Kasiba v Administrator General & Another (Civil Appeal 13 of 2016) [2018] UGSC 99 (1 November 2018)

r t t' THE REPUBTIC OT UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPAI,A (CORAM: TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA; MUGAMBA; BUTEERA; JJ.SC; NSHIMYE; TUMWESIGYE; AG. JJ.SC) BETWEEN ISAAC KASIBA LULE APPELLANT AND 1. ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL 2, MARGARET NABITALO NALONGO [Appeal trom the .decision of the Constitutional Court sitting at Kanpala (Opio-Aweri, Balungi Bossa and Kakuru, JIA) in Ciuil Appeal No. 1l of 20091 IIID(l MENT OF T II MW FCII:VE A ,: IST Isaac Kasiba Lule, the appellant, brought a suit in the High Court against the Administrator General (1.t respondentJ and Margaret Nabitalo Nalongo [2na respondent) for alleged illegal and fraudulcnt transfer of property which the 1'r respondent had transferred into the name of the 2nd respondent following the death of her father. The High Court [Mwangusya, J,) (as he then wasJ dismissed the appellant's suit. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal ',t hich dismissed the appeal, hence this appeal. 10 15 20 1, \ CIVIL APPEAL NO: 13 OF 2016 ::::::i::::::::::::::::::::::::::RESPONDENTS 25 l 5 About 10 years from the time the distribution of the estate was effected, the appellant and his younger sister Miriam Namusoke approached the Administrator General asking for the redistribution of the estate on the ground that the suit property was illegally given to the Znd respondent. In a letter dated 4th October, 1993 the Administrator General wrote to the 2nd respondent indicating his intention to redistribute the estate because of an alleged error he had discovered. However, the Administrator General subsequently abandoned his intention ofredistributing the estate. In 1994 the appellant filed a suit against the 1st and Znd respondent in the High Court asking court for the redistribution of the suit property and to declare the transfer of land comprised in Kibuga Block 38 Plot 166 in favour of the znd respondent null and void. He also prayed court to cancel the certificate oftitle which the 2nd respondent obtained in respect of the same property and for costs. The suit was dismissed on technical grounds and the appellant filed another one in 1999. It was the learned trial judge's finding that the suit property was not bequeathed to the 2nd respondent and neither was it given to her as a gift inter vivos by her deceased father. However, the trial judge allowed the Zna respondent to retain the suit property on the ground that it was the only immovable property the 2nd respondent had obtained from her father's estate, and that the appellant was estopped from claiming the property 10 years after the 2nd respondent assumed ownership ofthe suit property. The appellant being dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court appealed to the Court of Appeal which dismissed the appeal on the same ground as that 10 15 20 25 3 5 of the High Court. Being dissatisfied by the Court of Appeal's decision, the appellant appealed to this court. Appellant's grounds of Appeal. The appellant appealed to this court on the following grounds which he framed as follows: 1. The learned fustices of Appeal erred in fact and law when they failed to evaluate the evidence on record and came to the conclusion that the appellant having allowed the 2nd respondent to take over and use the suit property for over 10 years, he was stopped from claiming it back as part of the estate of the deceased. 2. The learned fustices of Appeal erred in fact and law when they took into account and relied upon extraneous matters when evaluating the evidence on record and came to a wrong decision. 3. The learned fustices of Appeal erred in fact and law when they failed to consider the law and authorities of the case to deny the appellant the remedies he sought on appeal. The appellant asked court to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Court ofAppeal. He also prayed for costs. At the hearing, the appellant was represented by Mr. Simon Kiiza Kabundama while Mr. Simon Muyomba represented the 1.t respondent. Mr. lvan Kyateeka appeared for the 2nd respondent. They all filed written submissions. 