Bukenya v Attorney General (Constitutional Appeal 3 of 2011) [2017] UGSC 86 (22 May 2017)

I I THE REPI.JBLIC OT UGAT.IDA IN TTIE SI'PREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPAI.A, [CO&AM: KATL.REEEE,CI; ruMWEilGW; KISAAKYE; MV/ANGUSYA; OPIO-AWERI; MWONDHA; & TIBATEM WA- EKIRIKUB IN7,A; lJ. S. C. l BETWEEN BUKET{YA CHLIRCH AMBROSE IAPPELLANT AND 10 THE AT'TORNEY GENERAL ] RESPONDENT [Appcal fiom the Rulittg ofJusties of the @nstitutional C.ourt (Bahigcine, IE!, TWinomujuai, l(zvufia, Nshirrr)rc, Aruch-knola, [A) dtted 2 t"t lVtarch 20 I I in &nstitutional Rcfercnce No. 26 of 2O IOJ "UPGMENI -OT PR ruSAAKYf, 1 JSC 15 l]ukcnya Church Arnbrosc (he rcinaftcr rcfcrrcd to as thc appcllant) filcd this appcal aSaillst the Ruling, of the Collstittrtional Courl which ltcld that lhc Jtrdicature (Fundanrental Rights and l'rcedonrs) (l)nforcement I'roccdurc) Rulcs, 2008 werc u nconstitutiorral. 20 'l'hc Constitutional Court nradc thc Ruling, lollowirrg a Constitutiorral Rcfcrcnce to it by the I li.q,h Court otr thc following, qucstion: "Whether the tudicaturc (Ifundanental RiShts and lTedoms) (Enforcement Prwcdurc) Rulesr 2OOS arc unconstitutional for hauhryg been made by the Rules Committee instead of Parlianent pursuant to Afticle 5O(4) of the Constitution." 'l'he Appellant's appcal to this Court is bascd on thc followin.g g,rouncls: 1 25 I CONSTITUTIONAT APPEAT NO 03 OF 2011 5 L That the Constitutional Court ened to have held that Parlianent had not made any law for the enforcement of fiindanental rights and frcedoms. 2. Ihat the &nstitutional Cowt enrd to have held that the Rules &mmitte was not empwercd to make Rules for enforcement of fundanental rights and Moms. He prayed that thc Ruling of the Constitutional Court be revcrscd and this Court finds that the Rules Committee is empowered to makc Rules for the enforccnrent of fundamental rig,hts and freedoms. Before I considcr the submissions and the merits of this appcal, it is necessary to provide a brief background to the appeal. In his application, the appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Governnrent's ban of open air ex-sludio radio broadcasts, commonly known as and hereinafter referrcd lo as 'bintceza.' lle prayed for a declaration from the IIigh Court that the barrning of 'ltitnccza'by the Government breached the freedom of specch, cxpression and the nredia, guaranteed undcr Article 29( I ) (a) of the Constitution. I{e also prayed for an order lifting the ban on 'bimeeza'as a way of enforcenrent of his fundamental freedoms of speech, expression and media. When thc application carne up for hearing,, the Attorne y Gcncral raiscd a prelinrinary objection ag,ainst thc corrlpcte ncy of the appcllant's application. The Attorney Gencral conturded lhal lhc Judicaturc (Ifundamental Rights and 10 15 20 25 2 Or1 2crrhJanuary 20lO, thc appellant filcd Iligh Court Misccllancous Cause No. 1 ll of 20IO against the Attorney (iencral. Thc application was brouSiht under Article 5O(1) of the Constitution of Llganda (1995), and Rule l3(l) of the Judicaturc (hndamental Righa and lMoms) (Enforcement nwdurc) Rules, SI No.55 of 2OO8. 5 Irwdons) (Enforcement Prccedurc) Rules undcr which thc appcllant had filed his application, were urlconstitutional because they wcre nrade by the Rule s Conrmittcc and not by thc I'arlianrcnt of Uganda, as is required by Article 5O(4) of the Clonstitution of Llganda. 'l-he Attorncy Gcneral prayed for the appellant's application to bc staycd and for a Ret'crence to thc Constitutional Court. On 8il'July 2O1O,Z,ehurikize,!., acting, undcr thc provisions of Article I ll7(5) of the Constitutiorr of Ugarrda, referred the constitutional question quoted at the beginning of this Judgment to the Constitutional Court. Instead of considering the referred question, the Constitutional Court considered the following question which was slig,htly different from the one that the High Court had referred to it. oWhether the Rules Committee in enacting the/udicaturc (Ihndantental Rights and Iledoms) (Enforcement Ptwdurc Rules) SI No. 55 of 2OO8, the Rules under which MC I 18 2OO8 was brcught, contruvend Article 5O (4) of the &nstitution.' The Corrstitutional Cotrrt madc its Ruling on 2 I 'r March 2Ol I and hcld that the Rules Corrrmittee acted corrtrary to Article 50(a) of the Constitution when it nrade the ludicaturc (Ibndanental Wts and llwdoms) (Enforcenent Procdurc) Rules. 'l'hc Law govcming ConstitrrtionaI Rcltrcncc ancl Appcals thcrcfrorn Article 137(5) of the Constitution of tlganda provides for Rcfcrcnces to the Constitutional Court as follows: 3 10 15 20 / TIre appellant was dissatisfied with this decision and appcalcd to this Court. He was represented at the hearing, of this appeal by Ladislaus Rwakafuzi while Richard Adrole, Senior Statc Attorraey and Gerald Batanda, Statc Attorney, represented the Attorney Gencral. Both parties made oral submissions. 5 oWerc anyquestion as to the intetprctation of this Constitution arises in any prweedings in a aurt of law other than a field cowt maftial, the court- (a)may, if it is of the opinion that the question involves a substantial question of law; and (b) shall, if any party to the pwdings tquests it to do so, rcfer the question to the constitutional oourt fordecision in asotdaace with clause (1) of this article." On thc other hand, Articlc 1ll7(6) of lhc Constitution .guidcs thc Constitutional Court whcn the que stion rcfcrrcd to in Articlc I lJ7(5) above is brou.g,ht bcfore it. 'I'his Articlc provides as follows: "Whete any question is rcfend to the hnstitufional burt under clauses (5) of this Article, the @nstitutional butt shall give its deision on the question, and the &urt in which the qu*tion arises shall disry of the case in accordance with that decision." furtlrcrnrorc, Rtle 22 ol thc C;onstitutional @urt (Petition & Refercnces) Rules provides that thc origirral courl shall disposc of thc casc in accordancc with the dccision of thc Constitutional Llourl or thc Strprente Court, if thcrc was all appeal fronr thc dccision ol'the Constitutiotral Court. I will now proceed to consider g,round 2 of appeal first before I deal with ground I of the appeal. 