Case Law[2024] ZASCA 21South Africa
MEC of Health and Social Development of the Gauteng Provincial Government v M (272/2022) [2024] ZASCA 21 (5 March 2024)
Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa
5 March 2024
Headnotes
Summary: Delict – claim for medical negligence damages – minor born with brain injury sustained during birth – whether hospital staff were negligent – if so, whether such negligence caused the brain injury – evidence did not establish that the hospital staff were negligent.
Judgment
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## MEC of Health and Social Development of the Gauteng Provincial Government v M (272/2022) [2024] ZASCA 21 (5 March 2024)
MEC of Health and Social Development of the Gauteng Provincial Government v M (272/2022) [2024] ZASCA 21 (5 March 2024)
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--FLYNOTES:
-
MEDICAL
NEGLIGENCE – Cerebral palsy – Sentinel event –
Evidence
that baby suffered acute profound brain injury intrapartum –
Contention that sentinel event would have been
detected and
avoided based on reverse reasoning that because baby suffers from
cerebral palsy there must have been detectable
and avoidable
sentinel event during his birth – CTG monitoring would not
have made a difference – Plaintiff failed
to demonstrate
that hospital staff acted negligently and failed to prove that
some wrongful conduct on part of hospital staff
caused injury to
child’s brain.
THE
SUPREME COURT OF
APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
### JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
Not
Reportable
Case No: 272/2022
In
the matter between:
MEMBER
OF THE EXECUTIVE
COUNCIL
OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT,
GAUTENG
PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT
APPELLANT
and
F
B M
(obo
L P
M)
RESPONDENT
Neutral Citation:
MEC of Health and Social Development of the Gauteng Provincial
Government v M
(272/2022)
[2024] ZASCA 21
(05 March 2024)
Coram:
DAMBUZA AP and SALDULKER, NICHOLLS, MABINDLA-BOQWANA and GOOSEN
JJA
Heard:
07 March 2023
Delivered:
05 March 2024
Summary:
Delict – claim for medical negligence damages – minor
born with brain injury sustained during birth – whether
hospital staff were negligent – if so, whether such negligence
caused the brain injury – evidence did not establish
that the
hospital staff were negligent.
ORDER
On
appeal from:
Gauteng Division of the High Court, Johannesburg
(Wilson AJ, with Weiner and Mudau JJ concurring) sitting as a court
of appeal:
1.
The appeal is upheld with costs, including the costs of two counsel
where so employed.
2.
The order of the full court is set aside and substituted with the
following: ‘The appeal is dismissed with costs,
including the
costs of two counsel where so employed.’
JUDGMENT
Dambuza
AP and Nicholls JA (Saldulker, Mabindla-Boqwana, and Goosen JJA
concurring):
[1]
This appeal is against an
order of the full court of the Gauteng Division of the High Court,
Johannesburg (Wilson AJ, with Weiner
and Mudau JJ concurring). That
court overturned a judgment of the trial court of the same division
(Molahlehi J) which held that
the appellant, the Member of Executive
Council for Health and Social Welfare for the Gauteng Provincial
Government (MEC)
[1]
, was liable
for damages suffered by the respondent, Ms M’s child, L, as a
result of a brain injury which it found to have
been sustained during
L’s birth.
[2]
The primary questions in this appeal are whether the medical staff at
Tshwane District Hospital were negligent in the care and
treatment of
Ms M, the mother of L, and whether such negligence caused the
consequent medical condition from which L presently
suffers. This
appeal is with the leave of this Court.
[3]
L was born at Tshwane District Hospital on 18 May 2010. His mother,
Ms M arrived at the hospital in the early hours of
the morning of
that day as an ‘unbooked’ patient, with no ante-natal
records. She was admitted at 01h45 in the latent
stage of labour,
with ruptured membranes. L was born at 15h10, on the same day, by
natural delivery, with Apgar scores of 1 at
one minute, 7 at five
minutes (assisted through resuscitation), and 8 at ten minutes
(assisted through resuscitation). At birth
he was flaccid, acidotic
and had to be placed on a ventilator.
