b'tdi' at
jtr
s$Blitlilstry-gsptrgltgstandin[t616run"in;tous
I
vieu]r'b*picsbddryylt6g]fti5pbti'
Uottr
gidesrspff$pFlititiffi*lb[1d
pidEdelslBprc the criminal uia!. fhe 06\Iit sdi[ed'thq 1easq4
for.thefrAidbr as follo.wir-
'
Wm*'ct^Wld'risthuitelnte"tha'tth|'iiuipdsebfthlifuffiAFffffSwu0wtbl'fw
(aw.Fv:efrp?IhE
trimtia'l pruiit'eiittion, But as'this.vourt held'in'conit.tPetiiion
No.4/97 A o hn vs. Attor Gen rul where criminal proceedings are pending
,in another.coufl,alid a petition is brought to this court in respect lo'the same
.matter, then
the petition should be stayed pending the determination of the
criminal matter in the trial court. AccordinSly we order that the petition be stayed
pending determination of Buganda Road court criminal case No.u 2636/9i
against the petitioners "
With the greatest:rdspect to the Constitutional Court, that order was misconceived' It is
,linconsisteiit:With
thp.lqtter and spirit'of the€onstitutiqBr.[&dPl Ahiater[}?i'arry
person
34
T
rglqstrS$e
Constitutional Court'in one of two ways. First, a person may petition fie
. Cogitutiblut 6ourt di*ctly for a declaration that any law, act or omission is inconsisrent
.wi*tii't'corilEtEHti6n ola provision of the Constitution. Secondly, a party ro an]
g$Sffid.urt of law, in which a question arises as to the interpreradon of the
Cgri*ltUtion, may request that court to refer the question to the Constitutional Court lbr
decision. Clause (7) of Article 137 provides that in either case, the court -
.l&Wl
proceed to hear and determine the petition as soon as postible.and may,
for
that purpose, suspend any other matter pending before il."
ere a court refers a question that arises in proceedings before it, it must await the
.{ecision
of the question by the Constitutional Court, and "dis the cas tn
accordance with that decision." The rationale for these provisions.'is obvious. The
Constitution is the basic law from which all laws and actions derive validity. Where tli,
constitutional validiry of any law or action awaits determination by the Constirurrcrn.
Court, it is important to expedite the determination in order to avoid apptving a lau, r
taking action whose validitv is questionable.
DA I'ED at IVIen
tl
-2.
gothis t l'' day of fulu l00l
J N Mulenga
JUSTICE OF THE SI.IPREME COURT
35
{wr'
a'
o
7
7
t.'.
f
fteean^
.4 e-xprer-i,*
(CORAM: ODOKI CJ, ODER, TSEKOoKO, KAROKORA, MULENGA,
KANYEIHAMEA, JJ,S.C AND T]YAMUGISHA AG. JSCl
CONS]'ITU'I'IONAL APPEAL NO.2 OF 2Ot)2
THE IIEPUBLIC OF IJGANDA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA
AT MENGO
6ETWEEN
o
1. CHARLES ONYANGO OBBO)
2. ANDREW IIUJUNI t,tw:NrjA)
AND
APPELLANTS
RESPONDENI'
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
(Appeal {ro]t the decision of the Constitutional Cour-t
(Manyindo, Mukasa Kikonyogo, DCJ, Kato,
Berko Engwau JJA,
artc! Trvirronruj,,i JA Dissenting) i, corstitutionar pelitictrt
No. 1s
oi 1997. ctated 21" July 2000)
o
JUDGMENT OF ODOKI. CJ
I i[rve irao (rre r]tiireril ur rearoirrg rr)0iLlt trrr
JUUgnlurri,,rr_rlrirretl l_ry
said in Man atid tlte Motlerrr State "no
one ltas the power to
o
control l'tis ittterrrai tltougltts and fec,lirtgs nor k) prevent hiut
front outvlarclly expr.'ss//rg /rjs ll;oi/g/)ts ;trtcl feelings.
Moreover freedont of objection and of discussiorr is one of the
surest sources of truth." (See Vallant F Sir (ed) An lntroduction
to the Study of Huntan Rights, 1972, page 46.)
Freedom of expression is recognised and protected by rrarty
internatronal converrtiorrs and declarations as well as national
constitutions. This freedom rs guaranteed under Article 2g (1) (a)
of the Uganda Constitutton. Although the Constitution does not
define what corrstitutes freeclom of expression, it rs gerieralll,
accepted tlrlrt rt entairls tlrL' frocdonr to lrold o[)[ror rs arrc] l,o seen.
receive and inrpart information and ideas of all kinds, either orally,
in writing, in print, in the form of a11, or through other chosen
media, without inference by public authority and regardless ol
frontiers (see: the lnternational covenant on civrl and
politrcal
Rights, Article 19, and the European Convention on Humarr
Rights, Article
'10). tn
Thornhilt V Atabama 310 US BB, pages
101-102, the US Supreme Court observed that freedom of speech
or of the press should be icientified with
,,the
liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfttlly all matters of public concern without
fear of subsequent punishntent.,'
Freedom of the press is a special freedom within the scope of
freedom of expression. Freedom of the press is considered as the
right to investigate anci pLrblish freely. But as Lord Denning saicl in
Scherinq Chenticals V. Falkntan Lrsl
(1981
\ry L.R.B48
o
)2
freedom of the press "covers not only the right of fhe press t<r
o
impart infornration of getteral interest or concen, but also the
right of the public to receive it."
The importance of freedom of expression inctucling freedom of the
press to a democratic society cannot be over-emphasised
Freedom of expression enables the public to receive information
and ideas, which are essential for them to participate in their
governance and protect the values of democratic government, on
the basis of inforrrred decisions. lt promotes a market place ot
ideas. lt also enables tlrose in government or authority to be
brought to public scrutiny and thereby hold them accountable.
ln Mark Gova Chavunduka & Artother vs The Minister of Home
o
Affairs and Another Supreme Court Civil Application No.156 of
1999, the Suprerne Courl of Zimbabwe emphasised the special
objectives that freedom of expression seryes in a democracy, in
these words:
"Furthermore, what has been emphasised is that
freedont of expresslon /ras four broad special
objectives to serve: (l) it helps an individuat to
obtain self-fulntent; (ir) it assisfs in the discovery
of truth and in promoting political and social
participation: (iii) it strengthens the capacity of an
individual to participate in decisiort trtaking; and
(iv) it provides a ntechanisrrt by whiclt it would be
possib/e to establish a reasonahle balance
between stability arrd change. See fo the san,e
effect Thonrson News ers Co. vs Canada (1ee8) a
51 CRR (2" 189 (Can. SC) at 237."
Democracy is a fundamental constitutional value and principle in
Uganda. The Preamble to the Constitution declares that the
3
o
o
people of Uganda are cornmitted ro establisning "a socr<t-
economic and political order throLtgh a popular and durable
national Cortstitution b.rsed on tlte principles of urtity, peace,
equality, democracy, freedom, social justice
and progress."
Clause ll of the National Objectives and Directive Principles of
State Policy in the Constitution sets cut Democratic Principles,
which provide, irrter a/ia that,
"(i) fhe State shall be based on democratic
principles which empower and encourage the
active participation of all citizens at all levels
itt tlteir own govenlance."
Furthernrore Article
.i
of the Constitution i'ecounrses ilrr:
sovereignty of the people and declares that "a// authority of the
State emanates from the people of Uganda, and the people
shall be governed through their will and consenf." lt is further
provided in Article i (4),
"The people slra// express their will and consent
on who shall govern thent and how they should be
governed, through regular, free and fair elections
of their representatives or through referenda."
The Biii of llrglrts rn Citirpter 'l guararrtees ror orrly civii arrl
political rights but also social, cultural, and economic rigtrts
lndeed the entire Constitution reflects a cornmitment by the peopte
of Uganda to establish a free anci cierrrocratic society. Tlrr,
implementatior-r of tlte varic-rus gov..rnmcnt
1tt_rlicies
un
dentocratisatrorr and liberaitiorr clearly cientonstreltes that Uganda ts
building a democratic society.
-t
O
The breadth and irrrportance of the right to free speech were
emphaslsed by the European Court of l-lurnan Rights in thd
Handvside vs The Urtited Kinctdoru (1979-- 80), 1.EHRR 737
(para.49) as being inherent in the concept of a democratic anci
pluralistic society. ln a celebrated statement, the Court observed,
"Freedom of expression constitufes one of the
essenfia/ foundatiorts of a dentocratic society and
orte of the basic conditiorts for its progress and for
tlte developtrrertt of every tttan. Subject to para.2
of Article 10 (of the European Cortvetrtiort ott
Huntan Riglrts), it ls applicable not ottly to
"information" ot "ideas" that are favourably
received, or regarded as inoffensiye or as a matter
of indifference but also to those which offend,
shock, disturb fhe State or any sector of the
populatiort. Such are tlte dentancls of that
pluralisnt, tolerance and broadrnindedrress without
wlriclt there is uo democratic society."
The second point to emphasise is that freedom of expression is
not absolute or bour.rdless, even in the most dernocratic societies
lnstead limitations nray be inrposed on the freedom of expression,
which strike a balance between State involr,,enreirt in the press arrcl
media alutononty, as well as between freedonr of cxpression and o1
the press and other basic rights and social interests, protected by
law.
The Uganda Constitutron abolrshed claw-back cl:ruses rn the Brll ol
Rights, which previously unduly restricted the enjoyment of basjc
human rights and freedoms. The general standard set for testing
the pernrissible limitations is now contained in Article 43. ln case
of freedom of expressiorr guaranteed under Artrcle 2g 1(a), no
o
5
o
restriction on the freedorn is permissible unless it is intended tc,
protect the riglrts of otlre.r's r.lr' the publir; interest As ret.;zrrt.is
1_rutrlit;
interest, the lirtritatiorr mrlst not go "beyond what is acceptable
and demonstrably justifiable
in a free and democratic society,
or what is provided in this Constitution."
The scope of the limitatrons imposed on freedom of expressiorr
has been considered by courts in various jurisdictions
throughout
the world including United Kingdom, Canada, lndia, Zimbabwe,
Zambia, Nigeria, European Union and the United States. The
criteria or tests to be adopteci in deciding whether the limitation is
permissible have been evolved. Of particular relevancy have been
the decisions which have considered, whether the offence of
publishing a false statement or rumour, is a permissible limitation
to freedom of expression. These include the decisions in the
Canadian case of RV. Zundet (1992) 10 CCR (2^d) 193 and the
Zinrbabr,velrn o" Mark Gova Chavunduka & Arrother V
Minister of Home Affairs and Another (supra). These decisions
have been ably considered in the judgment
of my learned brother
Mulenga JSC. ln both cases provisions similar to section 50 of the
Penal Code Act were strLick down as r-rnconstitutional.
The offence of publishing false news under section 50 of the
penat
Code Act is too vague, wide, and conjectural to provide the
necessary certainty required to impose an acceptable limitation on
freedom of expression. The determination of falsity of a statement
and likehood of causing fear or alarm are problematic.
The
limitation puts the press ancj other rledia in a dilernma as to
whether to publish and face punishment or not to publish and
o
()
o
o
witltitold tite irtforrturttL,ri ii..rttt tltc ptil)lt,- iI rtltpose:; a]rl
unacceptable chillin!l e[it:ut ort tite f reeclorrl of ti-tt:
l.rtess
lt doc:;
not serye any pressing ot !;ubstatttial sociatl Ireed, !vhich outweighs
the need to protect freetiom of expressiolt. Orr tlre cotttrary, tlr(l
limitation is out of
!lroi,i()Tttotl
to the oi,rler;tivr: rttttttrle(i 1,l lrt'
attetnrrri Ti't... lrrtitlrli,..,i' :i rt,rt ttc(lossill\,' l()
J)rr)li'(il
ilt(' ti(ilrlil
othcrS Or to prutect ttru pUbltc iirterest. lI ts lit.:te lor.: r](lL
acceptable or denlonstt arbly
lustifiable
in a free artcl democratic
society.
lagree with rvhat l\4c Nlilly J.A. said in iris concr.trr irrr;
ltlriqntr:rrt
rrr
lhe MaIk Gova Chavunduka Case. (sLrpra),
"The section is foo widely expressed toc.t unclear
as to its lirrtitatiorts, and too itttitrticlatirrg (becaust,
no-one can be sure whether what he says or writes
will or will rtot attract prosecution or
intprisortntettt.) That is why it cannot slarrc/.