10 15 20 25 4 30 Whcrc a party is clissatisfied with thc dccision of the Constitutional Court, he or she may appeal to the Suprenrc Court under Article 132(lt) of the Constitution. Rule 21(13) of the Constitutional burt (Petition & Refercnces) Rules, S.I 9I of 2OO5 also reiterates what is providcd for in Article I117(6) abovc. Rule 2I (3) specifically provides that aftcr the Constitutiotral Court has made its decision on a Constitutional Re fe rence, the decision of thc Constitutional Court, tog,ether with a copy of its procecdings shall bc remitted to the orig,inal court. Ground 2 of Appcal This ground w:rs franrcd as lollows: tThat the Constitutional C;ourt ened to have held that the Rules Committee was not empowercd to make Rules for enforcement of tundanental rights and ftwdoms.' Ar3tring in strpport of this ground, thc appcllant's counscl contordcd that the Rules Conrnrittce had power unde r scction 4l of the Judicature Act to rrrake Rules providin.g, for procedures bclorc Courts. I Ie subrrrittcd that whcn the Rnles Corrrrrrittee rrradc lhc ludicafurc (Ibndamental Rights and lMoms) (Enforcement Ptwedurc) Rules, the Conrnrittcc was e xercising powcrs vcsted in it by scction 4 1 (2) (e) of the Judicalure Act, Cap I l3 Laws of llganda. The appellant's counscl further submitted that the Attorney General did not come to Court in good faith becausc first, the Attorney General was a member of the Rules Committee and secondly, the Attorney General hadpafiicipated in the making, of thc inrpugrred Rules. It was thcrefore not proper for the sanre Attorney General to turn around and claim that the impugned Rule s are now unconstitutional, witl,out proviclin2i ag,grieved persons with any alternative. 10 15 20 25 5 5 The appellant's counsel also contended that the Constitution of Uganda had a Bill of Rights that was justiciable. 'l'herefore, he ar5iued that the Courts could not decline or refuse to enforce the guaranteed rights under the Constitution, on grounds that Parliamcnt had not made thc law for the enforcemcnt of the ri2;hts and freedonrs undcr Articlc 5O(4) thereof. ln light of the above arg,uments, the appcllant's counsel contcnded that it was wrong for the Attorney General to arguc atrd for the Constitutional Court to hold that the Rules Conrrnittee did not have power to make the impug,ned Rules. The Attorney General refuted the appcllar.rt's subtnissions. 1'he Attorncy General contended that whereas Article 5O(4) mandated Parliament to make laws for the enforcement of rig,hts, no law to that e ffect had been enacted since thc promul2;ation of the Constitution. Whereas the Attorney Gcneral conceded that the inrpugned Rules were constitutional, I have still found it nccessary to briefly consider this Sround to enablc mc to properly dispose of thc qucstion whethcr the Constitutional Court erred in law when it hcld that the said Rulcs were unconstitulional. In holding that the Rules were unconstitutiotral, the Constitutional Court held as follows: *5.L 55/08 was made by the Rules &mmiftee...in exercise of the pwe$ conferrcd upn the Committee by &ction 4 I (1) of the Judicaturc Act . ..|he Rules Committe thercforc derives its pwerc to 6 15 20 25 s The Attorncy General conccdcd thal tlrc ludicaturc (Ifundamental Rights and I@oms) (Enforcement hwdurc) Rules,, were madc under section 4l of the Judicature Act. Hc however subntitted that what was cnvisaged under Article 5O(4) of the Con.stittttion was that it was only lhrliarnent to make such laws for enforce utent of fundantental riShts and freedoms and not the 10 Rules Committee, as had happened in this case. In the course of making, subtrrissions, the Attorney General also conceded that (a)Parliamcnt does not trrake Rule s g,ove rtring procedurcs in Court proccedings; (b) that thc power of the Rules Comrnittce to make Rules of Proccdure for Courts stems out of scction 41 of the Judicature Act; and (c) that the Rules Conrrtittee had power undcr the said section to make Rulcs g,overning procedurc lbr cnforcentcnt of ri5;hts and I'rccdoms by courts under Articlc 50(I) of the Constitution; (d) arrd that thcrcforc the /udicaturc (Ilndanental Righ$ and ltwdoms) (Enforcement Prpcedurc) Rules are rlot unconstitutional. 5 make rules ftpm Article 15O(I) of the @nstitution. Ihe Rules arc for rcgalating the practice and ptwedurc in thetudiciary. Howrever, applications frcm which this rcfercnce arose wete made underArticle 5O of the Constitution...It is common laowledge that Parliament has not made any law under Article 5O(4) afuve. That fuing so, did the Rules Commiftoo have the mandate to make S.I 55/O87 By the use of the word 'shall'in sub Article (4) aboue, the {ramere of the Constitution made it mandatory that it is only Parliament that is empwercd by the @nstitution to make laws for the enforcement of rights and Moms under Chapter fow of the Constitation. It is not the rcle of any other fody to do it except under delegated authoity under Article 79, which is not the case herc. We thercforc agtw with the submission byMr. Adrcle and answer the qaestion in the affrrmative.' 'I'he question that rcrnaitrs is whcthcr thc Rules Conrmittec had powers to nrake Rules for enlbrccntent of fundatrrcntal riShts'/ 'l'his calls for an e xarnination of thc provisions tltal set up thc Rulcs Conlntittee. The Rules Committce was established under seclion 40 of the Judicature Act. Sectiorr 4l (l) which was rcferred to by the Constitutional Court provides as follows: furthcrnrore, the notcs to thc said Rulcs specifically provide that the Rulcs were nrade irr e xercisc of the powers vcsted in the Rules Committcc by section 4l(l) of theJudicature Act. On the other hand, section 4l(2) of thc Judicature Act lays out the functions of the Rules Committee. Of particular relevance is section 41(2) (e) which provides as follows: 10 15 20 25 30 7 The Rules &mmitte may, by statutury insfuument, make rules for rcgulating thepractice and prccdwe of the Suprcme &urt,the Court of Appal and the High Court of Uganda and for all other courts in uganda subotdinate to the High &wt.' "Without pejudice to the general application of subsection (1), the Rules &mmitte may make rules of coufi under that subsection for- (e) rcgalatiry and pewribitts the methd of pleading, practice and ptwdurc of the court, including all mafterc connected w'ith forms to be usd andfes to fupaidz It is also neccssary to considcr thc leg,al nrcanin.g, of Rulcs of Court and 'Enforcemort' and 'l'roccdure', which itr trty vicw, undcrlic thc objection of thc Attorney Ceneral and thc holding ol the Constitutional Court with rcspcct to the constitutionality of thc Rulcs. Rrrles of Courl or Court Rules have beetr dcfined by ltlack's Iaw Dictiotrary 9tr' Edition at pa3,e 4 1 tl as, oRegulations hauing the force of law and goueming practice and pwedurc in the various courts, ... as well as any lxal rules that a @urtpomulgates.' On the other hand, Black's Law Dictionary gil'Edition at pages 132i1-1:124 defines the term procedure as follows: o1 Z. Ihe judicial rule or manner for catrying on a ciuil lawsuit or criminal prcwution.' The same Black's I;rw Dictionary gttt Edition at pa8c 608 dcfines the ternr 'Inforcentertl" as: ahe act or ptocess of complling compliance with a law, mandate, ammand, detw, or agtwment.' 