15 4 10 20 25 Appellant's submissions. Mr. Simon Kiiza Kabundama, learned counsel for the appellant, on a preliminary point, stated that he would argue all the three grounds together. He argued that the learned fustices of Appeal failed in their role as a first appellate court to sublect the evidence to fresh scrutiny and come up with their own decision. He cited the case of Kifamunte Henry vs. Uganda. SCCA No. 10 of t997 to support his submission. He argued that it was wrong for the Court of Appeal to hold that the suit property was not a gift inter vivos to the Zud respondent and at the same time decline to grant the remedies sought. He contended that the Court of Appeal wrongly applied the law relating to estoppel by acquiescence and thus came to a wrong conclusion since the doctrine of estoppel cannot be used to circumvent the law. He cited the cases of Maritime Electric Company Ltd vs. General Dairies Ltd U9371A.C. 610 and Attorney General vs. Abdul Karim Winyi SCCA No. 24 of 1992 to support his argument. He argued further that the Administrator General offended s.191 of the Succession Act and s.134 of the Registration of Titles Act when he dealt with the deceased's estate without letters of administration. This made the transfer of the suit property into the name of the 2nd respondent illegal and fraudulent. He argued that the evidence of fraud was demonstrated in the 2nd respondent's written statement of Defence to the effect that the distribution of the deceased's estate was done by clan elders in good faith following customary guidelines after consultation with family members. The distribution of the estate by the clan elders and the Administrator General was fraudulent and illegal because they did it without letters of administration. 10 15 20 \ 5 He argued further that the manner in which the 2nd respondent acquired the suit property was fraudulent and illegal yet the two courts below failed to pronounce themselves on this illegality. He cited the case of Administrator General vs. Akello loyce Otti and Donato Otti. SCCA No. 05 of 1.993, where it was held that the Administrator General had no absolute rights to administer or obtain letters of administration to every deceased's estate. He contended that the Court ofAppeal failed to pronounce itselfon the issue of the purported transfer through use of the succession certificate by the lst respondent to the 2nd respondent. He concluded by arguing that since the distribution of the estate by the Administrator General was an illegality the appellant could not be estopped from claiming the suit property on the ground of acquiescence since equity follows the law, and further that the actions of the clan elders and the 1il respondent had the effect of diminishing the estate of the deceased since the suit properfy was taken out of the deceased's estate. 20 10 15 25 Mr. Simon Muyomba, learned counsel for the 1't respondent, submitted that although the appellant stated in his submissions that he would argue all the 3 grounds together, he did not at all submit on ground 2 and 3. He added that since those two grounds were not canvassed by counsel for the appellant, they should be regarded as abandoned. On the issue of succession certificates and transfer forms, counsel submitted that both are instruments of transfer and that they only differ in form and further that the 1't respondent's office used the two instruments 6 Counsel for the resoondent's submissions 5 interchangeably to effect transfer of interests and that it was immaterial whether a succession certificate or transfer form was used. He cited the case of Mabosi vs. Usanda Revenue Authoritv. Civil Aoplication No. 16 of 1995 for this proposition. Counsel further submitted that the act of the 1't respondent transferring the suit property to the 2nd respondent before the grant of letters of administration was validated by the subsequent grant of the letters of administration to the 1't respondent. He relied on s. 192 ofthe Succession Act and lsrael Kabwa vs. Martin Banoba Musiga. SCCA No. 52 of 1995 for the proposition that grant of letters of administration entltles the administrator to all rights belonging to the intestate as effectually as if the administration had been granted at the moment of death. He went on to state that the only acts which are excluded from ratification are those that diminish or damage the estate. Counsel added that this was not the case in the instant case since the suit property was given to one of the beneficiaries who was equally entitled to a share ofthe estate. On the doctrine of estoppel, counsel argued that the learned fustices of Appeal properly applied the doctrine and reached the right conclusion because s.114 of the Evidence Act prevents any person from asserting a claim or right that 15 20 25 7 On whether or not the estate of the deceased fell under the Local 10 Administration (Performance of Functions) Instrument 1967, counsel submitted that this was not pleaded and was not in issue, and no evidence was led on it in the lower courts. He added that the appellant should be bound by his pleadings. He cited the case of Uganda Breweries ltd vs. Uganda Railways Corporation. Civil Appeal No. 6 of 2001 to support his argument. 