We are not saying that freedorn of expression is
limitless. We are not saying that people may
publish artytlting they wislt, however porrtographic,
Itowever urttrutlrfully subversive, ltowc'ver race-
Itatrecl itrspirittg ....... All we are sayirtg is that tlre
sectiolr is unacceptab/e as it stands. "
I am of the opinion that Section 50 of the Penal Code Act was
saved r-rnder Article 27'-{ of tlre Constiturtion, brrl rro rrrodific;rtir.,l
can brirtg rt rr-r crrnlor'r rtrl'. wiir ttlc aor stitrrtrort. lirr: S,;.:tior rs ;
conflict with the provisiorrs oi Article 29(1) (a) of ll re Cc,rtstitutir-,i;
and rs therefore void.
o
o
It is rry consir-iere.rl oputron rl rat Section 5U of the Penail Code Act
belongs to those Iar,vs wirich should ltave !leen repeiiler.i folktwirtr;
tlre prontLrlg..ltir)n L)1 titu ,ll\'lij Crl r:;litr tir:rr li r., l:irll tiiitc tliil :.
cOllrprehensr\/e exel-cise is carrreci oLtt to revtew oI r uprg3l 511g1 ,
laws which are inconsistent with the Cr:nstitutiorr,
I agree vrith It4ulenr^a JSC that the ConstitLitionlil CloLtrt wits i;l
error to stlsl)L'DCj the irclr ing oi ihe t;orrstitutitrn;rl l)(jtilii)r1
;.rt:1tlirr.
the ct-tnclusrull ul I it t-, c i i r I I I I :j r j)lL,surluttun. Ilrc uourt :-;rtr_rLtlrt 1a,,,
heard the pLrtition trrst arrd suspenclecl tlre hearin!.r of rirt-, crrnirxr
case, because Constitutional Cases take precedence over other
cases,
As the othL.r nrenlbcIS t,r Ihc Cotrt als;,._t i]Ure,,, willl tl:,:
luclgrne.r
t
arrd orclers prr.;posuti 5y rly leirrnccl [_rro tet, lVluierrt.;lr JSC, tlr,;
unaninrous decision of the Court is as follows: -
rir
(Dl
(c)
Dated at IVlcrrgt-r llris
Thrs ltl-rLrglti is :tllornreti
It is rjo.clar'ed rhat Sectron 5Lr of the Penal
,.iocie
Act is
rnconsrsterrt with Arlicle 29 (1)(a) of the Corrstitutiol].
and rs void,
The appellants will have the costs of this appeal and in
the Colrstjtuti,.riral CoLirt i I
t,
day ot .l. 20O4
B. J Ocioki
CHIEF JUSTICE
,.-'-
/,.'/'.
(coRAM:
THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
UGANDA
AT MENGO
ODOKI, C.J, ODER, TSEKOOKO, KAROKOORA, MULENGA,
KANYEIHAMEA, ]J.S.C. AND BYAMUGISHA, AG'
].S.C)
CONSTITUTIONAL APPEAL NO. 2 OF 2OO2
BETWEEN
1
2
CHARLES ONYANGO OBBO
ANDREW MUJUNI MWENDA I
APPELLANTS
o
o
AND
1. ATTONEY GENERAL
I
RESPONDEN I-
JUDGMEN T OF ODER, ]SC
I have had lhe Jovijtltag(r c-,i reaClirrg irl draft the jr.rclg;rr retrt Of llly lcarncd L'r{''thilr
[.)r]lcnqi
"lsc,
.,titlt \\ltiLrr I :iLtr'1.i,. i Jlr.o .lqrr,,,
,.",rt:lt lltf til{I lrrtl .ji i)eil
ir( l, r''
allowed with costs.
ln his judgment, lvlulenga lSC, set out the background to, and the qrounds
appL'al. I shail rrot IL:[]ear tll!'lrr ilr rilis
ltlclqrnrlrlt'
I wisit to corllrllellt L)rl th.J filldlrlgs iJl thi LJrlstliLrt orl.)l Lutr[t r','hich '-Jav'r :L L" ir]'i
appellants' cc)rnplairtt in grorrnd one ot thc appeal. BL'rkc), JA
"vrottl
ihr: ltrC
judgment with lvhich thret other nrenlbere of the Court concurred: FOr tlle siikc oF
Clarity, I Shall rijf)riici"tCt-, ltereitl-Utldet tlr, lc !-/rrl[ ;,(]:iiJ(t!: I i']r5
lUtlr,
llt.': .. lr-
:-llu .
of,
o
o
"I
do agree tlr,tt article 29( 1) of tha Cortstitutitttt gu;tt'i't'IL'e> :t e"
speech and expression and also secures press freedont. These
are fundamental rights, It can be said that tolerating offensivc
conduct and speech is one of the prices to be paid fttr ,t
reasonably free and open society. Therefore, in nty view, the
function of the law,. attd particularly critnhtal l3w, should L'xLt:ti.ra
frorrt the ra ge uf individual cltoice tlrose acts lltdt ,tL:
incompatibte with the nraiDtelance of public
Peace
and tl,e
safety and rights of individuals, Freedom of sPeech and
expression cat,not be invoked to protect a person
!ryfo
falselv
sho u firt L' itt a tlte_ i,CLe tltd causirrtl Public Pan lc. Itt rtty
opinion where tlter.'at.' no constraints ott frec'lttttt of spt'.:t/t :tti,l
expression, the difficulty would arise that ot,e of the obiects of
ultholding free expression -
truth-would be defeated. It is
therefore important to regulate or limit the extent to which this
can happen: That i; the justification of enactting article '13 ot ttt,i
Constitution. A cititen is entitled to express hintself freely except
where the expression would
human riohts a nd fteedom of others or the oublic interest, I find
that section 5O of the Penal Code is necessary to cater for such
excesses, Clearly the democratic interest cdrrnot be seert to
require citizens tu make denronstrably untrue and alarntirtg
state rents t.ti)dei lltt gutse ol lrt'L'iltsr ol ;pt't':'/r .)r,li
expression....... fn rtty viery tlre trutl, or falselrood of thi arriclL'
is one of the ingredients of ofifences the state has to Drove."
Mr. -lames Nanqrval;r thL-: il[)prlllitnt"] luSrlliicl .oun'liJl, eritici:,'l thic iinCrt q i
''','
Constitutional Court ttr Su''.cl0l
5Iorr'Js.
llL c(rIlttr]aea, f.r:it.
rr'')' rlrir 1-p11 t i.. .'
address article -ti (2)
ic) -.i thc Cor)stituliorl.
Secortoly, that ilrany authorit.te',.'.'-;,:
cited by the appellants to that cour"t, but there's nothing to suggest that, tilat couft
o
considered them. This is in contrast with the dissenting
ludgnrent
of Twinomu;:,r',,
JA. None of tlte authoritias \v.tre [rindinq, bL:t were lltlrsuas
.'t. Lc.irrl'.]. .1 . '
COrlterrded tllJt L.\i'Irr alaflar' tllL- r.'an',tit,lti(lr),i ( ,,.111 lr.rai tt
'
,. lr'r ''l'r: r'
they rvefc' Trir'!.lnt Ti alrlr'r (ir'rilr!i \^,'tl.lt r:- ii((clll;ttl1,' .,tl'.t
j(
'i r: . I ' I I il I i . I : I
r
rl
a iree arrd dL'ntocratic society. Tile ieaflled coullsel contcnded that, had ll,'
Constitutional Court considered the relevance of article 43 (2), and the authoritic:r rn
question, it rryould not have cornc to the wrt)nq conclusiorr, whit:h it did, th:l ',,', t;r 'i
5ll rs not !iIdorl:]titLrti-,ilil .
Mr. Cheltorrettt tlt,l a.)rrrlLissi\lrre r lUr Civil L trg;ltrt,rr r l:,, ,'^\ll.rirr ,') ,,, i
CitantDer l.cprcser)tin!.J tl)e reSpor)dent, cr itrcrzcrl the a1lpr,'llitrrt ! r out)r,ci l.rr lr.rrr ,r .l
ground one the way il was framed. He contended that tlle appellant's cc,Lr :'.rl
restricted themselves to a narro\ry aspect of the Constitutiottal Court':. Cet isrc
AcCording tO tttc leillrcd CJttttitiss,onti, tttr'
(ot-tstttr,rirr)rtill (
!r.l: ',,-:i :-.:',ii'r '
section 50 is necessar',, tu I)rotcct 1lublic.
safely lJy llr rrtir)rj tl ,.;l,t
Lr
I i :
anicle 29 (l). There is no r^ray the Conslitutional Court coulcj irave said thitI scrlr,-l
50 was unjustifiable, Section 50 seeks to prohibit publication of false stdtenrrnts
and rumours; statements likely to cause fear or an alarm to the public, whlch nray
result in disturtlance of puoiic
lreace.
l-hese ttrc learnt'd cc,urr:ci c.riled t r.t,",1,, :.,
wirich go Dcyoncl thc r oht: prLrkrctrrl by artrcle l9 (l)tr,r ,.'lrrr-lr thu ,:utiri.,;', -. l
bL' pleselltecl.
'fllt
l('ilr r)tr] Cr)rlllllrssiurlcr Strl)lllitt(l(i tliirI rrr ,rrr], r [u .1.]t,'r r ,
wlretl)er sdctiun 50 contr:rvencs artic[r .2() (1), it siro,.rkl l), rr]i](l lo!;,'tn( r .,'.ili
clauses (l) and (2) of alticle 43. He also contended tlrat thr lest of :AhALtb
acceptable and demonstrabll justifiable in a free and democratic society"
is a subjective one.
"
Anicle 29 (1) (a) of the Constitution provrdes:
o
o
o
"29 (1) Every person shall have the right to - (a) Freedom of spee,tt
and expression, which shetll include freedont of thc press :trtd orltt'r
media."
The freedom of expression protectird by this article is not atlsoluti]. lt is sublcct t(', rl
provisions of ..111icltjs ']i, rrlrirlr
jtatL-:
"43 (1) In the enjoyDtent of the rights and freedonts presL'ribe.:1 itt r/tts
Chapter, no person shall prejudice the fundamental or other hunan
rights and freedonrs of others or the public interest
(2) Public interest urrder this drticle shall trot pL'fl tt-
(c) Any limitation of the enjoynrent of the rights and freedonts
prescribed by this Chapter beyond what is acceptable artd
demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society or whdt is
provided in this constitution. "
section 50 ( 1) Jl tllr f'tl.rl L.r,.jr-. r\a'., \'riliLlt tll( cplrcll.,nt - -r,.r
i- rl.ir i l ,l "
{j
,
:t i
being u nconstitutrona I provides:
"50 ( 1) Any person who publishes any false statentent rutnour or
report which is likely to cause fcar artd dlarttt to tlte public or tlisttt, b
the pultlic peace is guilty of ,t rrtisdenreanour.
(2) It shall be a defence to a charge under sub-section (1) if the
accused proves that, prior to publication, he took such nrc<rsut cs to
verify the accuracy oi the statentetri runrour and or report as to lead
hint reasonably to believe th.tt it was tue."
o
o
I lgrc.e \.!itlt tltc lLi.lllre!l ,-i.,LIr5r'l lot tllc .tppellallltS, vvltll rir'rcit ru5l)tat, tllirl :.',
malority of the learneo Ju:Lices oi the constitutional court appear to nave Dc(n
more concerned with justilication of the limitation which s.50 imposes on ttre
freedom of expression and freedonl of the press than with ttre protectiorr of th.):r,l
freedoms. The learncd Justice:; recogrtized the Constitullc,t)(ll pro[cctrur L !r '. ,.
freedomuncjera(iClG:|!}(l,lal](1thclinlitationl)laCed0[rlhJtlrt,edolllb;,;,rt.l.
(l) Lrut, allJlrl, T,rtll r('!l)('rt tllr'y !v('re tllrrr.c ( I)II( r,)IlIi.'(I lnr'lll llll] lrrrlilat (,r .. .'
article -13 (L) than wrtlr thc provisiorls of sticle 43 (l) (c). Thr' lt,,r ,
-r
Commissioner put it rightly that clauses (1) and (2) of article 43 should be read
together lvith article 29 ( 1 ), but with respect, i am unatlle to accept his argufl r(::rt
that the test of rvh,.tt is ncceptable 3nd dentortstr.lbly juslrfi;tble in 't.r. .i
dernocratic society nrust irc a subjectivc one. To nty nrind tli..: le st ntrr:.t .,
, ' r :
with what is universally accepted to be a dernocratic society. TheTe can ij,'i,J
varying classes of denrocratic societies. First because, Uganda is a party to sevrral
international treaties on fundanrental and human rights, and lreedonrs, ali of ,'.;,.-rr
proviJe for :nc tif ivrr!.ri :,1-'lllicat,on ,tf thosr ricllrts .rl,,l Iirir'Li1 rr
.,
an(j th''
lrr.[
...,,
Ol dentocrd,-y. litr r\i;r-.rrt elt.rltir I,JT riu(IcIr ctrr,-l I't.r,;
,r, i'!lrt:,,
.rr
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rrghts are only [\ /ri rxarnples.