[4]
On 15 January 2014 Ms M instituted an action in the Gauteng Division
of the High Court, claiming damages against the MEC
for medical
negligence on the part of the hospital’s staff. In the summons
she alleged that L suffered a hypoxic-ischaemic
encephalopathy (HIE
or brain injury)
[2]
during birth
as a result of negligence by the hospital staff. This resulted in L
suffering cerebral palsy which continues to afflict
him, she alleged.
[5]
She pleaded various acts of negligence on the part of the hospital
staff. In the main, her case was that her labour was
unduly prolonged
and that the hospital medical staff failed to take a decision at
13h10 to deliver the baby by caesarean section.
The contention was
that L suffered the brain injury due to perinatal asphyxia
[3]
which caused him to sustain severe brain damage, resulting in
cerebral palsy (CP), mental retardation and epilepsy.
[6]
MEC denied liability, pleading that there was no
negligence on
the part of the hospital staff. He pleaded that any duty of care owed
to Ms M and the baby she was carrying was circumscribed
by, and
subject to the reasonable financial, human, and other resources
available to the Department of Health to equip staff and
maintain the
hospital. It was asserted that
the hospital
rendered the best service it could to Ms M. However,
in the
event of the court finding that the monitoring of the foetus was
insufficient, such deficiency was not causally connected
to the
cerebral palsy suffered by L.
[7]
It was common ground that
on
her admission in the early hours of the morning, Ms M was connected
to a cardiotocography (CTG) machine.
[4]
At first, the CTG tracings (partogram) were ‘non-reassuring’.
This was resolved by application of Ringers Lactate.
[5]
The CTG machine was
allowed to run for another 30 minutes and was described as
‘re-assuring with good variability’.
Ms M was then
monitored with a Doppler at 4h00, 6h00, 8h00 and 10h00. Over this
period the foetal heart rate was recorded as being
between 142 and
147 beats per minute, thus falling within the normal range of 110
-160 beats per minute. The next CTG assessment
was performed at
06h24. The partogram was again described as ‘re-assuring’.
A handwritten note by the senior midwife
Sister Motshwene recorded
that the CTG assessment should be repeated after one hour. This was
not done.
[8]
Ms M went into the first stage of active labour at 7h30. Sometime
thereafter she was seen by a doctor
[6]
who referred to a ‘reassuring’ partogram. At 11h30, after
a further foetal heart rate assessment, she was transferred
to the
labour ward. The foetal heart rate was again assessed with a Doppler
at 12h00, 12h30 and 13h00. The next CTG assessment
commenced at 12h40
and the machine ran continuously until approximately 15h00. A note at
13h30 recorded that the foetal heart rate
was 160
[7]
beats per minute with slight decelerations. A further written note
was made to ‘report CTG to Sr Motshwene’. Foetal
distress
was diagnosed at 14h30 and Ms M was prepared for a caesarean section.
However, she became fully dilated at 14h45, after
being wheeled into
theatre, and she delivered L naturally at 15h10.
[9]
Ms M’s case was, in the main, constructed around two aspects of
her baby’s birth. First, she contended that
the CTG partogram
showed that a decision should have been taken at 13h10 on the day of
L’s birth, to have her deliver the
baby by caesarean section.
Aligned to this, was the contention that L’s foetal heart rate
should have been monitored by a
CTG machine for the whole period that
she was at the hospital, or that Ms M should have been put back on
the CTG machine at some
stage before 12h40. Had that been done,
irregularities in L’s heartbeat would have been observed
sooner, and the decision
to perform a caesarean section would have
been taken prior to brain injury occurring.