5 contradicts what one has said or done or what one has legally established as true. He contended that the appellant had failed to make out his case for redistribution of the suit property and that he could only do so by relying on the alleged illegalify to which he was party having taken his share from the same alleged illegal transaction. Learned counsel for the 2nd respondent supported the decision of the Court of Appeal arguing that the court as a first appellate court had subjected the evidence to fresh scrutiny and had made its own decision. He submitted that the appellant's 1st ground offends rule 81(1) of the Supreme Court Rules because it lacks conciseness and is argumentative. He prayed that it should be struck out. On the issue of alleged fraud and illegality, counsel argued that the appellant did not raise the issue before the lower courts and that he should be bound by his pleadings. 10 15 8 20 In the alternative, counsel argued that the actions of the Administrator General were validated by subsequent grant ofletters ofadministration to the 1.t respondent under s.1.92 ofthe Succession Act. He argued that the appellant cannot make out his claim offraud against the 2nd respondent because fraud is not attributed to her as a transferee, and that if the act of the t't respondent 2s were to be fraudulent, the appellant would also be a party to the fraud having benefitted from the same administration by the 1s respondent of his deceased father's estate. He relied on the case of Active Automobile Spares Ltd vs. Crane Bank Ltd. SCCA No. 2L of 2001 where court declined to make a refund in a matter where the appellant and the bank that engaged in an unlawful transaction were found to have been in pari delicto. Counsel submitted that the appellant sold most of his property while his late sister Miriam Namusoke sold all that she received. He added that the estate was no longer what it was before distribution and that, therefore, there was nothing to redistribute. Counsel prayed for dismissal ofthe appeal and for costs. Consideration of the srounds. The appellant's three grounds of appeal were reproduced earlier in this judgment. I agree with both counsel for the respondents that there is no reference to matters concerning grounds two and three in the submissions of counsel for the appellant. Nowhere in his submissions in relation to ground two does counsel show where or how the learned fustices ofAppeal took into account extraneous matters in their evaluation of evidence on record. Counsel for the 2nd respondent submitted and prayed that ground one of appeal should be struck out because it is not concise and is also argumentative contrary to Rule B1(1) of the Supreme Court rules. I agree that this ground 10 15 25 On ground three, counsel for the appellant did not at all show in his submissions which laws and authorities the learned f ustices of Appeal failed to consider that would have helped this court to arrive at its decision. Therefore, since counsel for the appellant did not submit on ground two and three, I will consider those tvvo grounds as having been abandoned and make no findings on them. Accordingly only ground one remains for consideration in this judgment. 20 9 which attacks the Court of Appeal's decision on estoppel by acquiescence could have been framed in a more concise manner, but I do not find this to be a sufficient ground to strike it out. The ground only contains the alleged error that the learned Justices of Appeal made and tries to elaborate on it. This makes it unnecessarily wordy. On the question of the ground being argumentative there is no counter proposal given by the appellant which would have made the ground argumentative. I, therefore, find no good reason to strike out ground one on this basis either. The main thrust of the appellant's appeal is that the learned f ustices of Appeal failed to evaluate the evidence on record and wrongly concluded that since the 2nd respondent had taken over and used the suit properry for over 10 years, the appellant was estopped by the doctrine of estoppel from claiming the property back for redistribution. The appellant's case is that the suit property was illegally and fraudulently taken out of his deceased father's estate for distribution by both the clan elders and l,t respondent and given to the 2,d respondent. Counsel for the appellant also contended that at the time of transferring the suit property in the name of the 2na respondent the 1't respondent had not been granted letters of administration which was contrary to s. 191 of the Succession Act and s.134 of the Registration of Titles Act. That the 1.t respondent used a Succession Certificate to transfer the suit properfy instead of a transfer form, which was also illegal. It was counsel for the appellant's argument that since equity follows the law, it was wrong for the Court of Appeal and the trial court to apply the equitable doctrine of estoppel to an act that was illegal. 15 20 25 5 10 10 5 1. Whether the 1st respondent's act of distributing the deceased's estate before obtaining a grant of letters of administration was illegal and fraudulent. 