Case Law[2023] ZASCA 91South Africa
Mosselbaai Boeredienste (Pty) Ltd v OKB Motors CC (1216/21) [2023] ZASCA 91 (9 June 2023)
Headnotes
Summary: Civil procedure – failure to comply with the rules of court – appeal lapsing – application for condonation and reinstatement of appeal – factors to be considered – strong prospects of success on appeal may trump unsatisfactory explanation – special leave granted – matter referred to the full court to determine the merits of the appeal.
Judgment
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# South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal
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## Mosselbaai Boeredienste (Pty) Ltd v OKB Motors CC (1216/21) [2023] ZASCA 91 (9 June 2023)
Mosselbaai Boeredienste (Pty) Ltd v OKB Motors CC (1216/21) [2023] ZASCA 91 (9 June 2023)
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sino date 9 June 2023
SAFLII
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Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
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Policy
THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
### JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
Not Reportable
Case no: 1216/21
In the matter between:
MOSSELBAAI
BOEREDIENSTE (PTY) LTD
t/a
MOSSELBAAI TOYOTA
APPLICANT
and
OKB MOTORS CC
t/a
BULTFONTEIN TOYOTA
RESPONDENT
Neutral
citation:
Mosselbaai
Boeredienste (Pty) Ltd v OKB Motors CC
(Case
no 1216/21)
[2023] ZASCA 91
(09
June 2023)
Coram:
MOCUMIE, SCHIPPERS, CARELSE, MEYER and GOOSEN JJA
Heard
:
04 May 2023
Delivered
:
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ legal representatives by email,
publication on the
Supreme Court of Appeal website and release to SAFLII. The date and
time for hand-down is deemed to be at 11h00
on 09June 2023.
Summary:
Civil procedure – failure to
comply with the rules of court – appeal lapsing –
application for condonation and
reinstatement of appeal –
factors to be considered – strong prospects of success on
appeal may trump unsatisfactory
explanation – special leave
granted – matter referred to the full court to determine the
merits of the appeal.
ORDER
On
appeal from:
Free State Division of the
High Court, Bloemfontein (Naidoo J and De Kock AJ, sitting as a
court of appeal):
1
Special leave to appeal is granted.
2
The appeal (in respect of the condonation application) is upheld,
with costs.
3
The order of the high court, dismissing the application for
condonation with costs,
is set aside and replaced with the following
order:
‘
(a)
Mosselbaai Boeredienste (Pty) Ltd is granted condonation for its
failure to comply with the provisions of uniform rules
50(4)
(a)
,
50(7)
(a)
and 7(2).
(b)
The appeal is reinstated.’
4
The matter is referred to the full court of the Free State Division
of the High Court,
Bloemfontein to determine the merits of the
appeal.
JUDGMENT
Carelse JA (Mocumie,
Schippers, Meyer and Goosen JJA concurring)
[1]
This is an application for special leave to
appeal against the order of the full bench of the Free State Division
of the High Court,
Bloemfontein (Naidoo J and De Kock AJ),
delivered on 18 November 2021 (the high court). That court dismissed
the application
for condonation of the late prosecution of the
appeal. On further application to this Court for special leave to
appeal, the application
was referred for oral hearing in terms of
s
17(2)
(d)
of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
. The parties were directed to
be prepared, if called upon to do so, to address this Court on the
merits.
[2]
The following facts are common cause. On 7
February 2018, the applicant, Mosselbaai Boeredienste (Pty) Ltd t/a
Mosselbaai Toyota
(plaintiff) and the respondent, OKB Motors CC t/a
Bultfontein Toyota (defendant), both motor dealers, concluded an
interdealership
agreement in terms of which the respondent bought a
Toyota Etios motor vehicle (the vehicle) from the plaintiff for
resale.
[3]
On the same day, Mrs Steyn, an employee of
the defendant, received an invoice from Mr Maritz, the plaintiff’s
sales manager’s
email address, namely sales2[…]. On 8
February 2018, the vehicle was delivered to the defendant but the
plaintiff did not
receive payment of the purchase price of
R159 353.76. The defendant paid the purchase price into an
incorrect bank account
because the invoice which was emailed to it
was intercepted by an unknown third party who fraudulently changed
the defendant’s
bank details on the plaintiff’s invoice,
and obtained receipt of the money.