Secondly, the preanrble to the Constitution recalls the history of Uqanda as
ch3ractenzed by pol trc;r lnd constit.Litionai irrstabi ityt rt:coqrrizrs th,. p(iul)le'l
Struggle aEainst the iorCc:i ,rf tyr.tnrry, oppr.-ssrtrn art(l ,:,llo t..rtion irnO Sa;,:. tir-rl !r..1
people cf UgindJ ;1,(. !oI|ri]rlttr.ll to truiltliri!l it Il(r[t(.r,i.rt1,,,.1,)f ,
,
, L it I ) | r ., t r i Ti r, Irrr |.,r
a popular an0 durable con:rrrtutton r)ased on thc pnncipl(,s of unrty, peaca, dclr.r.rirli,
democracy, ireedom, social justice and progress. I have rrot the slightest doubt that
when the franrers oF rhe Constitution committed the people of Uganda to buildirrg a
denrocratic Sriciety, titey clid nol rrean dcntocracy ac(.ordinq [o the stand,rrri ..,f
U!lJl'lda !vtll .il tltdI r! r'llL,rL]5,
-l
ltey tt'tu.ttt[,-]dnr,,,-r.r',y.rr Lrrl'.,'.r:oLiy ..ful, r.
o
o
At the hearing of the petition in the Constitutional Court the appellants reFerred tu
nLtnterous Sirthorities ,rl suilllLrrt -,f tlteir t-l-;t. l\lost cl- tllL'jlt ."'t'lu ci)i;es (l'rclt!,ri
Cc,ntntor't Li,,r JLrrsciiatlotls, ,ikr-' L.,ill tlrritl, Jealitlt; \'"'ith i!',Je5 )f at!'/ alld til, [ :l;;,,
to thosc in Llrc instJnt c.isd. lt l5 al ,.lllivct sail'r' ;lccelJt;lt-llu llr.ictlcu
tllJt (i.. ..1
cases decided by the highest courts in jurisdictions with similar lcgal systenrs, ,nlrr"|
bear on a particular case under consideration may not be binding but are of
persuasive value, and are usually followed unless ther'e are special leasons for rrot
dolng so. ln [1.](, instSr'rt L'.rsd, tltr'
(.or)stitutlor)ail (
oUrl, rrl Illy vr('wi ,-,r.1(ll;i lL ir r.r
follorved those authorities iavinq a bearinq urt this c;,'l-' [t-r rryiriclt Ih€
'i
-r;r.', .,,,',
reFerred it.
In considering rvhether section 50 contravenes article 29 (1), which protects trre
freedom of speech and expression and of the press, cetain cardinal prirrciplcs L-,f
constitutional interprctation nrust, in my vieu;, apply. Some of these are that:
-l'he
instrunter'ttS Dcrngl cet|:;rdcrc,-l rrtr.rst be trcJtrd J5.t wlii,,ie .ird .riL ;-ruvr:it-rn.
lrii ..ir , ..1
bearing on the subjcct nrJttcr rn drsputc must bc consiclcrrd togettrur J., .1r)
integrated whole; provisions relating to the fundamental human rights and freedom
should be given purposive and generous interpretation in such away as to secure
nta:rirttutt't cnjoyr1]ent r,i tirc l.r!lht:; artd lrtr,:tlonr: guar.rrl,','(i; .rn,.l wt'r'ir tr,,. :l r:,r 'r
ally' perSOIl ar ii.rtn,-)l it, i;ii.S tL, J0 clll JCt L,r pJSS Jn! L-,,. rii:ili dtr,rQiri, ,
'
:
enjoynrent oi the iurldanrental rights and lreedonrs guarJnterd under Clr.il)trr lu!rr
of our Constitution, the burden is on that perso|r or authorify seeking the derogatron
to show that the act or law is acceptable within the derogations permitted und*r
afticle 43 oF the Constitution. See: Maior General David Tinvefuza Vs Attorrrev
General, Constitutional No. 1 of 1997 (SCU) (unreported); De Clerk & Suct
Vs Du Plassis and Anor
(1994)
6BL 124, at Daqc 128 9
(The
Suorenre
Court of South Africa); Troop Vs Dulles US ZL. Erl. 785 of 590 (f956).
Under article 29 ( I
) (a)
eve,yone has the right to freedorr of spreech and
('"presEi()rl
and freedom of the press. This right is derogorated by article 43 (1) to the extent
that in the enjoyment of that freedom, no person shall prejudice the fundamental or
other human riqhts anll freedorr rs of others or the publii rTl[r]rest. Tnere rl ,
j Ili irt
pilcecl ttrt CjL'rorlJtiC)n \\,rtlt r\tgi)r(l t0 ptJtJl L- irlt('rLl:il. lt rr, tlt.rt crlry llrllltaitLr.llL,r
r"
enjoyrnent of tiris riqitt shJil rlu'. go bcyorir \!hat is c-lccdJ)ta l.)l(' and denl,)nstr:,1 ,
justifiable in a free and democratic society.
The inrportlnca ol ir ctcdofll of spccch c).llrt!;slull alrlo th,r pt,'5s l.luariltltt,"I rrv'
artCle 29 il) ir)
,rl -) .ir-'III--I,Iir :.r,.iLt) a.iirrl.,l ll, 4",':r
':ll
:'r:r.l:'''. 1
'
'l
e\prcsstoll iS tll(' li,.lllt 1() ('\l)l('r,: tlll()'1; ul) lll()ll ily ivc,ttl O1 llt,,Lltil, wrLlinrl, Il
ltll
and pictures or in any other manner. It includes the f reedont uf com nlu n rc.rtititl ,rttil
the right to propagate or publish opinion. Communicatiorl could be madt throlr!ir
any mediunl, nef,sp3pcr or -rntll
.r.
ln tne casc 01 Edntonton Jourrral Vs Alberta ( 1989) 45 CRRI !irr: :,u
o
o
Court of Canada said: '7f is difficult to imagine a guaranteed right more
important to a democratic society than freedont of expression. Indeed a
democratic society cannot . dst without that freedom to express ew
ideas and to put forward opinions about the functioning of public
institutions. The vital inr tortance of the concept cannot oe over
emphasized. No doubt that i, why the tianrers of the Charter set tbrth 5.2
(b). ft seems that rights et,shrined in 5.2 (b) should therefore onty be
stricted in the clearest circunt stances, "
The Charter rs the e(luivJl!'rrt u Chapter Futrr of cur
(-onstttLltton .lnc : .l ii-
r
sinrilaf to our a(icle 29 ( 1) (a).
ln Manika Ghandi Vs Union t India (1978)
2 SCR 621, Bhagwanji, I of the
Supreme Court of India put it thi: way
" Democracy is based essentially on a free debate and open
discussion for that is the only corrective of government action in a
democratic set up. If derttocracy nreans govefl:rtrt'ttt ttf thc' pt'oplt
by the people, it is obvious that every citizen nrust be entitle.l to
participate in the denocratic process and in order to enable hiot to
intelligently exercise his right of ntaking a choice, free and gettL'ral
discussion of public matters is absolutely essential,"
Another illustration of the importance of Freedom of expressron in a
democratic society is to be found in a statement by Alexander Meiklejohn
Anrerican Philosopher ir) his book Political Freedon, 1960 page 77.
o
o
"When men govern themselves it is they and no one else who ntust
passjudgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger, and that
means that unwise ideas must have a hearing as well .1s wise ottesl
unfair as well as fair, dangeruus as well as safe, un-Anteric,ttt ,ts
well as Anterican.,,...,,,.,,.. (These) conflictittg views ntay be
expressed/ nrust be expressed, not because they are valid, because
they are relevant..,To be afraid of ideas, any idea is to be unfit for
self governnrent. "
In my view, section 50 oF tile Penal Code clearly contravenes (he freedorn sif spcccii
expression and the press guaranteed under article 29 (1) of the Constitution, but the
crucial issue is whether the limitation imposed by section 50 goes beyond what is
acceptable and demonstrably justiflable in a free and democratic society under
article 43 (2) (c). As it was the respondent wlro sought to justiFy the lirnitation of
section 50 oi the Penal LDde on tire rreeconrs prOtecteo D,y artrcle 29
11 ; i.r
tr ':
burden lay on hinr to prove that the restriction is necessary within Ire ]rnrts
prescribed by the Constitution. See: Reqina Vs. Oakes, 26 DLR
(4s)
201
(The
t n P I Vs. Att rne ner I ZL h
H iqh Cou rt of Zimbabwe); Re Orrtario Film Ap ec iatio n SocieW .r n d
Ontario Eoard of Ce
Tinvefuza V Littpr3l.
lr '.
(l Maior Getr.l,rl
o
sectior) 50 w.rs Stated irr p;r.rqraph o (a) of llis Jllswel Lu tl)t] .rplrcll.jrltS' putllitJr ,. .l
was to the effect that sL'ction 50 reiterated article '13
of tht Constitutiun \'. hrtlr
required that the en;oynrent of that right should not pre.;udice the fundanrentJl or
Otner nUnl3tl i
rJlltS JlLr:
'i'(.cUOI rr ,-,1 ..rtitct : ,,ri puDlr . illit]rr ,'.. lll I tj .,.: 'r
supporting the finclinqs ot t.tie le:rrtred Justices ol thc
(
ulrstitutiurtal Clrurt, t, 'ii
t, .
have alreaOl tcferrerl, tlrc [];lfnud Comrnissrontr did not riiro\^, lrirta,r tlrL: SlrlLr,-:rl i,. ''
article published by tlre sppellants prejudiced or rvould Iri)vc
lrrcjuLlic(rJ
rrr,l
fundamental or other hunrarr rights of others or the public intercst.
ln the case of Zundel Vs the Oueen and others I 99
1
) 10 CRR
(20)
Canada
1.. :rl,. ,i.I' . | -::.I. !I ...! . .,1 ':. l l l.: '.' '.. l. .: ,r ,
f..:)lr! .rll('l('\l
-rrll'.1 .rr! r.. ',u-t,,,1 :iiL !,: llr,'!ril :1..: l, ..r i.rr-).. ..r:
almost similar to, and lras rhc sanre historical origtn a5, uLlr ljuctiorr 50 lrrt ['Lrrr"r
CoCe, Th. state subnrittcd thJt the false nerrys pLrblishod by Zundel '.veTt'
rrot
p
- !(-tca L\ '.r'-.
'
. : rl i' ..:ll.r l.r i.l.: -:i : li. .l 'll i
::'--''-':j,. .r rl.i-r l', ,l
_ ,
(.ril.i.i.l :lJ -l l'l , - i
i'-:.
, . ,. ./.
"The second argument advanced is that the appellant's
publication is not protected because it serves none of the valucs
underlying s.2 (b). A deliberate lie, it is said, does not promote
truth, political or iocial participation, or self-fulfillnrent.
Therefore it is not deseruing of protection.
A part front the fact that acceptance of this argument woultl
require this Court to depart from its view that the content of a
statentent should not determine whether it falls within s.2 (b),
a
o
o
the subntissiol, prese ts two rlifficulties tvhich are, irt nry view,
insurntou|tdble. Tlte first ste ri fron, the difticulty of cot tcludit,g
categorically that all deliberate lies are entirely unrelated to the
values underlyirtg s.2 (b) of the Charter. The second lies in rhe
difficulty of determining the meaning of a statemcnt and
whether it is false,
The first difficulty results fronr the pretttisc' that delibet,ztt" lics
can never have a value. Exaggeration
-
even clear falsilicatiort
'
may arguably serve a useful social purpose linked to values
underlying freedom of expression. A person lighting cruelty
against animals may knowingly cited false statistics in pursuit of
his or her beliefs and with the purpose of co rnrunicating a nore
fundamental tnessage, e.g. "cruelty to aninnls is increasing attd
must be stopped,"
A doctor, in order to persuade people to be inoculated against a
burgeoning epidemic, may exaggerate the nuttrber or
geographical location of persons potentially infected sitlt th<:
virus, An artist for artistic purposes, ntay ntake a statetl)ettt th;]t
a pafticular society considers both an assertion of fact and a
manifestly deliberate lie, Consider the case of Salntan Rusltdi
Satanic Verses viewed b y many Muslinr societies as perpetrating
deliberate lies against the prophet. All of this expression
arguably lt;ts irttrirtsic value in fosterrttg political parttcip.t tittrt
and individual self- fulfillntent, fo accept tlte proposition that
deliberate lies can never fall under s.2 (b) would be to exclude
the statements such as the examples above from the possibility
of Constitutional protection, I can ot accept that such was the
intention of tlte framers of the Constitutiort.
o
The secontl difficulty ties in the assumption that we can identify
the essence of corrtnrunication and detenttine that it is false with
accuracy to make falsity a fair criterion for denial of
constitutional
protection, fn approaching this question, we must
bear in mind that tests which involve interpretation and
balancing values and interest, while useful under s' 7 of tlte
Charter (similar to our article 43), can be unfair if used to deny
prima facie protection. One problem lies in determining the
meaning which is to be
iudged
to be true or false' A given
expression may ofifer many meaningl some which seem false,
others of a metaphorical or allegorical naturel which many
possess some validity, Moreover, meaning is not a datum so
ntuch as an i teractive processl depending on the listener as well
as the speaker. Different People
may draw from the same
statement different meanings at different times. The guarantee
of freedom of expression seeks to protect not only the meaning
intended to be communicated by the publisher but also the
meaning or meanings understood by the reader The
result is that a statenrent that is true on one level or for one
person may be false on another level for a different person."
o
The learned judge then concluded at page 209: -
"Before we put a
Person
beyond the pale of the Constitution,
hefore we deny a person the protection which the most
fundamental law of this land on its face accords to the person,
we shouldl in my belief, be entirely certain that there can be no
justification for offering protection' The criterion of falsity falls
short of this certainty, given that false statements can
sonretimes have value and given the difficulty of conclusively
II
t
o
deterntining total falsity, Applying the broad, purPosive
interpretation of the freedom of expression guaranteed by s'2 (b)
hitherto adhered to by this Coutt, I cannot accede to the
argument that those who detiberately
publish falsehoods are for
that reason alone precluded frorn claiming the benefits of the
constitutionat guarantees of free speech. I would rather hold
that such speech is protected by s.2 (b), leaving arguments
relating to its value in relation to its prejudicial effect to be dealt
with under s.1 (our article 4j)."