[10]
This contention was based on the evidence given by Ms M’s
obstetrician, Dr Murray, that if
the CTG had been
repeated prior to 12h40, an abnormal pattern would have been
diagnosed earlier, and a plan made for a caesareansection
to be
performed before the foetus became acidotic. According to her,
from
12h40 the traces depicted a pathological foetus, even though there
was normal variability. From that time two atypical decelerations,
and a baseline foetal heart rate of 160 bpm were present on the
partogram. When these features persisted for the 30 minutes ending
at
13h10, the foetus became pathological. The decision to perform an
emergency caesarean-section should have been taken at that
time, and
the failure by the hospital staff to do so was sub-standard medical
care, she opined.
[11]
The second aspect on which Ms M relied was the contents of joint
minutes prepared by medical experts, including radiologists
Dr A
Weinstein and Prof. Savvas Andronikou. The Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(MRI) scan on which the radiologists based their opinion
was done
when L was 4 years and 5 months old. The radiologists agreed that the
MRI demonstrated features in keeping with acute
profound hypoxic
ischemic injury. They also agreed that because the findings were
isolated, they required clinical correlation.
In their minute they
recorded that they had observed a bilateral ‘T2/flair’
[8]
hyperintensity of the child’s putamina,
[9]
these being features of an acute profound hypoxic ischaemic injury.
They agreed that the MRI scan demonstrated an ‘acute
profound
HII [Hypoxic Ischaemic Injury] that occurred in a term brain at 37
weeks or [older] probably in the perinatal time period
. They also
agreed that the involvement of the basal ganglia in a HII, in
general, indicates an acute profound event. In addition,
they agreed
that the injury to L’s brain was limited to the putamina and
that the other deep grey structures as well as the
hippocampi,
[10]
the Peri-Rolandic
[11]
regions
and cerebellar vermis had been spared. They stated that the
neurological outcome should be assessed clinically, by obstetricians,
for determination of a more accurate time and cause of injury.
[12]
Dr Andronikou, the radiologist who testified for Ms M, was of
the opinion that if the baby’s heart had been
monitored 24
hours a day by CTG, it might have been possible to pinpoint when the
sentinel event occurred by observing the deteriorating
foetal heart
rate on the CTG. He persisted in the view that the assault on L’s
brain was acute profound, and likely to have
been caused by hypoxia.
The MRI imaging, he said, indicated that something severe had
happened to the foetus, although it did not
show the period when the
injury occurred.
[13]
Paediatric neurologists Drs D Pearce (for Ms M) and J Rademeyer (for
the MEC) also prepared a joint minute intended ‘to
assist the
court in respect of causation/origin of the timing of [L’s]
diagnosis and neurological disability’. They
did a neurological
examination on L on 13 April 2017 and 8 August 2017 respectively, and
also considered the joint minute prepared
by the radiologists. They
agreed that L suffered from ‘mixed cerebral palsy
(predominantly dystonic
[12]
)
with a superimposed right hemiplegia and gross motor functional
classification scale 1V [which were] indicative [of the fact]
that
L’s physical impairments severely restricted his movements’.
[14]
The neurologists agreed that a diagnosis of early onset of HIE II
(neonatal encephalopathy) could be made based on the
history and the
limited clinical records available. Whilst they agreed that foetal
distress was evident in L more than 12 hours
prior to delivery, they
also resolved to defer to the obstetricians the question of
appropriate management of that observation.
They could not agree on
whether there could be other causes for the cerebral palsy other than
the HIE. Dr Pearce opined that because
the MRI findings were not
consistent with infection, congenital brain abnormalities, genetic
and metabolic disorders, or cranial
haemorrhage, the most probable
cause of the injury to L’s brain was intrapartum or peripartum
hypoxia.
[15]
Dr Rademeyer’s opinion was that the mild involvement of basal
ganglia observed was not consistent with a severe
hypoxic event. She
maintained that there was no evidence that other causes of HIE had
been investigated and insisted that the MRI
findings were not in
keeping with peripartum
[13]
hypoxia. However, she agreed in the joint minute that a diagnosis of
HIE could be made from records showing partially compensated
metabolic acidosis in L’s blood that was taken more than an
hour after delivery. She was also satisfied that there were no
other
identifiable causes of the injury to Baby L’s brain injury. She
still referred back to the MRI findings which, she
said, were not in
keeping with peripartum hypoxia.