[4]
On 8 February 2018, Mrs Steyn emailed proof
of payment for the vehicle which reflected the incorrect bank
details, which was once
again intercepted by an unknown third party
who changed the incorrect bank details to the correct bank details
that caused the
plaintiff to believe that the defendant had correctly
made payment for the vehicle. It is not disputed that the standard
practice
in the motor dealership industry is that a vehicle is only
released upon proof of payment.
[5]
The
plaintiff instituted an action in the magistrates’ court for
payment of the amount of R159 353.76, the purchase price
of the
vehicle. The defendant raised a special plea of
estoppel
by representation.
The
court
a
quo
upheld the special plea and dismissed the plaintiff’s case.
Dissatisfied with the outcome, the plaintiff appealed to the
high court. On 19 April 2021, the plaintiff noted its appeal
timeously in terms of
rule 51(3)
of the Magistrates’ Court’s
Rules of Court.
[1]
[6]
A party who
wishes to pursue an appeal to the high court must file a notice
contemplated in
rule 50(4
)(a)
[2]
for the assignment of a date for the hearing of the appeal, within 40
days of the noting of the appeal. It is common cause that
the
plaintiff failed to do so. In the result, the appeal lapsed. The
plaintiff had to lodge with the registrar two copies of the
record of
appeal timeously in terms of
rule 50(7)
(a)
.
[3]
This was not done. The plaintiff also sought condonation to file a
power of attorney in terms of
rule 7(2)
,
[4]
authorising the plaintiff’s attorney to lodge an appeal.
[7]
It is not disputed that the plaintiff failed to prosecute
its appeal
within 60 days of the noting thereof. The appeal lapsed on 14 July
2021. The plaintiff filed the record of appeal on
20 July 2021. A
further complaint of the defendant was that the plaintiff did not
file a power of attorney. On 2 August 2021, the
appeal was enrolled
for hearing on 15 November 2021. On 17 August 2021, the
plaintiff launched an application for condonation
of its
non-compliance with the above-mentioned Rules of Court, and if
successful, the reinstatement of the appeal. The defendant
opposed
the application on the basis of the tardiness of the plaintiff’s
attorney and the lack of prospects of success.
[8]
The high court directed that the application for condonation
be heard
first and the appeal itself at a later stage, depending on the
outcome of the condonation application. On 18 November
2021, the
high court dismissed the application for condonation with costs.
[9]
The reasons for the delay and non-compliance with the
rules have been
dealt with extensively in the judgment of the high court and need not
be repeated. It was not seriously contested
that the delay in
finalising the preparation of the record should be laid at the door
of the transcribers. The record shows that
there are two reasons why
the high court refused the application for condonation and
reinstatement of the appeal. The first is
that there were no
prospects of success on appeal; and the second, that the plaintiff
failed to file a power of attorney in terms
of
rule 7(2).
[10]
As to the first reason, the high court indicated it would have
granted the
application for condonation, but for the lack of
prospects of success. Regarding the second, it appears that a power
of attorney
is not required in order to reinstate an appeal. Thus,
the main issue for determination is whether the plaintiff established
reasonable
prospects of success on appeal.
[11]
Where
special leave is sought, as in this case, the existence of reasonable
prospects of success is insufficient, ‘[s]omething
more, by way
of special circumstances is needed’.
[5]
The principles underlying an application for condonation, in the
context of a reinstatement of an appeal is that the court has
a
discretion which must be exercised judicially. The Constitutional
Court has held that:
‘
. . . the standard
for considering an application for condonation is the interests of
justice.
Whether
it is in the interests of justice to grant condonation depends on the
facts and circumstances of each case. Factors that
are relevant to
this enquiry include but are not limited to the nature of the relief
sought, the extent and cause of the delay,
the effect of the delay on
the administration of justice and other litigants, the reasonableness
of the explanation for the delay,
the importance of the issue to be
raised in the intended appeal and the prospects of success.’
[6]
It
is trite that strong prospects of success can often overcome a poor
explanation for any delays. Differently stated, strong prospects
of
success may trump an unsatisfactory explanation for the delay.
[7]
[12]
There are
four issues to consider in the present matter in determining whether
there are prospects of success in the appeal. At
the outset, it must
be emphasised that this Court is not making any findings on these
issues: it is only necessary to determine
whether they demonstrate
reasonable prospects of success. First, the defendant raised the
defence of
estoppel
which was upheld by the court
a
quo
.