Although this Canadian case is not binding on our court, the Facts of the case are
on all fours with those of the instant case that I do not see any reason why, after
flnding it highly persuasive, I should not Follow it. I am fortified in my belief in the
correctness of the Canadian authority by a stateolent nrade by Archibald Cox in a
publication called SOCIETY VOL 24 P'8 No.1 November/December, 1986
where he stated:
"flome propositions seem true or false beyond rational debate,
some false and harmful, political and religious doctrines again
wise public acceptance, Adolf Hitler's brutal theory of a "master
race" sufficient example, We to lerate such foolish and
sometimes danqerous a Deals not beca use thev mav prove true
o
but becaus e freedom of oeech is indivisi The can not
be den to some 's and saved for others. The
'son
E
lain h no ntatr. nrmittee and n overn
has the infinite wisdom and disinterestedn ess accu rately and
unselfishl v to seoarate what is true from h at is debatable, an d
both, from what is false, lo licence one to i 'mpose his truth upon
dissenters is to give the same to all others who have, but fear to
loose, power, The judgment that the risks of suppression are
)
t
o
greater than the harnt done by bad ideas rests upon faith in the
ultinrate good sense and decency of a free peopl€"' (rnphasis nrtne)
In the instant case, I anr not satisfied that the respondent established that the
limitations placed on the enjoyment of the freedom of expression and the press,
guaranteed by article 29 (1) (a) of the Constitution by section 50 of the Penal Code
Act is not beyond what is acceptable and demonstrably
justified in a democratic
society.
In my opinion, Section 50 fails the test laid down in clause 2 (c) of article 43 of the
Constitution. It should, therefore, be struck down as inconsistent wlth the
Constitution. I would allow the appeal and make the orders proposed by my
learned brother Mulenga, JSC.
Delivered at mengo tnis .... \.[..11... ..day of February........ ....,..2004
\.,,1,
\
.. .
A.H.O. ODER,
]USTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
o
l.l
a
o
1
2
THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT MENGO
(CORAM: ODOKI, CJ, ODER, TSEKOOKO, KAROKORA, MULENGA
AND KANYEIHAMBA, JJ.SC. AND BYAMUGISHA. AG.JSC)
CONSTITUTIONAL APPEAL No.2 OF 2002
BETWEEN
CHARLES ONYANGO OBBO
APPELLANTS
ANDREW MUJUNIMWENDA
AND
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
[Appeal from
majority decision of the Constitutional Court at Kampala
(Manyindo, DCJ; Kato, Berko, and Engwau JJA; Twinomujuni, JA dissenting)
dated 21stJuly,2000 in Constitutional Petition No.l5 of 19971
JUDGMENT OF TSEKOOKO JSC: I have read in advance the draft
judgment prepared by my learned brother, the Hon. Justice Mulenga,
JSC, who has set out the facts of the petition. I agree with his reasoning
and the conclusion that this appeal should succeed, that section 50 of the
Penal Code is inconsistent with the constitution and is void. I also agree
with the other orders he has proposed.
I desire to add brief observations.
ln their petition in the Constitutional Court, the appellants as petitioners
averred in paragraph 3(b) that section 50 of the Penal Code Act............
under which the petitioners were charged is inconsistent with the
constitution in so far as it limits the enjoyment of the rights and freedom
I
I
I
1
RESPONDENT
o
o
The most relevant Article is 29 (1) (a) which reads as follows.
'29 (1) Every person shall have the right to: -
(a) Freedom of speech and expression which shall include
freedom of the press and other media'
Section 50 (1) which creates the offence states:
"Any person who publishes any false statement, rumour
or report which is likely to cause fear and alarm to the
public or to disturb the public peace is guilty of a
misdemeanour"
The history and incorporation of S.50 in our law is not quite clear. But the
British Colonial authority must have introduced it as one of the colonial
laws when Uganda was a British Protectorate at the time when the
offence had ceased to exist in England where it originated. Whatever its
background, the section has been on our statute books from colonial days
up to the present day posing a threat to prosecute any body who
publishes a false statement, rumour or report. The appellants having
been aggrieved because they were prosecuted, challenged the law in the
Constitutional Court which by majority decision dismissed the petition.
The appeal to this court is based on three grounds. Mr. Nangwala,
counsel for the appellants argued the first and second grounds while his
colleague, Mr. Rezida, argued the third ground.
2
prescribed in Articles 29 (1) (a) and (e), a0 (2) and 43 (2) (l) of the
Constitution of 1995.
Ground I and2 were framed in the following words:
o
o
1. Having found that Article 29 (1) of the Constitution guarantees
speech and expression and also secures press freedom and
having held that tolerating offensive conduct and speech is one
of the prices to be paid for a reasonably free and open society,
the learned Justices of Appeal erred in not finding that section
50 of the Penal Gode Act....... ls not demonstrably justifiable in
a free and democratic society within the meaning of Article 43
(1) and (2) of the Constitution.
2. The learned Justices of Appeal erred in holding that S.50 is part
of the existing laws saved by Article 273 of the Gonstitution.
Although the appeal is stated to be against the majority's decision, ground
two is actually an appeal against the conclusions of the whole
Constitutional Court. This is because Twinomujuni, JA, in his illuminating
dissenting judgment agreed with the majority view when he held, at page
20 of his typed judgment, that: -
'Without prejustice to the debate whether section 50 of
the Penal Code Act passes the standards set by article 43,
I am of the opinion that section 50 of the Penal Code Act
is valid law until it is declared otherwise by a competent
Court of law.'
The majority's decision was to the same effect.
Be that as it may, I would like first to make observation on procedure. I
agree with the opinion expressed by Mulenga, JSC that the Constitutional
Court erred first on 1511211997 when lt ordered for stay of hearing the
Constitutional petition pending the disposal of the criminal prosecution
which was taking place in an inferior court of the Chief Magistrate and
3
o
O
secondly when on 18/5/1999 the Constitutional Court again ordered for
the petition to be "sfayed until disposal of criminal appeal pending in
the High Court.'
The Court did not give sound reasons why it thought that the hearing of a
criminal matter took precedence over a constitutional petition. lt would
seem that the court acceded to the view of Mr. Cheborion, the then
Principal State Attorney, that a constitutional petition was akin to a civil
case and as such criminal proceedings took precedence over
constitutional matters. Acceding to this view would run counter to the
provisions of Art 137 (7) of the Constitution. ln addition, I should point out
that the practice of criminal matters taking precedence over civil matters
originated from England, where the practice has long ceased to apply. I
therefore see no good reason for Uganda to stick to an old habit which
has died in its country of origin.
ln reply Mr. Cheborion argued the three ground separately. He
supported the majority decision to the effect that criminal law is necessary
to exclude from the range of individual choices those acts which if allowed
4
Now in his submissions, Mr. Nangwala when arguing grounds 1 and 2
pointed out that S.50 has its roots in Article 43 (1) and that the majority in
the constitutional Court failed to address their minds to Article 43 (2) (c).
He also contended that the majority did not consider the cases he had
cited to the Court. He relied on a number of decisions including Regina
Vs Oakes, 26 D.LR. (26th) Page 200 and Zundel Vs The Queen &
Others 10 C.R.R. (2"d) page 193, (both are Canadian decisions) and
Mark Gova Chavunduka & Another Vs The Minister for Home Affairs
& Another Civil Application No.156/99 (Zimbabwe) to support his
arguments that S.50 is inconsistent with Constitutional provisions.
a
o
Mr. Nangwala's complaint about apparent lack of study by judicial officers
of cases cited to court by advocates is not new. I have heard it raised in
some other appeals in this court and in some other fora outside the court
system. I therefore would like to make observations on it. Advocates
appear to harbour the view that a court before which some case is cited is
under an obligation to specifically cite the case and perhaps express an
opinion thereon by saying, for instance, that the court has examined the
case and found it relevant, or irrelevant, to the facts of this case.
I think it is generally accepted that every case must be decided on its own
facts because no two cases have identical facts.
ln law, we normally refer to decided cases as precedents. A precedent is
a judgment or decision of a court of law cited as an authority for deciding
a similar set of facts. Therefore a precedent is a case which serves as an
authority for the legal principle embodied in its decision. A case is only an
authority for what it actually decides. lt has been said that "the only use
of authorities or decided cases rs the esfablishment of some
principle which the judge
can follow out in deciding a case before
him.'" See Re. Hallett (1880) 13 Ch.D.712. An authoritative precedent is
one which is binding on the court to which it is cited and must be followed;
a persuasive precedent is one which need not be followed but which is
5
would breach public peace, safety and rights of other individuals. He
contended that S.50 which is part of existing law is justifiable in the
Ugandan context. Among the authorities he relied on are Uganda Vs
Commissioner of Prisons Exparte Matovu (1966) E.A 514 and C'
Muhindika and & others Vs The People - Appeal No.95 of 1995
(Zambia). He contended that the test of what is demonstrably justifiable in
Art 43 (2) (c) is subjective and must be in the Ugandan context.
o
o
worthy of consideration. See Goncise Law Dictionary by Osborn, sth Ed;
page.248.
Courts should at least as a matter of courtesy acknowledge the effort of
advocates who produce relevant and useful or binding decided cases.
A binding authority would normally be a decision of a superior court within
the same
jurisdiction
Normally a court would be expected lo express an opinion on a relevant
and binding case cited to that coun especially if the court makes a
decision contrary to that case. Persuasive cases are of two types; namely
decision by peer courts (judgments of the Judges of the High Court) in the
same
jurisdiction or decisions of a lower court of record where that lower
court has given well reasoned treatment of a question of law. Persuasive
cases are also decisions by courts from other common law jurisdictions
dealing with similar question as that raised before the court.
ln my view binding authorities from superior courts in the same jurisdiction
must be followed unless there exist circumstances which permit
departure. The court departing from a binding case should explain why.
Persuasive authorities from the same jurisdiction such judges
of the same
court dealing with similar facts or same law ought to be followed so as to
maintain consistency. The value to be attached to persuasive authorities
from other common law jurisdictions depends on the hierarchy of the court
which decided the case. Obviously a court has no business in wasting
time considering irrelevant cases.
It is instructive to note that Article 132 (4) of the constitution refers to the
fact that decisions of this Court bind us as well unless we find it right to
depart. I have gone through the written submissions which counsel for
the appellants presented to the Constitutional Court. Cases are cited in
6
o
those submissions. They are the same authorities which have been cited
to us. None of those cases were binding on the Constitutional Court
because the cases were decided by courts from other jurisdictions.
However, a number of them are of considerable persuasive value. One of
them is the Zundel case in which the Supreme Court of Canada
considered and decided matters identical to those raised in the petition.
Its persuasive value is clear. ln the Court below the majority decision did
not allude to any of those cases and no reasons were given why. I quite
recognise that the court is very busy and may not have adequate time to
consider many of the decisions cited. But a reference to authoritative
relevant cases is good practice. As I said from the stad I have discussed
this complaint al some length because it keeps recurring.
The learned Commissioner for Civil Litigation's contention that we should
apply a subjective test to decide on ' what is acceptable and
demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society' in Uganda
has no foundation.