'lhrninpi to thc prcsent case, thc title of thc Rules is indicatec{ lhus. The Judiuturc (Ibndanental Rights and fiwdoms) (Enforcement nocdurc) Rules.' It is cvider.rt from the titlc of the se Rules that the Rules Comtrrittee made thenr to providc for the procedurc lor thc applicants sceking e nforcemcnt of fundanrental riglrts and frecdonts which provided undcr Articles 20-45 of the Constitutiotr, to bring these applicatiotrs to Courts of law. 10 20 25 8 30 5 15 5 The Rules defined the fornr such an application could take, that is by Notice of Motion and further that a single Judg,e would bc compe tent to hear such an application (Sce Rulc lJ(I)). lt should be noted that the Rules limited themselves to matters of procedure and did not attcnlpt to elaborate on the fundamental rights and freedoms laid out in Articlcs 20-45 of the Constitution. Sccondly, it should also bc noted that the Rules Conrnrittee did not attenlpt to define what a conrpetent Court is. ll however recognized that such applications filed under Article 50(1) and the Rulcs in question would be made to a corllpelent Court. It is not in dispute that the Judicaturc Act was enacled by I'arliament. Both the Attorney Cieneral and the Constitutional Court acknowledged that it is the same Judicature Act which established thc Rules Conurrittec and gave the Cor.unrittee widc rangin.g, powers undcr .scction I (2) (a)-(y) of the Judicalurc Act to nrake Rulcs reg,ulatin8, anlotlg othcrs, proccdures be fore Courts of law. It should be noled that the Judicaturc Act did not 8,ranl any powers to the responsible Minister to make Rcg,ulations under it. Rather, the Act vested these powers in the Rules Conrnrittee which is chaired by the Chief Justice. It is therefore nty view, that had the Corrstitutional Court properly addresscd itself to the provisions ol Articlcs 71) and I50 of thc Constitution; scction 41(2) (e) and4l(5) of lheludicaturcAct,and thcprovisionsof the ludicaturc (Itundanental Rights and ldorns) (htforcement nwdurc) Rules, it would not havc declared the Rules unconstitutional for having, been nrade by the Rulc's Corrrnrittee. In light of the prccedin.g discnssion, I firrd that thc Conslitutional Court crrcd in law when it hcld that the Rulcs Conrrniltcc did not havc lhe mandate to 10 20 25 9 15 5 nrake Rules of proccdurc lbr cnlbrccmcnt ol fundamental rights and freedonrs provided for under Chaptcr 4 of the Constitution. Beside the discussion above, I further note that neither the Attorney General nor the Constitutional Court addressed thernsclves to the provisions of section 4l (5) of the Judicaturc Act, which is instructivc in this matter. 'lhis section provides as follows: /'An instrument made under this section shall b laid beforc Parliatnent and be subject to annulnent by Parliament and shall cease to have effst when s annulled but without pejudice to anything done under it or the makittg of a fiirther insframent.' I am awarc that thc appcllant's counscl did not bring to the Constitutional Court's attention this section of the law and that he did not therefore canvass this argument. Nevertheless, the Constihrtional Court, like all other Courts in LJganda, is under a leg,al duty to bc or to r.nake itself awarc of all laws and provisions on our Statute Books. In thc sanrc vcin, the Court is also duty bound to apply thenr whe re they are applicable, even if the parties did not cite or rely on them. I am further aware that section 41 (5) of the Judicature Act requires an instrument made under sectiorr 41 to be laid before I'arliament. In my view, tabling thc statutory instrunrent be fore I'arliantent was not intended to validate the said Rules, but to notify lhrlianrent that thc Rules Committee l.rad exercised its delegated power under section 41 of the Judicature Act to make the Rules. furthernrore, such tabling would, in my view enable Parliament to play its ove rsight rolc and ensure that the powers it delegated to the Rules Committee had been excrcised in accordancc with the provisions of the Judicature Act. However while the section creatcd this duty, the sectiorr is silent orr who has the responsibility to do so and thc tinrefrarnc within which these Rules should 15 20 25 10 10 5 Be that as it nray, I am of the view that looking at thc composition of the Rules Committee under section 4O of the Judicaturc Act, thc Attorney General is the proper person to lay such Rules before Parlianrent. 'l'his is because he is the representative of the Exccutive and he also has direct audience in Parliament than the Chief Justice. thus if there was any failure to lay the Rules beforc Parliament, the blame should squarely fall on thc Attorney General or the Minister of Justice who is the line Ministcr responsible for the Judiciary Affairs. At the end of the day, it is the Executive that was at fault. I also find scction i\4 (D o| thc Interprctation Act, Cap 3 laws of Uganda rclcvant to this issue. lt providcs as follows: o(2) Where no time is prcscribd or allowed within which anythiry shall be done, that thing shall b done without unrca.rcnable delay and as often as due ecasion arises.' tt is also wortlr noting lllat thc /udicaturc (Ibndanental Righe aild lMoms) (Enforcement Ptwdurc) Rulesdid not providc for a contmetrccntcnt datc. I Iowevcr, section 17(l)(a) ol lhc InterprctationAct provides as follows: 'the commencement of a statutory insttument shall be such date as is prouidd in ot under the instrument or, whete no date is so ptouidd, the date of its publimtion as notified in the Gazette' 'lte Rulcs were gazcttcd on thc l2rl' f)ccctttbcr 2OOtt and thcre tbre carrtc into tbrcc on thc santc day. Given nry ar.ralysis above , I tnainlain nry firtcling, lhal lhc ludicaturc (Iludanental Righ8 and lMoms) (Enforcement Ptwedurc) Ruleswerc properly nrade by the Rules Conrtrtittee. ln the evcnt that these Rules wcre not laid before Parlianrent, I still hold that this dicl not makc lhc ,/udicaturc 10 15 20 25 11 bc laid bctbrc I'arlianrcnt. ln this case , lhe tudicatwe (Fvndamental Rights and ltedoms) (Enforcement ftwedurc) Rulesarc also silort in both aspccts. (IVndanental Rights and lleedoms) (Enforcement Ptwedurc) Rules unconst itu tional. I arn fortified in my position by thc fact that (a) tlrc Rules were made by a body legally establishcd and nrandatcd to do so and (b) the failure by the Executive to table these Rule.s did not makc therrr unconstitutional espccially in light of the fact that therc is no rule providirrg, that failure to lay these rules before Parlianrent will rcndcr thcnr unconstilutional. 