[16]
Dr Pearce saw L when he was 6 years 11 months. He accepted that the
MRI scan showed that the damage to the brain was
limited to the
putamina only, which meant that the lesion was not extensive. He also
admitted that the brain injury could have
occurred after birth, but
stated that because this was not what Ms M told her, and from all the
available records, there was no
evidence to suggest this. He agreed
that the complete cause of L’s cerebral palsy was uncertain.
[17]
The obstetricians, Drs Murray (for Ms M) and Archer (for the MEC)
agreed in their joint minute that the cerebral palsy
from which L was
suffering, was likely caused by intrapartum hypoxia which occurred at
an undefined time. They also agreed that
although at some stage prior
to 14h00 the CTG showed a pattern of recurrent decelerations,
variability remained normal. Only from
about 14h00 did the foetal
heart rate rise and variability fall.
[18]
In addition, the obstetricians agreed that although there were
decelerations or signs of distress on the earliest partogram
generated by the CTG, the foetus was ‘likely, overall in a good
condition at that stage’ as indicated by its positive
response
to the administration of the Ringer’s Lactate.
[19]
The trial court dismissed Ms M’s claim, having found that it
could not conclude that the injury to L’s brain
was sustained
intrapartum, or that the hospital staff was negligent. With the leave
of this Court the matter was appealed to the
full court, which
overturned the decision of the trial court and held that the MEC was
100% liable for any proven or agreed damages
arising from L’s
brain injury.
The full court
held that the
trial court should have found that:
‘
Ms
M’s foetal condition on admission was good, but that the first
CTG gave cause for concern; that continuous CTG –
or at least
two hourly – monitoring ought to have been implemented, but it
was not; that the foetal condition deteriorated
further at 13:30, to
the extent that the senior midwife on duty would have taken immediate
action had she been told about it; that
the situation deteriorated
rapidly after 14h30; that L was born hypoxic; and that L’s
cerebral palsy probably resulted from
a brain injury that occurred
during labour.’
[20]
There are a number reasons why the conclusion reached by the full
court that the standard of care afforded to Ms M was
sub-standard
cannot be sustained. First, it is evident that the conclusion of the
full court was based on the understanding that
Dr Murray was of the
opinion that the foetal condition became pathological at 06h24. Based
on this understanding the full court
reasoned that there was
‘deterioration’ in the foetal condition between 07h00 and
12h40 in the early hours of the morning,
which ‘rendered L’s
brain injury foreseeable’. Therefore, CTG monitoring should
have been continuous, and when
the partogram was not reassuring at
13h10, there should have been prompt intervention to deliver the
baby, the court found. It
concluded that the failure to monitor with
CTG constituted below par medical care.
[21]
However, it was not Dr Murray’s evidence that the foetus became
pathological at 06h40 and that its condition deteriorated
thereafter.
In fact, Dr Murray accepted that although the partogram had been
non-reassuring when Ms M was first put on the CTG,
it became
reassuring for hours after the Ringer’s Lactate was
administered. The conclusion by the full court that at 06h24
the
decelerations demonstrated such degree of abnormality as to be
regarded as requiring closer than standard care ignores the
positive
response to the administration of the Ringer’s Lactate.
[22]
Secondly, the suggestion that CTG monitoring of L’s heart rate
would have facilitated the detection and avoidance
of a sentinel
event is unsubstantiated. The radiologists, having observed the
injury to the basal ganglia (albeit confined to the
putamina), agreed
that L sustained acute profound HII. They were unable to pinpoint
when this occurred. Although Dr Rademeyer sought
to suggest that that
might not be so, she offered no clear or logical basis for such
opinion. The evidence to the effect that L
suffered an acute profound
brain injury intrapartum was overwhelming. The other experts were
consistent in their opinion in that
regard.