2. Whether there was diminution of the deceased's estate by the 1.t respondent's act of transferring the suit property into the 2nd respondent's name before the 1st respondent obtained letters of administration 3. Whether the suit property was taken out of the deceased's estate by the 1't respondent and not distributed to the 2nd respondent. To resolve this issue sections 791,, L92 and 193 of the Succession Act have to be considered together. S. 191 of the Act provides as follows: This section is what the appellant heavily and extensively canvassed in his submissions to show that the 1't respondent acted illegally and fraudulently to give the suit property to the 2nd respondent before obtaining the grant of letters of administration. Considered alone without any reference to other provisions in the Succession Act one would naturally conclude that the L.t 15 20 25 11 From the arguments of counsel for the appellant the following issues which are interrelated arise. They are: Issue No. 1: Whether the distribution of the estate by the 1st respondent was illegal and fraudulent. "Except as is hereafter provided, but subiect to section 4 of the Administrator General's Act, no right to any part of the property of a person who has died intestate shall be established in any court ofiustice, unless letters of administration have first been granted by a court of competent iurisdiction." 10 respondent acted illegally to distribute the deceased's estate without letters of administration. However, s. 192 states: "Letters of administration entitle the administrator to all rights belonging to the intestate as effectually as if the administration has been granted at the moment after his or her death." This section, therefore, validates acts which an administrator may have performed concerning the estate before the grant of letters of administration. The section was interpreted in the case of Israel Kabwa vs. Martin Banoba. SCCA No. 52 of 1995 [cited by counsel for the respondent) where the respondent in that case who had not obtained letters of administration at the time of bringing the suit and obtaining judgment sued the appellant in respect of the land that comprised part of the estate of his deceased father. One of the issues that were raised at the trial was whether the respondent had the locus standi to sue. Tsekooko, jSC, in his lead judgment stated: "This section shows that the moment letters of administration are granted, the rights of the holder of the letters of administration relate back to the moment after the death ofthe deceased." Section 192 is the same as Halsbury's Laws of England, Fifth Edition, Volume 103 p. 649 paragraph 646 headed "Validation of dispositions" where it is stated: The doctrine of relation back is also applied to render valid dispositions of the deceased's property made before the grant when it is shown that these dispositions are for the benefit of the estate or 10 15 20 25 1,2 5 10 15 20 The rights of the holder of the letters of administration cannot be said to exclude the right to distribute the estate of the deceased to the beneficiaries. If Parliament had intended to exclude distribution from the acts that can be validated it would have stated so in clear words. However, s. 193 adds a rider to s. 192. It provides: "Letters of administration do not render valid any intermediate acts of the administrator tending to the diminution or damage of the estate." Issue No. 2: Whether there was diminution of the deceased's estate by the 1$ respondent's act of transferring the suit property into the 2na respondent's name before the 1't respondent obtained letters of administration. It was the finding of the Court of Appeal and the trial court that the suit property was not a gift inter vivos. It is the appellant's counsel's argument that if it was not a gift inter vivos and the ls respondent took it out of distribution and transferred it into the name of the 2na respondent, then this act of the 1$ respondent diminished the estate and rendered the 1.t respondent's transfer ofthe suit property illegal. 13 have been made in due course of administration. The disposition need not have been made by the person who ultimately obtains the grant, provided it is ratified by the administrator on obtaining the grant. Therefore, acts of the administrator that tend to diminish or damage the estate before letters of administration are obtained are an exception to the acts which the law permits to be validated. r5 10 (a) (b) the deceased's estate to the children of the deceased following the distribution plan prepared by the clan elders. The distribution plan is contained in a letter addressed to the Administrator General (1s respondent) dated 1,9/10/1982 and signed by the clan elders. For the record it was translated by Mr. Salim Makeera, counsel for the appellant, who states on the document that he is fluent and knowledgeable both in English and Luganda. The Luganda version