'lhc Attorney Gerreral never made any arSunlcnt on this ground. Court carlnot therefore on its own volition make a case for the Atton.rcy Gencral which will have the effect of prohibiting the enforccment of fundamental rig,hts and freedoms by citizens before Courts of law. The import of section 4l (5) of thc Judicaturc Act is that in its wisdorn, Parliament gave full arrthority to thc Rules Conrmittce to make the Rules for regulatinp; procedures in Courts. Oncc such Rules are made by the Rules Comnrittcc, such Rules rcmain in forcc until l'arliamcnt nullifies them. The section however saves anything donc undcr the Rulcs prior to their annulmerrt. I would thcre lore allow ground 2 ot.appcal to succccd. Ground I ofAppeal I will now turll to consider Gronnd I of appcal which was framed as follows: *That the &nstitutional burt eM b have held that Parliatnent had not made any law for the entorcernent of ftindamental righe and Moms.' Thc appellant's counscl contendccl that whcreas thcrc wcre cxisting, laws for enforcenlenl of rights and frcedonrs, thcre was still necd tbr a specific law on e rrforccnrcnt of fundanrcntal rights and frecdonrs. Counsel prayed lbr Court to issuc a directive to the Attorncy (lencral to carry oul his duty under Articlc 10 15 20 25 t2 5 5 5O(4) of thc C-onstitution by introducing a Bill to l'arlianrent aimed at operationalizing Article 5O of the Constitution. On the other hand, the Attorncy General subnritted that Article 5O (4) of the Constitution mandatcs Parliaurcnt to enact a law lbr thc cnforcement of fundanrental rights and freedorns. He further contcnded that no such law for enforcement of rights and frecdonrs had been enacted by lhrliament. While conccding that the Rulcs Cornntittce has powcrs to ntake Rules of l'rocedure for Courts like it did with thc impug,ncd Rule s, the Attorncy General contended lhat no Act ol'thrliarrlent wa.s in cxistcncc in as far as enforcement of rights and freedoms was conccrncd. The Constitutional Court concurred with the subnrissions of the Attorney General on this point and hcld that no special law had been enacted under Article 50 (4) of thc Constitution. 'l'he Constitutional Court observed as follows: oApplications {tom which this rcference arose werc made under Article 5O of the Constitution. The rcleuant part rcad as follows: 5O Enforcement of rights and Moms. (1) Any prcon who claims that a findamental or other right or frccdom guaranteed under this &nstitution has been infringed or thrcatened, is entitld to apply to a competent Court for rcdrcss which may include compensation. 10 15 20 (2) (s) (4) Parliaruent shall malce laws for the enforcement of the rights and frwdoms under this chapter. It is common lqtowledge that Parliament has not made any law under Article 5O(4) aboue." 30 13 25 The learned Justiccs howeve r disagree d with the. sccond parl of the Attorney General's submission that no law was in cxistencc in tlg,anda for the enforcement of lundamental rights and freedonrs because there was no specific law enactcd to date. 'l'he C-'onstitutional Court he ld as follows: 5 4... However, we ate not in agrwment with him that in the absence of such a law, until Parliwnent makes law under Article 5O(4), Article 5O(I) is in abes,ance. The atgument that the enforcement of rights and Moms would b in abeyance in the absence of the laws enuiuged under Article 5O(4) is in our uiew, unfounded. When the &nstitution was prcmulgatd and cane into force, it came into force as a whole docwnent and not in parts. Ftom their submissions, bth sides arc alive to the fact that other existing ptwedural laws such as the Ciuil Prwedurc Act and the Rules thercunder, the Law Refotm Miscellaneoas Prcuisions Act and the Govenment Prccedings Act werc saved by the pouisions of Article 274 of the Constitution which savd all existing laws bforc the coming into force of the Constitution.' As can be noted from the above quotc, it is not true, as the appellant's counsel had argued, that the leamed Justiccs of the Constitutional Court held that f'arliarrrent had not madc any law for thc e nforcement of fundamental rights and freedonrs. The Constitutional Court rig,htly held that therc was no specific law envisaged utrder Article 50(4) of the Constitution. IJowever, the Constitutional Court ackr, owledged the existence of other laws which existed prior to lhe promul.gation of the Constitution and which were still applicable by virtue of Article 274 of the Constitulion. This Articlc saved laws cxisting as at the coming into force of the 1995 Constitution but required that such laws be construcd with such nrodifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with the Constitution. Having conside red the subnrissions of lhe parties and the Constitutional Court's holding, on this tnattcr, I have found no basis for upholding ground I of appeal. I would therefore find that the Constitutional Courl did not err when it held that no special law had bcen enacted by Parliament under Articlc 50(4) of the Constitution. 10 15 20 30 1,4 While the appellant's counscl concedcd that other laws existed under which the appellant could have ntovcd to enlbrce his fundarrrental rights and freedoms, he contorded that thcse laws were (a) insufficie nt; (b) used ordinary pleadings which would take long. In counsel's view, this absence of a speedy enforcement procedure would defeat the purposc of enforcement of fundamental rights and freedorrrs which required immediate redress. According, to the appellant's counsel, this required a spccific law on enlbrcenrent of lundanrental rights and freedonrs providing for a quick and specific procedurc for enforcenre llt of fulldanlental rig,hts and freedoms. On the other hand, the Attorncy General contcnded that even in the absencc of a specific law enacted by l'arliament for enforcenrent of fundamental rights and freedoms, an agqrieved party could still enforcc his or her fundanrental rights under Article 5O( I ) of the Constitution. He relied on Arlicle 274 which preserved existing law such as the Civil Pro,cedure Act, thc Magistrates Courts Act, the Govcrnment l'roceedinpis Act and the Law Refornr Miscellaneous Provisions Act amonS othcrs, under which an aSgrieved party could move Court to cnforce his or her rights. By way of illustration, the Attorney Gencral contended thal a parly who goes to Court because of breach of contract or a land dispute was in essence enforcing his right to property. This, according to thc Attorney Gencral, illustrated the fact that these rilihts can be enforced under numerous legislation enacted by Parliament. The Attorney General also contcsted the appcllant's subrnission that as a Member of the Rules Conrnrittec, thc Attorncy General had done nothing to nrove Parlianrent to cnact a law on enforce nrent of human rights and freedonrs. IJe argued that this was unncces.sary sincc the re was existing law under which fundamental rights and frecdonrs could be cnforced. 