[23]
The approach adopted by this Court in determining whether there has
been a breach of the legal duty to administer reasonable
health care
and skill in circumstances such as these is to distinguish between an
acute profound and a partial prolonged HII. In
NSS
obo AS v MEC for Health, Eastern Cape Province
[14]
this court set out the distinction as follows:
‘
An
acute profound hypoxic ischaemic event, such as in the present case,
must be distinguished from a partial prolonged hypoxic ischaemic
event. An acute profound event means a sudden, not progressive,
event. A partial prolonged event causes damage to the white matter,
or peripheral structures, of the brain.’
[24]
In
Member
of the Executive Council for Health, Eastern Cape v Z M
[15]
this court said the following:
‘
The
significance of this conclusion is an important matter. It was
explained, in the course of the trial, by the expert obstetrician
and
gynaecologist, Dr Buchmann, who testified on behalf of the appellant.
He testified that there is a distinction between an intrapartum
acute
profound brain injury (‘an acute profound injury’) and an
intrapartum prolonged partial brain injury (‘a
prolonged
partial injury’). An acute profound injury is severe, with
total or near-total asphyxia (deficient supply of oxygen);
it is of
short duration, and sudden onset, and generally occurs 30 minutes
before delivery. A prolonged partial injury is less
severe, with
partial asphyxia; it develops slowly over several hours; it is often
preceded by a deteriorating foetal heart rate
that gives a warning of
developing hypoxia, that is, lack of oxygen.
[25]
With reference to academic writings, this Court
has
held that authoritative peer-reviewed literature does not support the
view that monitoring of the foetal heart by CTG provides
prior
warning of a sentinel event. I
n
AN v MEC
for Health, Eastern Cape
[16]
this court held that:
‘
.
. . In a number of studies, monitoring of the foetal heart did not
support the case that there would probably have been prior
warnings
of a sentinel event. Okumura et al conducted a study where, in some
cases, the origin of the fetal bradycardia could not
be determined.
Monitoring actually indicated the well-being of these foetuses until
sudden fall of the foetal heart rate. No warning
was given. In
another study, Murray et al
[17]
studied three groups of infants where CTGs were available. The third
group, with normal CTGs on admission, suffered acute sentinel
events
without warning. Pasternak & Gorey
[18]
concluded in their study that in 9 of their 11 patients, ‘fetal
monitoring was thought to be reassuring until the onset of
the
terminal bradycardia, supporting the premise that the
hypoxic-ischaemic insult occurred at the end of labor and was acute
and severe.’ Finally, a standard text,
Williams
Obstetrics
,
[19]
warns:
“‘
There
are several fallacious assumptions behind expectations of improved
perinatal outcome with electronic monitoring. One assumption
is that
fetal distress is a slowly developing phenomenon and that electronic
monitoring permits early detection of the compromised
fetus.’”
.
[20]
The
appellant’s witnesses were unable to point to any contrary
literature. They appealed to the court a quo to accept what
they said
had been their experience. But this cannot be said to prevail in the
face of compelling peer-reviewed literature’.
[26]
In this case there was no evidence of a sentinel event. The
contention that a sentinel event would have been detected
and avoided
if reasonable care had been taken is based on the reverse reasoning
that because L suffers from CP there must have
been a detectable and
avoidable sentinel event during his birth. The courts have cautioned
against commencing with an unfavourable
outcome and working backwards
in search of a cause. Hornbuckle J warned that
with
the benefit of the knowledge that there has been a neurologically
unfavourable birth outcome, a plaintiff’s attorney
‘can
take any foetal monitor strip and make a malpractice case out of
it’.
[21]
[27]
Similarly in
Goliath
v MEC Health, Eastern Cape
[22]
this court cautioned that
a doctor should not be held negligent simply because something went
wrong. It cited with approval the
remarks made by Lord Denning in
Hucks v
Cole
[1968]
118 New LJ 469
(1993) that to hold a doctor negligent simply because
something went wrong, would be to impermissibly reason backwards from
effect
to cause. If we accept, as we must, that the evidence
overwhelmingly pointed to L having sustained an acute profound
hypoxic ischaemic
event which occurred intrapartum, then based on the
evidence of Ms M’S own experts the injury sustained by L was
not one
that might have been reasonably foreseeable.