is on p. 1,67 of the record as appellant's Annexture A. According to this document the elders' distribution plan was as follows: "Margaret Nabitalo (eldest child) is given: 0.06 decimals of land including a house at Wandegeya 5.00 acres including a house at Mpererwe "Miriam Namusoke Lwemuze is given: (a) (b) 0.97 decimals of land at Munyonyo 1.50 acres at Komamboga "lsaac Kasiba fheir) is given: (a) 6 acres of land at Komamboga" I have left out of the distribution list mention of personal and household items and money in the bank because they are not material to this appeal. The 1't respondent after receiving the elder's letter seems to have held meetings with clan elders and family members to discuss the distribution of the estate. They must have told the 1st respondent that it was the desire of the z5 15 15 20 deceased that the suit property should be given to the 2nd respondent after his death. Two of the elders, Christopher Lule Nakabale (DW1) and Ainea Katalemwa (DWZ) swore affidavit to that effect. The documents in the record of appeal were not well filed as they are mixed up and disorderly. The words are also faint and difficult to read. It is, therefore, not easy to tell where Exhibit P1, the 1't respondent's distribution list, begins and ends. Still it can be ascertained that Exhibit P1 states: "Distribution of land 10 15 20 1 2 Margaret Nabitalo Nalongo 4 acres at Mpererwe Kyadondo Block 206 Plot 38 (family burial ground) 0.97 hectares at Munyonyo Kyadondo Block 255 Plot 82 1.50 acres at Komamboga Kyadondo Block 196 Plot 352." On the same document on p.165 of the record and signed by A.E.N Kabogoza Musoke, for Administrator General, (date is not legible) it is stated: "To value of 0.06 acres at Makerere ibuea Block 38 Plot 166 - fcontral - 100.000 testate survived bv three children. 25 The deceased died on 26/06/A2.i 16 Isaac Kasiba fheir) Residential House 1.00 acre at Mpererwe Kyadondo Block 38 Plot 203 6.00 acres at Komamboga Kyadondo Block 196 Plot 552 3. Miriam Namusoke To Ministrv of lustice A.G.'s office - 1.000 5 DISTRIBUTION h of r a 10 15 20 25 Margaret Nalongo."(My emphasis) Apart from the value the Administrator General put on the property at Makerere Kibuga, Block 38 Plot 166 (the suit propertyl he also put a value on other properties he distributed as follows: "Value of 5:00 acres at Mpererwe Kyadondo Block 206 Plot 38 - 50,000.00 Value of .97 hectares at Munyonyo Kyadondo Block 255 Plot 82 - 20,000.00 Value of 7.50 acres at Komamboga Kyadondo Block 196 Plot 352- 75,000.00" The 1.t respondent did not give the suit property to the 2nd respondent as a gift inter vivos from her deceased father. Had the lstrespondent done so, he would have had to give her a share of the deceased's estate like other children since she would have been entitled to it. Failure to give her a share of the estate would have meant that the 1't respondent had illegally disinherited her. 17 The property under the name of the 2na respondent was listed as burial grounds for her to hold in trust for family use. It was not given to her as her personal property. 1'l-ar*l'}<--f Even during the hearing of the suit thY affellant agreed that since the properry at Mpererwe was burial grounds for the family the appellant should be registered in respect of that land. It is, therefore, not true for the appellant to claim that after the suit property was taken out of the estate, the 1$ respondent gave the Znd respondent 4 acres at Mpererwe, Kyadondo Block 206 Plot 38 as her share ofthe estate. 5 Since it is my view that the suit property was not taken out of the estate by the 1.'t respondent but was distributed to the Znd respondent, and the acts of the 1't respondent before he got letters of administration were validated when he obtained them, it means that counsel for the appellant's argument that the Ls respondent administered the deceased's estate illegally becomes untenable. The same goes for counsel for the appellant's argument that the 1st respondent illegally transferred the suit property into the name of the 2nd respondent using a succession certificate instead of an ordinary transfer form in the light of the validation of the 1n respondent's acts after he obtained letters of administration. Whether he used a succession certificate or an ordinary transfer form is to me o[no material significance since he had power to transfer the property. ln his plaint and affidavit dated 27 /07 /1994 the appellant was aggrieved that the 2nd respondent received a bigger share of the estate than her siblings. He put the value of the suit property at shs. 350,000,000/=. But he estimated this value after L 1 years had passed following the transfer of the suit property into the name ofthe 2,4 respondent. From the evidence on record, by the time the suit property was transferred to her, it had been bombed and was not habitable. The 2na respondent subsequently repaired it and improved it 10 20 25 18 The Administrator General under s. 17 of the Administrator General's Act is obliged to make an inventory of every estate he or she administers and the 1.t respondent prepared an inventory that included the suit properfy which was given to the 2nd respondent. It is difficult to see why if the 1st respondent had taken the suit property out of the estate he would at the same time include the suit property in the inventory ofthe estate. 