The learned Commissioner relied on Matovus Case (supra) and that of
Muhinduka (supra) in support of his view. These two decisions do not,
with respect, support that view. The latter case was concerned with legal
provisions which regulate the holding of public meetings in Zambia.
Relevant Art.20 of the Zambian constitution stated: -
a
and except so far as that provision or the thing
done under the authority thereof as the case may be, is
shown not to he reasonably justifiable in a democratic
society'
I have studied the case and especially page 172 (lo which the
Commissioner referred us) where the Zambian Court quotes a passage
7
o
I fully agree with the view that by incorporating in our constitution the
Human Rights provisions which are set out in various international
instruments, the framers of our constitution, consciously, opted for the
objective test in determining 'what is acceptable and demonstrably
justifiable in a free and democratic society". "Demonstrahly" as
used in our Art a3 (2) (c) appears to connote that whoever wants to show
that the act or commission complained of is justifiable, that person must
prove it by evidence. ln our case the respondent should have adduced
evidence to prove that the existence of S.50 in the Penal Code Act is
justifiable in a free and democratic Uganda within the provisions of the
current Constitution.
ln view of the presence of Art. 29 (1) (a) in our constitution, what would be
the underlying object of section 50 and the mischief or evil which it seeks
to achieve. Are Ugandans so gullible that they must be protected against
rumours by S.50?
o
8
from an Indian case
[Rangarajan Vs
Jagjivan Ram & Other (1990) LRC
(Const.) 4121. Ihere the lndian Court stated that there was no legal yard
stick of ascertaining what is reasonably
justifiable in a democratic society.
The Court held the lndian law to be unconstitutional. According to the
Muhinduka case, the Zambian law, like that of lndia, could not be justified
on a number of grounds and therefore the court found the law to be
unconstitutional. lt appears to me that the approach adopted by the two
Courts was the objective test in ascertaining whether the law being
questioned, was or was not reasonably justified in a democratic society.
ln my opinion this is in accord with the approach of the Canadian Court in
the Zundel Case (supra) and that in the Oakes case (supra). I agree with
those approaches.
o
By Art.20 (1) fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual are
inherent and not granted by the state. Freedom of expression is a
fundamental right protected under Art. 29. By this Article, every person
shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, which shall
include freedom of the press and other media. By criminalizing what is
perceived as publication of false news or rumours under S.50, the section
has the effect of demonstrably restricting or even prohibiting freedom of
expression enshrined in Art.29 (1). lthink that the reasoning of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Zundel's Case (supra) which considered
issues similar to the one in this appeal and the reasoning in the Nigerian
case of the State Vs The lvo rv Trump et Publishinq Co. Ltd. (which was a
case of sedition) the courts' discussions there are of considerable value
and I would adopt the same. As the custodian and guarantor of the
fundamental rights of the citizens a Constitutional Court has a duty cast
upon it of striking down any law which restricts the freedom of speech as
quaranted to the citizens under the constitution.
I would allow the appeal. I agree with the orders proposed by Mulenga,
JSC.
2004.
J.W.N. Tsekooko
Justice of the Supreme Court.
a
9
Dated at Mengo this .day of
a
6-6urt-Ka(c^-l']
CONSTITUTIONAL APPEAL NO. 2 OF 2OO2
BETWEEN
CORAM ODoKl, CJ; ODER, TSEKoOKO, KAROKORA, MULENGA,
KANYEIHAMBA, J.J.S.C., BYAMUGTSHA, Ag. J.S.c.
1
2
CHARLES ONYANGO OBBOI
ANDREW MUJUNIMWENDA]
ATTORNEY GENERAL
APPELLANTS
AND
o RESPONDENT
llpqeal from majority decision of the Constitutional Court (Manyindo,
DCJ, Kato, Berko and Engwau, JJA., Twinomujuni, JA disientiig, in
Constitutional Petition No. 1S/97 dated 21"t July,2bO1
o
I have had the advantage of reading in draft the
,iudgment
prepared by learned
brother the Hon. Justice Mulenga, JSC in which he sets out the facts and
discusses fully the questions of law which arise in this appeal. I entirely agree
with him that the appeal should be allowed and I have nothing to add to what he
says regarding the applicability of section
50 0f the
penal
code Act. I agree with
him that the section is too broad, lacking sufficient guidance on what is and what
is not safe to publish, because it is bound to be differenily interpreted.
consequently, I wourd agree that the intending newspaper reporter
or editor in
the media wourd be in diremma as to whether the news he intends to pubrish
constitutes a criminar offence or not. Further, considering the important role of
the media in a democratic governance, rthink that a raw that places that rore into
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA
HOLDEN AT MENGO
JUDGMENT OF KAROKORA, J.S.C.
I
o
that kind of dilemma and leaves such unfettered discretion in the hands of
Police/state prosecutor to determine what constitutes a criminal offence would
be unacceptable and unjustifiable in a free and democratic society.
Further, lwould agree with him that criminalizing false news under section 50 (1)
of the Penal code Act would not exist side by side with the rights of freedom of
speech and expression, which includes freedom of the press and other media
guaranteed by article 29(1)(a)
of the constitution in a free and democratic society,
because the skict enforcement of section 50 of the
penal
code Act would be
tantamount to taking away the rights guaranteed under article 29(1)(a) of the
constitution.
Finally, the majority of learned justices
of the constitutional court having earlier
observed in the lead judgment
of Berko, JA with which other 3
,iustices agreed
that tolerating offensive conduct and speech is one of the prices to be paid for a
reasonably free and open society, then in my view, since the respondent
adduced no evidence as required under articre 43(1) of the constitution to prove
that the news/article pubrished in the Sunday Monitor Newspaper dated 21st
september, 1997 prejudiced the fundamentar or other human rights and freedom
of others or the public interest, they
were in error when they herd that section 50
o
of the Penal Code
constitution.
Act was not inconsistent with article 2g(1)(a) of the
Moreover, I think that the respondent in the instant case courd not justify
prosecution of
the appeilant under section s0 of the
penar
code Act by craiming
that they did so in pubric interest, because the onus was on the respondent to
adduce evidence, which they never did, to prove that the existence of section s0
of the Penal code Act is acceptabre and demonstrabry justifiabre
in a free and
2
ln the circumstances, section s0 of the penal
code cannot stand in view of article
29(1) (a) of the constitution. lt is therefore null and void.
democratic Uganda today within the meaning of article 43(2)(c) of the
constitution.
ln the result I would allow this appeal and adopt orders proposed by Mulenga
JSC.
Dated at Mengo this
It
IL
day of 2004
A.N. KAROKORA
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
o
o
J
ts-:>
THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA
AT MENGO
BETWEEN
1. CHARLESONYANGO OBBO
I
2. ANDREWMUJUNT MWENDA
I APPELLANTS
o
a
AND
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL RESPONDENT
[Appeal
from the decision of the Constitutional Coutl
(Manyindo, D.CJ, Kato. Berko and Engwau J.J.A.. with
Twinomujuni, J.A. dissenting) in Constitutional Petition
No. 15/97. dated 21"t July. 20001
I had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment
of my learned
brother, Mulenga, J.S.C. and I agree with the reasons he has
articulated for his judgment
I also agree with his decision that this
appeal ought to succeed. I will only add one or two comments of
my own in support and by way of emphasis and elucidation The
facts and background to this appeal have been ably narrated and
described in the
judgment of Mulenga,
J.S.C and there is no need
for me to repeat them here.
CORAM: ODOKL CJ., ODER, TSEKOOKO, KAROKORA,
MU LEN G A, KANYEIHAMBA, JJ,S.C.,
BYAMUGISHA, AG, J.S.C.
CONSTITUTIONAL APPEAL NO.2 OF 2OO2
JUDGMENT OF KANYEIHAMBA. J.S.C.
o
o
ln both our recent decision in Paul K. Ssemogerere, Olum and
Kafire v. The Attorney General, Const. Appeal No. 1 of 2002.
(unreported) and our earlier decision in Major General David
Tinyefuza v. Attorney General, Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of
1997, (unreported), we have made emphatic pronouncements that
the Uganda Constitution is the supreme law of the land. We have
also made a clear distinction between constitutional provisions
and those of ordinary laws. No laws, rules or regulations, let alone
decisions of any authority, which are in conflict with the provisions
of our Constitution can stand in opposition to those constitutional
provisions.
The Uganda Constitution is to be interpreted both contextually and
purposefully. lt is an ambulatory living instrument designed for the
good governance, liberties, welfare and protection of all persons in
Uganda.
I agree with the opinion expressed by a Canadian judge, Dickson,
J., in Hunter v. Southam lnc. (1985) il DLR (4th) 644 (S.C.C.)
that
"The task of expounding a constitution is crucially
different from that of construing a statute. A
statute defines present rights and obligations. lt is
easily enacted and easily repealed. A constitution
by contrast is drafted with an eye to the future. lts
function is to provide a continuing framework for
the legitimate exercise of governmental power and,
when joined
by a bill or a charter of rights, for the
unremitting protection of individual rights and
liherties. Once enacte4 its provisions cannot
easily be repealed or amended. lt must be capable
o
o
of growth and development over time to meet new
social, political and historical realities often
unimagined by its framers."
This is what was envisaged in Article 273(1) of the 1995
Constitution which provides,
"SubTect to the provisions of this Article, the
operation of the existing law after the coming into
force of this Constitution shall not be affected by
the coming into force of this Constitution but the
existing law shall be construed with such
modifications, adaptations, qualifications and
exceptions as may be necessary to bring it into
c o nform ity with th is C o nstituti o n. "
ln my view, the rights which the appellants legitimately exercised
were in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution which
guarantee their freedoms and Section s 50(1) of the Penal Code
Act, in so far as it restricts those freedoms unconstitutionally must
be struck down as null and void. The appellants were righily
acquitted and they have correctly pursued their rights by
challenging that penal provision and the manner in which they
were prosecuted which must equally be held to have been
unconstitutional and unjustified. lt is worth noting that the
appellants took all the necessary and reasonable steps to
rnvestigate the falsity or truth of what they reported They should
never have been prosecuted
ln the Tinyefuza case (supra), I endeavoured to spell out the
constitutional functions of each organ of Government.
{
The Constitution provides
for and demarcates the powers and
functions of government amongst the various organs and
institutions of state but principally Parliament, the Executive and
the Judiciary. Pertinently, Article 79 of the Constitution provides.
inter atia, lhal subject to the provisions of the constitution'
Parliament shall have power to make laws on any matter for the
peace, order, development and good governance of Uganda and,
that except as provided in the Constitution no person or body other
than Parliament shall have the power to make provisions having
the force of law in Uganda without authority conferred by an Act of
Parliament made for that purpose. Consequently, the provisions of
Article 43 must always be borne in mind. They provide that,
o
a
"43(1) tn the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms
prescribed in ttils chapter no person shall
prejudice the fundamental or other human rights
and freedoms of others or the public interest'
2 Public interest under this article shall not
permit:-
(a) political persecution
(b) detention without trial
(c) any limitation of the enjoyment of the rights
and freedoms prescribed by this Chapter
beyond what is acceptable and demonstrably
justifiable in a lree and democratic society or
what is provided in this Constitution."
These exceptions mean that the freedom of speech and
expression which includes the freedom of the Press and other
media is not absolute, but if the Executive or Parliament are to act
or legislate in favour of these exceptions, they must do so strictly in
o
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and if called
upon,
justify what they have done or legislated for before courts of
law which have the duty to protect the Constitution and the laws of
Uganda and harmonise the
same.
o
It is Parliament, the representative body of the people in a
democratic and free society that has the power to make and
unmake any law and to proscribe any acts or behaviour as coming
within the purview of the exceptions enumerated in Article 43.
However, for Parliament to do so it must comply strictly with the
provisions of the Constitution. Thereafter, it is a principle of
constitutionalism that other arms of the state share a platform with
Parliament in the running of state affairs and in the protection of
individual liberty.
Where Parliament has made a law in accordance with the
Constitution, citizens are bound to obey it. ln the case of the
Press, citizens' rights are fortified by the knowledge that
journalists
exercise discretion of self-restraint and are subject to the Press
Act. Be that as it may, the freedom of the Press is largely
unrestricted even if those who exercise it may be prosecuted or
sued under a given law, aware of the old adage "publish and be
damned".
ln my opinion, however, the provisions of section 50 of the Penal
Code Act (Cap. t 20) conflict with the Constitution and constitute a
clear case which calls for intervention by the courts.
6
,
ln the result, I would allow this appeal and make the orders
proposed by Mulenga, J.S.C.
Dated at Mengo, this day of February, 2004.
G W KANYEIHAMBA
JUSTICE OF THE SUPRE ME COURT
a
o
1
I
o
Ilil,l lil..l,r lil.l( ol, t
(;,\\l).\
l\ I lll.- sL l'lil'.\ll'-
('
ot ttI ot, r.