[28]
During cross-examination Dr Murray was constrained to acknowledge
that the CTG is not a perfect tool with which to monitor
the foetal
heart during labour because of its ‘low specificity’. The
substantial body of evidence that was tendered
at the trial on
academic writings regarding the value of CTG in averting or reducing
HIE, is not conclusive on the issue. At best
the evidence showed that
on an interpretation of the partogram in terms of both the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists
(ACOG) and National
Institute for Health and Care (NICE) clinical guidelines,
[23]
acidosis may be deduced in category III (ACOG) or pathological (NICE)
partogram.
[29]
Dr Archer insisted that the 06h40 traces were only suspicious and not
pathological, because variability was good, and
that from 14h00 the
traces were merely non-reassuring (category II on the ACOG grading
system), because there was no total loss
of variability. He explained
that under ACOG, brain injury is likely to occur in category III CTG
traces, which would be indicated
in recurrent late decelerations with
no variability. However, he readily accepted that if the baby had
been born at 14h20 it was
not likely to have been acidotic as
variability was normal on the partogram until 14h30. But he was
unwilling to speculate as to
what happened thereafter. Her evidence
suggests that the insult occurred within an hour of the delivery.
However, the fact that
the injury occurred during that period does
not mean that it was necessarily attributable to negligence by the
hospital staff.
[30]
Dr Murray had initially asserted that under the NICE guidelines, at
13h10 the partogram traces signalled a pathological
foetus. However,
this stance changed once she saw the original partogram. She then
sent a text message (SMS) to Dr Archer on 3
September 2017 advising
that:
‘
.
based on the fact that we have seen the original ctgs, I need to
amend some of my points where I comment on there being no rate.
Also
I am happy and raise no comment about the fact that they are category
2 traces until the last hour. The management thereof
we need to
discuss.’
[31]
Having found that CTG monitoring would not have made a difference, it
is not necessary to consider the contention by
Ms M that the hospital
staff were negligent in failing to adhere to the guidelines
stipulated by the Department of Health when
attending to her. In any
event it was accepted that the decision to perform a caesarean
section (14h30), and L’s delivery
happened within one hour of
each other as stipulated by the guidelines. Ms M’s case on
negligence can therefore only be limited
to the alleged failure to
monitor the foetal heart beat continuously by CTG or to taking the
decision to perform a caesarean section
later than 13h10, which has
been discussed already. Ultimately Ms M failed to demonstrate that
the hospital staff acted negligently
in attending to her during L’s
birth. This also means that she failed to prove that some wrongful
conduct on the part of
the hospital staff caused the injury to L’s
brain.
[32]
Much was made of the admission into the record, of the evidence of
Prof Izelle Smuts, also a paediatric neurologist,
on the first day of
the trial at the MEC’s instance. The full court found that Prof
Smuts’ evidence should not have
been admitted because ‘it
sought impermissibly to undo agreements previously reached by the
parties’ experts’.
In addition, the court found that, ‘it
was never made clear which of the expert agreements the evidence
sought to undo, and
because there [was] no indication on the record
that there was good cause for the introduction of the evidence in
these circumstances’.
[33]
The circumstances which led to the admission of the expert evidence
of a further paediatric neurologist are not apparent
from the record.
And, as the full court remarked, there is no indication in the
judgment of the trial court whether there was consideration,
by that
court, of the effect of the departure from the previous agreements;
particularly on the fact that L suffers from CP as
a result of the
brain injury. In addition, this Court has discouraged departure from
agreements previously reached by experts.
[24]
[34]
Prof Smuts’ evidence led to revised joint minutes of the other
experts. Her evidence indeed impacted on issues
which had been agreed
on between the experts, the most significant of which was the
condition in which L presented, when he was
born. She cast doubt on
the previously uncontested evidence that L was born flaccid, that his
low Apgar score at birth was indicative
of HIE, and that L suffered
from CP. She highlighted his large brain size (megalocephaly), a
large head (macrocephaly), both of
which, according to her, are
inconsistent with CP, which generally presents with microcephaly (a
small head). She emphasised the
unexpected divergence between the MRI
imaging and the clinical findings and remarked on the absence of
multi-organ failure in L’s
case.