15 5 through loans she obtained from some financial institutions. Therefore, the value ofshs.350,000,000= the appellant put on the suit property cannot be a realistic estimate of the value of the suit property at the time the 1s respondent distributed it. With respect, the Court of Appeal should have listened to the appellant's grievance about the way the 1't respondent distributed the appellant's deceased father's estate and resolved it one way or the other. It was not right for the Court of Appeal to refrain from resolving the issue. The doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence does not apply to the facts of this case. It is difficult to see what actions, words or conduct the appellant can be held responsible for apart from the fact that he brought his action at the time he brought it, as it was about 11 years from the time of distribution which the two courts below considered to be a long time. From the evidence on record, it is clear that the 2nd respondent's actions of improving the suit property were not in any way induced by the appellant's conduct or behavior. The suit property was distributed to her by the 1$ respondent who transferred it into her name, and she rightly treated it as her property by repairing it and improving it regardless of the conduct of the appellant which conduct in any case did not exist. The Limitation Act circumscribes periods in which different actions must be brought. The appellant brought his first action in July 1994. The Administrator General got a grant of letters of administration on 11th January 1983. According to s. 20 of the Limitation Act, Chap.80, no action in respect of any claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to any share or interest in 10 15 20 19 25 5 such estate can be brought after expiration of 12 years from the date when the right to receive the share or interest accrued. Therefore, going by the dates aforementioned, when the appellant brought his first action in court, 12 years had not yet expired. As it is my view that it was not the appellant's conduct that induced the Znd respondent to take over the suit property, repair it and use it, the appellant was still within his rights to bring an action for redistribution of the deceased's estate at the time he did. Therefore, it was not right for the two courts below to refrain from considering it. The 1s respondent did not distribute the deceased's estate following the law. According to s. 27(1) of the Succession Act, the customary heir (which the appellant was) is entitled to a share of 1% of the estate. S. 28 of the Succession Act requires that all the children (lineal descendants) of the deceased get equal shares. According to the documents on record IExh. P1 on p. 143) the value of land measuring approximately 6.0 acres at Komamboga was stated to be 60,000/= shillings. The value of land at Mpererwe measuring approximately 1 acre and forming part of the land comprised in Kyadondo Block 206 Plot 38 was stated to be 10,000/= shillings. Both these lands were given to the appellant. So the appellant received land the total value of which was70,000/= shillings. 10 15 20 25 20 The value of land at Munyonyo which was approximately 0.97 hectares and which was given to Miriam Namusoke was valued at 20,000 shillings. All land at Komamboga of 7.50 acres was valued at 75,000= shillings. Therefore, the value of one acre of this land which was given to Miriam Namusoke was 5 15,000/=. The total value of these two properties given to Namusoke was therefore, 3 5,000 shillings. The Administrator General put the value of land comprised in Makerere Kibuga Block 38 Plot 166 (the suit property) at 100,000 shillings. This is what the 1't respondent distributed to the Znd respondent as her share ofthe estate. The total value of the property available for distribution was therefore 205,000 shillings. 