The
defendant’s case is that the plaintiff had negligently
misrepresented to the defendant that the banking details on its
invoice were the correct banking details. It is common cause between
the IT experts that the interception was on the side of the
plaintiff, in other words, the plaintiff’s email system was
‘spoofed’.
[8]
The
plaintiff was aware of cybercrime in the motor industry, and failed
to take measures to guard
against
this. As a result, the court
a
quo
held that the plaintiff was
estopped
from denying that the altered bank details were not those of the
plaintiff. Mr Oliver (for the defendant) testified that before
he had authorised the electronic transfer of funds to the plaintiff,
he had specifically asked Mrs Steyn, the sales assistant
(for
the defendant) whether she had verified the correctness of the
plaintiff’s bank details, which she confirmed. However,
when
she testified, she denied this. This material contradiction was not
considered by the court
a
quo.
[13]
Second, the court
a quo
failed to consider whether the alleged
negligence was the proximate cause of the payment having been
electronically transferred
by the defendant into the incorrect
banking account. Third, the court
a quo
failed to consider
whether the damage or loss that was caused by the third party
(the interceptor), was foreseeable.
[14]
Fourth, the
facts in this case may be akin to the interception of cheques. It is
well known that banking systems are targeted by
criminals. Cheques,
which were once the preferred method of payment, have become
obsolete. In
Eriksen
Motors (Welkom) Ltd v Protea Motors, Warrenton and Another
,
[9]
the principles to be applied in cases where cheques have been
intercepted in the post and misappropriated by a thief have been
reaffirmed thus: when a debtor tenders payment by cheque, and the
creditor accepts it, the payment remains conditional and is only
finalised once the cheque is honoured. Any risk of fraudulent
misappropriation should be borne by the debtor since it is the
debtor’s
duty to seek out its creditor. But where the creditor
stipulates the mode of payment and the debtor complies with it, any
inherent
risk in the stipulated method is for the creditor’s
account.
[15]
In
Galactic
Auto Pty Ltd v Andre Venter
,
[10]
the creditor sent the debtor an invoice via email and thereafter sent
the debtor its bank details. Unfortunately, the email was
intercepted
and the debtor received the email with incorrect banking details into
which it made an electronic transfer of the amount
as per the
invoice. The court relied on the decision of
Mannesmann
Demag (Pty) Ltd v Romatex Ltd and Another
,
[11]
and found in favour of the creditor.
[16]
The question that arises in this case is whether the same legal
principles
should find application, namely where the debtor remains
liable until payment has been credited to the creditor’s bank
account.
The question concerning the interception of a creditor’s
banking details sent by electronic means has yet not been decided
by
this Court.
[17]
A further
reason for granting special leave to appeal, is that there are
conflicting high court judgments on the question as to
who should
bear the loss where a payment is electronically made to a creditor,
which is fraudulently intercepted by a third party.
This Court was
referred to some of those conflicting judgments. In
Andre
Kock en Seun Vrystaat (Pty) Ltd v Snyman N.O
,
[12]
the high court held that the debtor is responsible for verifying the
creditor’s banking details. In
Hawarden
v Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs Inc
,
[13]
the high court held that the defendant had a general duty of care to
the plaintiff, the purchaser of immovable property, and concluded
that the purchaser could not be held liable for the electronic
transfer of funds into a banking account where the bank details
had
been fraudulently changed. In
Gerber
v PSG Wealth Financial Planning (Pty) Ltd
,
[14]
the high court held that ‘[t]he proximate cause of the loss was
not the hacking, it was the failure to employ the necessary
and
contractually prescribed vigilance when monies held in trust were
paid into a different account’.
[15]
In
Hartog
v Daly
,
[16]
the high court held that the electronic transfer of funds into the
incorrect account did not absolve the debtor from payment.
[18]
The applicant thus established reasonable prospects of success on
appeal. It
is appropriate that the matter be referred to a full court
of the Free State Division of the High Court, Bloemfontein to
determine
the merits of the appeal.
[19]
In the result, the following order is made:
1
Special leave to appeal is granted.
2
The appeal (in respect of the condonation application) is upheld,
with costs.
3
The order of the high court, dismissing the application for
condonation with costs,
is set aside and replaced with the following
order:
‘
(a)
Mosselbaai Boeredienste (Pty) Ltd is granted condonation for its
failure to comply with the provisions of uniform
rules 50(4)
(a)
,
50
(7)
(a)
and
7
(2).