[35]
We agree that the trial court should not have allowed Prof Smuts’
evidence without a substantive application setting
out factors on
which it could properly exercise its discretion. However, we are
satisfied that, even without reference to Prof
Smuts’ evidence
and the events pursuant thereto, Ms M did not establish negligence on
the part of the hospital staff and
the MEC.
[36]
In the result the following order is made:
1. The appeal is
upheld with costs, including the costs of two counsel where so
employed.
2. The order of the
full court is set aside and substituted with the following: ‘The
appeal is dismissed with costs,
including the costs of two counsel
where so employed’.
N DAMBUZA
ACTING PRESIDENT
C HEATON NICHOLLS
JUDGE OF APPEAL
Appearances
For
the appellant:
P Pauw with him U R D Mansingh
Instructed
by:
State Attorney,
Johannesburg
State
Attorney, Bloemfontein
For
the respondents: D T V R du
Plessis SC with him P Uys
Instructed
by:
Wim Krynauw
Attorneys Inc, Johannesburg
Martins Attorneys,
Bloemfontein
[1]
In April 2012 this Department was split into - a separate provincial
department of health and a department of social development.
However, in this judgment we continue to refer to the parties as
they were in the pleadings, the trial court, and the full court.
[2]
A type of brain dysfunction (brain injury) that occurs when the
brain experiences a decrease in oxygen or blood flow. It can
occur
before, during labour and delivery or after birth.
https://www.massgeneral.org as of 4 February 2024.
[3]
‘
Perinatal
asphyxia or birth asphyxia, results from an inadequate intake of
oxygen by the baby during the birth process –
before, during
or just after birth. Decreased oxygen intake can result in chemical
changes in the baby’s body that include
hypoxemia, or low
levels of oxygen in the blood, and acidosis, in which too much acid
builds up in the blood.’
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org
as of
4 February 2024.
[4]
The CTG is a machine used to monitor the heartbeat of a foetus and
the mother’s contractions during labour. It generates
a
printout on which traces depicting the baby’s heartbeat over
time are recorded. The three indicators to look out for
when reading
CTG tracings are: first, the rate of the foetal heartbeat, second,
the baseline variability, and third decelerations
in the heartbeat.
A foetal heartbeat of between 110-160 beats per minute (bpm) is
considered normal. Baseline variability refers
to the extent of
variation between one heartbeat and the next. When the heart rate
deviates from the normal baseline variability
this can be a sign
that the foetus has initiated defence mechanisms as a result of
decreased levels of oxygen. The presence of
variability suggests
that the nervous system of the foetus is still undamaged.
Deceleration occurs when the heart rate is reduced
to less than 15
beats per minute. This may signal that the foetus is becoming
hypoxic, or it may indicate something less sinister.
[5]
This is a ‘type of isotonic, crystalloid fluid further
classified as balanced or buffered solution used for fluid
replacement.
The content of Ringer’s Lactate includes sodium,
chloride, potassium, calcium and lactate in the form of sodium mixed
into
a solution with an osmonality of 273 mOsm/L and pH of about
6.5. See
https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
,
(the National Library of Medicine of the United States of America)
as of 28 February 2024.
[6]
The evidence was that
the
clinic did not employ specialist doctors but only general
practitioners.
[7]
The
actual note referred to 60 beats per minute but it is accepted that
this was an error and it should have been 160 beats per
minute.
[8]
This
stands for ‘T2-weighted Fluid-Attenuated Inversion Recovery’,
an area of high intensity on types of MRI scans
of the brain of a
human reflecting lesions produced largely by damaging of the myelin
sheath surrounding neurons and axonal loss.
[9]
A
paired structure that is part of the nuclei that form the basal
ganglia – which is responsible for motor control and other
functions of the brain.