5 10 15 20 15 25 5 The question that arose fror.n thc parties' respective submissions to the Constitutional Court and thc Llourt's respective holding was whether the appellant could then proc'eed under Article 50(l) of the Constitution in the absence of a specific law cnacted by Parliament under Article 50(4) of the Constitution. I havc studied the Ruling of thc Constitutional Court on this mattcr. With due rcspcct to thc lcarncdJustices of thc Constitutional Court, I find that they made sonrc e rrors in the questiorr they addressed themselves to. Secondly, the learned Justices also made contradictory holdings in the same Ruling, which resulted in their failure to resolve the questiorr put to them. I will proceed to discuss thesc matters in the following, section. As I notcd earlicr in this Judgnrcnt, the learned Justices of the Constitutional Court sct out thc Rcfercncc question at the bcginning of their Ruling, as follows: "Whether the Rules Committee in enacting the,ludicatwe (Ibndanental Nghts and llwdoms) (Enforcement Ptwedurc Rules) SI No. 55 of 2008, the Rules under which MC I I6 2OO8 was brcught, contravened Atticle 5O (4) of the Constitution.' The above question set out by the Court, though somehow similar to the question set out by the I Iig,h Court, was a wronS one. The right question which Zehurikize, J. referred to the Constitutional Court and appears al page 8 of the Record of Appeal, was reproduced earlier in this Judgment and read a.s follows: 'fhe question that thc Constitutional Court interpreted was whether the Rules Comnrittce had acted in contravention of Article 50(4) of the Constitution 10 15 20 25 oWhether the Judicaturc (Ihndamental Rights and lMoms) (Enforcement hwedwe) Rules, 2OO6 arc unconstitutional for hauing fun made bythe Rules hmmitte instead of Parliarnent purfuant to Article 5O(4) of the @nstitution.' 16 5 when it made the Judicaturc (Iundamcntal Rights and Freedoms) (Enforcenrent Proccdure) Rules. On thc other hand, the right question referred to the Court was whethcr lhe Rules were unconstitutional for havin2; been made by the Rules Committee arrd not Parliament, pursuant to Article 50(4) of the Constitution. I note that the nrix up of questions by the Constitutional Court was partially fatal to the decision thc Courl cve ntually rcndcrcd becausc it changcd the focus of the Court during, its consideration ot'the Referencc, 'l1.re question referred to the Corrstitutional L'ourt required arr examination of the constitutiorrality of the Judicature (Ibndamental Righ8 and tdons) (Enforcement hwedurc) Rules, whcreas the qucstion that thc Court cndcd up answcrinli required the Court to e xarrrinc whether thc Rules Conrnrittee had contrave ned Article 50 (4) whcn it nradc the inrpugned Rules. 'lhe error of the Court rcsulted in thc Con,stitutional Court taking a narrower approach by tbcusing its inquiry and decision on Article 50(4) of the Constitution, whercas it was nol rcquired to do so. This crror of the Court is evident in the following, holding,: aOur duty in this rcfercnce is to intetprct tuticle 5O (4) of the &nstitution to answet the above questions one way or the other. In so doing, we must bear in mind the guiding Constitutional intetprctation principles which arc to the effet that the &nstitution is to be lokd at as a whole. It has to be rcad as an integrated whole with no one pat'tiailar pouision desfroying another but suppottittg each othen All ptouisions ancernfutg an issue should be ansidetd together to giue effect to the pwpose of the Insbument. See Dr. tames Rwanyararc & Othen Vs Attoney General bnstitution Petition No. 7 of 2OO2. S.I 55/08 was made by the Rules Committe on the Zeh dayof Febtuary, 2OO8, in exervise of the pwe$ confefied upn the Committeo by &ction 4 I ( I ) of the ludicaturc Act which ... The Inng title of the "ludicatwe Act, Cap I 3 states that it is: 10 15 25 l0 t7 20 5 'An Act to consolidate and rcuise theJudicaturc Act to take account of the prcuisions of the Constitution rclating to the tudiciary.' The pouisions of the bnstitution rvlatirg to theludiciatyarc found in Chapter eight of the &nstitation. .. . TheRales @mmitte thercforcderives itspwerc tomake rules fiom Article I 5O ( I ) of the &nstitution. The Rules arc for rcgalathg the practice and pwdurc in theJudiciary.D 'lhc Constitutiorral Court having obsclcd that thc application fronr which thc Rcf'crence arose was nradc undcr Articlc 50 of thc Constitution, thcn outlincd the provisions ol Articlc 50(1) and 50(4) and concludcd as follows: "It is common lorcwledge that Parliament has not made any law under Article 5O (4) above. That being so, did the Rules Committ* have the mandate to make S.I 55/087 By the use of the word oshall' in Sub Article (4) abve, the framers of the @nstitution made it mandatory that it is only Parliament that is empwetd by the Constitution to make laws for the enforcement of rights and freedoms under Chapter four of the @nstitution. It is not the rcle of any other My to do it except under delegated authoity underAfticle 79, which is not the case herc. We thercforc agrro with the subnission byMr.Adrcle and answer the question in the affirmafive.' 'fhe Constitr.rtional L--orrrt did not spell out what qucstion it was answcring, in the aifirnrative. []ut from the analysis nradc carlicr in this Judg,nrcnt and the rcading, of thc Ruling, of thc Constitutional Court, I can safcly conclude that the Court's ruling was that in e nacting,lhe Judicaturc (Ifundamental Rights and lMoms) (Enforcement Prwdure) Rules , thc Rrrles Clonrnrittee had contravu.rcd Articlcs 5O(4) ol'ihc Constitutiorr. It was on that basis that thc Constitrrtiorral Corrrt lbund the Judicaturc (Ifundamental Righb and I@oms) (Enforcementftecedurc) Rules,by neccssary inrplicalion, to bc unconstitutional. 10 15 20 25 30 5 In so holding, the Constitutional Court the refore made two e rrollcous holding,s in its decision which hacl a direct ir.npact on the Court'.s dccision. The first error was thc Constitutional Court's holding that the Rules Committee derives its powers to make rules from Article 150(1) of the Constitution. As I notcd bcforc, thc Rulcs Committee derives its powcr from theJudicature Act. Althoug,h the head note to theJudicature Act provides thal it is al1 Act to consolidale laws relating to the Judiciary and take into account the provisions of the Constitution, there is no specific provision in the Judicature Act to thc cffect that it was enacted under Articlc I 50 of the Constitution. With due respect to the learnedJustices of the Constitutional Court, this holding was also erroneous in law as there was no evidence on the record indicating that the Rulcs Committee had purported to act under Article 5O(4) of the Constitution. Contrary to the Constitutional Court's findirrg, the l'reamble to the Rules clcarly shows that the Rules Comnrittcc acted under section 41(1) of the Judicature Act which I had reproduced earlier in this Judgment. IJaving reached the dccision that it did, thc Constittrtional Court then hcld that the enforcemenl of Articlc 5O( I ) and indeed all thc rights and freedoms .g,uararrteed rrnder Chaptcr I'otrr of the Constitution wcrc not in abeyance. Whilc this holding o[ thc Constitutional Court was correct and not errorleous, the ncl effect of its carlicr holding invalidating, lhe Judicaturc (hndanental Rights and l@oms) (Enforcement Ptwdurc) Rules, was to put thc 10 15 20 25 19 The second error was the Constitutional Court's finding that the Rules Committee had made Rulcs for thc cnforcement of fundamental rig,hts and freedoms under Article 5O(4) of the Constitution, thereby contravening that Article. 