(;.\\l).\
.\'l \ I l.\(;( )
; L'0lt.l.tl:
()lrl)Kl, (.1: ()ltl::ll..lS(': lSl:K()K(),.l.l( : l{-lllt )ht )R.-1, ./.\'( ; .l/('/-1i.\(rl l../S( ;
X.l.\'I EIIl..l.rl I1..1../.T( i 8l:.1.1/t 1;/.\'11..r. ,-l(;..15( .
( ()\s
Il I t Il()\.-\1. .\l'l'1,.,\1. \o.01 ol. 20()2
Ill: l \\'lrl.N
l. CFL\tu-t,ls 0\\ .\N(;()-0Bllo
2. ..\,NDltli\\'\ltl.ltiNl \l\\/liND.\:::iiiiiiiiiiiii,\l)l'l'll,l,,\N'l'S
,\\I)
.-\l"l'Ol{\1.\ -(il'.\l-l{.\1.::::::::::.:::::::::::::::::::ltl'-51,O\l)l-\ I
(.-l1t1tctl
./'rttttt tha
ntujtrit.y .lulgttttL'rtl tl lh,:
(
rtttrlilu tittrdl L't'urt sittitrg ttt
Kttttlntlt (\l:rrn irrtll. l)(',1: lr,rrtu.,l \: lJr'rl.o..l.\: l.rtgrrrttt..l.\: I rrirrortttr.irrrIi,.I \
listr:tttitt,g) ltt(J tlt( I l" .lul.r, :lt0ll 1tt ( t)fl.\tiltrtitt ul l','titiUtt \t,.l.t ,,/ lr')')
.tt,t)(;\il,]\t ot. lt\ \\tt
(;tsil.\
\g.,ts(
l-ltrs rs art appeal ilgiurtst tlts cleulsiort ot thc Colrst rt ut ronill C'ourt \\,hcreu)
ll)
I5
2l)
o
t5
b1'ura.joritl clecision it disrrrisscd th.' appellirrrts' pctition I h:ul the benelit
f
ol'r'eading iu dnifl tltc luirtl .1t(l!.tlle
tlt tltat rtrts
l)tel)illc(l
lrv I!1trle rtga.lS('
and I aEec s ith tlrc rcasons ltc Itits gn e tt that this uppe al oLtght to
strccccrl
Hou er,er, I har c rr t'crr rernarks ol'nrY txvu tcl rrrakc.
'l'he
thcts tlrat lcd to
tllr. institrrti\)ll ()l lllc
l)L'ltlt()n
ill lltc l\)\\et c\)irll iltc sttllieientlr sltrtetl rn
the lc;rJ.yrrrlgrllcllt. llt(r!'1i)re Irj,r t)t,t lr:trc 1,, lel)cirl tll.nr
O
'l'hc
lrlsrs ril llrr t,rrtrirllrrrtt l,r llt. lrIpe llrrnt. hollt lreri iu](i rr) Ilr. l\,\\er
court \\'ils thlit as.jorrn[rllsts tllcY pLrtrlished tlre ur-trclc irr rlLrcstrorr irr
lo exercise ot tlrr.'rl L'(rnslllulrr)nirl rrghts rrncler .\rticlc 2()( lXr) rrncl
1c)
t,l'tl,e
Constitrrtion.
'l'ltcr
corttctrtlcrl tlnit tlru pLtblrcirtirrrr rurs riorrc irr tlrc
eluo) nlent ol'thcrI tiglrts rrr thc |eastruatrlc bclie t tlrrrt sLrclr prrtrlicalrorr
\\'as acceptablc lulrl .lustlf
utble iu u ticc arrd dcrnr-rcurlrc societv under
.{rticlt {3(2)(c) ol tltr
('()llstrlutron lt
\\'irs lllcil c()ntcnti()n thul tlre lrctiorr
O
li ()1 1llu l)ircet,.,t ,,t l'trtrlrt l't!,\L! llt()I\ tr) l)t,i.,!ctilr'lirt tn l,,r ili Lr,!{l \
publishing tirlse ne *'s rrnrlel section 50( I
)
ot' tlre l)crral
('odc
i\ct u us u
violation ot'tlreir ti'eedtrur of'explession and tllc prcss Accorrlirrs to thc
appcllants the rrctrorts ol thc [) l) l) lrrrd tlrc prtrvisrorrs rrl section 5(l(su1lr rrt
al'e lrlcr)rlsislcnl \\llll lln(l ()l ln e()llttil\cttttort ol'llre
l)lr)\
tst() S ()t lll(
2() Corrstrtutiorr
The Attollev Cclertri irt tltc uusucr to tlle
Pctitioll-lustilictl
tlte cristcttcc
ofthc scction irrrtl thc lettrrtt ol'tltc l) l'l) ttt l)l()scctltc
lltc itppcllltttts Itt
pllrtlctllltl tt rtlts sllttetl lll:lt tlrL'l)atltl\rllels liee ,.l,rtlt ()l c\l)lu'i:1,)il
guaranteed undcl tllc L'oltstitLLtlorr is strb.ject to tlre qLrlrlilicltttott irt .\r'ticle
.13
oi'the Corrst rt rtt ttttt tiltttsc prrtr isi()tls lilllv sLll)pol-t tlrc ollelrce cruittctl
bl section 50 trl llrc
('rrric llt pilrtlslilpll 6 ol thc illls\\cl. lltc .\ttortlur
Ccrtcutl de'tL'rtrletl llle iiell\rl1 ,.rl tlre l)['l'lttltl !()lllellrlc(l tltlrt st'ctirrrt 5ll
O
does not niake lieedout oferpressiorr. press arttl associaliorl lls \\cll as llte
right to practrce tlt.'.loLttttalisttt proli'ssiort crirttrtlltl ilc(s lllstcil(l it \\ils
Ir) COptcldcd tltirt tltc, Sccll()tt Icttcnltcs .\t'ticlc JJ(l) rrl lllc ('trttslilttttotl
u,hrch reqLrires tllat lrl tltc ettjol'rrtertt ol'riglrts gLtalal)tcc(l tttttler tlle
Constitution orte lurs to be rtritrtitirl ol tlte t tuhts ol'otlre ls
l-1t,.'r'e is llo ([)llt)l r]) lll\ Iltitt(l tllitt
(
lilll)tcl I rrl tllc
( '(
) I I s I I t I ll I ( ) I I
o
l5 guarnntees tttntlitrtrcrttal ltttrttatt ttgltls itl)d licc(lollls.
'l
hrs is $'hat rs
referred to irs tlle [rill ol'rrghts itt sotttc.luris(llcttotls Article 29( I
)
protects ce ain ti r'd(lonls For
l)utposes
of tlle ttlatlct ttorr [te fitrc tltis
court it strltcs ils lirllo$s
''
t I
)
Erer.r pe t'.tott .tltttll ltut't Iltt rigltt ttt-
(u)
.f
rtc ont uJ s;1tt'ttlt tttttl L'.t p r t'.ts it t t t , wltitlt .tltttll itttltrtla.f rttrlrtttr rt.f
tltt press tttttl rtllter ntetliu.
l0
td.t
(e1
ft'eerlotn
o.l ussot'iutitttt rr'ltic'lt sltull irtclule lhc.lrtulttttt to.lbrrn
ttssociuliztts or uniotts, inclurlittg trrule ttniotts utttl pulitit'ul urttl
othe r c it'ic o rg u ttisul itt rt. "
o
j
l(l
i5
Article {J strrlus rts iolltrtr s
''
r l) ltt llte etjtt-1'tttettt oJ tlte rigltts tttttl
li'ettlottts
prcs(ribeil itr !ltis
Chupter, o ptlt'sott sltull preiudit'e the
Jfuutlutttctttul
ut ollter lttrtttutt
rigltts uttd
Ji'eedorrts
ttJ'others or the pttblic intcrest.
(2) Pttlttic ittttrasl tttt tr tltis urtiL'lt .slrull ttol pcrtttil
(a) politicul persetttti0
't;
(b) detention n'itltoul triul;
(c) ott.l' lirrtittttiott tl tltc ctrio.l'tttcttt o.l'thc rigltts utttl
.licailottts'
ltrast'ribttl
h)' llti.t
(
ltultltr bt.l ttrttl wlttt i.t ttt't't'ltltrhla ttrttl
rlCtttttttstruhl.l'
jttsti./iuhlt itt tt./rcc utttl tlctttttcrulit .tttt'icl.l', ttr wlttrt is
provided uttdet tltis
('ortslitrttitttt. "
'f
[.' p;or isrpls r.tl'thrs .\rtre li cle lrrlt irrrlicltc ttt ttte tltltt tltc ctl.jovltte ttl rrl
firrtdarrr ertlal lttttttart ltglrts attd lie"'tlottts ts ttot ltbsolrrtc. (Jttc
Itlts lg Irc
2() milt-ltirl ol'tlrc rights ol'othels irrrd prrtilic ttttcrcst rtlttlc cxerctsillg tllesc
riglrts
'flre
lintitations 1o be inrposed itt tlte cltlovrtlettt ot'tlte statcd rrgltts
O Itltrc tr,Lrc lru.cl,tlri,li.tllLl r I i l t t L I I r : I I : r I
'
I I ltr.ttltlil'le
tll ,r llr' rtr'l
rlct .,ct tttic :(relel) . ,lt u ltltl ls
I)t\)\
I(le(l t llre Constitrrtiott
\\''hlt i[res scction 50 (supll) prolribit'l lrt ordel to atts\vcr tltts clttcstiott tl
ti ls necessar\ t() prtrduce thc plor tsions ot'lhc scctiotl lrl lilll. It statcs lrs
fbllorr s
It)
"(l) urty per.son teho pttblisltes utr)'rtilse slulettvttl, t'tttrtour or report
wlticlt is liliel.t' to c'urtse.leur unrl uluru to tlte prtblit' or dislutb publit'
peute is gttill-l' rt/ u trt islettte ttt otr r. "
)
Tlte scction
l)l\)l)it)lts
tlre prilrliellrrrn ()l llr)\ l'lrlse sllrlerrrerrt. run)our r)r
reporl tllat is likclr t() cuusc l'ear irrtrl alilnl to tlrc ptrblrc ol tlrstrrrtr
;lrrblre
pcacd
Who deterrnrnss tllirt il stirtcIlcnt or rur])()ur that lr s [rcurr prrtrlislrctl is
liilse').{rticlc 120 trl'tlrc L'r)nslrtutr()r) cltltltcs tlrc l)rlcclor rrl l)rrtrlrc
P[oseduti!)ns \\rlh
lx)\\crs
t() lllslrlIlr'crIllirrirl prtrcccrlrrrus il!l nsl I|l\'
O
pefson o[ i.lr.r(lr()lrl\ l11 i IY cuult rrrth e onrpctcrrt.;Lrr rstlrutr0rr. lrr thc
crererse of tltcsc
[)rr\\r-'rS
llrr I) I']l) rs irrrlepcrr..lcr)l ln(l is no1
'Lrlrjettl,r
Ir) tlte control or dilcctron ol'arn'botlt'. liulthcrrrrorc lrc rs srrpltoscd ttr [re
gtridcd b1 priblre rrttctust. tltc irrtcrcst o1'thc lrr.Lrrirrrstlrtirrrr ol
.juslrcc
irrrr.l
the need lo prevcut tlrr: irbrrse ol leqirl proocss
ls tllcrc illl\ | t I s I I I I r' i I I I \
'
I I 1(r
l)l()sd\'tllr'
l)e \\ s
i):ll)L
r
l)r(rl)nL'll)ts
t'ritlrrti ; lLi
o
IJ
.;oLtlrilLList
lirl lrllegcrllr
1
r r r Ir I r : I t r r r.l rre rr: t hrit itu
i)!leur\,.r1
lr,tre iir l.u Irr
the D P.P.:) I do accept in principle that jourrralists irr tlteir dav to da1,
acti\ities ofdrsscnrin tirtu irtlirlrrratron in tlrc prrtllic dr) [rin sltould striYc
to lle honcst. lltir. trrrtlrlirl lrrr,.l rllrirrtlrirr lrirllr stlrrrtllrrtl: rrl etlrrt,rrl
behavitttrr. Hlrr ing saiti tiltt lttttrr:rcr. I tlo rrr-rl itccul)t llllt prrtrlrcatiorr ol
Ile\\'s that is 1telc.'ircd to bc talsc slroLrlrl rerrrain a crrnrirutl ol'll.ncc irr llris
cou |tlr.\ Ilttn s:rr rn! s(r l)deilusc lllst. t I rr. cli s s c r r r r r t I r t r t r r r ()l l I I I i , I I I r : I I r ( , I r
ltl
rnto the public donruirr lras bucn rcr rrlLrlrrrniscd [lv tlrc Irrtcltet
'l'lle
rc ls
_i
llr) SII)glc er)utllf\ !rt !tr)ul) (rl !()u t CS. \)t!iultsillt\)lt ctc. lllilt !l ) CII ) tr)
nlonopolise the soulce s ol'irrtbrrnatiorr or tllc ltuth or lirlschootl ol suclr
infornration. The advanccs tirat hlve becrr rrrirclc irr rnfblrrratiorr
technolor:r'. satcllitc [rroirtlcirstirru iutr.l thc irrtcr rret rs ntalirrrLl il trlrrrost
irrrpossrblc t() llr(lc rcl)rrrls lrl.c llrc onu lltitt turs pLrl,lrslrctl trr llrc
Itltllclllrtrts 1l,.,nt filrr'lirrrrt llre I llrlrrllrrr
lrtrlrlre
l,i trre llrr ; ltl(.rcitltl\ irl
the g ound at the present tin)e
O
.l
lte'pr,.rteutr,,tt r.It(l( r llr.