[10]
Complex
brain structure embedded deep into the temporal lobe.
https://www.ncbi.nim.nih.gov
>
pmc
[11]
Central
lobe of the brain. .
https://www.ncbi.nim.nih.gov
>
pmc
[12]
Involuntary
muscle twitch.
[13]
‘
Peripartum’
means ‘the period shortly before, during, and immediately
after giving birth’.
https://profiles.umassmed.edu
as of
14 February 2024.
[14]
NSS obo
AS v MEC for Health, Eastern Cape Province
[2023]
ZASCA 41
para 6. See further the authorities cited in that judgment.
[15]
Member of the
Executive Council for Health, Eastern Cape v Z M
ZASCA (576/2019) [2020]
ZA4SCA 169 (14 December 202) para4.
[16]
AN v
MEC for Health, Eastern Cape
[2019]
ZASCA 102
;
[2019]
4 All SA 1
SCA paras 24 and 25.
[17]
D Murray, M N
O'Riordan, R
Horgan, G Boylan, J R Higgins, C A Ryan
‘
Fetal Heart Rate
Patterns in Neonatal Hypoxic-Ischemic Encephalopathy: Relationship
with Early Cerebral Activity and Neurodevelopmental
Outcome’
(2009)
American
Journal of Perinatology
26:8 605
at 608.
[18]
J F Pasternak & M T Gorey ‘The Syndrome of Acute
Near-Total Intrauterine Asphyxia in the Term Infant’
Pediatric
Neurology
18(5)
391 at 396.
[19]
F G Cunningham, K J Lenovo, S L Bloom, C Y Spong, J S Dashe, B L
Hoffman, B M Casey & J S Sheffield
Williams
Obstetrics
24
ed (2014)496.
[20]
Article in BJM Electronic Foetal Monitoring and our epidemic of
Caesarean births (SEE CB 218-235)
[21]
Hornbuckle
J, Vial A, etc see f/n 21 page 229.
[22]
Goliath
v MEC Health Eastern Cape
2015
(2) SA 102
(SCA) para 9.
[23]
Dr
Murray preferred the NICE guidelines which are evidence based health
and care clinical guidelines recommended in the United
Kingdom,
while Dr Archer preferred the ACOG guidelines. Each one of them
explained how a program is interpreted and managed under
their
preferred system, with Categories I, II, and III partogram on the
ACOG grading comparable to normal, suspicious and pathological
under
the NICE guidelines.
Category
1 traces are characterised by a baseline heartbeat of 110-160 per
minute; moderate variability; no variable accelerations
or
decelerations. These are all strongly predicative of a normal fetal
acid base. Category 11 traces are those that don’t
meet the
criteria of Category 1. According to Dr Archer because they are not
characterised by a lack of variability, they are
not associated with
foetal acidosis, and should not be associated with brain damage.
They are non-reassuring and require some
intervention such as moving
the patient onto her side and administering fluids, but not
necessarily delivery. Category III traces
are characterised by
recurrent late decelerations or recurrent variable decelerations
with no variability. They are strongly
predicative of acidosis. Dr
Archer stated that it is accepted internationally that fetal brain
damage will not occur until there
is an abnormal acid base of a ph
of less than 7b and a base excess of more than 12.
Under
NICE guidelines Normal is where the fetal heart beat is
between110-160; variability is 5-25bpm; no decelerations; and
accelerations are present. A trace is characterised as suspicious
when there is one non-reassuring feature. It is pathological
when
there are two or more non-reassuring features present. (CB298-301)
This is when the fetal heart is more than 180 beats per
minute or
less than 100; the variability is less than 5 or more than 25 for
less than 90 minutes and that there are variable
decelerations
present for more than 50% of the contractions for less than 30
minutes or a single prolonged deceleration lasting
more than 3
minutes.
[24]
Bee v
Road
Accident Fund
[2018]
ZASCA 52
;
2018 (4) SA 366
(SCA) para 65.
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