5 fundamental rights and lrcedoms guaranteed under Chapter four in abeyance. 'l'his is becausc thc Constitutional Court had struck out the procedure which was laid out in the .said Rules, for persons proceeding under Article 5O(1) to bring, thcir claims bclbre the llig,h Court. In nty view, this error was not remedied by the Court's holding that the fundamental rights and freedoms could be cnforced through other existing laws which were saved by Article 27 4 of the Constitution. furthcrrrrorc, Articlc I lJ7((l) of thc Ctrnstitution provides as fbllows: "Werc anyquestion is rcfened to the C;onstitutional Court under clauses (5) of this Article, the bnstitutional Court shall give its deision on the question, and the C;ourt in which the question arises shall dispose of the case in accotdance with that decision." The inference fronr Article I 37(6) and Rules 2l and 22 referred to above is that the decision of the Constitutional Court on the question which has been referred to it by a lower Court must bc a clear decision which should guide and enable the referring, Court to hear and dispose of the application or the case in accordance with tl.re decision of the Constitutional Court. By way of contrast, the Constitutional Court, whilc disposintri of other Constitutional Reference s, has given clear gtridance and directions to lower Courts. For instance in Uganda v. Atugonza lhancis, &nstitutional Refercne No. 3I of 2OI4 the Constitutional Court answercd in the negative the question, " Whether the charging ct'lhe accusetl under the Anti- Corruption Act, 2OO9 which cotnnrcnced on the 2!itt' August 2OO9, for the oftbnce committed between [)ecentber 2007 ttttd Decenber 2008 is consistent with articles 28(7) ancl ( I ? of the Coilslitutioll." The Court then directed the trial Judge to proceed with the hearing of the case, without any further delay. 20 10 20 .Sinrilarly, Rtrlcs 2l (3) and 22 oi thc &nstitutional &urt (Petition & Refercnces) Rules, S.I 9I of 2OO5 already rcltrrcd to in thisJudgruent., also rcitcratc thc sanrc duty inrposcd on the Constitutiotral Court. 15 5 Sinrilarly, in Uganda v. Oneg ObeI, @nstitutional Petition No. 0O24 of 2OI L, the Constittitional Court aftcr dismissing a Re l'crcncc on thrcc questions directed its Re1;istrar to rcturrl the record to the lower Court for the responderrt's trial to procccd forthwith. lixanrples of similar clear decisions were ntade by tlrc Constitrrtiolal Courl, in anrorUl olhers., tustie./ulia kbutinde v. The Attoruey General, Constitutional Refercnce No. O5 of 2OO5 and Nestor Gasasira v. Uganda, Constifittional Refercnce No. 17 of 2OI I. Although this Court later set aside the Judgment of the Constitutional Court in the Kow7relo case (supra), I have used the Constitutional Reference in the Kwoyelo case and in other Reference s as an example to illustrate the point that when it conres to Constitutional References, the practice has been for the Constitutional Court to give its clcar decision and clear directives to the trial Court irr accordance with its decision. Turning to the Referurcc fronr which this appeal arose, it is clearly evident that the Constitutional Court did not g,ivc any specific direction in as far as hearing the application from which thc Rcfcre ncc arose was concerned. Yet the Constitutional Court had made three holdings, namcly that, (i) the 20 t5 2L Sinrilarly, in Ihomas tr@wyelo alias Latoni v. Uganda, Constitutional Refercnoe No. O36 of 2OI I, the Constitutional Court answcred in thc 10 affirnrative the question "Whether the lhilure by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) and the Amnesty Cottuttissiotr to act on lhe application by the accused person for.qrant of a Certificate of Annesty, whereas such certificates were granled to other persotts in circumstances sitnilar to that ol' the accused persott, is cli.x'riminatory, in c'c'tn I ra vcn tion ol) and inconsistent ls with Articles 1,2,20(2),21(l) and (3) ol'thc Ltonstitulion otlhe Republicol' Uganda." IJaving done so, the Constitutional Court then directed that the file be returned to the Court which sent it, with a direction that it nrust cease the trial of the applicant forthwith. Judicaturc (Ibndanental Rights aad llwdorus) (Enforcement Ptwdurc) lYales werc unconstitutional; (ii) no spccific law had becn enactcd by lhrliament undcr Article 50(4) ol the Constitution, and (iii) there are other cxistin.g, laws that coulc{ be used to cnlbrce frrndanrental rights and freedonrs. In my vicw, under Articlc 1lt7(5) of the Constitution, thc duty of the Constitutional Court when it is considering a Constitutional Reference is similar to when thc Clourt is hcarin.g a Constitutional l'etition. Article 137(5) clearly provides that the Constitutional Court shall make a decision in accordance with clause I of this Article: that is the Court shall consider the Reference as a qucstion for interprctation. But in addition to interpretation, it has to give guidance to the trial Court on that Constitutional Reference. Having held that the Constitutioll came into force as a whole document and that the enforcenrcnt of rights and freedorrrs enshrincd in it would not be in abeyance in the absence of the law cnvisaged under Article 50(4), it was incumbent on the Clonstitutional Corrrt, to invoke ils intcrpretation powers under Article 1137 of the Constitution to g,ivc 2;uidance to the High Court, and 20 25 22 s Considered togethcr, the three holdings of the Clonstitutional Court left the appell^nl and the I{igh Court at cross-roads, because thc Court did not make specific ordcrs directing the tligh Court on how to procccd with the appellant's application and indced other sinrilar applications that had been pending at the Hig,h Court. for instancc, dicl the invalidation of the r.0 Judicaturc (IVndanental Rights and tedoms) (Enforcement nwdurc) Rules nrcan that all applications brought under the unconstitutional Rules were to be dismisscd/ Or did it mean that the High Court would not dismiss them, but rather give an opporlnnity to thc parties to anrord their pleadings and proceed under the ordinary Civil l'rocedure Rulcs, by way of plaint. 