1 percent of this value which is 2050 shillings should have been given to the appellant as the customary heir. This value of shs 202,950 should have been divided amongst the three children to give each child 67,650 shillings worth of property. The appellant, going by Exh. P1, was, therefore, entitled to get 67,650 shillings worth of property and 2,050 shillings as customary heir which adds to shs. 69,700/=. He received property worth 70,000 shillings. So he got 300 shillings worth of property over and above what he was entitled to receive. The 2na respondent received shs 100,000= worth of property which was shs. 32,350/= over and above the 67,650 shillings she was entitled to receive. Miriam Namusoke who received only 35,650 shillings worth of properfy received less 32,650 shillings worth of property than she was entitled to receive. She alone should have been the one to complain about the unfair distribution ofthe deceased's estate and not the appellant, for going by the 1s respondent's documents relating to the distribution of the deceased's estate and the values of the properfy the 1s respondent distributed to each beneficiary, the appellant received slightly more than he was entitled to 10 15 20 25 recelve. 2L 5 Accordingly, I would dismiss this appeal. Since I find that the 1s respondent did not divide and distribute the deceased's estate in accordance with the Succession Act, and the 2nd respondent was the major beneficiary of the 1st respondent's failure to distribute the estate properly, I would make no order as to costs. Dated at Kampala this day of oV(,.^-,bd Jo tlt umwesi b.t e AG. JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT 10 15 20 22 Since, as I indicated above, the suit properfy was not illegally transferred to the Znd respondent, and the appellant was not in any way prejudiced by the distribution of the deceased's estate going by the values that were attached to the lands that were distributed to each beneficiary, I find no merit in this appeal. {+ .2018 IN THI SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT I{AMPALA ICORAM: TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA; MUGAMBA; BWEDRA; JJSC; NSHIMYE; TUMWESIGYE; AG.JJSC.] BETWEEN [Appeal from the decision the Constitutional Court sitting at Kampala (Opio- Aueri, Balungi Bossa and Kakuru, JJA) in Ciuil Appeal No. 11 of 2OO9.l JUDGMENT OF TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA JSC. I have read, in draft, the judgment of my learned brother, T\rmwesigze, Ag.JSC and I agree with him that this appeal should be dismissed on the grounds he has elaborated in his judgment. I also agree with the reasons he has given for dismissing the appeal with no order as to costs. 1 THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA CIVIL APPEAL NO. 13 OF 2016 ISAAC I{ASIBA LULE : : : : : : : : : ! : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : APPELLANT AND 1. ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL 2. MARGARET NABITALO NALONGO : : : : : : : : : : : : : RF,.SPONDENTS l 7 \ As the rest of the members on the Coram agree, this appeal is hereby dismissed. Dated at Kampala this $ ,| Day of \l*r,n,/*, 2018. PROF. LILLIAN TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT 2 THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA CIVIL APPEAL NO. 13 OF 2016 (ARISTNG OUT OF CrVrL APPEAL NO. 11 OF 2016) ISAAC KASIBA LULE APPELLANT VERSUS 1. ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL 2. MARGARET NABITALO NALONGO RESPONDENT IUDGMENT OF MUGAMBA JSC I had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment prepared by -y brother Tumwesigye Ag. JSC. I concur with the judgment and the orders he proposes. I have nothing to add. \ Paul K. Mugamba IUSTICE OF SUPREME COURT Given at Kampala this .i day of October 2018 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPA]A (CORAM: TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA; MUGAMBA; BUTEERA; JJ.SC; NSHIMYE; TUMWESIGYE; AG.JJ.SC) CIVIL APPEAL NO 13 OF 2015 BETWEEN ISAAC KASIBA LULE APPELLANT AND ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL & ANOTHER RESPONDENTS THE JUDGMENT OF BUTEERA. I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment of Tumwesigye Ag. JSC. I agree with him that appeal should be dismissed for the reasons he has given. t I day of ... L Y Delivered at Kampala th is H on. Justice Richard Bu teera 20L8. JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT. 7 THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA t THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN IHE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPATA ICORAM: TIBATEMWA EKIRIKUEIN4 MUUMBA, BUTEERA, JJSC, NSHIMYE TUMWESIGYE AG.JJSC,] crvrr APPEAT No.r3 0F 2016 BETWEEN APPELTANT AND I. ADMINISTRATOR GEN ERAI- 2. MARGARET NABITALO NATONG [Appeal from tle decision of the Constitlttional Court sitting at Kampala (Opio- Aweri, Balungi Bossa and Kakuru,, JJA) in Ciuil Appeal No.1 1 of 2OO9l tuocmrNT oF l.s. rus I have had the benefit of reading in draft the lead judgment by my brother Justice J. Tumwesirye Ag. JSC. I agree with the way he has analyzed the issues, reasoning and conclusion that the appeal lacks merit and ought to be dismissed. {l Dated at Kampala, this ------ IM A.G. WSTICE OF SUPREME COURT .l , ISAAC KASIBA LULE:: RESPONDENIS I also agree with the order he has proposed regarding costs. i .l \/ t 66y 61-- -f -L[-,-Lruh !- - - - - 20 I 8. A.S. N