( ( ,r l\ I I I r I t i (
'
I I lirI llr'erlLrrtr,,1 tlr..
1,tr,...:It(l
e\[]lcsstoll ls. lrr nl\ \ta\\ ll(,1 lIciLrll l()t sllttt'lli(l]ls \)r tu] ()Ul\
lltitl lrre
l() pelcerr ecl to bL' trullllr.ll
Secondlr. prrblicatitrrr rtl' rreri sltlper s likc tlre orre llre lrppcllitrrts rrele
uorking tbl lt tlre tlnlc ntirtcliill trr this llllrclrl. ts r.lt)\cl ne(l [rv llrc l)r.ess
atttl ,lourrtulist .\ct (( :ll). l(15). lire .\uL elltne urt() lrrlte rrn ljri. ,lS .lulr
1995
.just a
te\\, nlollths ltetorc' thc cotnitrgl urto lbrcc ()f'the
I 995
o
ls constitutiou one ol'thc stalcd ob.icctive s ol the Act is to errsrrru Iicctlgrrr
of thc llress.
Ntrrrc, ol tlte lt(lr,:clrles rrlro lrltprlricrl trcli,r.c rrs (.tlr.(i lltr:
l)tO\Istr)ltj
()l lllrs.\!l lltc l.ltt:lrttrttt)nill (
\rut1 .rl.,r rirLl ()l !,, sr(l.r ,l
The Act itsell'does trot (letlnd rvhirt lieedt_rrrr ol'rire prcss is. I shall trr ro
exarnine sonrc of its provisiorrs and detelrnirrc tlreir ptrrposc arrrl ellccl orr
tlld
lrlr)\
lsi()tls ol sectiott 50tsttpnrr Sec(iorr -| l,rr t.rns Ille rtrlll to lttrlrlr:lr
l()
a ne\\ spllpl'.r ll s:l\ s
"(1) .1 persun nru.t', subject to tlte provisiotrs ot'lltis .-lcl publish u
newspoper.
(2) .\'o persott or uutltorit.t'sltull,
p t t b I i c' tt I i tt t t, t u l; e u t r.t' ( t L' ! i ( ) t t t t o I t
lurt Io prcrtttl tltt'
(u) I'r itt t itt g
(lt) Pu blic'utio tt;ot'
(d) circ'ulatiott utnong tltc pttblit',
ott grotttttl o./ llte L'ontttttt o.f u
uttltot'i.tctl tttttlar lltis .lt'! ot' ttt|' ulltcr
o
o
o.f u ttctt'spttper. "
l() Section J reqrrires prrblishcrs ot'rrcl spapers to currrplr rvilh lrrn' otlrcr
Ia\\ lt stutcs tllat
l-i
"\'otltittg
totrlrtittctl itt ,\ecliott ,t o.f lltis ..ltl ttltsolvr:.s utt.1'
ltarsott .fittttt
t'o tttp I iu t tc a *' it lt tt t t.,t I t tt'-
(a) proltibiting lhe publicutiott of pornogrutpltic mattet's and obscene
publicutiotts itt sofur us the)'teild to ot[enil or ct)tupl pubic
tttoruls:
(b\ prohiltitittg utt.t' publitutiott t)lti(lt intprt4ttrll itt.fi'irtgt's ott tltc
privtc.t' ol tttt itttlivitlttul or n'ltit'lt cotttttitts.litl.tt ittfbrtttulittrt."
One of the tiutctions ot'tlre editor of a rnass rncclia oruruisatiorr is trr
ensure tllat rr hat rs prrblrslretl prrlrlrc rnonr lilr' l'hrs is ts lt0l c()nttilr'\ to
c()nli lre(j rD sccli0rr'(lr) r,l tlte .\.r llre .\et .rl:,,sel t rir rr \ ie.lrrr
2i
Cotrrtcrl
'
re firnctrorrs ol tlrc crrrrne rliuc sct oul rrr scctiurr l{l ihcsc lrrc
.\rr
.rj
(a) to reguhte tlte conduc'l und prouole gooil etltit'rtl sturtduris attd
ilist'iplitte ol'jo tt r rt u list;
(b) to urhitrut( tlislttttt,s ltatvaatt-
(i) tlte pttblic utrtl tltt ttteliu: unl
(ii) the state tnd the tnerliu:
(c) to c.uerc'istt ilist'iplittur-y t'ttttrrol oyer jourttulists,
t:tliturs utttl
ptt hlis lrt'rs;
(d) to protnote, gettcrull.t', tlte
Jlorv
o.f it(brtnutitttt;
(e) to censor
Jilttts,
video tupes, plo-t's and other reluted oppurutuses
lbr
pu blic consu tnptio rt ; utt d
(f1 lo e-uercise an-y
futtt'titttt tltut
tttu.t' he uutlrorisctl or requirtd h.1, utt.s'
lurr.
'l'lrc..\.t
rcl)cillc.l lltc )r.tt)l'iil)(r .lll!l I
)
t I i) i I ! i I I I \
'
I I i \et .rtt,,l lli' i't r'
'
eens.,rshrll i tri ( ()nd(ll()tt.\ct I tlriet stclitttt 9 ol tlte I)r,\\ lel)cille(l l)lr:.'
and Censorsltip Act tlte ir4inister ltad pow'els to or'(lcr tltc prollrictor ol'
all\ Ilc\\sl)lllr!'I tl)il1 ltlts ptL[,lrsltcti illl\ slillcll]cllt $lttult ttl llte
"Itttit'lt "l
the \llluSlCl t: ilrl:.e|.,r (itst()tte\l I'r
l)ul)lrsll
:r e r , I r t' L I I I ) ! : I r il e t t tr't t t llllle
prop ctr)r rclirsctl 11, prr[rlrslr ir e()r|eclirl!t stirlcr))L'lrl 1l1c sliltcl]lcl)l lltllt rt:t.
Orlglnall\ pu[)llSIlc(l \\r)tllrl t)d tl.'ctttcd t() l)( il sc(llll()tls
l)tl[)lltiltl\)l)
lll('
l)r'opr.rrtor'()1'llle
nu\\sl)ltpct irrrttlrl Ilc pt,,,scettlc..l lt clrtt Ilc \lll(l lllclcli]t I
that'lhc l)t'css:ttttl ,lottt'rt:tlisl .\tt ttsltct'etl ll) il lle \\ lJ!'ltll(,)l
l)ld\\
ti'eedorrr \\ ltll sontr lttlllliltl()tts its se l otll in thc ,'\ct
'l
ltc
llottcts ol
tltc
Ministcr *clc abolrsltcd.
'l
i-r nte tltis u'as a slSllitlcilllt tle vcloprtte ttt lt
nleans that tl)r' pl()l)lict()rs ol'Itclslrltllets llllvc tlle lteetltrttl lrr
lltttrlisll
\\ltl r) lllr'
ll.Lr.i
ttcle|s :it (l(r\\ll Ilr tlrc.'\it llle
l)()\\cl:,.rl
tlte .ritttt:lct
having been abolislted, it is rn1'htrrttble opirriorl tlrat thcsc po\\/ers \vcre
ttot lranslerred to tlrc l) I'}l) lltttt e,,ttsltltittcrl l,r sltr s() l)cciltl5c
'1,4
t1 ltol.'
l)ut'I)\)sc
ttl lth.lltslttrtg tlto
ILrtrer:
rrl tllc \lttltsiel \\ilS tr) \l()l)
I)l(ss
censorshrp br (iorctttntcttl
itttrl t1s, lllccls.
'l'tr
tttc tl rrotrld ilclcat tlle
purposc an(l ultentr()rt rrl'tltc' r\et tl'tltc
1l,l*e
ls tltitl trete ()llsc c\clclse(l
lrr tltc \lrrtrstcr \\ !'te llltlsl!'ttcrl trr iltc l).1'l'rrlltr t. ltll ,'lll,-.'t r,l
G6r elrrrlrcrrt rrr u N.lilislr
y lreltlutl
Irv a N,lrnrslrr
o
l0
o
l5
s
lr)
o
The .,\ct lnrposcs lr rlLrlr trrt pnrpr ictrrrs rrl rtc'ri'splrpe l irrrti tlrcir ctlittrrs ttr
ensrlrc tllat rrhirt is
Iut)lrslluil
irr llrc rrcrrsPal)er rs noI irg insl
1;rrtrlic
moralitY or rlt)fS not illli in!c o tllc
l)Ii\
cY trl'iur rrrtlrr idLrirl lirrI tlrl'lcrcnt
reasolls I u otrlrl tcn(l to illarce rr ith tlrc sutrrrrissiorrs ol N4r Nlrrrurr trllr.
s lealrretl cotursel lbl thc appcllants, that rvlien the 1995 Constitrrtroll cilnlc
into tbrce. section 50 rvas no Ionger irn cl ctive lcgrslirtrorr It u irs
rertrlelctl irrcttcetir c [rr l]re l'r'ess irrrtl ,lour-rr:rlist .\ct.
The 1995 Constitutiorr ushered into this couutry it nc\\ constitrrtlonal
l0 ordet . Olle ol'tlte oblcr:trrcs ot'thc
('ortstilution
rs to [rLriltl dsrrrocrAcr'. N..r
socrcl\ cilll [rrrild ticrrrocrlcl lrrrtl slt()rlr instituli()ns l() (lqlcnrl tltirt
detlltruuter tl tltctc ts n() liec ll()\\ trl i r t I i r I r t r i t I t r r r I e\fr) il s('n)( (tl lllltl
irtfblrnatiou rs tirlse . Dcnrocracl b1, rts ve11, r)aturc e onlcs at ir
ltrrce
Mr'
Chebrion Barishaki lcarrrecl Conrutissioner ttlr Civil I.itigation subrnrtretl
o
ti belbre rrs tltirt rr c shorrlrl takc irrto corrsrtleratl()n lllu
lluerrliur
circt ust nccs ol'tltts e orrrtlIr'. llc tlrrl n0t cllrlrolirtc I lrr\\ c\.c1. llrc liirrrrcts.
of the Constitution had tlre pecLrlrar cltcunlstancus of lhis countri, in rrrind
*ltt'n llter clllrslc(l llru
('orrstitrrtiorr
'l'lrcsc
lrre Itrulrlir.llttctl irr tlre
prei.unt)le ils [)')lrtleitl
i trl er)trstllutt(rnll rrrsllrirrlrlr. t\ Lln \. (rl)l)lc st\rl)
and exploitatiorr.
'l'ltev
stater.l the goals to be attairred.
'l
hese rvcre to [te
ullit)'. peacc equallt\. rlenrocracr. Ilec.clorn. arrrl socutl jrrsticc
I corrsirlcr
l0
these to be thc values. rrorurs anrl lspirations ol'thc pcoplc in thrs corrntrr
that have to lrc uurtrrrctl l'herclirre tlrc rcsponrlcrrl hirtl thc [rrrrtlcrr ttl
jLrstrl'r tlic c\rslcnr'c ()l scclion 5(l rtr ricrr ()i llru slirtr(l ,,lr1e,.tir,-s tri Ir.-
attau)c(l lurd.\rliclc J-] trl tlrc L'()llslrlulir)n
s M) understanding ot'thc articlc is that the C'onstilLrtrorr its tltc suptelltc
la\\' of'the Iantl * as rrrldc thc yardstrck to lru uscrl rn rrreusLrlrrru trll tlrc
existins arttl tirlrrre lurr s lrr t;ther rvortls all larvs hutl to eorrtirr rrr lo llre
o ne\\ collstitutlor)al ordcr.-l-ltrs rrils rellcctcd rn,\rticlc 27J.'l lre lr|trelc
states us tirllos s
o
l(r
l5
20
"( l) .\tthjcu ttt Iltt proisiotrs u.l tltis urliclt,, tha opcrttiott o.f tltt,
e\isting law ufter co tit,g irttoJbrce of tlris Cottstitutiott sltttll ttot be
offeclel bt tlte conting intoforce oJ this Cottstitutiott hut the existittg
latr sltull bc L'ortsltu.!tl tt,illr suclt tttotffit'uliotts, t1uuli.fic'uliurt.s tttttl
exL'epliotts us rntt.t'be ttct'cssur)'trt hrirtg it ittto t'ott.fbrttrit)'n,itlt tlti.t
Co ttstittt t io t t.