'l.his 1s uncertainty demonstratcs the point that thc Constitutional Court only partially executed its task and left many qucstions unanswered. even other intending, litigants as to what was the correct procedure to cnforce fundamental human rig,hts under Article 5O of the Constitution. I therefore find that the Constitutional Courl errcd in law when it failed to make specific orders for the High Court's guidance. By failing to guide the High Court on how to proceed with the matter that led to the Reference, the Constitutional Court, failed in its duty and therefore, in nry view, erred in law. The net effect of the Constitutional Court's failure to give clear direction was tlrat Misc. Cause No. 7i1 of 2OlO could not procced because the Preliminary Objection had been upheld by the Constitutional Court. This in turn had the effect of leaving the appe llant and any other pe rson who wished to see k redress undcr Article 5O(l) for hunran rig,hts violations with no recourse to Courts, until Parliamellt enacted a law under 5O(4). This created a scenario for growth of a culture of impunity on thc part of both State and non-State actors who violatc thc ri2ihts of othcrs. While sorne existirr.g laws providcd lbr avcnucs for the enforcement of some rip;hts provided for under Chapter 4 of thc Constitution, these existing laws which were cited by the Constitutional Court predated the Constitution and did not provide for a similar procedure to that which had been laicl down by the./udicaturc (htndanental Wb and lMoms) (Enforcement Prwdurc) Rules. Taking the case that the appcllant filed as an cxample, his application before tlre lJigh Corrrt sought for ordcrs that the banninSi of bineezalopen air ex-studio public live radio broadcastsl by Government breached his freedoms of speech, expression and mcdia guaranteed undcr Article 29(l) (a) of the Constitution and for liftinli of the ban on binteeza by way of enforcenrent of the applicant's fundamental frecdoms of speech, expression and nredia. It is clearly evident lronr thc ordcrs sought that cxisting laws are 10 15 20 25 5 not suited to dealing with claims of violations of fundamental rights and tiecdoms unde r tl-rc Constitution. The Constitution reaffirnrs the fact that frrndamental and other Ilurran fughts and freedoms are inhercnt and not grantcd by the State. Similarly, Article 2O(l ) of the Constitution directs that thcse rights and freedonrs must be respected, upheld and prorrrotcd by all organs and ag,etrcies of Government and by all persons. Indecd, States have an obligation under International Law to put in place nrechanisrrrs to cnsure that these rights are realized and enjoyed by all citizens. It is thcreforc a l'rlattcr ofgrcat concern that no law has been enacted in accordance with Articlc 50(4) of thc Constitution. Although it cannot have been thc intention of the make rs of the Constitution to 'freeze' the enjoyment and operationalization of the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in Chapter lbur of our Constitution, it cannot at the sanre tinre be argued that such a law was not necessary. Article 5O(4) is a constitutional directive to Parliametrt. It is not optional. While no timefranrc was 51iven in the Constitution for such a law to be enacted, therc is at the same tinre no justification for a 22 ycar delay or failurc to act on this important constitutional dircctive. It should be noted that Articlc 5O(4) is but one of thc nrany provisions in thc Constitution were the makcrs of the Constitution directed for laws to be made. Whereas f'arliament has gone ahead to enact laws under various Articles like Articles l'tO(s), 135(2), 4O(1),47(2),,58,59(4),,64(5),72(3), 1 04(9), I 52(:\ 1 1 55(6), and I 8ti(lt), which are couched in similar terms to Article 5O(4) no action has been takcn under Article 5O(4). Action on Article 50(4) is long overdue. It is indeed a nlatter of grcat conccrll that the Ref'erencc from which this appeal arosc, enranated fronr a prelinrinary objection rnade by the Attorney 10 15 20 25 24 5 Lie rrcral aborrt thc constitutionalily ol thc tudicature (Ihndamental Rights and Ilredoms) (Enforcement Prwedurc) Rules of 2OO8. It is worth noting that the application in question which gave rise to this Reference was filed in 2O1O ( 1 5 years), after the promulgation of the Constitution. In my vicw, the Attorncy General (representin2l the f,xecutive), who in the first place had e ither neg,lccted or failed to table the law envisag,cd under Article 50(4), should not havc been allowed by the Court to successfully carry the day-by putting roadblocks in the way of those seeking to enforce fundamental rights and freedoms entrenched in our Constitution underArticle 50(l), in the absence ofa specific law passed by Parlianrent under Article 50(4), 'l'he Constitution of Uganda in Article I I9(lt) clearly provides that the Attorney General is the principal leg,al advisor to Governnrent. As a member of the Executive, thc Attorney General should have advised Government lo enact the law as required by Article 5O(4) of the Constilution, soorl after the promulgation of the M95 Constitution. '[his non-action on the part of the Executive and lhrliament to pass thc law 22 years after the Constitution was promulgated, runs contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution of Llganda which was intended and indeed came into effect on the date of its promulgation on 8th Octobcr, 1995. Secondly, the Rules the Attorney General objccted to, were made in 2008, which was 13 years after thc Constitution had come into force. The Attorney General missed yel arrothe r opportunity, as a membe r of the Rules Committee to guide the Committce about the allcacd inconsistency of the said Rules with Article 5O(4). Thirdly, section 4l (5) of the Judicature Act requires thc rules to be laid before Parliament as a Statutory Instrument. Again, it is not very clear if the Attorney General conrplicd with these provisions. 10 20 25 15 5 lburthly, since raising, the preliminary objcction in thc appellant's Misc. Application No. 1 13 of 20 10, there has still been no action on thc Attorney Ge neral's pad, the lhrliament's parl or Executive's part to comply with Article 5O(4) of the Constitution. It is indeed unfortunate that it took the Government's chief lcgal advisor 7 years to finally concedc bcfore this Court that the Rules Comnrittee actually had powcr to make thc Rules for laying out procedure for enforccnrort of fundanrental rig,hts and frccdoms in question and that the said Rulcs werc not unconstitutional. I take note that a l-luman Rights (Enforccment) Bill, 2015 was tabled in Parliament as a Private Member's Bill but was withdrawn for further consultations with the Executive. 1'he Attorncy General should rise up to his duty and advise the Governlnent to conrply with the clear provisions of Article 50(4) of the Constitution, by tabling a law before Parliament for its action, without any furthcr de1ay. On the other hand, sincc the Article 50(4) of the Constitution spccifically vests the rcsponsibility to pass the law in Parlianrent, law nrakers should also movc to conrply with the Constitution, without waiting fbr the Executive to act. In the meantime, Courts should remain nrindful of the fact that the Constitution did not provide for fundamental rights and freedoms to remain in abeyance. Courts have a role to enforce fundarnental rights and freedoms and to uphold the Constitution. Thereforc, Courts should not condone the violation of fundamental rights and freedonrs, by turning, away litigants frorn their doors. Such an outcome would also rclegate the application and enforcement of the liill of Rights in our Clonstitution, which has been in forcc since October 1995. Ordcrs I would theretbre allow this appcal to succced in part with thc lollowing orders. 