(b)
The appeal is reinstated.’
4
The matter is referred to the full court of the Free State Division
of the High Court,
Bloemfontein to determine the merits of the
appeal.
________________________
Z CARELSE JA
JUDGE OF APPEAL
Appearances
For
appellant:
C
D Pienaar
Instructed
by:
Oosthuizen
Marais & Pretorius Inc, Mosselbaai
Phatshoane
Henney, Bloemfontein
For
respondent:
A
P Berry
Pieter
Badenhorst Attorneys, Bloemfontein.
[1]
Rule 51(3)
of the Magistrates’ Court’s Rules provides
that ‘[a]n appeal may be noted within 20 days after the date
of
a judgment appealed against or within 20 days after the registrar
or clerk of the court has supplied a copy of the judgment in
writing
to the party applying therefor, which ever period shall be the
longer.’
[2]
Rule 50(4)
(a)
of the Uniform Rules of Court provides that ‘[t]he appellant
shall, within 40 days of noting the appeal, apply to the registrar
in writing and with notice to all other parties for the assignment
of a date for the hearing of the appeal and shall at the same
time
make available to the registrar in writing his full residential and
postal addresses and the address of his attorney if
he is
represented.’
[3]
Rule 50(7
)(a)
of the
Uniform Rules of Court provides that ‘[t]he applicant shall
simultaneously with the lodging of the application for
a date for
the hearing of the appeal referred to in subrule (4) lodge with the
registrar two copies of the record: Provided that
where such an
appeal is to be heard by more than two judges, the applicant shall,
upon the request of the registrar, lodge a
further copy of the
record for each additional judge.’
[4]
Rule
7(2) of the Uniform Rules of Court provides that ‘the
registrar shall not set down any appeal at the instance of an
attorney unless such attorney has filed with the registrar a power
of attorney authorising him to appeal and such power of attorney
shall be filed together with the application for a date of hearing.’
[5]
Including: ‘. . . that the appeal raises a substantial point
of law; or that the prospects of success are so strong that
a
refusal of leave would result in a manifest denial of justice; or
that the matter is of very great importance to the parties
or to the
public.’
Cook
v Morrison and Another
[2019]
ZASCA 8
;
[2019] 3 All SA 673
;
2019 (5) SA 51
(SCA) para 8.
[6]
Van
Wyk v Unitas Hospital and Another
[2007] ZACC 24
;
2008 (2) SA 472
(CC);
2008 (4) BCLR 442
(CC) para
20;
Brummer
v Gorfil Brothers Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others
[2000] ZACC 3
;
2000 (2) SA 837
(CC);
2000 (5) BCLR 465
(CC) para 3;
PAF
v
SCF
[2022]
ZASCA 101 2022 (6) SA 162 (SCA).
[7]
Valor
IT v Premier, North West Province and Others
[2020] ZASCA 62
;
[2020] 3 All SA 397
;
2021 (1) SA 42
(SCA) 42 (SCA)
para 38.
[8]
In
the Oxford Learners Dictionary, ‘spoofed’ is defined as
the practice of sending emails that appear to come from
somebody’s
email address.
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/spoof
2?q=spoofed. Accessed on 30 May 2023.
[9]
Eriksen
Motors (Welkom) Ltd v Protea Motors, Warrenton and another
[1973]
4 ALL SA 116
(A). See a more recent judgment,
Stabilpave
(Pty) Ltd v South African Revenue Services
[2013] ZASCA 128
;
2014 (1) SA 350
(SCA) para 9.
[10]
Galactic
Auto v Pty Ltd v Andre Venter
[2019] ZALMPPHC 27.
[11]
Mannesmann
Demag (Pty) Ltd v Romatex Ltd and Another
[1988] 2 ALL SA 353 (D).
[12]
Andre
Kock en Seun Vrystaat (Pty) Ltd v Willem Stephanus Snyman N.O
and
Another
[2022] ZAFSHC 161
para 9.
[13]
Hawarden
v Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs Inc
[2023]
ZAGPJHC 14;
[2023] 1 All SA 675
(GJ) para 122.
[14]
Gerber
v PSG Wealth Financial Planning (Pty) Ltd
[2023]
ZAGPJHC 270.
[15]
Ibid para 90.
[16]
Hartog
v Daly
[2023]
ZAGPJHC 40;
[2023] 2 All SA 156
(GJ).
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