(21 l"rtr tlte pttrltost,o.l tltis.trtitlt', tlta L,.t'ltrassion t,.r'i.ttittg ltnt"' rttcttrt.t
lhe urtwrittett lutu o.f I'gutttltt ot'un.t'put't tl it us r:.r'isteI ittt ttte d iutcl.t.
beJbre couitrg ittloJbrce oJ tltis
('t-trtstitutiott,
it,L'ludittg utt.t' ..1(t o.l
Parlianrctil or Slulutc or stutttlot't,iuslrutnct cttucle or tttutlt he.fbre
lhal dule whic'lt is to (ottt( irtto./brtc on or u.fitr thut tltta."
l'lterc ts tttt dott[rt ttt tttv rttirr,.l tltlt ir lrcrr tlre uppclllrnls lilcri tlruir ])ctttlolr
tltel rrcLc clurllcngirrg ir lurr llrll llrur llrorrulrl rgl r)l
the tlrst ag;pr'llant. h('irrs lcslrt)onl tr, tltilt lhct
'l
lrc putilrorr lrllcgerl tlrirt
\\ I , )ti! l\ \\ il:, t
25 e\lstL'llcc bclirre the e()nlul! ull() li)rrc ol tltc t'rrtslrtLrlrorr. llrc stittunlct)t
in the petitron arrtl thc accorrrpaur rrrg allldirvit ol'C'harlcs Orrviurgo Obbo.
sectitin 5()(srrprii)rs inu,.rrrsrstsnt ri,rllt antllot is irr eonlltrver)tl()1 ol tltc
ll)
5
pro\ isious ol
(lle ('ollstltuli()n.
l lle
l)etition
cndcd \\'illt onc ()l tlltj
ltritvct
s
sccktt)S lt r,lce llrtlllr,.,rt llllrt tltL's\'etl()ll is lnc()n5rslct)l rrillt tlr,..
l)ri)\tsrr,n:,
\)l
Articles 29(l)(rr) iul(l (b), -10(2)and JJ(2Xc) ()l r11c L'()nslrrutron
Illrr rrru slrrtl tllrt. (ltu [,rrrrlcrr \\irs ()ll lllo lrplrclllrrrts l1r
l)lr)\e
tlrlrt llrr Stlrt..
In thc rrrlttcr norr [rclirrc us Ills lll)l)cllants I thirrli estlrtrlrslrr-ri br.thcrr
pcltlr(rlr llt:tt llr,,':t(ts (rl Illa I) l) l't,r
l)t(rsctUlc
llrcr ir;r.. ltr!(, ,t..tenl 1,t |)
contra\ eDtiolr ol'therl n,rlhts as errslrrined irr the Corrstrtrrtion.
'l
he [rurrlerr
shiticd to thc.Strrtu'to.iLrstilv thc rcslricrions ls burru tlcrrrorrstnrtrir
.jLrstillll[rlc in lr Ilcc ilnri (ldn]()cllllr!' s\,cicl\ ()r \\rll]Ir I I r t, g r r r r I i r r i s Lrl tlr,.
L'Ottstt(ttttirrr. Ilte.lLrslrltclrtrtrr) \\il\ e\)rlliur)uil trt tlte irr)s\\tr l() tlrc
l)ulrll()rr
and tlrc ilcc(),lpa.\ rng .l'tiila'it s*.or rr [ir. N4onicir ]\,lur:ct^ r, lr Statc
r\ttolttcl lll lllr.-\ttr)ntrr (ierrcllil's
elrarrthcr.s. l)lrr.lrur.irltlt (r
rrl llrr: lrrtsrrcr
slltlcd lrs lolltrrr s
"'l'lte
uc'tittrts oJ tlte l)iret,tor oJ'l,uhlit, Prosec,uliotts uttrl .let.tiott-i0 o.f'
the Pettul L-ode..lt,t ,.e ol itttottsistent willt lltc t,0ttstittrti0tt u.s.:
L)r sonrL't)o(l\ ulse rrrrrier tlrc liLrllroritr ol lrrrr Ilrrr lrlr: \ r()lirlc(i rlre rr rrlrlrl:
and fi'eedonrs to publish guar-antced Lrnder the
('onstituttoll.
Oncc tlutt hirs
O
Iruen .'stlrt,lrslr.,,l. tlt. i,Lrr.lirr.lirtt: t,, llt,..StlLte,rr Ilr.,ir..r.r1r11
,,,.
11,,.-;1.i.
are [)eiur.r corrrpluirred ot'to
1trslilr tlrc rcstrictitrns lreirru rruposcrl or tlre
l(l cotttLrtLrcr.i c\lstrnec ()l tl)c llllpu!ncLi lcgrsltrtiorr
o
t-\
lo
o
l0
li
(a) 7-he-r lo ttttt trtulia.ft'ee orrt o.l e.rpressitttt, press utttl ussttt'iutiott trs
well as the rigltt to proL'tiL'e tlte journulistn pro.fessitttt u t'rirninul
ucls os ulleged itt gt'otttttl 5(l) oJ the Pelilitttt- Ittstt:rttl sc(tiott 50 t).f
tltc l'cttul Co a.lt't railtt'utas .lrtit'la 1-l(l) t{ tha
('rtttstittttirttt
tvlticlt
reqtrires lltut ft'eeduttr to be ntitttl/itl tt/ tlte./reuilttttts o.f utltcrs, llte
trutttltlittg ttpott x'ltit'lt ttttillts ttot ottl.t'llte l)irtctor ul l'tthlit
Proset'utiotrs bul ulsu the l'tthlit' lo sceh pruleL'tit)t,.lt'ottt
('ottrts
o.f
lurt'.
(b).-lrticle a-lQ)@ is ttot u rttugit wund in tlrc hattls oJiourttnlisls ltt
pttblislt irrespunsiltl.t', tttulicittusl.s'or u t,pro.f'ess io tt ull.l'.
(c) I'he denrut'rut'-t' irt l'gutttltt is trot nteusured !;olel.r lt.t'lltc petitiotter.r
sitttltl.t' ltt't'ttttst' tht It'ttllt ot' tt thrt,!iL'il.y tt/ tlttir ttt'lirtrt.t itrr ltuittg
tluL'sliottL'(l itt rt
('ttttrl r4l l-urt'httt is.tttltitct ltt tltt ttrlt (t./ I'tttt' (ttttl
tt tst bt
./br
tltt gttttl o./ srtt'itl.r gtttcrull.l'. "
The ans*er to the pctitioll tlid not stirte that thc t'eslticliotts irrrllosccl [x'
section
i0 lte (lL'nl()nstrlblr irrstillirlrlc irr ir lr'ec lttttl tlctttoctlilie s()clel\' ()l
rvhat is pro\ rrled utttl:r tlt.' L'ottslttttlttltt.
-l'ltc
itttsu et' t() tlle
I)ctitioll
20 shorrld have shou n s lrr prrlrlication ot lirlsc ne n,s urtri nul)()urs rtttgltl tr,
reurain a crinrirtal ol'tence ttt a fier'attd dctttoctittrc s()elety likc rrtrrs lo
nre tllis \\as tllc cr-tt\ ()l tltc rtutttel . lrr otlte I lrot tls..'\ttotttcr'(iultutltl
O
shorrltl lrrrre \lli)\\n rlerirlr tlrr( tlre lrriitirlr(rr ulri),r:(11 l,'. sreliott 5ll trrll.
rr ithrn Articlc lJ(sLrltrll) r)r lllt\ i.)tllct ptoVistotts ol tltc
(
trttsttttttiott ltttti
li the provisions olthe l'r'ess rrnd Journalist,\ct. It is tttr cottsiclerecl
oltint.rtt tllrt tlrc I)tt'celrrr ol l'ir[llie I)l()scetlliolls slt,rlll,l tt,tl lllrrc lllc
po\\crs to dctet tttirrc rrtt [rclltlt'ol oret ]0 ttttllrort
1tct,1rlr
ltrtttl ttt lltts
cor.lntr\/ that a statenrent. runloLlr or rcport publishcd [rY attl'llerstln is
likelt' to caus!' tcar lttd alat-ttt to tlre prrltlic trl to tlisttrr't.l ptrbltc
lrcituc
ro This caunot be n slrt
ll
Tltc ..\ltontcr
(icrtclrl
nr nl\ \ rerr rlr,.l rrtrt tlrsclrrllc llre cr rtierrlurl hrrrr[.rr
ot'.lust)1\ lng tIre eorrtrrrtrerl d\lslfnec \)1 1lle nl)tL.une(l \a(ll() \,lr (rUl
statutc book s
)
US.lrrr.llr. ltkc rt[trtr ()thcI L'(]tlnlrrcs rrr llre $or lr,l lllrrc,.lrose rr ilrc plrtlr,rl
cientoe llrtic u\)\clniurcc. lhcrc itre l))iuly itulltollties li()nt nliln\
O
.jttrtsr,itclt,.ttt.-
rtltte lt llri; ir.,.'11 1g1,11r1l1tecLI ttt I I r r' i
( l\ I ! I r ) u I r I \ li,:il llir\(.)g.l
beett dc'livcretl lt is rrot nccessirn'to tcprodrruc thcrn lrere llrrl llrcsc
l(l iltltlloIllres ils L ur)(lcr:lilll(l lllr'nl rlrc:r lltc ilnl)()lt. l!i,,1 licr'.l,,rrr ,rl
expression as beiug thc colner stone of L.\,erv socictY tllat is
dellloc|ltticallr rlr) \ u le(l
lJglrrrtll cl)(i).' ll
[)llt]t
irl l.icrrtriclirlrc )t\)\c lilncc iln(l tllclcli)tc slrc ltir.. lr
o
I5 dutl'to protect tl)e rights regarding thc tiee florv ot irrlorrrratiorr. Iice
debat.'lrrtd ol)cn rtiscusstr)ll r)l'lssucs tlutl cortee rrr tlr..eitrzerrr,rl tlri:
c0unll \ ln oldel to c\crcisc thcsc rrglrts thclc rrrtrst irc rrrr r;rurblrrru rcsirle
lirl pcoplc to ticclr c\l)rcss tltctl rtlclrs iur(l ()l)tnr()ns irs l()nrr irs rrr urr.;olirrg
these rights sr.rch people do rrot prc.jLrtlice tlle r igllts arrrl li ecdonrs ol'
others or publrc urte lcst
'l'huse
irrc tlte onlv rcstlietiorr tlrlrt .\r.ticlc
{J(SLrprirl tllll)()SC\ .\.i lLr S.rs
irt e rIrrssrr)-! ()tt! \ ()l) t]. lr (.\
-.I tl lt t\
20
t'alse. the persoll doltrg so drres rrot prc,judrce thc riuhts arrcl li.cedorrrs ot'
lr
otllt:rs. o[ tlte pulrlte lnl(tcsl lltcrt' rr, rrlii l,e rr,, ll:llt1] ,lr,I! lrr lrI I tt.rr
, \ ):
sccli()n 5(i r: I I tu . r I r .. I i
t ( r I I \\ rllt .\ r'ticlc'd;i'r,l llre
( , rrr:rrlrrlr,, rr l,,r
criurinalising everv stateluent that is published cveu lf that sttrtcrucrrt has
not caused iltr\
l)rL'ju(licL.
to tlle ng.llls ol'()tllcls l:tcrr rl tlrcr e rs lt
Yiolltiorr r)r l)l!'lU(lrec
rrl ollrcf
l)c()l)ie
s' rigl s. llrerc li:l rc le(i\ ()t'
Dated at Ka rrr palu thir.
j.
t.r..:uf..\!.\,.t :-x
'.,'.]
reuledies that ale pror icle d uuder the cxisting laiv ii,lre le orrri curr see k
redress in a eir il coutt
'l'his
n)cillts lltilt orrr socictv ntusl lcilllt to
O
ilf!(\lllll)\)(litl-.1 \\rLl.'r. tel\ r,l \1,'\\\ lr!.llLI\ i.lr .,, i,I tl .Lrrir
'. l!\\\ ( i
beliei.s are rdl)ugl'tilnt rrrl corrllirrY l() ouI o\\'n
l0
I rvould allorr this irppcal ln the terrrrs proposccl bv N4rrlcnga.ls('
00+.
o
l5
.\1r..lustie c ol'lhe Sup
(,
slrir
t'e rtt t (
ourt
'
:-
(
. K.llr)a rrr rrgi
I
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