26 10 15 20 25 5 (i) 'fhat the Judicatwe (Ibndanental R$hts and ttrodons) (Enforcement Ptocdurc) Rules a rc ct'rnslilutional. (ii) That the Rules Conrnrittec acled within its powers when it made Rules providing for the procedure to seek redress for violations of fundamental rights and freedoms under Article 50(1) of the Constitution. (iii) 'llrat thc I liglr Corrrt should procced to he ar Mis. Cause No. 13 of 2OIO: Bukenla Church funbrcse v. Attomey General and disposc of it on its nrerits. 10 15 t)atcd at Krrrrpala l,i. .{.?l{ny or 2017. 27 (iv) That the appellant be paid lhe costs incurred for preparation and pursuing the Reference in the Constitutional Court and also in this Court. JUSTICE DRESTTIER KISAAKYE rusTrcE oFTHE SUPREME COURT THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KA]VIPALA [CORAM: KATIJREEBE,CJ; TUWIDSIGYE; KIS.IAI<YE; MWANGUSYA; OPIO- AWERI; MWONDHA; & TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA,' JJ.S.C,/ CONSTITUTIONAL APPEAL NO 03 OF 2O1I BUKENYA CHURCH AMBROSE : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :] APPELLANT AND 10 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :] RESPONDENT 15 JUDGMENT OF KATUREEBE, CJ. I have had the benefit of reading in draft the Judgment of my learned sister Kisaakye, JSC. I agree with her that this Appeal should succeed. I also agree with the Orders she has proposed. 20 As the rest of the members on the Coram agree, this Appeal is hereby allowed on the terms as proposed by the learned Justice. The decision of the Constitutional Court is set aside. ^d ... day of Dated at Kampala thisep VJ*, t- .... 2017. 1 BETWEEN [Appeal Jrom the Ruling oy[&stices of the Constltutlonal Court (Bahlgeine, DCJ, TulnomuJunl, Kauuma, Nshlmge, Arach-Amoko, JJA) dated.27.t March 2O71 tn Constltutlondl ReJerence No, 26 of 2O7Ol ,/24---Z:-- /-- JUSTICE BART M. KATUREEBE CHIEF JUSTICE THE REPUBLIC OT UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OT UGA.NDA A,T KAMPAI,A (CORAM: KATUREEBE, C.J; TUMWESIGYE; KISAAKYE; MWANGUSYA, OPIO- AWERI, MWONDHA, TIBATEMWA, JJ.SC) CONSTITUTIONAL APPEAT NO: 03 OF 2011 BETWEEN BUKENYA CHURCH AMBROSE APPELLANT ATTORNEY GENERAT RESPONDENT [Appeal from the Ruling ot Justices of the Constitulional Courl at Katnpala (Mpagi- Bahigeine, DCJ, l\dnomujuni, Kavuma, Nshimye, and Arach-Atnoko, IJA) dated 2l March 201 I ln Constitutional neference lvo. 26 of 20101 IUDGMENT OF TUMWESIGYE. ISC I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment of my learned sister, fustice Esther Kisaakye, JSC and I agree with her that this appeal should succeeed. I also agree with the orders she has proposed. Dated at Kampala this ... day of zo77 Iotha umwe e AND IUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT THT REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT I{AMPALA Coram: Katureebe; CJ, Tumwesigye, Kisaakye, Mwangusga; Opio Auteri; Mwondha; Tibatemu.t a JJ. S. C. CONSTITUTIONAL APPEAL NO. 03 OF 2011 BUKENYA CHURCH AMBROSE APPELLANT And THE ATTORNEY GENERAL RESPONDENT (Appeal from the Ruling of Justices of the Constitutional Court (Bahigeine DCJ, Kouuma, Nshimge, Arach-Amoko, JJA) dated 2L.t March 2O11 in Constitutional Reference No. 26 of2O10) WDGMENT OF MWANGUSYA; JSC I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment of my learned sister, Justice Esther Kisaakye, JSC. I agree with her that this appeal should succeed. I also agree with the orders she has proposed. 6\a\ r\-I F. n Dated at Kampala this ...r{cz{..I.-t.... d.y otl..Y..!+1.. zotz. M gusya Eldad f JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT Between , TI{E REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN TI.IE SUPREME COURI OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA ( Coram: Katureebe, CJ; Tumwesigye; Kisaakye; Mwangusya; Opio-Aweri; Mwondhal & l'lbtemwa-Ekirikubinza; JJ.S.C). CONSTITUTIONAL APPEAL NO. 03 OF 2011 BETWEEN BUKENYA CHURCH AMBROSE::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::APPELLANT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAI- RESPONDENT ' ,' \ r r i , ( . : , , : . ' ) i r , lfri. Ilul ng 01 .,!slr|:|l L'l Ih(j O(,ns1,t!trorliil (jorrii. (tlalr9orxc. l)(l, wrrrrlrl'lrJirir'. I'l:jf: Ttyo. Ar,r(:l Arll()ko. ..ln ) l)illo(l llr t|/|,rtq ?i)tt rn (lorrslll'll orlill llolert-'n1jc \o ,r(r oi JUDGI\4ENT OF OPIO-AWERI, JSC I have had the benefit ot reading tn draft the ludgmenl of my learned sister, Justice Dr. Esther Kisaakye' JSC. I agree with her that thrs appeal should succeed . I also agree with the Orders she has proposed. Dated at Kampala this lllqd .. aca\ .. .day ot ln C,,\J t-- lUtt. HON. JUSTICE OPIO_AWERI JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT. \ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA I{AMPALA Katureebe CJ, Tumwesigze, Kisaakye, Mwangusya, Opio-Aweri, Mwondha and Tibatemwa; JJSC Constitutlonal Appeal No. O3 of2O11 BET1VEEN BUKENYA CHURCH AMBROSE APPELLANT Coram: Signed Faith Mwondha JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT AND I agree also with the orders she proposed Dated at Kampala thi" ..e21.1. aay of .ffi ATTORNEY GENERAL (Appeal from the Ruling of the Constitutional Court at Kampala ( Mpagi Bahigaine DCJ, Twinomujuni, Karruma, Nshimge and Arach Amoko JJA, dated 2 I st March, 2 O 1 1 in consolidated Ref. No. 2 6 of 2 O 1 O) I have had the opportunity of reading in draft ttre judgment of my learned sister Hon. Justice Esther Kisaakye JSC. And I agree tJlat this appeal should succeed. a 20t7 THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA RESPONDENT Judgment of Faith Mwondha: JSC r l L - 5 THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KA]VIPALA [CORAM: KATUREDBE,CJ; TUMII|ESIGYE; KISAAKYE; IvIU|ANGUSYA; OPIO- AWERI ; MWO NDHA; & TIBATEM$VA-EKIRIKWINZA; JJ. S. C.l CONSTITUTIONAL APPEAL NO 03 OF 2O11 BUKENYA CHURCH AMBROSE : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :l APPELLANT AND 10 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :] RESPONDENT [Appeal from the Rullng o./.ftrstices of the Constltutlonal Court (Bahlgelne, DQ\ Tulnomufunl, Kanruma, Nshlmge, Arach-Amoko, JJA) dated 27.. March 2Ol7 ln Constltutlonal Reference No. 26 of 2O7Ol 15 JUDGMENT OF TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA, JSC. I have had the benefit of reading in draft the Judgment of my learned sister Kisaakye, JSC. I agree with her that this Appeal should succeed. I also agree with the Orders she has proposed Dated at Kampala tiri" Xl1 day of ...1f1".-{.... .... 2or7. J 20 JUSTICE PROF. LILLIAN TIBATEMWA-EKIRTKUBINZA JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT 1 BETWEEN .*.:les--..19"^.x;.